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## Data and descriptive Statistics

**Data on civil wars** In the analysis, I use a panel of countries including 133 countries all over the world in between 1975 and 2004. The data of civil wars come from PRIO/UPPSALA, who considers every political conflict which reached more than 25 deaths in a year. PRIO/UPPSALA codes a war as a dispute for *government* (such as FARC fighting the Colombian government), *territory* (such as India and Pakistan fighting over Kashmir) or *territory and government* (such as Taiwan fighting China, it should be noted, however, that this classification rarely shows up in the database). I consider only the wars fighting for the government, excluding from the database secessionist wars and wars disputing government and territory.

**Government transitions** To recover the probabilities of government transitions, I use data from government transitions from the Database of Political Institutions, which codes since 1975 who governs a certain country, for how long the incumbent has been in government and what is his party (including whether it is a military government). It is common to see in this cross-country data transitions of government in which the son of a king undertakes a coup against his father, or in which there is a transition of government that keeps the same party in power. Probably, the king's son or a member of the party in government have access to technologies to take over the government that are not available to movements considering to go to war. For that, I focus solely on party transitions, not considering transitions of government that keep the same party in power and not considering peaceful transitions of government in one party states. Also using this database, I coded which of these party transitions happened peacefully or as a result of wars and coups.

**Covariates** Additionally, from the data from PRIO/UPPSALA and from the data on attempted coup d'états from the Center for Systemic Peace, I code a variable that equals one if the army is acting against the government. More precisely, this variable takes a value of 1 if there is a member of the army

leading a coup plot or if a member of the army leading a rebel movement at war.

To measure democracy, I use the POLITY IV database. This score is available since the year of 1800, and its score goes from -10 (the most autocratic regimes) to 10 (the most democratic regimes). For the country-years in which it is not clear which political regime is in place, the database codes the occurrence of a transition of government, an interruption of government, or an interregnum. I also used the following intermediate measures built by the POLITY IV database: “competitive participation”, which codes from 1 to 5 the degree to which alternative policy preferences can compete; “unregulated participation”, which corresponds, roughly, to a regime of free entry; “competitive executive recruitment”, which codes from 1 to 3 the extent to which the selection of the executive leader is competitive; and “unregulated executive recruitment”, that states which countries do not have regulated political succession of governments.

I also use data on per capita income from the Penn World Tables.

**Data on policy** The model yields predictions on promised transfers from the government to the opposition. These transfers might be done by implementing policies defended by the opposition and attacked by the government. To compare the model’s implied transfers with actual implemented policies, I also use data on the government share of GDP from the Penn World tables. Additionally, I use from this database two measures of federalism: the first takes values from 0 to 2, where zero indicates there are no municipal elections, a one indicates there are legislative municipal elections and a two indicates there are both executive and legislative municipal elections. The second federalism variable takes the same scale, but considers elections at the state/province level.

Also, from the Database of Political Transitions, I use their coding of ideology of governments. Each political party in government is classified in multiple ideological dimensions. On an economic policy dimension, the party is classified as left wing if its platform advocates for socialism, communism, social democracy, or generally left wing policies (such is the case of the Mexican party PRI before the debt crisis in 1982, of Spain’s PSOE and of Brazil’s PT); right-wing if its platform is conservative or christian democratic or generally right wing policies (such is the case of Likud in Israel and ARENA in Brazil); center (for instance, if a party advocates for private enterprise, such is the case of the Mexican PRI after 1982); or undefined (for instance, when a party includes members with diverse ideologies or when there is no mention to their

economic policy).

On another policy dimension, parties are classified as nationalist if they defend the creation or defense of a national identity. Parties that fought for independence, such as FRELIMO in Mozambique, that advocate for persecution of ethnic minorities, such as Iraq's Baath, and for xenophobic policy are examples of parties coded as nationalist.

Parties are also classified on three other policy dimensions: if it is a rural party; a regional party (such as the Flemish party VLD, in Belgium); and if it is a religious party (such as the Christian Democrat Fine Gael, from Ireland). However, rural and regional parties comprise, jointly, 3% of the sample. The small number of observations of parties with such ideologies prevent us from comparing their policies with policies of non-regional and non-rural parties. Besides that, the difficulty to observe the policies that religious or rural parties would like to implement makes it difficult to use these dimensions of ideology to compare the model's result with implemented policies. For that, I do not use the classification of rural, regional and religious ideologies.

**Summary statistics** Table 10.1 shows descriptive statistics. They indicate that 12.7% of the country-years in the database are at war, and 6% of the country-years are facing an attempted coup. Since, in a given country, many coups happen in the same year as a war has started, 15.7% of the country-years in the database have faced an attempted coup or a war.

Peaceful transitions of parties happen in 7.5% of the sample. Transitions of parties due to wars happen in 5.1% of the sample. This would be problematic if there wasn't heterogeneity in  $q^W$  and  $q^P$ , which I am going to document later. In 2.7% of the country-years in my database, the army has acted against the government. During coups or wars, 17.5% of the country-years have had the army acting against the government, and army action against the government was more intense in country-years with military governments.