

9. Conclusion

The evidence presented in this work suggests that dynasties affect the composition of mayors across Brazilian municipalities. Particularly, it seems that dynasties are favoring the entry of women and younger candidates in local politics. In addition, dynasties increase the support of mayors, but are not able to affect their capability of approving laws in the municipal council. Family successions do not affect any of the policies investigated in this paper. They do not affect the economic growth of their municipality either. However, voters seem to prefer non-dynastic candidates.

The positive effect on the number of female candidates indicates that dynasties increase the number of women Brazilian local politics at least in the short term. These women could be filling the empty spots left by their family predecessors, while they are ineligible. In this case, they would not remain in power after their mandates are over, and this inclusion would not be able to effectively diversify the gender composition of Brazilian local politics in the long term.

The most interesting result of this thesis is that dynasties do not affect public policies, the political competition and the municipal economic performance. Despite their incumbency advantage and the greater legislative support, dynastic mayors leave the results of local politics unchanged. A possible explanation for this result is that the identification strategy estimates effects among municipalities with high political competition. This competition could discipline dynastic mayors to make greater efforts while in office (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009).

On the other hand, the fact that dynastic mayors do not present higher reelection rates, despite their greater spending on their reelection campaign, indicates voters prefer non-dynastic politicians. Analyzing why voters behave this way is crucial to understanding the consequences of political dynasties. Further research in this direction is encouraged.

It is also necessary to examine the limitations of the identification strategy. A theoretical framework addressing the sample selection and the experiment design would help us better understand the external implications of these results. Additionally, other measures of the discussed political and economic outcomes should be used, as a robustness check, since this work's measures are imperfect. Furthermore, family successions may have long term effects, not identified in the short term. Therefore, the causal relations between historical political concentration and the current level of development should be studied. Finally, the result found by Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), that women invest more in infrastructure relevant to their needs, suggests that dynasties may have an indirect effect on expenditures' composition. Hence, it is advisable to investigate these effects.

In conclusion, this report suggests that, despite their incumbency advantages, political dynasties do not affect the public policies or the municipal economic performances. The main consequence of family successions in politics is on the mayor's identity. These mayors present a higher legislative support, are younger and more likely to be female. These last two results corroborate nicely with the Economist's article previously cited: "More sisters, daughters and wives are taking the top political jobs".