

PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA
DO RIO DE JANEIRO



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Political Dynasties and the Quality of Government

Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities

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Thesis presented to the Postgraduate Program in Economics of the Departamento de Economia, PUC-Rio as partial fulfillment for the degree of Mestre em Economia.

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Este trabalho pretende documentar o efeito de dinastias políticas em resultados socioeconômicos e políticos entre municípios brasileiros. O exercício é relevante para entender as consequências da concentração de poder político na sociedade, bem como para identificar se os efeitos nocivos já documentados nas sucessões familiares de CEOs estão também presentes na política. Com este intuito, a descontinuidade de eleições concorridas é usada como um quase experimento. Os resultados sugerem que sucessões familiares aumentam a probabilidade de o prefeito ser do sexo feminino, diminuem a idade média dos prefeitos e aumentam seu apoio legislativo. Entretanto, dinastias não afetam a escolha de políticas ou o bem-estar.

Palavras-chave

Dinastias Políticas; Qualidade de Governo; Competição Política; Concentração de Poder; Escolhas de Políticas; Gênero

Abstract

Rivera, Juan Fernando Rios. **Political Dynasties and the Quality of Government**. Rio de Janeiro, 2012. 57p. Dissertação de Mestrado - Departamento de Economia, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

This thesis aims to document the effect of political dynasties on socioeconomic and political outcomes among Brazilian municipalities. This topic is relevant to understand the consequences of the concentration of power in the society as well as identifying whether harmful effects already documented in the family succession of CEOs are also present in politics. For this purpose, the discontinuity of concurred electoral races is used as a quasi-experiment. The results suggest that family successions increase the probability of electing a woman, decrease the mayor's average age and increase mayors' legislative support. However, dynasties do not affect policy choices or welfare.

Keywords

Political Dynasties; Quality of Government; Political Competition; Concentration of Power; Policy Choices; Gender

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