

Marius Johan Geertsema

Heidegger's onto-poetology
The poetic projection of Being

TESE DE DOUTORADO

Thesis presented to the Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia of the Departamento de Filosofia, PUC-Rio as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doutor em Filosofia.

Advisor: Prof. Edgar de Brito Lyra Netto

Volume I

Rio de Janeiro
April 2016



Marius Johan Geertsema

Heidegger's onto-poetology
The poetic projection of Being

Thesis presented to the Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia of the Departamento de Filosofia do Centro de Teologia e Ciências Humanas da PUC-Rio, as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doutor.

Prof. Edgar de Brito Lyra Netto

Orientador

Departamento de filosofia - PUC-Rio

Prof. Luiz Camillo Portella Osório de Almeida

Departamento de filosofia - PUC-Rio

Prof. Paulo Cesar Duque Estrada

Departamento de filosofia - PUC-Rio

Prof. André de Macedo Duarte

Universidade Federal de Paraná - UFPR

Prof. Fernando Antonio Soares Fragoso

Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro - UFRJ

Profa. Denise Berruezo Portinari

Coordenadora Setorial do Centro de Teologia
E Ciências Humanas - PUC-Rio

Rio de Janeiro, April 3rd, 2016

All rights reserved

Marius Johan Geertsema

The author graduated (BA) in Philosophy from the University Leiden in 2008 and received a master degree in Philosophy in 2009 and a master degree in Education in 2010 both from the University of Amsterdam.

Ficha Catalográfica

Geertsema, Marius Johan

Heidegger's onto-poetology : the poetic projection of Being / Marius Johan Geertsema ; advisor: Edgar de Brito Lyra Netto. – 2016.

2 v. ; 30 cm

Tese (doutorado)–Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Departamento de Filosofia, 2016.

Inclui bibliografia

1. Filosofia – Teses. 2. Heidegger. 3. Ontologia. 4. Linguagem. 5. Poesia. 6. História. I. Lyra Netto, Edgar de Brito. II. Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro. Departamento de Filosofia.

CDD: 100

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Capes and PUC-Rio for scholarship and support. This thesis could not have been realized without it. Allard Gunnink for reviewing the text and René Nachtschatten for his advices on German translations. My adviser prof. Edgar de Brito Lyra Netto for his classes and orientations. Boardmembers: Prof. Paulo Cesar Duque Estrada, prof. Luiz Camillo Osorio de Almeida, prof. André de Macedo Duarte, prof. Fernando Antonio Soares Fragoso. And, finally, my girlfriend Beatriz Blanco Siffert for her patience, friendship and love.

Abstract

Geertsema, Marius Johan; Lyra Netto, Edgar de Brito (Advisor). **Heidegger's onto-poetology:** The poetic projection of Being. Rio de Janeiro, 2016. 356p. Doctoral Thesis – Departamento de Filosofia, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

Ecstatic Being takes place as the way in which the concealed origin futurely comes towards itself, which Heidegger calls the ‘appropriating event’ (*Ereignis*). This self-appropriation of Being is a turning homewards as a homecoming, which has no longer its say in Heidegger’s late thought by means of the language of metaphysics, in terms of the being of *Dasein* or the being of entities, i.e. the language of presence, but poetically, silently, as the language of absence, i.e. the mystery. Heidegger’s view that poetry is the language of Being spoken of Being by Being we call ‘onto-poetology’.

Keywords

Heidegger; ontology; metaphysics; history; language; poetry; truth.

Resumo

Geertsema, Marius Johan; Lyra Netto, Edgar de Brito. **A Ontopoetologia de Heidegger**: a projeção poética do Ser. Rio de Janeiro, 2016. 356p. Tese de Doutorado – Departamento de Filosofia, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

O Ser extático existe como o modo pelo qual a origem oculta se e volta a si mesma futuramente, o que Heidegger chama de ‘o evento apropriador’ (*Ereignis*). Esta auto-apropriação do Ser é uma viagem pela estranheza, um virar em direção à casa, como um retorno à casa, que no pensamento tardio de Heidegger já não se expressa mais por meio da linguagem da metafísica, em termos do ser do *Dasein* ou o ser dos entes, ou seja, a linguagem da presença, mas poeticamente, silenciosamente, como a língua de ausência, ou seja, o mistério. A perspectiva de Heidegger que a poesia é a linguagem do Ser é falado de Ser pelo Ser que chamo de ‘onto-poetologia’.

Palavras-chave

Heidegger; ontology; metaphysics; history; language; poetry; truth.

Table of contents

Introduction.....	9
1 The appropriation of existence	17
1.1. The ancient quarrel	17
1.2. Heidegger's quest for being - an overview	24
1.3. A battle of giants - being in <i>Being and Time</i>	32
1.4. The world and the clearing	43
1.5. Existence: 'a time to'	66
1.6. The sting of death.....	85
2 The appropriation of Being	94
2.1. The turning	94
2.2. The appropriating event.....	138
2.3. Truth and method	155
2.4. The hidden spiral in the epoch of modern technology	181
3 The appropriation of the word.....	216
3.1. Language	216
3.2. Heidegger's concept of poetry.....	234
3.3. Hölderlin – the herald of the mystery	243
3.4. The elucidation - snowfall on a bell	248
3.5. On distant peaks	256
3.6. Founding and grounding.....	268
3.7. Holy names	276
3.8. The fourfold – The four poles of the poetic projection.	291
3.9. Poetry - historical topology	315
3.10. An uncanny feast.....	343
Conclusion	352
Bibliography.....	353

*Oh, the poets are right, there is nothing so little and of so little account that man
could not be inspired by it.*

Friedrich Hölderlin, *Hyperion*

Introduction

In thinking all things become solitary and slow.

Heidegger, *From the Experience of Thinking*

To present an introduction in philosophy is to assume, in Heidegger's view, that the one who ought to be initiated stands at first outside of philosophy.¹ But in fact, the historical human being stands essentially and therefore always already within philosophy, Heidegger argues in line with a historization of Plato's original argument.² Strictly thought, there cannot exist an introduction into philosophy. The historical human being moves always already around in thought by 'thinking of' (*andenken*) and 'thinking towards' (*zu-denken*), which Heidegger calls the 'wellspring' of poetry.³ As a remembering (*andenkendes*) being, the human being philosophizes. Philosophy, that is to say the human being itself, has a Janus head that looks at once back and ahead. That which is thought towards and at the same time already thought before, is man's area of abidance (*Aufenthaltsbereich*) as philosophy, which has a poetic source. Since all human beings are essentially thinking beings, they cannot be 'in'-troduced into what they already are. Philosophy is, in Heidegger's view, therefore rather the remembrance and appropriation of what one already is, namely a way; a becoming; a historically self-appropriating being.

Although man is a thinking being, not everyone is a thinker and at any given time already thinking.⁴ We should therefore, in Heidegger's view, as thinking beings first become thoughtful. This means that one might be reminded of one's thinking nature, like Heidegger intends to do by means his writings and we in his shadow try in this 'introduction' as well. We say 'we', since it is essential that the reader is included in that contemplation. Thinking can only be disclosed by means of thinking itself, instead of mere representing, ordering or cataloguing. Let us not

¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsches Metaphysik, Einleitung in die philosophie: Denken und Dichten*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990. GA 50. p. 90-91.

² HEIDEGGER, M. *Wegmarken*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. GA 9, p. 122.

³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Wass heisst denken?*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002. GA 8 p. 13.

⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsches Metaphysik, Einleitung in die philosophie: Denken und Dichten* p. 101.

beat around the bush. What Heidegger calls ‘thinking’ has very little to do with ordinary scientific and academic aspirations. In Heidegger’s view, thinking relates itself to that which is concealed for thinking by being reserved and still in store. In other words, thinking relates itself to that which is ‘withdrawing’ instead of that which is positively given. This is according to Heidegger, the originary way of relating to truth. Thinking should heed what it is given to think, which is, in Heidegger’s view, first of all something negative, manifest as the thoughtless condition of ordinary thought. We are thinking beings and we are not thinking yet. One might notice that it is not unusual for a philosopher to think that no one else is really thinking except for himself, like a prophet often deems himself the last loyal and true believer that has been left among his people. But presumably Heidegger experienced something critical, which his own speaking could not escape as well, namely the planetary uniform transformation of thought into mere calculation and information technology. Thinking that is not useful or universal communicable comes in need of having its say when cybernetics renders all meaning into information as the mere successful ‘feedback’ in a loophole of data. Consequently, the non-successful is simply selected out as senseless. Heidegger suspects that precisely essential poetry and thought that is oriented by and towards the whole, will suffer this fate. The language of traditional thought, namely metaphysics, has transformed into communication technology by giving rise to cybernetics. Cybernetics takes, in Heidegger’s view, being and meaning, i.e. the ontological as something ontic, i.e. something present. Information is stocked being. Cybernetics stems from the heart of modern technology to which contemporary science belongs, in Heidegger’s view, as well. However, within the uniformity of modern technology, a more primordial way of saying might be found. This saying is neither representative, secure, exact, useful, nor informing, but rather ‘hints’ and ‘suggests’. This saying is poetry. To hear poetry in the midst of the present technological world means, from Heidegger’s perspective, hearing the voice of Being. Precisely the thoughtless and thought-repressing character of modern technology forms for Heidegger not so much material for an introduction (*Einleitung*) into philosophy, but a thought-provoking occasion (*Anleitung*), since modern technology remains after all an intrinsic part of man’s essential history. Such occasions wherein thinking emerges are in his view, nevertheless, rare. The path of thinking is abysmal, never a smoothly guided tour and constantly

threatened by a relapse into the plain indifference of the ordinary. Nietzsche says in this regard: “Philosophy means living voluntarily amid ice and mountain ranges”.⁵

The particular occasion (*Anleitung*) that gives food for thought in this thesis is the ostensible lack of reference to poetry in Heidegger’s formulation of the task of thinking. The essay *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking* (1966) is one of the few writings after *Being and Time* (1927) lacking an explicit reference to poetry.⁶ In contrast with many of his later writings, Heidegger’s magnum opus *Being and Time* had not been principally concerned with poetry. Heidegger advocates in *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking* that philosophy, as metaphysics, has come to an end and suggests that futural thinking should on the path of overcoming metaphysic think ‘truth’ from its relation to *aletheia*, i.e. the un-concealment as the openness of presence.⁷ Metaphysics knows nothing of openness, he claims in the same text. Because it is a late work, we have reason to assume that the text is based on a broad trajectory of Heidegger’s thinking, giving his exhortation therefore a rather seminal character. Should one conclude on the basis of this text that the task of thinking openness and the overcoming of metaphysics are not related to poetry? In our view, the reverse is the case. The central question of this thesis is therefore: What is the relation between poetry and the openness of the truth of Being throughout the works of Heidegger? Our thesis is: Being, from the perspective of the later Heidegger, first opens and appropriates itself through poetry.

I will argue throughout the thesis that Heidegger’s dialogue with poetry forms an essential step on the path of overcoming metaphysics and thinking the openness of presence. Heidegger’s engagement with poetry is an important moment in the development of his philosophy - or rather ‘thinking’ - of Being. Being speaks, in Heidegger’s view, itself poetically. In our words, rather than a logician or a thinker, Being is a poet. Concerning thinking the truth of Being, a philosophical reflection on language becomes finally inevitable, if it is true that

⁵ NIETZSCHE, F. *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1973 §292, p. 167.

⁶ *Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens* (1966) in *Zur Sache des Denkens*. (1962-1964) GA 14.
Sein und Zeit GA 2 (1927).

⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1985. GA 12.

thinking cannot exist without language. The essence of language is poetry, according to Heidegger, which he characterizes as occurring from the appropriating event (*Ereignis*). The much discussed ‘turn’ in Heidegger’s thinking is a turning of thinking towards Being itself, which occurs in Heidegger’s view, however, first from Being, as the appropriating event, itself. The appropriating event is the historical way in which Being in originary thinking futurally turns towards its own origin, which the philosopher determines therefore as a ‘homecoming’. Homecoming must always first traverse its own alterity and experience its own ‘uncanniness’ as the mood in which one finds oneself to be initially not at home in one’s own being. It is, in Heidegger’s view, Being itself that by means of a historical dialogue between thinking and poetry, has poetically its say in this turning. The self-appropriation of Being occurs in this very conversation, which forms the essence of the human being. As such, poetry is essentially the self-saying of Being. In its appropriation, Being projects, founds and abodes itself anticipatorily through poetry. This ontological view on poetry we will call ‘ontopoetology’. Since Being’s homecoming first occurs in poetry and its interpretation, philosophy - or rather ‘thinking’ - should leave the language of metaphysics behind on the path of overcoming metaphysics and let itself engage in an open dialogue with poetry. As such, it is Being’s poetic saying that reveals Being to itself in the openness of the clearing, which has therefore a poetic character as well. The meaning or the direction of time and history is always projected, founded and grounded in advance in language, which is, in Heidegger’s view, essentially poetic. The essence of poetic language is, in turn, open and, as such, mysterious, mystic and silent. Thinking the openness of presence must therefore imply thinking the opening, founding and grounding essence of poetry. In conclusion, what is at issue in this thesis is the triangular free and open relation between Being, time and language throughout the works of Heidegger. Initially, Heidegger had, however, worked out the question of Being as the question concerning its access, which is the human being and poetry is for the early Heidegger not an essential topic in as far as language has not returned to its essence yet. We will, however, pay at length attention to the early Heidegger to experience the motives that drive Being, in Heidegger’s view, homewards and in order to provide context for his poetic elucidations.

The title of the thesis says ‘ontopoetology’. We will inquire therefore not

merely poetry or language in Heidegger, but the essential relation between Being and poetry. The course of the thesis cannot head immediately at poetry as one theme among others that can be studied in Heidegger's thought and whereto the investigation should be delimited. In contrast, poetry is approached here from the question that has pervaded Heidegger's thinking through and through, namely the question of being. Throughout the course of the thesis we will pay in particular attention to the notion of the 'open' with respect to ontology and poetry and, as such, the open in 'ontopoetology', as a way of following Heidegger's own exhortation concerning the task of thinking.

The term 'poetology' from the title is roughly meant in the meaning that Ammara Ashraf attaches to the term when she writes in *Romantic Poetologies: Collaboration and Interdisciplinarity in early Anglo-German Romanticism* (2013):

(...) this is the process I am calling poetology, the expansion of philosophical discourse to allow for poetics.⁸

The term 'poetology' is chosen over the more common term 'poetics', since the latter is commonly distinguished from hermeneutics by its focus on the understanding of the way in which different elements of a text come together and produce certain effects on the reader. The term 'poetics' connotes therefore commonly the metaphysical thought that poetry resides in the domain of literature, rhetoric or aesthetics instead of philosophy. However, as a particular view on poetry among other views, poetics would be merely a form of 'poetology'. The broader term 'poetology', as the theory of poetry, seeks to avoid a rigid dichotomy between the effect of forms, on the one hand, and content as meaning on the other hand. Secondly, Heidegger mentions the term 'poetics' only deprecatorily and always in contrast with his own onto-historical intentions. Thirdly, the term forms, as the reader probably could not have missed, an allusion to Heidegger's concepts of 'onto-theology' and the in a Heideggerian context

⁸ ASHRAF, A. *Romantic Poetologies: Collaboration and Interdisciplinarity in early Anglo-German Romanticism*. Dissertation, London: Queen Mary University of London, 2013. p. 16. <https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/8366> consulted at 18/02/2015.

often used term ‘onto-history’ as well.⁹

As the reader will notice, the course of this thesis does not first take interest in what Heidegger in particular says about this or that phrase from this or that poem. But what is at issue and concerns philosophy or thinking is the ‘poetic’ as principle, that is to say the poetic as origin and how it is related to thought. Poetry is therefore read in our interpretation as an ontological notion and approached exclusively from the perspective of Heidegger’s ontological problems.

The thesis is divided in three main chapters that inquire somewhat catholic (son, father, spirit) into three moments of appropriation.

1. The appropriation of existence
2. The appropriation of Being
3. The appropriation of the word.

The goal of the first two chapters is to show that Heidegger’s engagement with poetry follows from the ontological problems of his earlier thinking and not arbitrarily from the fact that Hölderin’s poetry in the thirties starts to appear in his writings, with whom he had actually already been familiar in the period before *Being and Time*. Hence, our presentation of the categories and existentials of *Being and Time* will look already forward to the later Heidegger, and our interpretation of his poetic elucidations will look back to the question concerning Being, its origin and its modifications. We will start by outlining the historical dispute between poetry and philosophy in relation to Heidegger’s quest for being in chapter 1.1. Since Heidegger’s first reflections on being, the question of being is transformed into the question concerning its ‘open character’ as the question of its access. As we will see in chapter 1.1, early Greek metaphysics had feared that precisely poetry is likely to close the access to truth and being. Initially, Heidegger does not seek the access to being in poetry as well, but in the human existence and the way it takes place in the working world, which we will inquire in chapter 1.2-1.6. Important in these chapters is the way being precisely does not open itself to the human being. The open shows itself as finite and denies itself to the human being. We interpret the relevance of Heidegger’s early approaches of being as consisting in its failure that leads up to the change of starting point of

⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsches Metaphysik, Einleitung in die philosophie: Denken und Dichten*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990. p. 69. *Identität und Differenz*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006. GA 11 p. 66, 67.

ontological inquiry in the ‘turning’, namely the shift from transcendental *Dasein* to concealed Being itself, which we inquire in chapter 2.1-2.2. Being is now found to be hidden and absent, which has consequences for the concept of truth and its role in language and thinking as we will see in chapter 2.3. It would not make sense to speak of ‘Being itself’ if not regarded from the perspective of Heidegger’s earlier attempts of disclosing the meaning of being, neither would we know ‘who’ speaks in language and poetry. We must discuss the early Heidegger at length to demonstrate which experience of thinking prompts Heidegger to engage himself with poetry. Since truth occurs in language, ‘untruth’ and the closing off of the access to Being occurs in language as well, which Heidegger calls the ‘extreme danger’ of modern technology as ‘en-framing’, which we will discuss in chapter 2.4. In the turning, the appropriation of the human existence turns out to be the appropriation of Being itself that, in turn, takes place in the appropriation of language. The latter is inquired in chapter 3. The access to Being is finally found in the ‘houses of Being’, namely language, which is essentially poetic. As we will discuss in chapter 3.1, Heidegger states that ‘language speaks’, but regards language, in turn, from the perspective of concealed Being. Here, it is no longer the human being that speaks and poetizes, but it is Being that seeks and finds itself in poetry, such that it remains at the same time what it is, namely concealed. Being’s saying is at once saying and hearing, poetizing and interpretation, poetry and thinking. Poetry finally reveals itself in Heidegger’s thought as nothing but the truth of Being in anticipating the feast of its homecoming, wherein space-time, space and time, place, history, the people and the human being first become what they ‘are’, which will be inquired in chapter 3.6-3.10.

In his thinking, Heidegger has sought words that could contribute to an interpretation of the meaning of time from the historical destined meaning of his own time and language. A scrutiny by universal logic or an ontic confrontation will fall short, since his originary thinking and speaking is a priori to such intellectual endeavors. As such, Heidegger runs the risk, however, of immunizing himself for critique and is often criticized for being authoritative, an obscurantist and irrational. Our method intends to follow Heidegger’s own thoughts and words in an exegesis that brings some elements of his thinking together to show their relatedness, while leaving the senseless to its own senselessness. The thesis has

therefore more a character of an exegesis than a confrontation or a critique.

It remains to say a few words here about communication. The here presented philosophical interpretation concerns a German philosopher, German poets, is written in English and will mainly be read by Brazilian Portuguese speakers. Moreover, none of these languages is the author's mother tongue, which happens to be Dutch. A thesis in this context might truly be considered as a sign of our modern cosmopolitan time. Although English might be a useful *lingua franca* for the technological sciences, we must ponder the question to what extent it is possible to translate philosophy and in particular poetry, which is within any given language the most sophisticated language game. I would like to draw attention, however, to the fact that is of all Heidegger who has explored the possibilities and limits of translation, in relation to languages like German, Greek, Latin, French, English and sporadically Chinese and Japanese. Likewise, Heidegger entertained a dialogue between various possible modes of existence, as that of the thinker, the mystic, the poet, the artist, the ancient, the modern, the eastern, the western, the elevated and the banal, the holy and the profane. Therefore, this thesis is implicitly also contemplation on the possibility of the rendering of one into another. Moreover, language itself presupposes to a certain extent the possibility of translation as *trans-latio*: a carrying across, removal, transporting, and transfer of meaning.¹⁰

¹⁰ Compare Heidegger on translation HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin's Hymne Der Ister*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1984. GA 53 p. 75.

1 The appropriation of existence

1.1. The ancient quarrel

I think that in the end we will all cry out: Saint Plato, forgive us! We have gravely sinned against you!

Hölderlin, preface of *Hyperion*

It is in the year 1907 that Dr. Congrad Gröber, the later Arch Bishop of Freiburg, hands over Franz Brentano's dissertation *On the manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle* to the only 19-year-old Martin Heidegger. The work would convince the young genius that the case of philosophy is the case of being and provoke him to think on the unity in the manifold of being resulting ten years later in the formulation of the main question of his magnum opus *Being and Time*: "What is the meaning of being?" Heidegger becomes familiar with the poetry of Hölderlin, Rilke and Trakl around the same time, more precisely between 1908 and 1914, and declares many years later in a seminal letter in response to the French philosopher Jean Beaufret on the topic of humanism in relation to ontology, entitled: *Letter on Humanism* (1946), that his thoughts on the destiny of the truth of Being are related to his interpretation of Friedrich Hölderlin's (1770-1843) hymn *As on a Holiday*.¹¹

Heidegger never took an interest in poetry and literature incidentally. The question concerning the relation between language and being has always stayed at the background of his quest for being, which, however, should neither be considered a particular Heideggerian digression, nor part of the so called 'linguistic turn', but instead a basic question of philosophy itself.¹² Philosophy has

¹¹ *Brief über den Humanismus* (1946) in *Wegmarken* (1919-1961) GA 9. *Wie wenn am Feiertage*, Hölderlin.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Wegmarken* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. GA 9, p. 335.

¹² HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1985. GA 12 p. 89.

reflected on its own form and means of expression since its inception. Likewise, it has reflected on that which is not philosophically said or not even expressed at all. The emergence of ancient Greek philosophy that in its quest for the origin (*arché*) began to accept only truth claims based on the *logos*, has often been interpreted as an early emancipating scientific counter movement to earlier supernatural explanations of the world in terms of myths and sagas. Nevertheless, these later have always been an important impetus of philosophical thought, as can be seen, for instance, in the numerous citations of myths and poetry in the works of Plato and Aristotle. The only extant work of the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides entitled ‘*On Nature*’ was even written in the form of a didactic poem. A more explicit and at the same time radical stance towards any kind of expressed form of language is to be heard in Plato’s *Seventh Letter*. Here, Plato writes that although a serious writer’s written works abide in the fairest region he possesses, the sense of the original essence will, nonetheless, be ruined when put into writing due to a weakness inherent to language. No intelligent man will therefore commit the dynamics of his essential insights to the concepts of his reason (*logos*) and let them solidify into static writing.¹³

One can safely assert that Heidegger’s thinking has been most influenced by the philosophers and thinkers of Ancient Greece. For example, his explanation from *Being and Time* of the word as a tool, based on the functionality of its indicating reference character, still echoes Plato’s dialogue the *Cratylus*, in which Socrates, Plato’s teacher and the protagonist of his dialogues, asks about the truth (correctness) of the name and determines the name in a comparison with a drill and a shuttle as an ‘instrument’ by which we teach one another to distinguish among entities based on their essence.¹⁴ Here, Socrates’ investigation takes the poets mainly as the inventors, makers and original givers of names. Since the name as an image corresponds to the idea, i.e. the essence, Plato ascribes an ontological relevance to the work of the poets writing:

Then, Hermogenes, the giving of names can hardly be, as you imagine, a trifling matter, or a task for trifling or casual persons: and Cratylus is right in saying that names belong to things by nature and that not everyone is an artisan of names, but

¹³ PLATO. *Letter Seven*. in *Plato in Twelve Volumes*. trans. Bury, R. London Cambridge: Harvard University Press - Heinemann, 1966. Vol. 7, 342c.

¹⁴ PLATO. *Cratylus* in *Plato in Twelve Volumes*. trans. Fowler, H.N. London, Cambridge: Harvard University Press - Heinemann, 1921. Vol. 12, 388.

only he who keeps in view the name which belongs by nature to each particular thing and is able to embody its form in the letters and syllables.¹⁵

But precisely because of their central relation to truth, Plato criticizes the poets severely as well. In the *Ion*, Socrates concludes that the professional performers of epic poetry called rhapsodists are magnified by the poets, who are, in turn, magnified by the gods. Like the poets, the rhapsodists are inspired and lyrically possessed by the gods thereby lacking a sober perspective.¹⁶ In the *Republic* Socrates argues that the poet ‘paints’ like the painter an inferior degree of truth by mimicking experienced life. Plato considers the latter to be already a lesser true copy of the true original world of ideas. Poetry makes therefore an image of an image. Secondly, Socrates argues that the poet is concerned with an inferior part of the soul. Fairly poetically, Plato describes how poetry feeds and waters the passions and desires: it lets them rule instead of ruling them. According to Socrates, the poet indulges the feelings, while he enfeebles the reason. Poetry is an outrage on the understanding and having come to years of discretion, we know that poetry is not truth.

In the *Republic* it is even suggested to expel the ‘fables’ of traditional poetry, such as those of Homer and Hesiod, from the ideal Republic, because the youth is not yet able to distinguish the allegorical from the non-allegorical.¹⁷ The light hearted way in which the poets narrate the injustices of the gods is improper with respect to a virtuous upbringing. The argument is ultimately a theological argument, since Plato’s universal generalization about the nature of the gods, which considers the gods to be categorically good and wise, turns out to be inconsistent with the way in which the traditional poets depict them. With respect to the poets in the ideal state Plato writes:

But as to saying that God, who is good, becomes the cause of evil to anyone, we must contend in every way that neither should anyone assert this in his own city if it is to be well governed, nor anyone hear it, neither younger nor older, neither telling a story in metre or without metre; for neither would the saying of such

¹⁵ PLATO. *Cratylus*. in *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, trans. Fowler, H.N. London, Cambridge: Harvard University Press - Heinemann, 1921. Vol. 12, paragraph 390b.

¹⁶ PLATO. *Ion* Cambridge: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd., 1925, paragraph. 533.

¹⁷ PLATO. *Republic* in *Plato Twelve Volumes*, trans. Shorey, P. London Cambridge: Harvard University Press - Heinemann, 1969. Vol. 5 & 6, paragraph 363.

things, if they are said, be holy, nor would they be profitable to us or concordant with themselves.¹⁸

In the *Protagoras* Plato makes it clear that poetry lacks a philosophical criterion to determine its sense. Socrates compares arguing about poetry to the chatter of wine parties of common market folk.¹⁹ The poets cannot question on the sense of what they say and whoever discusses poetry remains powerless in determining the matter on which he argues. Plato discredits the poets here as sophists.

However, despite his critical stance towards poetry, Plato leaves at the same time the door open to a possible return of poetry to the ideal *polis*, writing on the ‘ancient quarrel’ between poetry and philosophy:

And let us further say to her, lest she condemn us for harshness and rusticity, that there is from of old a quarrel between philosophy and poetry. For such expressions as “the yelping hound barking at her master and mighty in the idle babble” “of fools,” and “the mob that masters those who are too wise for their own good,” and the subtle thinkers who reason that after all they are poor, and countless others are tokens of this ancient enmity. But nevertheless let it be declared that, if the mimetic and dulcet poetry can show any reason for her existence in a well-governed state, we would gladly admit her, since we ourselves are very conscious of her spell. But all the same it would be impious to betray what we believe to be the truth. Is not that so, friend? Do not you yourself feel her magic and especially when Homer is her interpreter?” “Greatly.” “Then may she not justly return from this exile after she has pleaded her defence, whether in lyric or other measure?” “By all means.” “And we would allow her advocates who are not poets but lovers of poetry to plead her cause in prose without metre, and show that she is not only delightful but beneficial to orderly government and all the life of man. And we shall listen benevolently.”²⁰

Plato suggests that poetry might be supported solely in a restricted sense, therefore not by means of the lyrically magnified rhapsodist, but an interpretation in prose instead. In this way the ancient quarrel might turn into an elucidating dialogue between the poet and the philosopher. As such, Plato does not so much attack the poets, but rather the rhapsodists as a philosophical attack on thoughtlessness with the intention to let wisdom rule. In Plato’s view it is clearly philosophy that should set out the conditions concerning the sense of poetry.

¹⁸ Idem 380b.

¹⁹ PLATO. *Protagoras* in *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, trans. Lamb, W. London, Cambridge: Harvard University Press - Heinemann, 1967. Vol. 3, paragraph 347c.

²⁰ PLATO. *Republic* in *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, trans. Shorey, P. London Cambridge: Harvard University Press - Heinemann, 1969. Vols. 5 & 6, paragraph 607.

Thinking ought to be a discipline that dominates poetry instead of letting itself be dominated by poetry.

The philosophical hostility towards poetry in its relation to truth will carry through in the works of Plato's student Aristotle and again in an (onto)theological context. Aristotle defines the first philosophy, i.e. metaphysics as an independent science that exists for itself. Aristotle argues that its acquisition might justly be supposed to be beyond human power, since in many respects human nature is servile (*physis doule*). In a certain sense, only God possesses excellent science, because solely his wisdom is without a lack. Metaphysics can therefore be considered a divine science. Since metaphysics deals with God as a principle and one of the causes itself it is in as far as it deals with divine matters also in a second sense a divine science. However, according to Aristotle, the poets tell us that the Deity is jealous by nature, which must contain therefore a logical contradiction. If God is independent and with excellent knowledge, he cannot be jealous of what he does not possess. Aristotle brings therefore to mind the proverb: "Poets tell many a lie"²¹. In the *Poetics* Aristotle fans the flames of the ancient quarrel even higher by saying:

Above all, Homer has taught the others the proper way of telling lies, that is, by using a fallacy.²²

Particularly, Aristotle accuses Homer of using the affirming-the-consequent-fallacy in the *Odysseus*. The fallacy is of the form: P, then Q, Q, therefore P.²³ Instead of the *idea*, word or concept, *logos* in the sense of the assertion becomes for Aristotle the vehicle of thinking, location of truth and consequently the central object of philosophical analysis. The focus on the assertion enables the development of logic as syllogistics on the basis of which Aristotle subsequently discredits logical inconsistencies in poetry.

However, a more appreciative tone with respect to poetry is to be heard in the same *Poetics* as well. In line with Plato's argument, it must be admitted that

²¹ ARISTOTLE. *Metaphysics I*. trans. Tredennick, H. London Cambridge Harvard University Press, 2003. paragraph 983 p. 15.

²² ARISTOTLE. *Poetics in Aristotle in 23 Volumes*, trans. Fyfe W.H. London, Cambridge: Harvard University Press - Heinemann, 1932. Vol. 23, paragraph 1460.

²³ HOMER. *The Odyssey*. Public domain edition, trans. Butler, S. London: A. C. Fifield, 1900. 19. p. 164.

poetry has a right of existence on the condition that it will be met with philosophical scrutiny. According to Aristotle, different forms of poetry, such as comedy or tragedy are different ways of mimicking (*mimesis*) life.²⁴ Aristotle deems poetry even to be something more scientific (*philosophoteron*) or ‘philosophical’ in ordinary sense, and serious (*spoudaioteron*) than history. History might be written in verse and metre, that is as poetry, but not necessarily. The difference between history and poetry does therefore not consist in its form but in its mode of truth. History tells what happened and poetry what might happen.²⁵ Poetry tends to give general truths while history gives particular facts. Since poetry concerns the realm of the possible it concerns principles and has therefore more relevance to philosophy than history.

Given the fact that *Being and Time* is highly influenced by the thoughts of Aristotle, the aforementioned take on poetry could be interpreted as an antecedent of the single time in which Heidegger in *Being and Time* explicitly mentions poetry and in particular in relation to the ‘possibilities’ of human existence. Heidegger writes:

The communication of the existential possibilities of attunement, that is, the disclosing of existence, can become the true aim of ‘poetic’ speech.”²⁶

In less philosophical terms one would say that a poem could show something about life and man. Poems do not contain information, but are rather possible commencements of meditation.

For Plato and Aristotle, the ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy is concerned with the nature of the gods, a theme that as odd as it might sound to a contemporary secular ear will also return in Heidegger’s philosophical confrontation with poetry, as we will see. Heidegger reads poetry unmistakably from an ontological stance, which becomes mostly apparent in the following words on the German poet Hölderlin:

²⁴ ARISTOTLE. *Poetics* in *Aristotle in 23 Volumes*, trans. Fyfe W.H. .London, Cambridge: Harvard University Press - Heinemann, 1932. Vol. 23, paragraph 1447.

²⁵ Idem paragraph 1451b.

²⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 152.

The poetic approach to his poetry is only possible as a thoughtful confrontation (*Auseinandersetzung*) with the revelation of being won in this poetry.²⁷

Heidegger writes on his own Hölderlin lecture:

Therefore this lecture stays in the most intimate relation with the adopted task of putting into question the truth of Being and it is not merely a bypath in a philosophy of the art of poetry or art at all.²⁸

Heidegger's engagement with poetry is an important moment in the development of his philosophy or rather 'thinking' of Being. In the end, everything in Heidegger's thinking boils down to the question of Being, including poetry. Heidegger writes:

Also the historical remembrance of the origin of western thinking and poetizing is solely expedient as long as we do not pose the question of Being as our and futural question and venture out into the strangeness of that which is worth questioning (*Fragwürdigen*).²⁹

Although many scholars have commented on Heidegger's writings on poetry, a start with reading and interpreting Heidegger's writings on poetry primarily from the perspective of his ontological concerns has hardly been made, let alone from the perspective that Being speaks itself poetically.³⁰ Such a reading would nevertheless be justified if it is true that Heidegger's writings on poetry are an integral part of his thinking, and therefore of his ontology. To pass over the relation between ontology and poetry in Heidegger's work would be like reading Van Gogh's letters without taking his paintings into account. We will start therefore with a reconstruction of Heidegger's philosophy of being.

²⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 6.

²⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Besinnung*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997 GA 66 p. 426.

²⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 270.

³⁰ Compare e.g. ALLEMANN, B. *Hölderlin und Heidegger*. Freiburg: Atlantis, 1954 and BUDDEBERG, E. *Heidegger und die Dichtung: Hölderlin, Rilke*. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche, 1953.

1.2. Heidegger's quest for being - an overview

From pure reason yields no philosophy, for philosophy is more than the limited knowledge of what is present at hand.

Hölderlin, *Hyperion*

A historical people without philosophy is like an eagle without the high expanse of the radiant aether, where its flight reaches the purest soaring.

Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*

In the dialogue *Theaetetus* Socrates asks his young dialogue partner Theaetetus: ‘What is knowledge?’ When his bright pupil answers that geometry, cobblery and other craftsmen’s arts are nothing but knowledge, Socrates praises with his notorious irony Theaetetus for being noble and generous, because when he is asked for one thing he gives many and a variety of things instead of a simple answer. But Socrates is neither interested in examples of knowledge, nor wants to know what knowledge is in a certain respect or from a certain point of view. On the contrary, Socrates wants to know what knowledge itself really is, knowledge as such, its nature; its essence; its being.

The “What is?”-question is concerned with an essential definition and asks about the being of a thing. The being is the unity in the manifold of things that are the same and that which makes those things what they are. But the term ‘thing’ is already a way in which we unwittingly determine that which is. One hesitates e.g. to call radiation, persons or dreams things, which in a certain respect, nevertheless, certainly ‘are’. That which is, ‘is’, in the first place a being, which henceforth will be called an ‘entity’ to distinguish the term clearly from ‘being’ whether in verbal or substantiated use.

If one asks about the being of an entity one distinguishes the entity from its being. Heidegger calls the distinction between being and the entity the ‘ontological difference’. The distinction concerns being and the philosophical discipline that deals with the concept of being is called traditionally ontology.

Heidegger's ontology distinguishes itself from traditional ontology in as far as it claims to be non-metaphysical. Metaphysics is traditionally understood as the discipline of philosophy that is concerned with the first principles, origins or foundation of reality, truth or being and therefore often interchangeable with the term ontology. But in contrast with metaphysics, the basic intuition of Heidegger's thinking has been that of the 'groundlessness' (*Bodenlosigkeit*) of human knowledge and human understanding.³¹ As such, Heidegger saw a lack of foundation with respect to any metaphysical claim concerning the existence of ultimate and eternal truths as absolute foundations of reality, truth or being. The lack of foundation does not primarily concern the foundations of science, theory or philosophy, but becomes, according to Heidegger, above all apparent in our daily lives. Heidegger states in this regard: "The human being exists itself abysmally."³² Science, theory and philosophy are each in their own particular way situated within the human existence, whence they should be regarded subsequently. Although related, Heidegger understands the concept of metaphysics slightly different from the aforementioned formulation of metaphysics. Heidegger understands metaphysics as the Western philosophical tradition that in search for absolute foundations of knowledge and a determination of the totality of present entities has interpreted and explained being in terms of an entity itself. Concerning the science of the first principles Aristotle writes:

There is a science which studies the being qua being (*to on hêi on*), and the properties inherent in it in virtue of its own nature.³³

Heidegger argues that *to on hêi on* means the 'entity qua entity'. The science of the first principles inquires into the entity only with regard to what makes an entity the entity it is, namely its 'being'.³⁴ As such, the Greeks have posed the question of being, but obscured it as well by framing it immediately as the question of the being of the entity instead of the question of being itself.

Although Heidegger's ontology does not have a systematic character, but

³¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 p. 223.

³² HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 400.

³³ ARISTOTLE. *Metaphysics IV*. trans. Tredennick, H. London Cambridge Harvard University Press, 2003. paragraph 1003a p. 147.

³⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978. p. 12.

concerns instead a dynamic and ever anew self-reinterpreting thought on being that in the publication of a series of lectures, essays and books, has been presented to the public fragmented over time, a systematized representation in the form of a reconstruction of the original argument, which bears, nevertheless, in mind the organic character of the original thought, will in propaedeutic and didactic sense be justified and welcome. The term ‘argument’ has a rather rational or logical connotation here, but is meant, however, in the sense of ‘demonstration’. The word shares the same root with the word ‘argent’ and is derived from the Latin *arguere*: to make clear, make known, prove, declare, demonstrate, which is, in turn, derived from the PIE *argu-yo*, from the root ‘arg-’ ‘to shine, be white, bright, clear’. As such the argument aims not to prove, but to make clear and is in Heidegger’s terminology a form of ‘clearing’ (*Lichtung*).³⁵

We will start in this chapter with a general outline of Heidegger’s ontology, followed by a more detailed presentation of some of its key elements in the next chapters to see where the case of poetry enters the stage.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger asks about the ‘meaning’ of being. Since it is not clear what being means, obviously, the entity can also not be defined beforehand. However, the distinction between being and entities is already assumed as a basic distinction from the very first page of the book. As the reader goes along the first paragraphs, he will become familiar with the distinction that gains certainly a specific meaning by its consistent use. Implicitly, and in contrast with being, the entity means: ‘that which is present’. *Prima facie*, this interpretation seems obvious and even trivial. This is, however, not the case, which becomes clear if we examine the ontological critique of Alfredo Guzzoni in *Ontological Difference and Nothingness*, a text from a commemorative publication publicised in honour of Heidegger’s seventieth birthday, entitled *Martin Heidegger, for the seventieth birthday* (1959).³⁶ Guzzoni argues here that if being ‘is’, being must be regarded as an entity as well. Guzzoni’s argument has solely a grammatical basis and inquires neither into the origin of grammatical relations nor into the question with what right grammar may be taken as a

³⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 p. 50.

³⁶ *Martin Heidegger Zum Siebzigsten Geburtstag* *Ontologische Differenz und Nichts*. (1959) in *Martin Heidegger Zum Siebzigsten Geburtstag*. (1959).

measure for thinking. At any rate, Guzzoni's critique shows that the term entity must mean more than the mere tautology 'being being'. As remains to be shown in the following chapters, the entity must be understood from the perspective of being in relation to truth and time as that which is present. We will examine the critique of Guzzoni more thoroughly in chapter 2.1 when we have gained more familiarity with the vocabulary and dynamics of Heidegger's ontology.

Furthermore, the following citation from *The History of Being* (1938-1940), which is, however, from the period of thinking after *Being and Time*, attests clearly that Heidegger regards the entity as that which is present. "It is Being itself that, as the clearing, precisely through the present (entity) (*anwesende (Seinde)*) conceals itself and attracts."³⁷

As we will see, being present or absent is in Heidegger's view a consequence of time. Since the term 'consequence' already articulates a certain interpretation of the relation between time and the entity, one might rather opt for the expression 'given in and by time'. For now, it is important to notice that presence and absence imply an entity that is able to notice and understand that which is present or absent. This entity is the human being, which Heidegger calls '*Dasein*'. In order to relate to being as absence, somewhat tautologically expressed, that entity must from the perspective of our former interpretation, be present, but at the same in and by its own being essentially open to absence, in the way that absence is part of its very own being, which Heidegger will explain in *Being and Time* as the temporality of *Dasein*. Hence, initially at issue at the core of the ontological difference is time and the essence of the human being.

Now, the moment one characterizes the entity in its entity-character one talks about being and everything one says about the ontic, as ontic, has immediately inevitably an ontological character. To avoid such confusion one could speak instead of the 'ontological' as the talk of entities versus the 'meta-ontological' as the talk of being. However, with regard to the context of our inquiry, the term 'ontic' is an 'existential' term in *Being and Time*. If one asks e.g.: "Could you pass me the butter, please?" and someone replies: "I'm sorry, it is finished, there is none", we are not dealing with a negative ontological

³⁷ *Die Geschichte des Seyns* (1938-1940) GA 69.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 145.

statement from an explicit ontology, but with an ordinary life occurrence. To speak in this case of the ‘ontological’, as suggested by the distinction between the ontological and the meta-ontological, would at least in a phenomenological sense be meaningless. On the other hand, the existential is, according to Heidegger in *Being and Time*, not part of philosophical existentialism, but itself a step of ontology. The ontic, as ontic, is nothing trivial but has always relevance for ontology, whether as its prior condition or its articulation. Moreover, the term ‘meta-ontology’ suggest that there is a way of talking about ontology that is itself not ontological, which is impossible if the domain of ontology is ‘being’ and there is nothing outside being, provided the assumption that none-being, nothingness and negation belong to the domain of being as well. Ergo, less is gained with replacing the ontic/ontology-distinction with the ontology/meta-ontology-distinction.

Heidegger regards the way in which *Dasein* exists in ontical sense in *Being and Time* as the way *Dasein* is present to itself by being always already related to its own being, which is therefore indeed characterized as ‘ontological’ too. We will see in chapter 1.3 what the ambiguity of being, as the ontical and the ontological, means in terms of *Dasein*’s ‘ontic-ontological’ existence.

Finally, one should take into account that the relapse of the meaning of the ontical in the ontological or *vice versa*, must be ascribed to the unity of the distinction, i.e. the meaning of being and must, as such, sooner or later be inevitable in any explicitation of ontology. However, it is necessary for Heidegger to show precisely in which regard the ontical is distinct from the ontological, while holding in view the meaning of being as the unity of that very distinction. At a point where he still regarded the ontical to be the condition for the ontological Heidegger writes:

Either everything ontical is dissolved into the ontological (Hegel), without insight into the ground of possibility of ontology itself; or else the ontological is denied altogether and explained away ontically, without an understanding of the ontological presuppositions, which every ontical explanation already harbours as such within itself.³⁸

Heidegger would later come to the understanding that, in contrast with the

³⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. p. 327.

aforementioned citation, Hegel too had grounded the ontological in the ontical, in as far as ‘absolute spirit’ is an ontical determination of being, because absolute spirit expresses how being has become historically present to itself.³⁹

Heidegger has distinguished not only the entity from its essence, but also the essence, as the being of the entity, from sheer being. The latter is certainly a positive step further in logical, semantic and ontological sense. Although the distinction in its triple structure is in Heidegger’s work not formally and explicitly elaborated as it is, e.g. in Hegel’s *Science of Logic* (1832), where Hegel distinguishes pure being (*reines Sein*), from determined being (*Dasein*), and thirdly, from something (*Etwas/daseindes*), or explicit as Aristotle’s threefold distinction between substance in first and second sense and the being of the causes, it certainly shows in what sense Heidegger’s quest for being differs from traditional metaphysics, which has not radically enough distinguished being from the entity, in as far as it has interpreted being as an entity itself.⁴⁰ However, it has to be admitted that neither Plato’s notion of idea as *idea*, nor Aristotle’s notion of substance as *ousia*, nor Hegel’s concept of pure being as *der absolute Geist* are merely understood by these thinkers as things among other extant things. Nevertheless, in one way or another, their being consists in being present, which Heidegger implicitly understands by the term ‘entity’ (*Seiendes*), according to our interpretation.

But what is more important is that the threefold distinction motivates ultimately Heidegger’s radicalization of the quest of being as the shift from an orientation on the ‘being of entities’ towards ‘being itself’. The being of entities turns out to be not yet being itself and is still taken from the realm of presence as the present. We will explain this ontological shift as the shift from a pluralism of existential temporality to a monism of time as Heidegger’s last response to the question concerning the unity of being of which Aristotle had said: “The term ‘being’ is used in various senses”.⁴¹

In conclusion, Heidegger addresses the case of the being in three different

³⁹ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 192.

⁴⁰ *Wissenschaft der Logik* (1832).

⁴¹ ARISTOTLE. *Metaphysics IV*. trans. Tredennick, H. London Cambridge Harvard University Press, 2003. p. 147. 6. Heidegger writes in *Contributions to Philosophy*: “Being essentially occurs in a very richly structured way and without image, yet it rests in itself and in its simplicity”. HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 370.

senses. Firstly, as beings or entities (*Seiendes*), which he understands as that which ‘is’ in the sense of that which is present, or has presence. It would be, e.g. this book, that man or those birds. Secondly, as the being of entities, which is the mode of being of entities (*Seinsweise*), whether as *essentia* or *existentia*.⁴² In the period following *Being and Time* Heidegger adds a third sense to the two senses of the ontological difference, namely, being as ‘*Seyn*’, which henceforth will be written here with a capital letter as ‘Being’. *Seyn* indicates Being itself, that is Being at large (*das Seyn im Ganzen*), which, what he calls, ‘essences’ (*west*) and ‘presences’ (*west an*) entities by letting them arrive in their specific mode of being, having itself, however, an absent and rather concealed character.⁴³

The former renders understandably into three lines of analysis that can be traced in Heidegger’s work. Firstly, the ontic, secondly, the ontological: a fundamental ontology in *Being and Time*, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a historical ontology (*seinsgeschichtlich*) in the period afterwards.⁴⁴ And, lastly, from the perspective of Being as *Seyn* an analysis concerning the appropriating event (*Ereignis*), which is itself no longer historical, since there are no differentiations of absence in terms of ‘earlier and later’ like those of presence.

The human existence (*Dasein*) characterized as a ‘being-in-the-world’ is in its daily care ontically concerned with entities that are present to him. Metaphysics, or traditional ontology asks about the being of entities as the

⁴² Notice that being as ‘*existentia*’ runs the risk of a relapse into the entity character. However, the fact that something is present or absent is itself not found among the properties of a present entity, but understood in and from out of its being. Heidegger writes: “But what about its being - its being present at hand and way of being (*So-sein*)? The being present at hand of a stone is not present along with it like this colour or hardness, et cetera.” HEIDEGGER, M. *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978. p. 16. It is therefore important to distinguish ‘presence’ from that which is ‘present’, ‘*anwesen*’ from ‘*anwesendes*’. However, the meaning of *Seyn* can relapse into being (*Sein*) too as its radicalization and that which has been ontologically sought from the start, admitting that concerning the ontological distinction the *genitivus objectivus* should be read as the *genitivus subjectivus*, which means that the being of the entity is the entity (presence) of Being. Such a relapse of meaning of Being could explain why Heidegger does not take the ontological difference explicitly to a threefold structure as we do in our interpretation for the sake of ontological clarity. Furthermore, one should not forget that Heidegger’s focus is not of the extendness of the plurality of Being, but primarily on its unity. Heidegger writes: “Being comes to language as the being of entities” so this is an obvious starting point of ontological questioning, but not necessarily the origin. Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Holzwege*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977. p. 332.

⁴³ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. p. 238.

⁴⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 161.

question about the ‘beingness’ (*Seiendheit*) of entities.⁴⁵ Socrates asks for example: What is knowledge? What is goodness? Etc. The goodness is in this case the being of all good beings. In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936-1938) Heidegger criticises the ontological approach of *Being and Time* that privileges a single entity – namely, the human ecstatic eccentric existence - in order to disclose the meaning of Being.⁴⁶ Heidegger acknowledges that this way of questioning still follows the line of questioning of metaphysics, since being comes only into view here within the horizon of time, which is understood as the being of the entity *Dasein*, i.e. its temporality.⁴⁷ “Being is always the being of an entity”, Heidegger still writes in *Being and Time*, making it clear that the entity does not stem from sheer being, but that being belongs in the first place to the entity.⁴⁸ However, thinking the appropriating event (*Ereignis*) means, in contrast, to think Being as time, by taking Being itself instead of the human being or the nature of entities as starting point.

⁴⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. p. 53

HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 9.

⁴⁶ *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (1936-1938) GA 65.

⁴⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. p. 197, 233, 237, 241, 278, 335, 358.

⁴⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 7.

1.3. A battle of giants - being in *Being and Time*

Heidegger's philosophical quest is marked by the search for a starting point in the ontological labyrinth. Initially, he finds a starting point in the human being, to which he refers as '*Dasein*'. *Being and Time* argues basically against two traditional, but deeply rooted metaphysical concepts, viz. being as substance and man as a subject. The introduction of the work opens with a citation from Plato's *Sophist*:

For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression 'being'. We, however, who used to think we understood it have now become perplexed.⁴⁹

Socrates foreboded that a battle between giants (*gigantomachia peri teousias*) would be waged upon the question of being. Heidegger asks if we have nowadays an answer to the question and replies resolutely: "Not at all!" Moreover, we are even not at all perplexed about our inability to understand the expression 'being'. Not only is the meaning of being obscured, but also the relevance of the question itself has sunk into oblivion. Therefore, we must reawaken the understanding of the meaning of the question, according to Heidegger, which would require an explicit retrieve of the question not by a mere repetition, but rather in a renewed way. Heidegger announces therefore in the introduction of *Being and Time* that the provisional aim of the work is the interpretation of time 'as the possible horizon of any understanding of being whatsoever'.⁵⁰

Now, supposed that time is actually the horizon of every understanding of being, how could such a rather simple principle have been overlooked for at least already two and a half thousand years of Western contemplation? Although Heidegger indicates that it is not important whether the proposed perspective is completely new or not, he, nevertheless, needs to demonstrate from the case of being itself why the proper question of being actually has been omitted.⁵¹

Heidegger explains the omission as the result of three prejudgements related to the ostensible self-evident character of the concept of being. One's initial

⁴⁹ Idem p. XIX.

⁵⁰ Idem p. 1.

⁵¹ Idem p. 17.

understanding of being has always an average character (*durchschnittlichen Verständlichkeit*) that oscillates between knowing and not knowing reflected in three prejudgments concerning being. Firstly, being is conceived to be the most universal and emptiest concept, which therefore, secondly, withstands a genus–differentia definition. If one applies the ‘What is ___?’ question to its own ‘is’, one finds in the *definiendum*, which is empty of determination, no *definiens* that differs as a specific *differentia* from the *definiendum* as the more universal genus–concept, because being is itself already the most universal concept and can therefore not differ from a more general genus–concept. In other words, being cannot be defined as an entity that differs by a specific difference from other entities. Thirdly, a definition of being is considered to be not necessary at all, because being is already practically known in all knowing and predicating and, as such, already comprehensible without further ado. It is precisely the ambiguity of knowing and not-knowing the meaning of being that forces Heidegger, on the one hand, to a renewed retrieve of the question of being and, on the other hand, provides him in the form of ‘everydayness’ with a lead to the possibility of the question itself and access to a possible response.

If one asks: ‘What is being?’ without knowing its answer, the question already supposes a vague and average comprehension of being, since in some sense, as Plato already held forth, we have indeed “long been aware of what we mean when we use the expression” and the term is after all already used as *copula* in the question concerning itself. The formulation of the question appeals already to a certain sense of what is required. Moreover, one expresses and articulates in one’s common understanding ‘being’ already every day. Heidegger writes:

Being is found in *thatness* and *whatness*, reality, the objective presence of things (*Vorhandenheit*), subsistence, validity, existence (*Da-sein*), and in the ‘there is’ (*es gibt*).⁵²

Consequently, Heidegger asks: If being is in some sense present in entities, from which entity should the disclosure of being begin? As a formal requirement, that entity has to be an entity that is open towards being and, as such, always already related to that which is interrogated. The required entity must already be open, unlocked, or disclosed to being. It must be able to ask about being and

⁵² Idem p. 4, 5.

therefore also ask about its own being. Hardly surprising, this entity turns out to be the entity that we are ourselves in each case.⁵³ Like life is itself the precondition for knowing life, *Dasein* is the precondition for knowing the being of *Dasein* and, as such, the precondition for knowing being in general. But ‘life’ is, however, a term that Heidegger seeks to avoid because of its ambiguity, its ontical and primarily biological connotation.⁵⁴ The human being that asks about being will be referred back to the question of the being of the human being. Hence, Heidegger provisionally reverses the question of being by a regression to its access, which is known as his famous ‘step back’ into the possibility. Since we are able to ask about our own being, the question of being becomes first possible. Accordingly, to work out the questions of being means in *Being and Time* to make first our own being transparent.

Heidegger calls the human being, the entity that we are ourselves in each case, ‘*Dasein*’. *Dasein* is never an entity that occurs among others, but is always that entity that is concerned about its very being in the sense that it has to be its being as its own. What is at stake for *Dasein* is its own existence.⁵⁵ As such, ‘having’ is in *Dasein*’s self-appropriation most originary related to ‘being’. *Dasein* is disclosed to itself through its own being, because understanding of being is itself a determination of *Dasein*. “We come to terms with existence only through existence self”, writes Heidegger.⁵⁶ This means that the access to being and *Dasein*’s own being in the first place, is man’s own existence. Through ontical existence that is concerned with its own being, ontological knowledge concerning that existence and the understanding of being in broad sense becomes first possible. Hence, Heidegger prioritizes *Dasein* ontologically over other entities and deems it ontically distinct from them, because solely the entity *Dasein* is itself ontological.

In summary, firstly, *Dasein* exists in an ontical sense in as far as it is present. Secondly, *Dasein*’s particular way of existing means that it is always related to its own being, which makes it also an ontological entity. Heidegger reserves the word ‘existence’ (*Existenz*) exclusively for the human being.

⁵³ HEIDEGGER, M. *History of the Concept of Time*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. p. 148.

⁵⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Heraklit*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994. GA 55 p. 92.

⁵⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 39.

⁵⁶ Idem p. 10.

Existence is derived and composed from ‘*ex*’ which means ‘forth’ and ‘*sistere*’ meaning ‘causing to stand’, which renders ‘existence’ into ‘to stand out for itself’, or ‘standing out and perduring the openness of the there (*Da*)’, according to one of Heidegger’s later formulations.⁵⁷ Although the term ‘*Dasein*’ both in common German and in the tradition of metaphysics simply means: to ‘exist’, as being extant or present-at-hand, Heidegger reserves the terms ‘*Dasein*’ and ‘*Existenz*’ only for the human being, since *Dasein* is in contrast with, e.g. a stone, a plant or an animal the sole entity that stands open to its own essence and, as such, the only entity capable of ‘standing out’ or ‘standing forth’ for itself.⁵⁸ This can be conceived as a reformulation of the phenomenological finding of the ‘father of phenomenology’, Heidegger’s mentor and teacher Edmund Husserl, that all consciousness is essentially self-consciousness. However, around the period of *Being and Time*, Heidegger seeks to avoid the traditional terminology of the metaphysics of subjectivity including terms like ‘consciousness’. We will examine in the next chapter more thoroughly the particular self-relating nature of *Dasein* in relation to time. Lastly, just as originally as *Dasein* has understanding of its own being, it has understanding of the being of entities that do not have the character of *Dasein*. As such, *Dasein* ‘is’ ontic-ontological. However, the former does not necessarily imply that *Dasein* develops also an explicit ontology. But because *Dasein* exists as the understanding of being, it is pre-ontologically the condition for any explicit ontology. Thus, the possibility of ontology is not merely based upon entities, but one entity in particular, namely *Dasein*. The human being forms therefore in *Being and Time* the linchpin of the ontological difference. An ontology that reflects on its own conditions is in *Being and Time* called a ‘fundamental ontology’, which expresses that *Dasein*’s temporality forms the basis for every understanding of being, that is to say, any particular ontology or form of metaphysics. Accordingly, Heidegger declares that the proposed fundamental ontology must be sought in an existential analysis of *Dasein*.⁵⁹

Heidegger’s investigation into being starts with an analysis of the being of an entity that is the closest, namely our own being. Heidegger follows the

⁵⁷ Idem p. 125, note †.

⁵⁸ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. 237.

⁵⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 11.

suggestion of Augustine who asked:

But what is closer to me than myself? Assuredly, I labour here and I labour within myself: I have become to myself a land of trouble and inordinate sweat.⁶⁰

However, the fact that an analysis is required already implies that a proper and explicit understanding of one's own being is lacking. Thus, says Heidegger: "Dasein is ontologically nearest to itself, but ontologically farthest away."⁶¹ Unlike Descartes, who thought that the self, as mind (*res cogitans*), is more easily known than the body (*res extensa*) whether one's own body or other bodies, Heidegger thinks by a rejection of Descartes' dualism that essential self-appropriation and authentic self-understanding come lastly in the order of ontological comprehension.⁶²

Be that as it may, *Dasein* is pre-ontologically certainly not foreign to itself. It is therefore able to show itself on its own terms to itself, which can become the starting point of an understanding of self and world. The ontical everydayness of existence is indicated in *Being and Time* with the neologism 'existentiell' and ontological transparency concerning that existence is characterized as 'existential'. The latter is concerned with what constitutes existence, i.e. ontology and must therefore not be interpreted merely as an element of a philosophy of existence.⁶³ The analytics of *Dasein* has to show *Dasein* as it is initially and for the most part in its average everydayness, which means the mode of being of factual *Dasein* preliminary as temporality. As such, ontology, as the analytics of *Dasein*, is in *Being and Time* a form of phenomenology. Phenomenology means, in turn, in *Being and Time* a transcendental approach of ontology, which means that *Dasein* is the condition for transcendence as the understanding of its own being and the being of entities. Heidegger writes:

⁶⁰ Idem p. 41.

⁶¹ Idem p. 14.

Brief über den Humanismus in Wegmarken. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. GA 9, p. 331.

⁶² DESCARTES, R. *Descartes meditations on first philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. p. 16.

⁶³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 11.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 184

Every disclosure of being as the transcendens is transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth (disclosedness of being) is *veritas transcendentalis*.⁶⁴

Subsequently, *Dasein* shows itself in Heidegger's analysis to be a plural phenomenon that is characterized by three internal perspectives. Firstly, *Dasein* as existence (*Existenz*), which articulates the way *Dasein* is always related to its own being. Existence is always determined by the 'mineness' (*Jemeinichkeit*) of its experience and intentionality.⁶⁵ Every *Dasein* has an appropriating direction in which it relates to the possibilities of existence as its 'own', however, without ever necessarily arriving at its 'own-most' possibility. One says e.g.: 'I really have to take this chance now' as an expression of relating to the potentiality of life as one's own. *Dasein* does not first ask itself the question 'Who or what am I?', but always 'Who or what can I be?' Secondly, in as far as *Dasein* is not a single super subject, but in as far as there exist as many *Daseins* as there are entities that relate to their own being, *Dasein* implies other *Daseins* and is, as such, a 'being-with-others' (*Mitdasein*). Thirdly, *Dasein* has the character of 'world', as the context of understanding the being of other *Daseins* and the being of entities that do not have the character of *Dasein*. Because the world is never given to *Dasein* as a present-at-hand entity, but has a disclosing character (*Erschlossenheit*) itself, it must be interpreted in a similar way to *Dasein*. Therefore, even in their most extreme possible opposition, *Dasein* remains the unity of self, world and its alterity. As such, *Dasein* is in *Being and Time*, *inter alia*, called the 'between' of subject and object.⁶⁶ However, this term is not free of ambiguity. Two years earlier Heidegger had written:

Should we be permitted to maintain the orientation to a world and a 'subject', however, we could then say that the being of *Dasein* is precisely the being of the 'between' subject and world. This 'between', which of course does not first arise by having a subject meet with a world, is the *Dasein* itself, but once again not as a property of a subject. This is the very reason why, strictly speaking, *Dasein* cannot be taken as a 'between', since the talk of a 'between' subject and world always already presupposes that two entities are given between which there is supposed to be a relation.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 34.

⁶⁵ *Idem* p. 49.

⁶⁶ *Idem* p. 124.

⁶⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *History of the Concept of Time*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. p. 251 & 252.

Dasein has ‘always already’ (*immer schon*) an average understanding of being. Firstly, *Dasein* has understanding of its own being. Secondly, *Dasein* has understanding of the being of other *Daseins* and, thirdly, of the being of ‘ready-to-hand’ (*zuhanden*) and ‘present-at-hand’ (*vorhanden*) entities encountered in the surrounding world in action. *Dasein* borrows unreflectedly its ontological model and criteria for Being from the *pragmata*, the things it lives amidst.⁶⁸ Ready-to-hand entities are marked by their manuality, as, for example, a pen. A present-at-hand entity is e.g., the planet Jupiter. ‘Readiness-to hand’ and ‘presence-at-hand’ indicate ways of being that are distinct from *Dasein*’s way of being. As far as the materialists are concerned, Socrates already relates our ‘primitive’ way of interpreting being in terms of the handy. Hegel speaks, in turn, of the ontological prejudice of palpability (*Handgreiflichkeit*), which he ascribes to the idealists and therefore Plato as well, writing:

To get at least some inkling of this, one must put aside the notion that truth must be something palpable. Such palpability, for example, is carried over even into the ideas of Plato which are in God’s thoughts, as if they were, so to speak, things that exist but in another world or region, and a world of actuality were to be found outside them which has a substantiality distinct from those ideas and is real only because of this distinctness.⁶⁹

The phrase of Parmenides: *chre to legein te noein t’ eon emmenai*, which usually renders into ‘one should both say and think that being is’, Heidegger translates parataxically: ‘Needed: the saying so thinking too: entities: being.’⁷⁰ ‘*Chre*’ belongs to the verb ‘*chrao*’, ‘*chrestai*’, in which lies the word ‘*he cheir*’, the ‘hand’. ‘*Chrao*’ means ‘I maintain’ (*handhabe*), I hold it in my hands, I use, I need. To hold something in the hand means to adjust the hand to its measure. Heidegger translates Parmenides ‘*chre*’ therefore to ‘it is needed’. ‘To need’ means, according to Heidegger, originally ‘to let something be or to conserve something in its essence’.⁷¹ As such, Heidegger ascribes an ontological meaning to the handy and reads the handy in the oldest words of the philosophical tradition.

⁶⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 64.

⁶⁹ HEGEL, G.W.F. *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2008. p. 34.

⁷⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Was heisst denken?*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002. GA 8 p. 189.

⁷¹ Idem p. 190.

At any rate, the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand ways of being are in Heidegger's view part of *Dasein's* concern in which they become first accessible. The terms indicate therefore different ways of becoming present. As such, they are ontological determinations that belong to the 'way of being', 'being as presence' or rather 'presencing', as we will explain later. *Dasein's* first engagement with being is not the result of reason, theory or abstract thoughts, but found in the manuality of its practical caring way of being-in-the-world. The metaphorical content of 'hands' should not be taken literally. Metaphorically, the tactile terms indicate *Dasein's* concrete way of dealing with things, in contrast with the objective and distanced sight of the eyes or the detached metaphysical eye of the mind. As such, the terms indicate the pragmatic and practical approach of the ontological motivated epistemology from *Being and Time*. In particular, the term 'presence-at-hand' signifies what is traditionally and metaphysically understood as objectivity in the sense of extantness. But whenever one is practically and purposefully absorbed in the world, one does not commonly relate to things as objects, as will be examined in the next chapter. Moreover, objectivity refers to the metaphysical object/subject-structure, which is precisely the kind of metaphysics from which the project of a fundamental ontology attempts to break free. 'Readiness-to-hand' and 'presence-at-hand' signify with respect to time, being in as far as it is encountered in the present; the domain of actuality. The concepts serve to explain why *Dasein* philosophically and pre-philosophically has the tendency to explain being from that which is 'ostensibly' close, as, on the one hand, the possibility of an average understanding of being, and, on the other hand, the source of the covering-up of the full spectrum of being, as the covering up of the non-present character of being.

With a clarification of the meaning of *Dasein* (*Seinsinn des Daseins*) the meaning of being is not won yet, but at least a soil (*Boden*) from which we may reap might be prepared, Heidegger argues.⁷² One should bear in mind that the project of *Being and Time* has explicitly a provisional and preliminary character in relation to the question of the meaning of being. Secondly, it is important to note that Heidegger calls attention to the fact that the line of questioning in the work runs in a circular way. *Dasein* is that which is interrogated and at the same time

⁷² HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 15.

understood as the very condition for the interrogating question. *Dasein* must therefore in some sense already be presupposed in the question. Or on the level of being, the question of being presupposes already an access to the meaning of being, i.e. the entity who can ask about being, which is already a way by which being is determined, albeit provisionally and preliminary. Heidegger justifies this assumption by arguing that presupposing belongs as self-presupposing to the being of *Dasein*.⁷³ When shown phenomenologically it will become clear that the argumentation remains far from a *circulum vitiosum*. The circle is the existential form of the hermeneutical circle that says that each particular element is always regarded in the light of the over time increasing apprehension of the whole. In *Being and Time* the circle is phenomenologically understood from the ‘fore-structure’ (*Vor-struktur*) of *Dasein*. *Dasein* is in any type of concern always in advance confronted with a ‘fore-having’ (*Vorhabe*) as the situational background of entities as a whole, which *Dasein*’s understanding takes provisionally into consideration as in a ‘preview’ (*Vorsicht*) and understands and interprets by means of a ‘fore-concept’ (*Vorgriff*).⁷⁴ This having, seeing and conceiving in advance is founded in the way *Dasein* anticipates itself. The human being projects itself ahead. *Dasein* is always future oriented. As such, in all ways of relating, *Dasein* relates first to itself as different ways of presupposing its own being. The question of being is always a questioning departing from that which is in some sense already known and based upon one’s familiarity with being. The question of being is therefore never a question of a complete unknown X that should be determined logically or empirically, but always already in advance understood in an average way as *Dasein*’s own existence and only, as such, circular. Hence, the type of argumentation consists here neither in the proof of a logical deduction, nor an empirical induction, but is a phenomenological clearing of the conditioning character of self-presupposing human existence. *Dasein* is always already concerned with its own being and, as such, always presupposing its own being, Heidegger explains. A phenomenological clearing concerning the being of *Dasein* is won by showing the phenomena of *Dasein* as phenomena, while at the same time heeding the phenomena in their covering tendencies due to metaphysics and everydayness. Subsequently, these phenomena must be stripped from their

⁷³ *Idem* p. 209.

⁷⁴ B&T p. 142, 143.

covering tendencies. The familiar must be estranged not artificially, but shown from its proper strangeness. In order to do so, Heidegger often provokes and evokes in his writings a mood of ‘uncanniness’ (*Unheimlichkeit*). The covering tendencies of *Dasein*’s everydayness consist, according to *Being and Time*, in covering that which is not present. But the uncovering results, however, not in the uncoveredness of entities, which e.g. science does through discovery, but finally in a negative determination of *Dasein* and, consequently, the meaning of Being. What can be discovered, or actually disclosed regarding existence is nothingness, i.e. the meaning of death as finitude. Heidegger makes not present what is absent but un-conceals the concealed possibility of the presence of absence. Philosophy or thinking is, as such, solely a seeing and showing and never ontical discovery, nor a mere making or producing, which is reflected in the method of saying of *Being and Time* characterized as ‘formal indication’ (See chapter 3.1).

The phenomenology of *Dasein*’s everydayness requires an original explication of time as the horizon of the understanding of being. Like any horizon, temporality opens a view, but limits it at the same time as well. The original explanation has to be worked out in terms of ‘temporality’ as the being of *Dasein* who understands being. The course of argumentation from *Being and Time* is intended to show how time forms the horizon of every understanding of being, not as a revolutionary new ontological perspective, but as a phenomenological justification of the way in which time shows itself in everydayness and the way it is articulated in one’s own average everyday understanding of being. Only in this way, time as the meaning of being and, firstly, temporality as the meaning of *Dasein* would be philosophically justified, instead of being the result of a mere abstract deduction from arbitrary basic assumptions.⁷⁵ A fundamental ontology, as intended in *Being and Time*, concerns therefore methodologically not metaphysical speculation, but phenomenological justification. Philosophically, one tends to forget time all the time. Practically one takes, however, time already all the time into consideration. The latter has to be shown phenomenologically, whilst the first has to be explained, firstly, from the covering tendencies related to the way *Dasein* partakes inauthentically in a common everyday world and, secondly, from the way in which *Dasein*’s being-in-the-world is always already

⁷⁵ Idem p. 15, 209, 216.

metaphysically determined.

Existence has in *Being and Time* both the character of ‘covering’ (*bedecken*) as well as ‘disclosure’ (*Erschlossenheit*), which the later Heidegger will work out, not on an existential level, but more radically and on a broader ontological level, as the interplay of the ‘revealing’ (*entbergen, enthüllen*) and ‘concealing’ (*Verbergung*) dynamics of being. In the following chapter we will discuss the world both in its disclosing and covering character.

1.4. The world and the clearing

The most beautiful thing in the world is, of course, the world itself.

Wallace Steven, unknown source.

A basic concept from *Being and Time* is ‘being-in-the-world’ as the ‘basic constitution’ (*Grundverfassung*) of *Dasein*.⁷⁶ The German word ‘*Grundverfassung*’ is derived from ‘*Faß*’, meaning a barrel or round container. But *Dasein*’s ‘being-in’ has never the character of an object in a spatial container. Heidegger writes: “By way of abbreviation, we shall speak of the constitution of *Dasein* and always mean by it ‘in its way to be.’”⁷⁷

Dasein’s being-in-the-world must firstly be understood from the concept of world, that is to say the constellation of meaning as the possibility of intelligibility. Comprehension precedes in epistemological sense always already physical movement. Before one can physically traverse space, space must already have been identified and become an intelligible place. In other words, before one moves across physical space, one must first move across symbolic space; space as place that is meaningful as ‘world’. This happens, according to Heidegger, in thinking, hearing and understanding being.⁷⁸ Heidegger gives the following example:

If all of us now think, from where we are right here, of the old bridge in Heidelberg, this thinking toward that location is not a mere experience inside the persons present here; rather, it belongs to the nature of our thinking of that bridge that in itself thinking gets through, persists through, the distance to that location.⁷⁹

Dasein’s understanding stands open to the world. Physical space is always given and only made accessible in ‘world’ instead of the reverse. Consequently, if the possibility of being in space or a being at certain place depends on the condition for *Dasein*’s understanding of being, that possibility must from the

⁷⁶ Idem p. 49.

⁷⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *History of the Concept of Time*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. p. 155.

⁷⁸ The understanding or hearing of being depends in turn of the saying of being. The latter is first the ‘way making movement’ of the world, Heidegger argues in *On the Way to language*. HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. p. 108.

⁷⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 154.

perspective of *Being and Time* be based upon temporality, as the possibility of *Dasein* being outside and beyond itself, its being ‘out there’ in a world, which it within the limits of the possibility of its ‘disclosedness’ (*Erschlossenheit*) and ‘discoveredness’ (*Entdecktheit*) understands ‘essentially’. Moreover, Heidegger argues that we are ourselves the understanding of being as the ‘*da*’, the ‘there’, and therefore in some sense ourselves space, place and world. Heidegger writes:

When I go toward the door of the lecture hall, I am already there, and I could not go to it at all if I were not such that I am there. I am never here only, as this encapsulated body; rather, I am there, that is, I already pervade the room, and only thus can I go through it.⁸⁰

Heidegger argues that we never first have intuitions as mere sense data, like sounds, noises or images to which we add subsequently meaning by means of our interpretations. Every intuition or experience is always already interpreted and meaningful from the context of world. This goes so far in Heidegger’s view that he even claims that we immediately hear the difference between car brands like Mercedes or Adler (Volkswagen). Heidegger writes:

Rather, we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, the three-motored plane, the Mercedes which is immediately different from the Adler.⁸¹

It is unlikely that people would recognize different car brands by means of sounds of different combustion engines. However, regardless the degree of subtlety of our abilities to distinguish, we are indeed unable of having complete meaningless perceptions. We always experience something ‘as’ something, that is to say ‘meaningful’ from the context of world. This holds true for entities and their being, Being itself is, however, according to the later Heidegger, never meaningful experienced, a thought which is in *Being and Time* prepared by the denial of a positive sense of *Dasein*’s existence.

Being in a world belongs essentially to *Dasein*, Heidegger often repeats. Its being in time means in the first place that it exists in a world. *Dasein* is an entity that ‘temporalizes’ itself and other entities as a way of disclosing, according to Heidegger. As such, *Dasein* is itself time and exists in a world historically.

⁸⁰ Idem p. 155.

⁸¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Off the Beaten Track*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 8.

Heidegger writes in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1927)⁸²:

World exists - that is, it is - only if *Dasein* exists, only if there is *Dasein*. Only if world is there, if *Dasein* exists as being-in-the-world, is there understanding of being, and only if this understanding exists are innerworldly beings unveiled as extant (present-at-hand) and handy (ready-to-hand).⁸³

In *Being and Time* the formal existential expression of the being of *Dasein* is understood as 'being-in'.⁸⁴ Less formally expressed, the being-in of *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world means a 'dwelling' (*wohnen*). The 'in' of being-in stems from the Old German '*innan*', which means 'dwelling' and the '*an*' of '*innan*' means 'I am used to', 'familiar with', 'I take care of something', argues Heidegger already in *Being and Time*.⁸⁵

Dasein is in the world 'co-present'. Therefore, 'being-in' always means a 'being-with' (*Mitsein*). *Dasein*'s co-presence never means being objectively present together as two present-at-hand entities. In contrast, *Dasein* is present as existence, a dwelling, taking care or dealing, as ways of disclosure. *Dasein* discovers 'innerworldly' entities in their being, which means that *Dasein* first brings entities near in a way of 'de-distancing' (*entverren*). According to Heidegger, present-at-hand objects can never have this way of being. To disclose as to discover means to 'de-distance'. Ontically, entities seem to be close, but ontologically they are far from us in as much as their being is not transparent to us. However, their being is at the same time precisely that which is the closest, according to Heidegger. Only by *Dasein*'s disclosing essence, entities can be discovered in their being and brought near as such. To experience that which is the closest is the most difficult.⁸⁶ Heidegger writes:

What is close and closest is not what the so-called 'man of facts' thinks he grasps; instead, the closest is the essence, which admittedly remains for the many the

⁸² *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (1927) GA 24.

⁸³ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. p. 297.

⁸⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 51.

⁸⁵ *Idem* p. 51.

HEIDEGGER, M. *History of the Concept of Time*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. p. 158.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 145.

⁸⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 p. 201.

farthest of all, even when it is explicitly shown to them, insofar as it allows itself to be shown in the usual way at all.⁸⁷

Like *Dasein*, the world has a ‘there is’-character (*es gibt*), according to Heidegger.⁸⁸ The world is present, but never as a countable innerworldly entity that is merely present among other entities. The world itself is never given to *Dasein* as a present-at-hand entity, but must be understood as a characterization of *Dasein* itself, in as far as the world always becomes only present by its disclosing character, that is to say, the disclosure of *Dasein*’s own being and the discovery of the being of entities that do not have the character of *Dasein*. Heidegger later clarifies the ambiguous presence of the world by saying that world never ‘is’, but ‘worlds’.⁸⁹ World is here understood from transcendence as *Dasein*’s projection of world.⁹⁰

The disclosure of being is possible because the world is open to *Dasein* and *Dasein* stands open to the world. The world is open to *Dasein* in as far as the being of entities is shown to *Dasein*. According to the ontological presupposition of the phenomenology from *Being and Time*, phenomena show themselves from themselves. Equally, *Dasein*’s intentionality stands open to the world in as far as it is always purposefully ahead of itself in its circumspect heedful concern with ‘innerworldly’ entities, which are the entities that *Dasein* encounters in the world that do not have the disclosing character of *Dasein*. The basic characteristics of *Dasein* are called ‘existentials’ and the basic characteristics of innerworldly entities are called ‘categories’. The categorical, or entities are discovered and the existential is disclosed. Disclosure and discovery are equi-primordial, but disclosedness is always intrinsically (*von Hause aus*) disclosed towards the possibility of discovering, Heidegger argues. In order to discover e.g. new oil one has to understand the economic and geological context by means of which one understands oil, e.g. as the ‘black gold’. However, the disclosure of the concept and its context as world is neither simply the same as the discovery of oil as entity, neither is the latter simply derived from the former. Kant roughly said: It is

⁸⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Basic Questions of Philosophy: selected problems of logic*. trans. Rojcewicz, R., Schuwer, A. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. p. 73.

⁸⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 68.

⁸⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 126.

⁹⁰ Idem p. 128.

easier to discover something once we have been shown where to look.⁹¹ The opening orientation preceding discovering is what Heidegger calls disclosure. In traditional terms one would say that analytical relations are not synthetic relations and conceptual understanding does not imply material discovery. Also the way of being of entities is not merely derived from world, rather the reverse is the case, entities enter a world discovered as themselves and from out of themselves. In view of one's common understanding, however, the former rendition can only have a preliminary and auxiliary function. In the end, one cannot interpret Heidegger in terms of traditional metaphysics if his philosophical expression is designed and chosen in a manner that is precisely meant to overcome metaphysics. It is important to realise that discoveredness belongs to that which is seen and the way it is seen corresponding to the way of being of the entity, while disclosedness concerns the temporal structure of seeing and its temporal conditions, which is in *Being and Time* explained in terms of *Dasein*.

We will take a closer look now at the way in which the 'meaningfulness' (*Bedeutsamkeit*) of the world emerges, first from the categorical side of being and, secondly, from the existential side of *Dasein*.

Heidegger formulates being-in-the-world as "signifying the unthematic, circumspect absorption in the references constitutive for the handiness of the totality of useful things."⁹² This concise but dense determination begs for a clarification. *Dasein's* being-in-the-world is always a 'taking care of' (*Sorge*) that has in practical sense the character of a 'taking care for' as a way of providing (*besorgen*). In this way, *Dasein* has a heedful (*besorgendes*) circumspect (*umsichtiges*) everyday concern (*Umgang*) with innerworldly entities ready at hand. Notice that the everydayness is already a temporal determination in terms of the 'when' as a 'how' of *Dasein's* way of being-in-the-world. The model for everydayness is in *Being and time* the work-world that contains a manifold of *Daseins* and innerworldly entities.⁹³ However, their way of 'being together' in a world has never the same character. The presence of *Dasein* differs from innerworldly entities by the way in which the first forms the condition for the

⁹¹ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 175.

⁹² HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 75.

⁹³ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *History of the Concept of Time*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. p. 194.

second.

Innerworldly entities have a ‘being-together-with’-character, which is always meaningful because of the way in which they refer to other entities in their ‘what-for’ and ‘for-the-sake-of-which’-character, according to Heidegger.⁹⁴ The starting point of the human perspective is never that of a detached subject confronted with a complete random and unfamiliar single object about which one subsequently with theoretical detachment asks: ‘What is the nature of this object?’ *Dasein*’s attention is, in contrast, always purposeful and ‘circumspect’, which means that it takes the being of variety of innerworldly entities from past, present and future simultaneously into account and always in view of a certain projected *telos*. We can illustrate this by the process of driving a car, which is an act of practical and applied knowledge and which almost every human adult is capable of. In the case of driving a car it cannot be denied that one relates to a world in which discerning the nature of its elements is vital and thus essential. Driving a car can be a matter of life or death. A car is in our example a means that literally brings one to a certain goal, formulated as one’s destination. When driving a car one takes a great many of elements into account. One’s attention is not only concerned with an object that happens to be directly in front of one, but is instead occupied with the complete surrounding world (*Umwelt*) in action. While driving, one’s left foot exerts decisive pressure on the clutch, one’s right foot switches between the gas pedal and the brake pedal and when not switching the turn signal or windshield wiper switches, one’s hands are cooperative and complementary moving the steering wheel. Simultaneously, the right hand switches between its task of steering the wheel and operating the gear stick while one scans the road ahead, the view from the side windows, the view in the review mirror and the parameters on the dashboard, interpreting and assessing the traffic situation, possibly enhanced with aid of listening to traffic news from the radio. Hopefully, one is in the given example not driving in the UK, but the point is that regardless of driving left or right, while operating a car one’s attention has a circumspect character. A practical way of relating to entities, as in our example of the car, is most common and firstly constitutive for the way one relates to entities in a theoretical or thematic sense, according to Heidegger. However, important of this

⁹⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 75.

phenomenological observation is that the circumspect look always takes past and future into account, as the way Heidegger works towards the phenomenon of temporality.

Hence, in the everyday character of *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world *Dasein* takes circumspectly care of innerworldly entities at hand. In this mode of being, entities are encountered in a way in which they are useful and in which *Dasein* lets the worldly quality of innerworldly entities appear, Heidegger argues. In other words, *Dasein* lets entities appear in and from their use-relations. However, their usability character is commonly covered in the mode of handiness and qua being, entities have an inconspicuous presence. The aforementioned can be illustrated with an example as well. When using a pen for writing, one's attention is absorbed in the process of writing and rather concerned with the content and the objective of one's writing. Although one implicitly understands a pen as an object for writing, the pen is not present in this sense while writing. But when e.g. the ink finishes, one will notice that the pen does not write as it should write and the equipmental contexture of the pen, as an object for writing comes suddenly to the fore. Usually, entities at hand do not call one's attention to the associations in which one uses them. But when they fail functioning, they break free from their inconspicuousness and the context of their usability becomes subsequently apparent. Heidegger writes: "In its conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy, what is at hand loses its character of handiness in a certain sense."⁹⁵ In the disruption of reference by being 'unusable-for', the reference becomes explicit and the being of the entity in question becomes explicitly disclosed. Only now 'a pen is a pen' as a writing utensil, because it should write and the pen in question fails to write. The ontological point here is that presence lights up because of absence.

Basically, Heidegger argues that one practically understands entities from the way one handles them corresponding to their functionality. The equipmental contexture of entities becomes explicit at the moment of a failure of functionality and, as such, the context of useful things can become explicit as world. The point Heidegger is trying to make is not that one only knows what a pen is when it stops functioning. On the contrary, one can only use a pen because one already knows

⁹⁵ Idem p. 69.

implicitly practically and un-thematically by its pre-concept (*Vor begriff*) what a pen is, based on the understanding of the kind of world one happens to dwell in, which includes in our case pen gear. Heidegger draws therefore attention to the mode of presence of things in order to show the realm in which they are disclosed when the world becomes manifest 'as' world. Context, as the direction from the 'whence' to the 'whereto' becomes explicit in a crisis. Likewise, the world becomes explicit when it is torn apart as the breakdown of its inconspicuous and common functional character.

Ontologically, the 'there is' of the world has to be disclosed in its relation to *Dasein*. According to the philosophical approach of *Being and Time*, ontological, theoretical or thematic understanding are always derived from the world one lives in. Pragmatism must therefore be regarded as the starting point for knowledge. Nevertheless, pragmatic understanding has an average character and is not yet phenomenologically cleared in and from its relation to time.

The world is thus understood as the referential totality in which one's circumspect attention moves. Innerworldly entities relate to each other as tools in cohesion of usability and serviceability. They have a 'wherefore'-character by means of which they refer to each other, e.g. the hammer refers to the chisel, the chisel, in turn, to the wood, et cetera. In an update of imagery one would say that a mouse relates to a computer, a computer to a screen, a screen to a printer, et cetera. As such, useful things can become signs that altogether indicate 'the wherein' one lives as world. Significance is, according to Heidegger, not derived from symbols and sign objects, but emerges from the way *Dasein* lets entities be relevant in the context of everydayness. By the same token, symbols and signs are to be understood from their functionality as well. In as far as they serve to indicate, they also have a 'wherefore'-character and must therefore be interpreted as tools. Symbols have no meaning in themselves, but become meaningful thanks to their use and application. In this way, Heidegger explains how entities build up a world of meaning as the condition for language. Here too, entities form the basis of ontological understanding, albeit in relation to the ontological disclosing and discovering character of the entity *Dasein*. Either way, the ontical lies at the basis of the ontological.

The tool-being of innerworldly entities means that they have meaning by pointing to the totality of relevance as world. Although neither explicitly nor

thematically, *Dasein* is practically always already familiar with the world that is disclosed as the equipmental contexture of the encountered entities at hand. Therefore, the world is the ‘wherefore’ one lets entities be encountered as relevant. Heidegger writes:

The for-the-sake-of-which signifies an in-order-to, the in-order-to signifies a what-for, the what-for signifies a what-in of letting something be relevant, and the latter a what-with of relevance.⁹⁶

The referential relations do not necessarily occur in the above-mentioned order. Heidegger calls the relational totality of signification the ‘significance’ (*Bedeutsamkeit*) or ‘meaningfulness’ of the world.

However, the world points, in turn, back to *Dasein* as its mirror. *Dasein* is always already familiar with the world as the context of significant relations on the basis of which it practically interprets innerworldly entities. By its familiarity with these relations of ‘relevance’, *Dasein* signifies to itself, because *Dasein* is with regard to its being-in-the-world always concerned with its ‘potentiality-of-being’ (*seinkönnen*), according to Heidegger. One uses e.g. a pen for the sake of making notes in order to remember elements of a lecture in a class situation with the aid of a notebook. If one asks why one wants to remember elements of a lecture, we can reply that it is in order to have better grades. If one asks, in turn, why one should desire obtaining better grades, one might answer that it is to become a better student. On the whole, becoming a good student refers to oneself, as the way in which one is concerned with the potentiality being of one’s particular way of being in the world. One is oneself the ‘wherefore’ of the world. Hence, the being of a pen is disclosed as a tool that serves a possible way of being-in-the-world, which in the final analysis is the entity that we are in each case ourselves. The former is not to say that one simply equals the being of a pen, but that, from the perspective of *Being and Time*, the being of entities is disclosed only in and from the human existence. The categorical, whether as the ontical entities at hand or as the being of entities found and determined by discovering them in their own right, is possible only because of the ‘existentiell’, which, subsequently, can be ontologically disclosed as the existential. The being of the ontical condition of the discovery of innerworldly entities as the ‘worldliness’ of

⁹⁶ *Idem* p. 85.

the world, has an existential character that turns out to be *Dasein* itself.

Dasein's existence in a world implies that it is never an encapsulated subject. Its 'being-in' is always a 'being-with'. Heidegger emphasizes that in the context of everydayness one does not relate to concepts or representations, but to nothing but the entities themselves. The latter does not imply that we relate to them 'in themselves', that is to say stripped from their relation to *Dasein*, references and world, just as less as it implies that we know them exhaustively or in an absolute sense. According to Heidegger, entities are always manifest as a whole. He writes:

Here it is not necessary that this wholeness be expressly conceptualized; its belonging to *Dasein* can be veiled, the expanse of this whole is changeable.⁹⁷

Dasein brings itself 'outside', or is always already outside in a world as 'thrown projection', and lets entities be met as they 'are' to the extent that they make themselves known. In other words, entities are discoverable as phenomena by the way in which they show themselves as themselves and from themselves. It belongs to *Dasein*'s basic understanding of being that it considers itself and other *Daseins* distinct from entities that do not have a disclosing character. Both the categorical and phenomenal character of innerworldly entities are therefore grounded in *Dasein* as existence. This gives rise to the question how the categorical can be distinguished from the existential, if the categorical is ostensibly grounded in the existential. The distinction is possible because the categorical is firstly grounded in the 'existentiell' and only, secondly, in derived sense in the existential. Ontical existence that is concerned with its own being yields two distinctions. Firstly, the distinction between the ontical and the ontological, secondly, the distinction between one's own being and other being, i.e. alterity. Nevertheless, the latter is a semantic distinction that arguably might be liable to negating sublation in the essential circular course of the clearing of *Dasein*. But the first is, albeit in the language of metaphysics, not a *de dicto* distinction, but a *de re* distinction that equals the existentiell-existential distinction and is first the condition for the category-existence distinction. The ontological difference is, as the ex-static distinction, the first possibility and unity of any

⁹⁷ Heidegger, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 121.

secondary distinction. *Dasein* is in *Being and Time* the existential personification (*per sonare*) of the ontological difference. Heidegger calls the ontological difference at one point ‘enigmatic’.⁹⁸ It is the difference of all differences and the origin of all differences.⁹⁹ Man is able to relate differently to e.g. the being of a hammer, the being of a chisel, or its own particular way of being, based on the phenomenological fact that *Dasein* is always already related to its own being. The distinction between mere meaning, i.e. language and mere being is therefore not to be found in the distinction between the categorical and the existential, but in the distinction between the categorical/existential versus the existentiell. Although it is for common thinking tempting to think that categories and existentials correspond to respectively object and subject, they can never be distinguished in such a way, since the ontological structure of *Dasein* ought to precede that distinction as its very first condition. In contrast, they belong to the mediating ecstatic transitive character of the human existence. In other words, the world of *Dasein*’s ‘being-in’ yields semantic distinctions and is therefore the possibility of derived ontological distinctions. However, *Dasein*’s being-in is also a being-with innerworldly entities, albeit their essences in exhaustive sense might remain covered or recovered instead of discovered. *Dasein*’s being-in-a-world and being-with depend on *Dasein*’s ecstatic eccentric character pointing to time as the temporality of *Dasein*. We will criticize this stance on the relation between the ontical and the ontological from *Being and Time* in chapter 2.1.

Both ways, the categorical and the existential, belong to the same openness of the clearing (*Lichtung*). *Dasein* is itself its disclosure as a ‘*lumen naturale*’.¹⁰⁰ Heidegger writes:

To say that it is ‘illuminated’ means that it is cleared in itself as being-in-the-world, not by another being, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing.¹⁰¹

One uses the term ‘clearing’ to refer e.g. to an open spot in the forest that allows light passing through, thereby providing sight. Such a clearing surrounds

⁹⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 29/30 p. 512.

⁹⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 p. 225.

¹⁰⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 125.

¹⁰¹ Idem p. 124.

any person entering the open spot and is between him, other persons, objects and the entering light. In accordance with this metaphor, Heidegger understands the human existence as an ‘open encompassing between’ that has a public and mediating character (*Offenbarkeit*) by means of which entities become consequently accessible in and from out of their being, for each singular *Dasein*.¹⁰² Heidegger writes in *Nietzsche II* (1939-1946):¹⁰³

We think that an entity becomes accessible because an I as subject represent a world. As if this not requires that something open already must reign before, wherein from this openness something can become accessible as object for a subject and the accessibility itself can traverse as something experienceable.¹⁰⁴

The collective public character of *Dasein*, which Heidegger calls the ‘everyman’ (*Das Man*) is therefore the condition for individual experience and understanding instead of the individual subject that establishes a world out of itself. Before any individual can think or experience the being of a given entity, the entity must already have been cleared, in other words, released in the open publicly accessible domain of the understanding of being. The clearing is therefore the public domain that precedes individual consciousness. Ontologically speaking, before one becomes aware of entities, entities must already have become unconcealed into the openness, whence entities become publicly accessible and thereby subsequently accessible to the individual.

The concept of the clearing as ‘revealability’ (*Offenbarkeit*) excludes a single source of ontological intelligibility as e.g. a real object, or an ideal or transcendental subject. The existential phenomenology from *Being and Time* excludes therefore realism, idealism and transcendental idealism as variations on the subject-object structure, by first acknowledging the phenomenological fact that *Dasein* ‘always already’ exists in a world, which means that *Dasein* has already been let into the openness of the clearing as world. Hence, methodologically, Heidegger leaves open the question which ontical agent is

¹⁰² The term ‘open encompassing between’ is not used by Heidegger as such, but composed by the author from the sub-terms, ‘openness’, ‘encompassing’ and ‘between’ that Heidegger actually does use to indicate *Dasein*’s features as clearing in order to synthesize these elements in an intelligible way analogue to its metaphorical content. The open encompassing between is paradoxical neither ‘here’ nor ‘over there’ but simply ‘there’.

¹⁰³ *Nietzsche II* (1936-1946) GA 6.2.

¹⁰⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsche II*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997. GA 6.2 p. 138.

responsible for the constellation of intelligibility by renouncing any metaphysical reduction to a single primordial ground.

However, it must be admitted that in *Being and Time*, *Dasein* seems to be itself that ground, which calls therefore for further clarification. The understanding of being is called in German ‘*Seinsverständnis*’. ‘*Verständnis*’ is derived from ‘*verstehen*’ which means, *inter alia*, ‘clearly hearing’ (*deutlich hören*) as experiencing, grasping or understanding. Etymologically the words says ‘to stand (*stehen*) before (*ver*)’, akin to the meaning of ‘standing forth or causing to stand’ of the term ‘existence’. The ‘before’ suggest as distance that must be traversed in nearing and distancing. MHG ‘*verstān*’, ‘*verstēn*’, ‘to stand still’, ‘to break off’ (*aufhören*), a hearing that suggests a mediating intervention. OHG ‘*firstantan*, *-stān*, *-stēn*’ also ‘to stand in the way’, ‘to block’, ‘to hinder’.¹⁰⁵ The later Heidegger would understand this mediating intervention in terms of the ‘rift of time’ as the condition for intelligibility, which we will discuss in chapter 3.7. Hearing presupposes, on the one hand something which is heard, as that which makes itself present to hearing, and, on the other hand, an ear that can hear. Analogously, the understanding of being has two conditions. Firstly, entities that show themselves from themselves as phenomena and, secondly, *Dasein* that discloses being by discovering entities in and from out of their being. However, the phenomenal character of entities takes exclusively place within *Dasein*’s disclosing care, according to Heidegger, which is finally grounded in *Dasein*’s temporality. Understanding means to project oneself on a possibility as one’s own potentiality being.¹⁰⁶ Hence, *Dasein* appears to be fundamental here. Especially if ‘*Dasein* is the possibility of a fundamental ontology’, if time is *Dasein*’s ‘temporality that temporalizes itself’, *Dasein* is ‘cleared in itself’ (*an ihm selbst gelichtet*) and the ontological priority of the question of being, §3 of *Being and Time*, is grounded in the ontical priority of the question of the being, §4. It is therefore hermeneutically of crucial importance how *Dasein*’s entity character is understood, merely as present or ‘ontologically’ present, and therefore also absent.

Heidegger names the clearing as collective *Dasein* the ‘everyman’ (*das Man*), but the everyman is nothing ontical in particular, because it is everyone and

¹⁰⁵ <http://www.dwds.de/?qu=verstehen>, consulted at 8/01/2016.

¹⁰⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. p. 22-23.

no one at the same time, having therefore a ‘floating’ (*schwebendes*) character. The floating character consists in the way *Dasein* as the everyman does not restrict itself neither to the ontical factuality of manuality, nor to the being of entities, by being not in the world but merely ‘with’ the world, which is in turn, nevertheless, only possible as a mode of being in the world. As the ‘everyman’, *Dasein* existentially determines itself from the present, i.e. in an ontical instead of ontological way. However, when *Dasein* has the possibility to understand its own being authentically, that is to say, precisely not solely from its present character, it transits from its ontical ‘everyman’ character towards its own authentic being and, as such, *Dasein* essentially enters the domain of being. Only when *Dasein* starts to understand itself ontologically, it can understand itself as the ontological ground of the ontical and, consequently, prepare itself for the being of entities as ‘being’. If one keeps in mind that entities show themselves from themselves as phenomena, their being cannot just be *Dasein*’s being merely imposed on them, which would imply a relapse into subjectivism. However, at the same time, one can still detect transcendental tendencies in *Being and Time*, albeit not in terms of an encapsulated subject that makes a world possible, but in terms of *Dasein*’s being in the world as the possibility of the intelligibility of that world and its innerworldly entities. Being in a world is not possible because of a transcendental subjective faculty of reason, but because of existential projection as temporality, i.e. *Dasein* as temporal self-projection that has been thrown in a world. This way of existing always presupposes itself and other entities in world, according to Heidegger.

However, it is questionable if *Dasein* should be considered as the final ground of revealability by means of its temporality or that *Dasein*’s being should be interpreted merely as the access of being and therefore from its belongingness to being in broad sense. We will discuss the step from *Dasein* to Being in chapter 2.1, but in order to make the transition from *Dasein* to being one has to see that *Dasein* is already in *Being and Time* not a interpreted solely from its entity character; its presence, but ontologically in essential conjunction with its own absence in its ‘being-towards-death’ (*Sein-zum-Tode*). The latter we will discuss in chapter 1.6.

On the one hand, being-in-the-world indicates a unified phenomenon. On the other hand, some distinct basic phenomena of the human existence are

explored in *Being and Time* as well.¹⁰⁷ Shortly after *Being and Time*, Heidegger writes: “The structure of being-in-the-world is unitary, but it is also organized.”¹⁰⁸ Although existentials and world-phenomena are all essentially related to time as forms of temporality, none of them is more constitutive than others so that other structural moments can be derived from it. Man is not more constituted in one of its possibilities than in others, e.g. manuality, work, speech, chatter, curiosity or angst. Furthermore, the provisional character of *Being and Time* implies that the list of inquired phenomena should not be interpreted as exhaustive and complete. The plurality and, above all, diversity of existentials and world phenomena are related to the particular way time in *Being and Time* is understood. Being-in-the-world is regarded as the basic constitution of *Dasein*, which we will unfold in the next chapter as temporality. Time happens, as we will see, always in and from the three ecstases, viz. past, present and future. What is originary, i.e. ‘originating’ in the sense of constituting is therefore not merely the earlier as the past. Hence, there is no prior existential state like that of a sinner or a saint, an anxious or a serene, of which other modes of existence follow, but existing makes itself all the time possible by articulating itself in moments as phenomena. The past is constantly rewritten by the way it is happening out of the future. None of the ecstases is ontologically primal but they are all grounded and unified in the possible. Man can therefore not naturally mature towards a certain prefixed *telos* as a single possibility of all of his possibilities. Past, present and future are ‘equi-primordial’ (*Gleichursprünglich*), according to Heidegger. Time, articulated in moments, is never more now than other moments once were or shall be, just as less as it is more mine, yours, his, hers or theirs, and by the same token, just as less only ‘here’ or ‘there’, but what Heidegger calls ‘there’ (*Da*) as the ‘open encompassing between’. Furthermore, one must recall that *Dasein*, as the human perspective, is articulated in three perspectives, viz. existence (*Existenz*), world and other *Daseins* (*Mitdasein*).¹⁰⁹ The course of the existence of one human being in history is in itself not more constituent for the human existence than that of one other, whether from the past, present or the future. More principally Heidegger

¹⁰⁷ Idem p. 49.

¹⁰⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. p. 291.

¹⁰⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 129.

writes:

The phenomenon of the equi-primordially of constitutive factors has often been disregarded in ontology on account of a methodically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and anything from a simple 'primordial ground'.¹¹⁰

The German 'da' of *Dasein* does not mean 'there' in contrast with a 'here', which would actually be 'dort' in German, but a spatial undetermined 'there', as e.g. in 'being there' or 'there are'. Heidegger calls at one point the *da* the 'here-there'.¹¹¹ The 'da' of *Dasein* from *Being and Time* has to be read not as a preposition, but as a time indexical, which is neither just here nor just there, but rather everywhere and nowhere in particular and if it is to indicate place at all, it is place in time as transition. Heidegger criticises therefore the French translation of *Dasein* as 'être-là'.¹¹² 'Da' is neither 'dort' or 'là', like e.g. a present-at-hand chair, but it is the range that stands open between here and there in a way that this range is addressed (*angegangensein*) by things.¹¹³

Dasein's being-in-the-world as the clearing is always attuned (*gestimmt*), according to Heidegger. Therefore, its way of understanding being is always attuned as well. Attunement (*Befindlichkeit*) is ontically most familiar and an everyday kind of thing, Heidegger argues. From the perspective of our common understanding, one would interpret attunement in terms of feelings. However, generally, feelings are by that same common understanding considered often as meaningless and subjective, which is quite the opposite of what Heidegger intends to express with the term. Let us therefore elucidate the concept of attunement with an example. It is a common experience in which one senses that it is 'time to leave'. When one feels that it is time to leave, we are not sensing a mere subjective feeling of which we only have access to as individuals, like being thirsty or being in pain, for example. One also does not experience something factual or objective, since nothing indicates objectively that it is time to go as e.g. the way in which time can be indicated by the clock. We are also not dealing with a rational thought, because at any rate we are not able to deduce logically and

¹¹⁰ Idem p. 124.

¹¹¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. p. 300.

¹¹² HEIDEGGER, M. *Seminare*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1986 GA 15 p. 204.

¹¹³ Idem p. 202.

precisely with certainty and necessity that it is time to go. Our example rather concerns one's assessment of oneself in relation to a certain situation, which, as an interpretation based on the situation, cannot have altogether a pure subjective source.

Heidegger calls the specific way in which *Dasein* is attuned 'mood' (*Stimmung*). The fleeting and changeable character of moods does not ontologically dismisses them as irrelevant, but only shows that *Dasein* is always already in a mood and secondly in movement. 'Attunement' is the translation of 'Befindlichkeit', which is derived from the verb 'befinden' meaning 'to be' as 'being situated'. The term indicates therefore where one is as where one is at and can find oneself. "Mood makes manifest how one is and is coming along" Heidegger writes.¹¹⁴ In this 'how one is', being-in-a-mood brings being to its 'there' as *Dasein*'s way of being-in-the-world. The mood is a disposition, it is not objective like an affect or subjective like a feeling. Heidegger writes:

Moods are not placed in the subject or in the object, but we are, in unity with the entities, placed in moods. Moods are the radical circumferential powers that are at once cast over us and the things.¹¹⁵

Attunement is always a way of disclosing, but that does not mean that, that which is disclosed is also exhaustively understood or known. The cognitive and therefore rational possibilities of disclosure fall far short of the primordial disclosure of moods in which *Dasein* is brought before its being as the 'there' (*Da*). Heidegger writes:

Just in the most indifferent and harmless everydayness the being of *Dasein* can burst forth as the naked 'that it is and has to be' The pure 'that it is' shows itself, the whence and whither remain obscure.¹¹⁶

Moods are directive and indicative, albeit finitely. *Dasein*'s mood can have a burdensome character in which it becomes tired of itself. Unlike *The fundamental concepts of metaphysics, world, finitude solitude* (1929-1930) that

¹¹⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 131.

¹¹⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 89.

¹¹⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 127.

deals with the mood of boredom as a way in which *Dasein* relates to its own essence as temporality, *Being and Time* phenomenologically explores only the mood of angst, which we will examine in relation to *Dasein*'s finitude in chapter 1.6.¹¹⁷ In attunement *Dasein* experiences its 'thrownness' (*Geworfenheit*) into its there, the facticity of its being delivered over.¹¹⁸ *Dasein* is by birth thrown into its world, which has never been neither its own choice nor its own creation, but marks *Dasein* nevertheless. *Dasein*'s past has, according to Heidegger, a character of a burden, which in attunement can be experienced as burdensome. The 'that' of facticity is never to be found by looking, Heidegger argues. This means that the being of *Dasein* as *existentia* can never be an extant entity. It is precisely in this sense that somebody can in a non-trivial way become aware of its existence. A child knows that it is a countable member of the world, but only in puberty he can come to the disrupting awareness of its own existence, as such. 'I am' can be a nontrivial revelation if our existence is never merely an object. However, children are, according to Heidegger, not excluded from the clearing. *Dasein*, as such, does neither have a particular age nor a biologically necessary development. It remains a question if from the perspective of *Being and Time*, children are capable of experiencing existential angst and what the consequences are of enriched experience of the elderly with respect to the development of *Dasein*.

Dasein's 'being-with' means not only that it exists with innerworldly entities from the work-world, but equi-primordially *Dasein* is a being-with other *Daseins* in the sense of a 'being-with-others' (*Mitdasein*). *Dasein*'s being-with-others is, in turn, not in the first place a being with other people in a physical sense, but other *Daseins* are firstly co-present in the worldliness of the world as the equipmental contexture that refers to human beings that actually make use of tools. In streets, buildings, cars, boats the others are always already encountered in the world as co-present. With the rise of the internet, the tool of the computer signifies now one's being together with innumerable others.

Dasein's usual way of being-in-the-world is characterized in *Being and Time* as 'fallen prey to the world' (*Vervallensein*). Initially and for the most part, *Dasein* is taken by its world. Heidegger writes: "*Dasein* initially finds itself in

¹¹⁷ Compare also *Was ist Metaphysik?* in *Wegmarken*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. GA 9 p. 110.

¹¹⁸ *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt - Endlichkeit - Einsamkeit* (1929-1930) GA 29/30.

what it does, needs, expects, has charge of, in the things at hand which it initially takes care of in the surrounding world.”¹¹⁹

Dasein that has fallen prey to the world exists as the ‘everyman’ (*das Man*) that exists as everybody and nobody. *Dasein* exists in this mode of being inauthentically. However, this does not mean that *Dasein* has lost its ‘mineness’. As the ‘everyman’, *Dasein* is itself as everybody is itself. Heidegger writes:

We enjoy ourselves and have fun the way they enjoy themselves. We read, see, and judge literature and art the way they see and judge. But we also withdraw from the ‘great mass’ the way they withdraw, we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking. The everyman, which is nothing definite and which all are, though not as a sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness.¹²⁰

Dasein is itself but also not itself, in as much as it has fallen prey to the world and merges in the ‘everyman’ character of existence. Authenticity and inauthenticity are modes of our existence as ways of relating to our temporality. The former relates to *Dasein*’s finitude, the latter only to its actuality. Both modes are equi-primordial, according to Heidegger, because temporality does not pre-eminently belong to collective *Dasein* instead of singular *Dasein*, just as less as it belongs more to the past and the future than to the actuality. The concept of fallen-prey-to-the-world implies methodologically that one knows oneself only by means of an inauthentic mirror of the world, which renders pure introspection therefore meaningless.

In the mode of the ‘everyman’, *Dasein* tends to interpret itself from its fundamental constitution of being-in-the-world. *Dasein* takes its own being as something real or objective from the actual context of its heedful circumspect association with innerworldly entities. Commonly, *Dasein* understands itself therefore as what it does in the world. It takes itself in the same way as it manages entities, namely as a projectable project. In as far as *Dasein* is merged in the world as a being-with-others (*Mitdasein*), *Dasein* participates as the ‘everyman’ in the idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity of human existence. In this mode of being, *Dasein* is not essentially ‘in’ the world, but merely superficially and floatingly ‘with’ the world. Floatingly, *Dasein* extracts itself from the world and is merely with the world, as the ‘nobody’ of the ‘everyman’, which is, nevertheless, still a

¹¹⁹ Idem p. 112.

¹²⁰ Idem p. 119.

way of being-in-the-world. Theoretical objectivity that distances itself from the world understood as subjectivity in favour of the publicly accessible object is the extreme form of this way of being-in-the-world. Fallen-prey-to-the-world, *Dasein* takes care of innerworldly entities in the everyday work-world. In a disclosing anticipation of its possibilities, *Dasein* projects mundanely its own existence.

Meaning, whether that of the world or *Dasein*'s own existence, presupposes in *Being and Time* the teleological aspect of *Dasein*'s temporality. The world is never given as a thing, but exists as the realm in which things first become comprehensible. The world is therefore always 'meaningful' or the structure of meaning itself and never merely an object or an extant entity. Since the world surrounds *Dasein*, *Dasein* is 'in' the world, but the world must also be understood as a characterization of *Dasein* itself. *Dasein*'s 'being-in-the-world' implies that it is inside itself by being outside and beyond itself. The condition for this paradoxical phenomenon of *Dasein*'s ecstatic eccentric existence is precisely to be located in time, according to Heidegger. We shall first take a closer look now at the way in which the temporal aspect comes to expression in *Dasein*'s existence. In the next chapter we will further explore temporality and in chapter 1.6 we will elaborate on the possibility of *Dasein* coming to understand its own essence as temporality.

To exist within time means that in its daily care and circumspect heedful dealing with entities ready-to-hand *Dasein* is always ahead of itself by means of an anticipatory disclosure of its futural possibilities. By means of its providing, planning and ordering in the work-world, *Dasein* takes time constantly into account. But, as we have seen, such situations signify moments of *Dasein*'s own existence, which is therefore finally at stake. As such, *Dasein* is in its practical anticipations always ahead of itself and projected into the future. However, *Dasein*'s futural possibilities are made possible by its past possibilities and *Dasein* understands the possibility of the future from the perspective of the past. This means that its futural self-projection depends on the factual way *Dasein* has been thrown in the world. Only from the perspective of the past, as *Dasein*'s own existence, possibilities show themselves in view of the future as probabilities. As such, *Dasein* is 'thrown projection'. This in the past thrown futural projection is existence thrown open between past and future.

Heidegger speaks of the 'thrownness' of *Dasein*'s existence, which is the

translation of the German neologism ‘*Geworfenheit*’, expressing the way in which *Dasein* has entered a world involuntarily, which it did not create out of its own actions or projections. ‘*Geworfenheit*’ is a composite of ‘*geworfen*’ and ‘*heit*’. ‘*Heit*’ is a suffix that indicates a universal and in this case a substantiated verb. ‘*Geworfen*’ is the past participle of the infinitive ‘*werfen*’ that means: ‘to throw’, ‘cast’ or ‘thrust’. In *Being and Time*, the term ‘*Geworfenheit*’ is conceptually related to ‘*Entwurf*’, i.e. the concept of ‘projection’. *Dasein* is ‘*geworfen Entwurf*’, which renders ‘thrown projection’. The prefix ‘*ent*’ of ‘*Entwurf*’ indicates a negation in the sense of reversal, as e.g. the prefix ‘*dis*’ functions in English. ‘*Wurf*’ is the noun derived from ‘*werfen*’, as the fling of throwing. Hence, ‘*Entwurf*’ signifies a counter movement to being thrown. Heidegger will later call projecting the ‘disintegrating of the throw’ (*Auslösen eines Wurfes*).¹²¹ Thrown past and projected future carry away from each other as the way *Dasein* is the opening of the open between. At the same time, the opening of the possible remains dependent on the having-beenness of thrownness. As such, every existential way of projecting is a response to *Dasein*’s inability of infinite projection as the way all ways of *Dasein*’s projecting have to take over its having-beenness. Since *Dasein* lives between birth and death, its initial inability to project occurs as the limitation of its futural ability to project itself in terms of *Dasein*’s finitude. Heidegger speaks therefore of the ‘burden’ of *Dasein*’s past, as the way in which futural possibilities remain tied to past possibilities. *Dasein* has to project itself by choosing from its proper possibilities. If *Dasein* chooses in the acceptance and acknowledgement of its ‘own’ way of being thrown in the world, as something that it could not project altogether, in other words finitely, it exists authentically. We will take a closer look at *Dasein*’s finite temporality in chapter 1.6.

The concept of *Dasein* appears in *Being and Time* in the place of the traditional subject-object structure. The term ‘subject’ is rendered from the Greek ‘*hypokeimenon*’, meaning ‘that which lies beneath’. The original meaning of ‘*hypokeimenon*’ as subject e.g. in a grammatical sense, is quite different from its translation to Latin as ‘*subjectum*’. The ‘ject’ of sub-ject and ob-ject, of which subject and object remain variations, is derived from the Latin ‘*iacere*’ that means

¹²¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Holzweg*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977. GA 5 p. 61.

to ‘throw’, which sense is not to be found in the Greek *hypokeimenon*. Only after Descartes, the term ‘subject’ starts to designate besides its grammatical meaning also the agent of knowledge as the one who knows, thinks, perceives or experiences. Heidegger is not so much interested in prefixes in terms of prepositions, but rather prefixes as temporal indexicals. The connotation of throwing is saved in his vocabulary. The ‘*ge*’ indicates the past as ‘having-beeness’ in ‘*Gewesenheit*’ that combined with the ‘*ent*’ indicates the reversal of the past by the way in which the past occurs from the future. As such, *Dasein* is ‘thrown projection’. Heidegger writes:

The average everydayness of *Dasein* can thus be determined as entangled-disclosed, thrown -projecting being-in-the-world - which is concerned with its own-most potentiality in its being together with the ‘world’ and in being-with the others.¹²²

Dasein is for itself its own possibilities. Moreover, it ‘is’ itself its own possibilities. In the anticipatory disclosure of its possibilities it is its own ‘earlier’ and its own ‘later’. As such, *Dasein* is invaded by itself as the being that it still is and already was. It is constantly as ‘having-been’. *Dasein*’s ‘substance’, not in a metaphysical sense, but as that which ‘remains’ is its existence, argues Heidegger, which is to be understood as the totality of its temporality as the possible.¹²³ Heidegger writes: “*Dasein* is the being that I am always myself as the potentiality being that is concerned to be this being.”¹²⁴ The later Heidegger will regard the way the throw of the past, as havingbeeness, conditions futural projection in terms of the ‘pass’ (*Zuspiel*).¹²⁵ One can think of a soccerplayer that freely projects its strategic attack in the open happening of the game based on the way the ball will be played to him. Each move towards the objective of winning must take over the game as it freely unfolds.

Dasein exists for the sake of itself. The term *Dasein* has therefore to be read as a transitive verb. *Dasein* has to be the ‘there’ (*da*) of its own existence, *prima facie* as its futural existence, which occurs nevertheless not solely from the future. Phenomenologically, one is who one was and who one will be, in the sense that

¹²² Idem p. 170.

¹²³ Idem p. 110.

¹²⁴ Idem p. 289.

¹²⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p. 169.

one's former possibilities form the condition for one's later possibilities and one understand his futural possibilities from one's past possibilities, in as far as they return as one's own possibilities. In as much as *Dasein*'s past returns, its past is its future as the having-beenness of its futural past. Heidegger writes: "Temporality temporalizes itself as a future that makes present in the process of having-been."¹²⁶

Being ahead of itself, that is anticipating its futural self from the understanding of its past self, *Dasein* exists 'ecstatic'. *Dasein* 'stands out' (*existere*) in time and, as such, it stands open to the world and the being of entities. The debit of *Dasein*'s past possibilities 'stand out' as a credit of futural possibilities. *Dasein* owes its past as its future. By means of its temporality, *Dasein* transcends its present self as the way in which it understands and anticipates its future possibilities. *Dasein* has to 'stand' the possibilities that it has 'standing out'. Therefore, *Dasein* has to stand or sustain (*ausstehen*) itself as its own existence, which are its own possibilities as the guilt from which it has to be released. *Dasein* can live free for its possibilities by being properly related to its 'own-most' possibility of being not possible anymore, i.e. to be longer in the world, which we will further investigate in chapter 1.6.

The history of the concept of time is only explicitly discussed in the last two sections of *Being and Time*, but each phenomenon related to *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world is constantly explained in view of its temporality. We will follow the course of the argumentation of *Being and Time* and will from the question of being, through its access, which is *Dasein* as a being-in-the-world, finally arrive at time in terms of temporality as the essential condition of *Dasein*'s way of being-in-the-world. In the following chapter we will take a closer look at time as the temporality of *Dasein*.

¹²⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 321.

1.5. Existence: 'a time to'

There is a time for everything, and a season for every activity under the heavens: a time to be born and a time to die, a time to plant and a time to uproot, a time to kill and a time to heal, a time to tear down and a time to build, a time to weep and a time to laugh, a time to mourn and a time to dance, a time to scatter stones and a time to gather them, a time to embrace and a time to refrain from embracing, a time to search and a time to give up, a time to keep and a time to throw away, a time to tear and a time to mend, a time to be silent and a time to speak, a time to love and a time to hate, a time for war and a time for peace.

Ecclesiastes 3:8

Heidegger regarded Aristotle's time interpretation most influential with respect to the traditional concept of time. In the beginning of *Being and Time*, Heidegger expresses his intention to show how one's vulgar understanding of time and the metaphysical time concepts of Aristotle and Bergson are derived from 'originary time' in terms of temporality. Heidegger intended to discuss Aristotle's treatise on time as a way of discerning the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology in the third division of the second volume of the original project of *Being and Time*. But the second part of *Being and Time* never saw the light of day. Chapter § 82 of *Being and Time* discusses the history of the metaphysical concept of time, but pays eventually only attention to Hegel's interpretation of time. However, an extensive interpretation of Aristotle's analysis of time is to be found in the *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. The work is part of a more elaborate project of a destruction of metaphysics as was initially intended in the unwritten second part of *Being and Time*. The lecture course dates from the summer of 1927, the same year as *Being and Time* was published. Both works share still the same ontological points of departure. The end of the lecture course contains an interpretative exposition of Aristotle's concept of time from the perspective of an original phenomenology of *Dasein's* temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*). In line with *Being and Time* Heidegger writes: "The constitution

(*Seinsverfassung*) of *Dasein*'s being is grounded in temporality".¹²⁷ In *Being and Time*, *Dasein*'s basic constitution as being-in-the-world had been introduced and justified as a phenomenon. Subsequently, it remains to be shown how the concept of world is interconnected with the phenomenon of time, which after all had to serve as the horizon of every understanding of being whatsoever. In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Heidegger repeats basically the line of argumentation from *Being and Time*. However, Heidegger proceeds phenomenologically less elaborated and argues in a direct discussion with Aristotle and Kant. We will discuss here the time analysis from *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* that is based upon the interpretation of the time concept of Aristotle, firstly, for the sake of a concise introduction of the concept of temporality and, secondly, because of the seminal status Heidegger ascribes to Aristotle's concept of time.¹²⁸

Aristotle determines time as: "*touto gar estin ho chronos, arithmos kineseos kata to proteron kai husteron*". In the English translation of Heidegger's translation this renders into: "For time is just this, something counted in connection with motion that is encountered in the horizon of the earlier and later."¹²⁹ Time is itself nowhere to be found but in the soul, according to Aristotle. In Heidegger's interpretation this means that time is never an extant entity and must solely be sought in *Dasein* as existence. Heidegger follows the phenomenological indication provided by Aristotle's determination of time that shows how time becomes 'accessible'. Heidegger argues that Aristotle does not provide a final definition of time, but only an 'access-definition'. As such, Aristotle's definition is valid, but requires, firstly, further phenomenological interpretation and, secondly, an original exposition of its phenomenological basis.

Aristotle's time concept approaches time in its relation to motion. The Greek '*kinesis*' means 'movement' but can also be understood as 'changeover'. Motion, whether as change or locomotion, is always at a place at a time and therefore intra-temporal. Motion is always the movement from something to something as the possibility for the earlier and the later to be counted. The counting of movement implies, in turn, a following of the motion by the soul,

¹²⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. p. 228.

¹²⁸ Idem p. 255.

¹²⁹ Idem p. 237 & 238.

which becomes manifest in the ‘now’. The now is the following of the motion and is concomitantly counted. One counts e.g. events X, Y, Z, in a series of nows at t_1, t_2, t_3 . On an analogue clock one counts two complete cycles of the little hand as two nows in which one counts the movement of a complete rotation of the earth around its own axis. One counts twelve nows as months on a calendar in which one counts the movement of a complete orbit of the earth around the sun. The ‘before’ and the ‘after’ that is counted are in Aristotle’s view the different places of the motion. But the counting itself, in other words number (*arithmos*), is itself nothing limited and bound by the essence of that which is counted. Number determines in a way that it remains independent of what it delimits, Heidegger explains. For example, the nature of a horse does not make a difference for counting five or ten of them. One quality can be counted several times. This means that the counting motion occurs in some distance to the nature of the motion. The difference of counting in time has a quantitative instead of qualitative character. However, the cardinality of numbers implies their own qualitative distinctness as the condition of their ordinality due to the sequentiality of counting. The essence of a number always makes an appeal to other numbers, e.g. two comes before three and after one, therefore e.g. $2 = <3, >1$. As such, each counting is on its way from its predecessor to its successor. In counting one has to remember the last counted and anticipate the next count. Concerning a motion one says in English that one counts ‘times’, which Heidegger understand as ‘nows’. But the counting now is by its essential nature always in transition and, as such, not a limit, but ‘number’, because it is each time open to the not-anymore and the not-yet in the motion of time, Heidegger argues. By determining the now one marks time, but in a way that time itself remains delimited, that is to say in motion. Therefore, time, as flux and motion, remains a continuum. That which is counted by Aristotle in the motion is a series of nows that hold time together and in which its specific continuity is rooted, according to Heidegger. Hence, the now holds all moments together, while at the same time not every moment is now yet or now anymore.

Because of the continuum character of time holding at once the different nows together, Kant determines time as a basic form of intuition. Each object of experience is always intuited within space and time. However, time as a mere form is devoid of conceptual content, because forms of intuition are distinct from

the concepts of understanding, according to Kant. A concept collects a manifold of objects under the same term, whereas a form contains these objects within itself. Just as Aristotle distinguishes the counting from the motion that is followed in counting, Kant distinguishes pure forms of intuition from objects of experience. However, both philosophers fail to provide time with significant determination explaining the way in which time holds together. Hegel's phenomenology rejects Kant's distinction between experience and thinking, the world of objects (phenomenal world) and the world of concepts (nominal world), and demonstrates in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) the way in which thinking historically has come to experience itself.¹³⁰ Hegel provides time with conceptual content by distinguishing different moments of time referring to temporal indexicals like past, present, now and future that dialectically determine each other as 'negative determination'. But Heidegger goes a step further in deformatizing time by demonstrating the way in which distinct moments gain significance, not due to the dialectical structure of the concept (*Begriff*), but because of *Dasein's* comportment as a being-in-the-world. After the 'turning' (See chapter 2.1) Heidegger will explain the comprehensible difference within time as 'dimension', a poetic 'measuring through' of the nearing and distancing of time in its historical course, which we will discuss in chapter 3.9.

Returning to Aristotle, each now is a different now, but, as now, always now. The ever different nows are different and nevertheless exactly the same. Aristotle writes: "*to gar nun to auto ho pot' en, to d' einai auto heteron*", which Heidegger translates as: "The now is the same with respect to what it always already was."¹³¹ As such, the continuum of time is stretched out within its own self. The structure of time as 'now', 'earlier' and 'later' is not changeable like extant things in motion. Time as counting does not belong to the counted motion, but rather embraces and holds around everything that is within time. Everything changes over time, except for time itself.

Aristotle's concept of time makes an appeal to the concept of the soul, which gives rise to the question concerning a subjective ground of time. Heidegger will explain counting in terms of a 'projecting upon' and the soul in terms of *Dasein*. As we have seen in the last chapter, time is, in Heidegger's view,

¹³⁰ *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807)

¹³¹ *Idem* p. 247.

the first condition for the object-subject relation as the way object and subject first are able to relate. *Dasein*, as a being-in-the-world, always already transcends subjectivity as the thrown open between of subject and object.

Subsequently, Heidegger asks: What does it mean to count by following a movement? What character of the original phenomenon of time makes countability possible in the first place? Heidegger follows Aristotle's suggestion that time becomes accessible in counting, but dismisses a wordless and pure formal way of counting. Counting happens not in the soul by a subject that is deprived of world, but by *Dasein* as a being-in-the-world. The following of a motion in counting is only possible because of *Dasein*'s eccentric ecstatic 'being-with' character. Furthermore, time can only be counted if its moments have a qualitative sense, that is to say when the now has meaning or significance, and the nows are qualitative distinct and therefore datable.

In conclusion, from the interpretation of Aristotle's concept of time the indication is won that time appoints the human being, which Heidegger regards not as a soul entity, but in terms of *Dasein*. Secondly, the now understood both as continuum and transition means that time is a stretching out within itself as the condition for its open and ecstatic character.¹³² Thirdly, the sameness through change of time is regarded as 'having-beenness'.

Aristotle's interpretation of time represents the common concept of time as a sequence of nows, which manifests itself explicitly and primarily in the use of the clock, according to Heidegger.¹³³ But the nows of the time sequence are never isolated things or timepieces merely put together, but instead essentially moments of *Dasein*'s concern (*Sorge*). Hence, the way in which one relates the moments of one's existence depends on one's concern about self and world. One makes use of time fore-mostly by using the clock. But when one makes use of the clock, one takes time into account without comporting oneself thematically or explicitly towards time or to the clock as object. Rather by using the clock one reckons with time and determines time as 'time to'. The clock tells one how much time one has 'in order to' do something. The use of the clock signifies therefore the purposeful ways in which one acts in the world.

What becomes phenomenologically apparent by the examination of the

¹³² Idem p. 250

¹³³ Idem p. 257.

context in which one makes use of the clock is that time is never only a motion that is passing by in front of one, which one freely follows and subsequently counts. In contrast, one's own existence is itself embedded in time. In other words, one is itself in motion. In contrast with Aristotle, Heidegger interprets the counting of time not outside the time in which the motion takes place. Moreover, reckoning with time reveals precisely an essential existential feature of time, because counting means, in Heidegger's view, in the first place to 'count on' as a form of care. *Dasein* exists by taking time for itself and thereby expressing itself, Heidegger states.¹³⁴ As such, time and the expression 'now' never refer to something extant, but rather to one's own existence that is in the end taken into account in each way of counting time.

When one says 'now' one does not mean now as such, but in now-saying one is itself transient, Heidegger argues. In the understanding of 'now' one is itself in motion. As such, one is with the 'whereto' of time and therefore its 'wherefore' determination. In as far as time as motion is directed, it comes to expression that oneself is directed. Heidegger states that we move in a silent discourse that can come to expression in temporal indexicals like 'now', 'not until', 'in former times', 'finally', 'at the time', and 'before that'. However, this should not give the impression that time is merely case of grammar, i.e. part of the rules of expressed meaning. Even before expression, that is to say silently, the now is always a 'whereto' and a 'wherefore'. The now and its uttering is always part of one's precaution, planning or occupation. The now is therefore first in a teleological sense meaningful.

The mood of boredom is a case in which time lacks ostensibly a 'wherefore' determination. But boredom is at the same time a way of relating to time that shows that one, based upon one's everyday circumspect heedful way of being absorbed in the world, commonly expects time to have a 'wherefore' determination. In the disposition of boredom it becomes pre-eminently apparent that when experiencing moments lacking a purposeful direction, it is one's own direction that has been put into question. Heidegger writes: "The relations of the in-order-to, but also those of the purpose-free and purposeless, root either ultimately or initial in the for-the-sake-of-which."¹³⁵ The 'for-the-sake-of-which'

¹³⁴ Idem p. 259.

¹³⁵ Idem p. 295.

character of time is in the final analysis *Dasein* itself. By being occupied with its ‘potentiality-of-being’ (*seinkönnen*), *Dasein* is always already understood by itself as the ‘for the sake of itself’.¹³⁶

Heidegger calls existential time ‘originary time’. Existential time has a Janus-head. As transition, the now looks backwards and forwards, to the past and to the future. In the present the earlier and the later are at once differentiated and present. Correspondingly, Heidegger distinguishes on a phenomenological basis three temporal compartments in which existential time becomes apparent in the human existence, viz. expecting (*Gewärtigung*), retaining (*Behaltung*) and en-presenting (*Gegenwärtigung*). By being ahead of itself, *Dasein* expects the ‘then’. Referring to the ‘at the time’, *Dasein* retains the bygone. Whenever *Dasein* says ‘now’, it comports itself as ‘en-presenting’ to something extant; something present that is in its present. Heidegger argues that forgetting is a specific mode of retention and writes:

A very definite type of comportment of the self towards the bygone is exhibited in a mode in which I close myself off from the bygone, in which it is veiled over me.¹³⁷

Precisely because of the original retaining character of temporality forgetfulness will always hold the possibility of a reawakening. However, the reversal of its closing off remains dependent on the process of revealing. One can re-enact phenomenologically the former by noticing that it is often quite hard to remember intentionally. We experience the urge to remember only when there is something worth mentioning or worth recalling that we have forgotten. In such situations, one merely has to wait for the desired memory to be reawakened or search for specific clues to trigger its remembrance.

Despite the fact that primal time is distinguished in three temporal compartments, viz. en-presenting, expecting and retaining, they never occur in isolated sense. Each of the temporal indexicals, ‘now’, ‘then’, and ‘at the time’, is spoken from out of the unity of an ‘en-presenting-expecting-retaining’ expressing the unity of originary time.¹³⁸ Heidegger writes in another work:

¹³⁶ Idem p. 295.

¹³⁷ Idem p. 260.

¹³⁸ Idem p. 260.

The historical human being thinks of this or that from out of the past (*Herkunft*) and the future. From the perspective of such remembrance (*Andenken*) he thinks each time the present. In as far as the historical human being thinks the present as that which has been and which is coming, he thinks the entities as a whole according to all ways of being.¹³⁹

The unity of originary time lies in its ecstatic and eccentric character. This implies that its unity lies at once not solely in its unifying, but in its differentiating character as well. As such, time forms Heidegger's response to Hegel's attempt to think the unity of identity and difference. Time is due to an internal break always 'inside' itself by being 'outside' and beyond itself as the result of the way in which the three moments of temporal compartment co-originally traverse and intersect each other. Time is therefore always a two way traffic, at once a back and forth. If one wishes to follow Heidegger's argumentation one has to presume that time and therefore identity is not something primarily logical. One must therefore suspend one's logical judgment for the time being, while following the phenomenon of time itself. Heidegger's exposition of temporality will be justified, if it is possible to experience time phenomenologically in its ecstatic character.

Originary time renders into four characterizing moments by Heidegger called 'structural moments of expressed time', viz. significance, datability, spannedness, and publicness.

The in-order-to-character of time can be appropriate or inappropriate concerning its *telos*. The teleological character comes phenomenologically pre-eminently to expression by the use of clock time, which is responsible, according to Heidegger, for the 'significance' (*Bedeutsamkeit*) character of time. Consequently, the connection between time and world becomes clear. As discussed in the previous chapter, it is 'significance' that characterizes the world as world. The functionality of entities, world and time means the way in which they partake in *Dasein*'s compartment, wherein *Dasein* forms its own *telos*. They are all ways in which *Dasein* uses and consumes its own possibilities as its own existential time. *Dasein*'s time is to its own concern. One says therefore in a derivative sense that 'time is money' and one deems that someone's labour time yielding economic value demands compensation. The elements of Heidegger's

¹³⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsches Metaphysik, Einleitung in die philosophie: Denken und Dichten*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990. p. 90-91.

ontology are not things, or objects, but moments related in *Dasein* as the human existence. Time is always ‘time for’ when we count or reckon of time. It is therefore nothing natural, but belongs pre-eminently to *Dasein* and its world. The concept of time must therefore firstly be regarded existentially instead of being derived from physics. Science, including natural science, is part of the human existence that is firstly grounded in originary time as temporality.

Existential time is ‘world time’ according to Heidegger. It has always significance, thereby forming the possibility of datability. Each now is expressed in an en-presenting of something in unity with an expecting and retaining, according to Heidegger. When one says ‘now’, one tacitly adds ‘now, when such and such’, when one says ‘then’ one always means ‘then, when’ and one’s ‘at the time’ means implicitly ‘at the time, when’. “Every now dates itself as now when such and such is occurring, happening, or in existence”, Heidegger states.¹⁴⁰ Since time has significance, its nows are moments referring to each other in the ‘when’ of their datability. The datability of nows can be more or less exact. Datability can come to expression by the calendar or be more indefinite, as e.g. in ‘At the time when the French were in Germany’.

Datibility shows that each moment occurs against the background of other moments, negating a possibility of meaning of moments in themselves. Each time when one explicitly or in-explicitly understand the ‘when’ of time, one is not only referring to moments as single occurrences in time, but one rather talks about moments as periods. One says e.g. ‘till then’. When one says ‘then’, one starts from a now, and one means a ‘meanwhile till then’. Time can therefore dure, endure and have the character of duration as the ‘stretchedness’ or ‘spannedness’ of time, Heidegger argues. The spannedness of time is expressed by the indexical ‘meanwhile’, corresponding with the transitory character of the now, which is not merely eternally lasting, but always in motion and on its way. Hence, Heidegger understands time in an iterative way.

At any rate, Heidegger regards ‘publicness’ as the most important character of time as its open clearing character. He writes: “The expressed ‘now’ is intelligible to everyone in one’s being with one another.”¹⁴¹ As such, the now is the basic form of the situation, which in *Being and Time* is understood as the

¹⁴⁰ Idem p. 262.

¹⁴¹ Idem p. 264.

‘involvement-whole’, in other words the ‘circumstantial totality’ (*Bewandtnisganzheit*) of the world, as the totality of references in a specific situation. Heidegger argues that in ‘expectant-retentive en-presenting’ the equipment (*Zeuge*) comes into play, becomes present or enters into a present. As is examined in the previous chapter, the clearing of the world has a public character, which is in the sense of the everydayness of *Dasein* expressed as the ‘everyman’. When someone refers to the now, we all immediately understand this now, despite the possibility of dating the now in a different sense. One might localize oneself differently in the now based on a different position or orientation. However, different interpretations have the same now that we can all immediately understand. This means e.g. that the now of one person can mean that he has dinner, while the now of another other person means that he has to serve dinner. But in as far as the now is a moment of the shared common world and the possibility of synchronisation of different actions, both persons must understand the now and have access to in the same way. When looking at one’s watch to determine what time it is, one does not know what time it is ‘now’, but one does take it for granted that at the moment it is ‘now’ and that everyone else understands ‘now’ as the time of speaking. As such, the public character of the now signifies the comportment of en-presenting, which each person is capable of. Even if time is not exactly determined, its temporal indexicals, albeit relative, are commonly determined. One can discuss where now is leading up to, but not that now is not yesterday or tomorrow. The public character of time means that the now is accessible for everyone, but therefore also belonging to no one. As such, a ‘peculiar’ objectivity is assigned to time, according to Heidegger.¹⁴² But this objectivity is clearly founded in inter-subjectivity or rather *Dasein*’s open and public character, since any subject or individual can only abstract from the personal in order to arrive at the objective, if the ‘object’ or entity first has become intelligible, that is to say in Heidegger’s terms: released in the openness (*das Offene*) of un-concealment (*Offenbarkeit*).

Kant’s forms of intuition, viz. space and time, are interpreted by Heidegger in terms of world and temporality. Time is always something given and therefore in a certain sense extant, however, without one being able to say how and where it

¹⁴² Idem p. 264.

is. Like in the case of world, one can say ‘there is (*es gibt*) time’. But in Heidegger’s final analysis both phenomena refer to the way in which *Dasein* is ‘there’. Like one has an average understanding of being, thanks to the way in which one is practically emerged in a shared world, one has an average and common understanding of time as well. Heidegger cites Saint Augustine:

What then is time; who can explain it easily and briefly? Who has comprehended it in thought so as to speak of it? But what is there that we mention in our discourse more familiar and better known than time? And we always understand it whenever we speak of it, and we understand it too when we hear someone else speak of it. What then is time? If no one asks me about it, I know; if I am supposed to explain it to one who asks, I do not know; yet I say confidently that I know: if nothing were to pass away there would be no past time, and if nothing were coming there would be no time to come, and if nothing were to exist there would be no present time.¹⁴³

Time belongs, in Heidegger’s view, essentially to *Dasein*, since time is nothing but the ‘da’ of *Da-sein*; the ‘there’ as the ‘when’ that is nowhere and everywhere, but always present as the possible. Heidegger writes:

Dasein is always conjointly expected in the expecting of the occurrence itself. *Dasein* understands itself by way of its own-most peculiar capacity to be, of which it is expectant. In thus comporting toward its own-most peculiar capacity to be, it is ahead of itself.¹⁴⁴

By expecting possibilities, *Dasein* discloses and anticipates the possibilities of its own existence. By expecting a possibility, one comes from this possibility towards that which one is in each case himself. It is an essential characteristic of time that it comes towards itself, according to Heidegger. Heidegger regards the ‘when’ of time therefore as the very being of *Dasein*. In and over time, *Dasein* comes towards itself and exists as such essentially ‘futural’. By retaining and forgetting, *Dasein* always relates to what itself already has been as its ‘factual’ past. Heidegger writes: “That which *Dasein* has already been in each instance, its (past as) *having-beenness* (*Gewesenheit*) belongs concomitantly to its future.”¹⁴⁵

Dasein is in fact what it was. One’s past has not just gone by or passed away. One can as little get rid of one’s ‘bygoneness’ (*Vergangenheit*), which is one’s past, as escape one’s death, according to Heidegger. He writes:

¹⁴³ Idem p. 229.

¹⁴⁴ Idem p. 265.

¹⁴⁵ Idem p. 265.

Dasein always comports itself more or less explicitly towards a specific capacity-to-be of its own self, since *Dasein* always comes-towards-itself from out of a possibility of itself, it therewith also always comes-back-to what it has been.¹⁴⁶

Temporality is the original unity of past, present and future as the ways in which time temporalizes itself. The essence of *Dasein*'s future lies in 'coming-towards oneself'. The essence of *Dasein*'s past (having-beenness) lies in 'going back-to', and that of the present in 'staying with', 'dwelling-with' as ways of 'being with' (*Mitsein*). By being itself in motion, *Dasein* moves in its temporality back and forth to its 'being-with', which is, as such, always outside itself. The now is therefore outside itself as nearing and removal and, as such, always at once *not* now.

Time has the character of coming towards itself. The past comes towards itself in as much as having-beenness occurs out of the future. The past is 'outside', 'with' and 'in' the future and the future is 'outside', 'in' and 'with' the past. The concept of *Dasein*'s selfhood is therefore implicit 'toward-itself' and 'out-from-itself', Heidegger states.¹⁴⁷ He writes:

As future, *Dasein* is carried away to its past (has-been) capacity-to-be-, as past (having-been) it is carried away to its having-beenness, and as en-presenting, it is carried away to some being or entities.¹⁴⁸

Time is therefore 'eccentric' and 'ecstatic'. Heidegger explains that time is within itself the original 'outside-itself'.¹⁴⁹ Temporality means stepping outside itself as '*ekstatikon*'. Future, past and present are three 'ecstases' of temporality that belong together. They are equi-primordial, that is to say that they are united in time as origin. Hence, time as ecstatic temporality is the condition for *Dasein* as a being-in-the-world. Due to the 'ecstases' of *Dasein*'s temporality, *Dasein* is never an encapsulated subject and its 'being-in' and 'being with' become first possible. Temporality is always a carrying-away towards something. Heidegger writes: "*Dasein* is by its very nature always beyond itself as the possibility of its

¹⁴⁶ Idem p. 266.

¹⁴⁷ Idem p. 300.

¹⁴⁸ Idem p. 267.

¹⁴⁹ Idem p. 267.

Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 302.

transcendence”¹⁵⁰ The Latin ‘*transcendere*’ literally means to ‘step over’, ‘pass over’, ‘go through’, and occasionally also to ‘surpass’. As such, temporal ‘ecstasis’ means ‘transcendence’, as to ‘step over’ by ‘stepping-outside-self’. As such, *Dasein* stands open to the being of entities that is different from its own being. However, this is, in turn, only possible because *Dasein* has been disclosed first. In other words, *Dasein*’s temporality means an ‘opening up’ as being opened up.

The remotion of the carrying-away is principally open, Heidegger argues. Therefore each ecstasy is open in its specific way towards the ‘horizon of ecstasy’ itself. Heidegger writes: “The horizon is the open expanse towards which remotion, as such, is outside itself.”¹⁵¹ The remotion of the ecstases is never a removal in to nowhere, but always a projecting upon the totality of the ecstases as the ‘beyond itself’ of transcendence, which Heidegger calls ‘*praesenz*’. ‘*Praesenz*’, or ‘presence’ is distinct from the mere present and the now and indicates the way in which the three ecstases result in a ‘being with’ of *Dasein* beyond itself.¹⁵² *Praesenz* is the ‘where out there’ and the ‘wither’ of the ‘beyond itself’. Heidegger determines *praesenz* therefore as the basic determination of the horizontal schema of ecstasy.

The ecstatic horizon sheds a different light on the now and the mere present. The now belongs to the in itself interlocked compartment of the discovery of present-at-hand entities and, as such, pre-eminently to handiness, Heidegger argues. But in as far as the present or en-presenting is considered as only one of the ecstases, that is to say from the perspective of horizon of time, it can be regarded as the ‘instant’ (*Augenblick*). The German word ‘*Augenblick*’ literally means the ‘glance of the eyes’, as the blink of an eye, a split second, the moment

¹⁵⁰ Idem p. 293.

¹⁵¹ Idem p. 267.

¹⁵² Compare how Sheehan places *praesenz* within the present as single mode of time and in contrast with *absenz*. Rather the reverse is the case, within the *praesenz* prevails absence, absence of the past and the future as well as the absence of entities in the present. SHEEHAN, T. *Making sense of Heidegger: A paradigm shift*. Rowman & Littlefield International, 2015 p. 203. Sheehan understands Heidegger not through and through from the relation between time and being, which is reflected in the remark: “It is not entirely clear what Heidegger hoped to achieve by showing the symmetry between thrown-openness (thrown projection) and the articulated horizon that it holds open.” Idem p. 204. However, the thrown-openness is nothing, but temporality just like the horizon of *praesenz*. The key question that motivates the turning is, however: What means ‘thrown’ if not by *Dasein*’s temporality? Who discloses disclosing *Dasein*? In what way points the limit of self-projection not only towards death, but also to a transcending origin? p. 203

or the instant, also connoting ‘to see with one’s own eyes’ as an face to face intimacy with phenomena that only can take place in the present, however not conditioned by the present. Heidegger writes:

We call the present that is held in authentic temporality, and is thus authentic, the instant. This term must be understood in the active sense as an ecstasy. It means the resolute raptness of *Dasein*, which is yet held in resoluteness, in what is encountered as possibilities and circumstances to be taken care of in the situation.¹⁵³

In contrast with the now, the instant is not an intra-temporal term, but it indicates temporal relatedness and is therefore first the condition for the now. Heidegger writes:

‘In the instant’ nothing can happen, but as an authentic present it lets us encounter for the first time what can be ‘in a time’ as something at hand or objectively present.¹⁵⁴

Clearly, Heidegger distinguishes the temporal structure of temporality from that which takes place within temporality. In contrast with the first, the latter is apt to change. The term the ‘instant’ accounts for the fleeting nature of time, however, without attesting yet of explicit insight in the ecstatic relationship between being and time. The in-stant names how temporality stands out in itself, the instantaneity of the exstase. The instant does not necessarily have to know the horizon as horizon. The instant is therefore not the same as *praesenz*. The instant relates to something present, while *praesenz* expresses also the presence of absence, viz. the absence of past and future in retaining and expecting. Hence, *praesenz* expresses that, that which is present or the collection of present entities, is distinct from ‘presence’ as ‘presencing’. Conclusively, presence has three moments determined by their degree of oblivion of temporality as the condition for being. Firstly, the ‘now’ which is the intra-temporal interlocked compartment belonging to handiness, which, however, does not give account of retaining and expecting. Secondly, the instant as the authentic compartment that lets entities be objective present out of ‘en-presenting-expecting-retaining’, nevertheless, without giving

¹⁵³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 311.

¹⁵⁴ Idem p. 311.

account of the temporal horizon as the temporal horizon of being.¹⁵⁵ Thirdly, *praesenz* which means presence as ‘presencing’, attesting the phenomenological insight that ‘absence’ in retaining and expecting forms the condition for presencing.

At any rate, the now and the instant remain dependent on an ‘implicit’ understanding of *praesenz*. *Praesenz* names the relation between being and time. Being is presence (*anwesen*) as *Dasein*’s temporal ‘being-with’, i.e. ‘presencing’ as *praesenz*. The present is, as en-presenting a removal to the past occurring out of the future and, as such, in motion open for entities that are confronting us. As such, the present is implicitly always already understood from time in a broad sense, as the way the now is openly projected upon that which is yet to come as what has been, and, as such, antecedently understood upon ‘*praesenz*’. This means that one’s absorption in the now is only possible by means of an implicit understanding of the now, not merely as the extant, but as the instant; as ecstase; as projected upon *praesenz*. In other words, one can only be absorbed in the now by means of an implicit understanding that one is never solely ‘here and now’. This means that *Dasein*’s existence is possible not only by being present, but also by being absent. But the philosophical and explicit account of time has, nevertheless, mainly been formulated in terms of the ‘now’ and that which is present.

Everything encountered in the en-presenting comportment of the now is understood as a presencing entity (*Anwesendes*), Heidegger argues. ‘Presencing’ belongs according to *Being and Time* and *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* to the horizon of ‘*praesenz*’ i.e. *Dasein*’s existence as temporality. Hence, being as ‘presencing’ must in the aforementioned works always be regarded from the horizon of time.

Because *Dasein*’s occupation with its own potentiality being is directed to the future, the impression might arise that *Dasein*’s temporality is pre-eminently its future. But as we have been pointing out, the future is nothing but the way in which the past in *Dasein*’s temporal self-projection occurs as having-beenness. In *Being and Time* Heidegger writes that the primary meaning of existentiality is the

¹⁵⁵ The later Heidegger will understand, however, time from the appropriating event instead of *Dasein*’s temporality. *Praesenz* will become the appropriating even (*Ereignis*). Heidegger will call the instant (*Augenblick*), as the rift, the broken fleeing moment, the ‘origin’ (*Ursprung*) of time. HEIDEGGER, M. *Besinnung*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997 GA 66 p. 144.

future.¹⁵⁶ Subsequently, Heidegger speaks of a ‘priority’ of the future in the ecstatic unity of primordial and authentic temporality.¹⁵⁷ The future is present in as far as temporality occurs ‘out of the future’. But the ‘re’ of a returning to the past or the return of the past as retaining already designates the future. In as far as the present is not static, but ‘ecstatic’, that is to say in motion, the future is the ‘whence’ of time that is coming towards *Dasein*. However, when *Dasein* is ecstatically ahead of itself, it is not more its own earlier than its own later. The future is therefore, according to Heidegger, the ‘primary’ phenomenon, which is, however, not much more than saying that the future forms the ‘access’ to time. The determination concerns a phenomenological order instead of an ontological order. Hence, one must conclude that phenomenological priority does not equal ontological primacy, resembling the words of Aristotle from *Physics*:

So in the present inquiry we must follow this method and advance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature.¹⁵⁸

Origin and phenomenon seem to diverge, which gives rise to the question in what sense phenomenology is bound to the present and, secondly, if it can be equated with ontology as is after all done in *Being and Time*. We will further discuss this issue in chapter 2.3.

To resume, temporality temporalizes itself in the way that in the carrying off and removal of the ecstases, each ecstasis always modifies the others along with it. Ergo, past and future constantly rewrite each other in the occurrence of the present. *Dasein*’s temporality is as such always a self-projection of one of the ecstases modifying the others upon their transitive unity as *praesenz*. Analogously to the way in which temporality is the self-projection of *Dasein*, the later Heidegger will regard the occurrence of Being as time in terms of the appropriating event (*Ereignis*), often translated as ‘en-owning’. En-owning is the self-appropriation of being as the way being becomes itself by taking its own essence into possession. The word ‘*Ereignis*’, meaning ‘happening’ or ‘occurrence’, appears to be compounded by the suffix ‘*er*’ and ‘*eignis*’ from the verb ‘*eigen*’

¹⁵⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 301.

¹⁵⁷ Idem p. 303.

¹⁵⁸ ARISTOTLE. *Physics*. Sioux Falls: NuVision Publications, 2007. p. 7.

meaning to ‘own’. However, etymologically the noun is derived from an earlier verb ‘*eräugnen*’, which means to place before the eyes, to show, containing the word ‘*Auge*’, eye.¹⁵⁹ As such, it expresses how Being comes to view itself as phenomenon or the self-clearing truth of Being. Heidegger essentially regards the ‘becoming’ of Being as its ‘self-appropriation’. We will use for *Ereignis* therefore the translation ‘appropriating event’ instead of ‘en-owning’, which will be further discussed in chapter 2.2.

The ‘carrying off’ opens up the temporal horizon and keeps it open. ‘Open’ is the translation of the German ‘*offen*’ which also means ‘free’. As such, *Dasein* as the free horizon is the human perspective, which Heidegger calls a ‘free projection’. Heidegger writes:

Being does not become accessible like an entity. We do not simply find it in front of us. As is to be shown, it must always be brought to view in a free projection (*freien Entwurf*).¹⁶⁰

Heidegger calls this free projection innitally a ‘phenomenological construction’.¹⁶¹ Hence, *Dasein* can never be exhibited and described like something objectively present, but only to be grasped hermeneutically.¹⁶²

Heidegger writes:

Thinking that thinks the essence (*Wesensdenken*) is however creative projection, in as far as the essence of entities is not up for grabs as each entity itself.¹⁶³

Heidegger writes around 1934/1935:

¹⁵⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. XIX. See the mutual belonging of *ereignen* and *eräugnen* in the excellent introduction to *Poetry, Language, Thought*. by Albert Hofstadter on page XX. Notice that the duality of occurrence and its intelligibility is already expressed by Plato’s metaphor for being; the sun. The light of the sun at once enables to see and lets grow. Compare also SHEEHAN, T. *Making sense of Heidegger: A paradigm shift*. Rowman & Littlefield International, 2015 p. 232-233. The problem with *Ereignis* is not that it is ‘not’ (an) event or happenig as Sheehan argues, but that it is not ‘one’ event among others and that it is not throughout positive or present and only, as such, not ‘*ein Vorkommnis*’. Time and being belong to *Ereignis*, the later is therefore not a moment in time.

¹⁶⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. p. 22.

¹⁶¹ Idem p. 22.

¹⁶² HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 254.

¹⁶³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 164.

Our being is not only thrownness, it is as well projection when in this or that way the trajectory of the throw as sending and assignment opens or closes and disfigures.¹⁶⁴

Being comes only into view within a projection. In modernity nature comes into view within the projection of modern science which is a projection determined as a mathematical technological order of world transportation.¹⁶⁵ However, more originary, according to the later Heidegger, the poetic projection of Being is *physis* and earth.

As ecstatic horizontal temporality, the free projection is the ontological possibility of *Dasein*'s basic constitution of being-in-the-world. However, temporality is responsible as well for the common understanding of time as an irreversible sequence of nows. This means, on the one hand, that *Dasein*'s temporality forms the condition for the disclosure of the being of entities by enabling *Dasein*'s transcendence as its being-in-the-world. On the other hand, temporality conceals that very same disclosure as well, because of its public character and *Dasein*'s being fallen prey to 'world time', resulting in the common average understanding of time as clock time. As such, temporality lies already at the basis of what Heidegger later will call the 'concealing clearing' (*bergende Lichtung*) of the world of *Dasein*'s 'being-in'. Aristoteles' analysis of time is in Heidegger's view derived as well from world time as clock time.

Heidegger explains *Dasein*'s openness providing entry for the being of entities that are different from *Dasein* by means of the way in which *Dasein*'s temporality is open towards itself. Heidegger writes at one point: "Man is he who he is precisely in the attestation of his own existence."¹⁶⁶ However, the fact that *Dasein* is disclosed for itself does not explain without further ado how *Dasein* is disclosed for its alterity. At most one can phenomenologically ascertain that one's understanding of self, world and innerworldly entities never occur in an isolated sense. However, to conclude that *Dasein*'s temporal self-relation is the condition for its relation to its alterity seems a rash and unjustified conclusion. We will come back to this issue in chapter 2.1 called 'the turning'.

¹⁶⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 175.

¹⁶⁵ Idem 195.

¹⁶⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. trans. Hoeller, K. New York: Humanity Books Prometheus Books, 2000. p. 54.

We have seen now the structural moments of time in terms of temporality. However, the former should not remain the result of mere conceptual analyses, but experienced as phenomena and, as such, cleared to *Dasein* itself, which we are in each case ourselves. *Dasein* becomes essentially transparent to itself in its 'attunement'. We will examine this in the next chapter and return to the course of argumentation of *Being and Time*.

1.6. The sting of death

At his very birth, indeed, a man is born as himself a debt to death. When he sacrifices he redeems himself from death.

Satapatha Brahmana 3.6.2.16

I searched myself

Heraclitus, *Fragments*

Heidegger considers *Dasein* from its temporality essentially as a ‘being-towards-death’. The temporal horizon of *praesenz* contains, as we have seen, not just the compartment that is directed towards the present as ‘en-presenting’, but also the compartment directed towards past and future, viz. retaining and expecting. *Dasein*’s way of relating to the future is determined as ‘expecting’, which means that in existential sense *Dasein* is never merely confronted by the future as mere darkness. Heidegger writes:

To initiate mortals into the nature of death in no way means to make death, as empty Nothing, the goal. Nor does it mean to darken dwelling by blindly staring toward the end.¹⁶⁷

In contrast, *Dasein* is always confronted by the projection of itself as *Dasein*’s own futural possibilities based on its having-beenness. On the other hand, the future, as the possible, never has the clearly determined, secure and grounded character of the present. Past and future are from the perspective of the present, the negative and absent moments, which define, nevertheless, one’s temporal existence. Heidegger writes: “Care itself is in its essence thoroughly permeated with nullity.”¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 148, 149.

¹⁶⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. 263.

Relating to absence becomes in existential sense pre-eminently apparent in the way one relates to one's own death. In somewhat harsh terms one can say: death is what is up. The later Heidegger writes: "No conception of Being is sufficient that has not assigned itself to the task of thinking death."¹⁶⁹ And at another point: "In death the supreme concealedness of Being crystallizes."¹⁷⁰ Death indicates initially the ecstatic nature of *Dasein* and after the turning ecstatic Being itself.

Death constitutes the human existence, in Heidegger's view. Saint Paul asked "O death where is thy sting?"¹⁷¹ Hegel regarded becoming as being's stanceless unrest (*haltungslose Unruhe*) due to its intrinsic nothingness.¹⁷² *Being and Time* elucidates how death can be a sting in the first place. Heidegger demonstrates how one's existence is not only affected by that which is present, but essentially moved forth by the pressure of the meaning of absence, as a specific way of understanding the possible in relation to one's own being. Death is, as such, the reminder of life. Heidegger writes: "Everything positive becomes particularly clear when seen from the site of the privative".¹⁷³

Care is itself being toward death, according to Heidegger.¹⁷⁴ *Dasein* is in its daily care and concern moved forwards by the sting of death. This means that *Dasein* avoids in and by its care the possibility of being no longer possible. Out of all the possibilities that *Dasein* can take into account while projecting its own existence, its 'own-most' possibility is being no longer possible. This possibility is therefore strictly *Dasein*'s own possibility in the sense that nobody can deprive *Dasein* from its own death. As such, one's death is the only inevitable absolute. As a being-in-the-world, *Dasein* understands itself by means of an anticipatory disclosure of its possibilities. As such, *Dasein* understands itself as the final *telos* of all its anticipations. Heidegger does not make use of the term '*telos*', but uses the term '*Sinn*' instead, which means 'meaning'. However, being-in-the-world as care is Heidegger's explanation of the teleological aspect of the human life. Care

¹⁶⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 173.

¹⁷⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 198.

¹⁷¹ 1 Corinthians 15:55.

¹⁷² HEGEL, G.W.F. *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2008. p. 149.

¹⁷³ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. p. 309.

¹⁷⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 303.

as implicit self-care is therefore the meaning of the human existence. *Dasein* understands itself from its being-in-the-world and is thereby for itself initially inauthentically disclosed. *Dasein* knows itself in this mode of being as the ‘everyman’ (*das Man*) knows itself. *Dasein* does not know itself by means of introspection, in Heidegger’s view, but only by means of the mirror of the world and therefore in an indirect and inauthentic way. It is primarily the world who tells one who one is. However, that same world does not necessarily determine one in its essence. As a being-in-the-world, *Dasein* is emerged in the activities of its care and concerning its own death it acknowledges at most that every-one one has to die some day, without radically understanding to be included in that ‘one’. ‘Fallen prey’ to the world, *Dasein* never comes to the radical realisation of its own mortality. *Dasein* anticipates and discloses its future possibilities therefore in a way that it flees from its own-most futural possibility of being no longer possible. Nevertheless, the possibility of being no longer possible as a being-in-the-world is constantly looming. From the perspective of care, *Dasein*’s existence could be regarded as survival, but this not in the sense of a mere continuation of life, but as the way in which *Dasein*, as a being-in-the-world, purposefully discloses the being of entities. Concerning *Dasein*’s being-towards-death it is important to notice that the possibility of being no longer possible as a being-in-the-world is not only *Dasein*’s futural possibility, but has been already possible since its birth. Furthermore, its futural possibility of not being in the world had already been possible before *Dasein*’s birth, since *Dasein* was not in the world yet.

Dasein has an ambiguous meaning in *Being and Time*, viz. as collective *Dasein* or singular *Dasein*. This distinction is not to be found in the work as such, but signifies two ways in which Heidegger makes use of the term *Dasein* and the two senses are often intertwined. Since Heidegger speaks also of a plurality of ‘*Daseins*’, *Dasein* cannot be essentially a superindividual structure like e.g. Kant and Hegel intend with the term ‘Reason’ (*Vernunft*). Also the distinction between collective *Dasein* and singular *Dasein* is not the same as the distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence, since these terms designate the different ways *Dasein* relates to its own temporality and consequentially its mortality. For instance, *Dasein* as the ‘everyman’ (*das Man*) merely moves around in an eternal present and regards itself in some sense as immortal. In this mode of existence, *Dasein* never comes radically to the understanding that it is he himself who is

going to die. As the ‘everyman’, ‘one’ dies, as simply ‘everyone’ must die one day. As such, *Dasein* exists inauthentic. But that same *Dasein* remains always a mortal being and can, nevertheless, come to an end, without ever explicitly arriving at the moment in which it authentically relates to its own mortality. It would, however, be a simplification to assert that collective *Dasein* and individual *Dasein* are both mortal and that only the latter exists according to its essence and the former exists merely in denial and therefore in-authentically. One’s inauthentic self boils down to who one is, just as much as one’s authentic self. Heidegger never isolates the existential/ontological meaning of *Dasein* from *Dasein*’s existence in ‘existentiell’ sense, which happens to be mortal, as if the latter would define *Dasein* more radically in its essence. In contrast, that which is essential to *Dasein*’s death is the meaning of its death and not the fact that *Dasein* will die one day. Plants, animals and buildings will also come to an end one day, however without ever realizing so. Their end has no meaning to them, in which at the same time their difference from *Dasein* consists. Heidegger’s jargon of authenticity must therefore come to a questionable conclusion as expressed in Andy Warhol’s one-liner “I am deeply superficial”. In other words, *Dasein* is ‘authentically inauthentic’. The ambiguity of authenticity is not so much problematic as a violation of logic, but rather questionable in its explanatory power. After *Being and Time* Heidegger starts to refer to *Dasein* as the people (*das Volk*). A people is united not by its inauthentic ‘everyman’-character, but in a poetical sense. Poetry is associated with authenticity, but it remains a question how a people can die, let alone relate to its own mortality. We will further discuss in chapter 2.1 called ‘The turning’ the way in which Heidegger initially tried to work out the problem of subjectivity by means of an original phenomenological attempt and which he finally abandoned. What becomes crucial is not first the meaning of one’s own existence, but the meaning of Being in the sense of the truth of Being. For what it is worth, Heidegger would later come to the understanding that one does not belong in an essential and authentic sense to oneself, but to Being instead.

To resume, in the structure of care, i.e. the way *Dasein* acts in the world and practically understands itself, *Dasein* never lets its own-most future possibility coming at itself. By its care, *Dasein* relates to its own ‘outstanding’ possibilities and knows itself to be indebted to these possibilities as its own. ‘Outstanding’

does not mean ‘excellent’ in this context, but is used in the sense in which a debt can stand out. *Dasein* is ‘standing out’ (*steht-hin-aus, hin-aus-stehen*) in as far as its own possibilities stand out. *Dasein* relates negatively to its own-most possibility of being no longer possible. It anguishly avoids its own death thereby negating its indebtedness to that which it constitutes. One is indebted to one’s possibilities, because they show themselves as one’s own possibilities. One anticipates the possible in the light of oneself understood as a possibility, according to Heidegger. As such, one’s outstanding possibilities call for granting by means of one’s existential projecting. Heidegger speaks in this regard of the ‘guilt’ of *Dasein* in relation to its possibilities and, in particular, of the guilt of *Dasein*’s own-most possibility of being no longer possible manifesting itself as the consciousness of *Dasein*’s understanding. The German word for consciousness, not in the sense of awareness, is ‘*Gewissenheit*’, which could literally be translated as ‘having-knownness’. Consciousness expresses in this sense of the term that which one in one way or another always already has know and understood, which is in the end one’s own mortality, according to Heidegger. Heidegger argues that one will not be released to the possibility to which one is the most indebted, as long as one does not acknowledge the constant looming possibility of one’s own death and as long as one remains merely fleeing from it. One has to pay Charon a coin of acknowledgement for the passage to one’s true mortal self. Hence, Heidegger argues in *Being and Time* that to know oneself means to learn how to die by *being* the mortal being that one is. As such, to know oneself truly, not in a mere psychological but ontological sense, means to exist authentically.

Dasein’s possibility of being no longer possible first makes itself present through *Dasein*’s attunement as existential angst. Heidegger distinguishes fear (*Furcht*) from angst (*Angst*). The first has a determined object in the world from which fear attempts to flee. The latter has no object in particular and is therefore rather angst about the nothingness of the world, the world as world and *Dasein* as a being-in-the-world. Fear fears something present, the domain of the ontical, angst is related to nothingness and therefore ontological. Heidegger writes: “The everyman does not permit the courage to have angst about death”.¹⁷⁵ In *Off the*

¹⁷⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 235.

Beaten Track (1950) Heidegger speaks therefore of the ‘angst about angst’ (*die Angst vor der Angst*).¹⁷⁶ Death and finitude means for *Dasein* nothing in particular and is as such ‘nothingness’. Angst about angst means that *Dasein* experiences itself to be nothing in confrontation with its own nothingness. Heidegger argues that in angst there occurs a ‘shrinking back before’ that is surely not any sort of flight but rather a kind of ‘spellbinding calm’ (*gebannte Ruhe*).¹⁷⁷ Angst remains distinct from fear, which can by having an object still be a flight and thereby being ‘fear of’. Angst has, however, an empty open centre (nothingness) that is calm and at once spellbinding. As such, *Dasein* has angst about its own past and futural essence. In its daily care, *Dasein* avoids the angst that heralds its own death. This gives rise to the question how the possibility of death becomes present. According to Heidegger, this is possible because *Dasein* can be called towards its proper self by the call of its consciousness. It is its mortal authentic self that is calling in *Dasein*’s consciousness. As, such, authentic being calls itself towards itself as a recollection, or essential repentance. At any rate, the term ‘self’ should not be metaphysically reified here, but indicates the full spectrum of *Dasein*’s existence including its absence. The step from inauthentic being to authentic being is a form of self-appropriation and Heidegger’s answer to Nietzsche’s dilemma: “how one becomes what one is”.¹⁷⁸ After the beginning of the thirties, the appropriating turn from the self towards itself will no longer be understood by Heidegger on an existential level, but primarily and more originally on an ontological level, as the self-appropriating occurrence of the event (*Ereignis*) in the turning (*Kehre*) homewards of Being (*Seyn*) as ‘in-turning’ (*Einkehr*), which we will further discuss in chapter 2.1.

Consciousness calls ‘silently’ in *Dasein*’s angst when *Dasein* does not encounter itself in the world as a present-at-hand or ready-to-hand object. In other words, *Dasein* never hears from itself in objective sense. Whether one defines oneself as one’s body, the accumulation of memories, thoughts or possessions, one’s final self will always be eluded from any of such positive determinations. The silence of the call of *Dasein*’s consciousness is the way in which *Dasein*

¹⁷⁶ *Holzweg* (1950) GA 5.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Holzweg*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977. GA 5 p. 267.

¹⁷⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Wegmarken*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. GA 9 p. 114.

¹⁷⁸ The original note on this passage in Heidegger’s own copy reads : “But who are ‘you’? The one who lets go - and becomes.” HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 136.

understands its own absence in the world, which calls *Dasein's* understanding towards its own-most possibility as the possibility to which it understands itself to be the most indebted. *Dasein* experiences its own limit as its essential negativity when it becomes apparent in the attunement of angst that it can never find itself in the world as a present entity of which it can take care of. In *Contributions to Philosophy* Heidegger will explain *Dasein* as 'being-away' (*Das Weg-sein*). Essentially, *Dasein* is never solely present and therefore never only 'here and now'. Both in German and English the ambiguity of 'away' and 'a way' is noticeable. That what is far behind and far ahead on the way is not present to the being that is on its way. Existence is as such ambiguous, because its on its way and itself the way. Heidegger writes: "*Dasein*: Sustaining (*ausstehen*) the openness of self-concealing (*die Offenheit des Sichverbergens*)".¹⁷⁹ This means that *Dasein*, as the complete way, is itself the 'away' of its past and future, thrownness and death.

When angst sets in, the world renders meaningless in the sense that *Dasein's* care and anticipation in the world shows to lack an ultimate positive *telos* as a completed and final mode of *Dasein*. As such, *Dasein's* average understanding in which it takes itself as the feasible goal of its actions suddenly falls short. Hence, *Dasein* experiences in angst the 'bottomlessness' of its own existence. This opens up, in turn, the possibility of a confrontation of *Dasein* with its own-most possibility of being no longer possible. In other words, angst forms the possibility of a confrontation with *Dasein's* utmost possibility as its finite constitution. The moment when *Dasein* comes to this apprehension it reaches its 'wholeness' as the widest possible circle of self-projection, which at the same time sets out the limitation of *Dasein* in its possibility character. When *Dasein* becomes authentically disclosed for its own being, *Dasein's* finitude draws the circle of its wholeness. As such, *Dasein* can exist truly as what it is, namely a mortal being, which has, nevertheless, always the possibility of living as what it is not, namely an immortal being. Since the inauthentic mode of being is initially and foremostly *Dasein's* mode of being, it cannot merely be regarded as an illusion in a metaphysical essence/appearance distinction. As a way of being (*Seinsweise*) *Dasein's* inauthentic present existence belongs equi-primordially to its essence.

¹⁷⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 238.

To resume, Heidegger argues that *Dasein* always lives free for its own possibilities, which means that its existence is never a mechanical or natural development. However, *Dasein* is not free from the burden of the past as long as it is not released towards its own-most possibility of being no longer possible. Authentic *Dasein* exists free for its own death, because it no longer flees from its own negativity. In authentic existence *Dasein* comes to the understanding it is not only thrown-in-the-world but also thrown-in-death.

Dasein is essentially a being-towards-death, according to Heidegger. What does that mean? Heidegger argues that *Dasein*'s existence does not have an end where it just stops, but it exists finitely because it is always related to its death, whether by fleeing from the possibility of its own impossibility or the moment in which it for angst prepared sustains (*ausstehen*) its utmost possibility of being no longer possible. If *Dasein* exists authentically, it has the possibility of projecting itself freely, since it is as such liberated towards its own essence, i.e. death as finitude. In authentic self-disclosure *Dasein* makes the existential transition from being merely thrown projection to a free projection. Precisely in the experience of its limit and finitude *Dasein* finds its liberation.

Heidegger calls 'resoluteness' the compartment in which *Dasein* is able to face its own death instead of fleeing from its inherent negativity in the care of everydayness. Authentic existence is therefore never merely busy and occupied as the distraction from the possibility of the experience of the absence of an absolute goal in a finite existence. Hence, proper ontological and existential self-knowledge results in the resoluteness to act and is as such directed to its historical appropriation. Therefore, taken to its limits, existential angst never results in apathy. Heidegger writes:

We shall call the eminent, authentic disclosedness attested in *Dasein* itself by its conscience - the reticent projecting oneself upon one's own-most being-guilty which is ready for angst – resoluteness.¹⁸⁰

A free projection implies resoluteness as the possibility to act in accordance with that which first has been disclosed as possible, which is being. Therefore, in existential sense a free projection means to be prepared for angst, while enduring

¹⁸⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 273.

nothingness as the presence of absence. This means in the first place, that *Dasein* has to endure its own nothingness. Because *Dasein* is merely transiting back and forth between its possibilities, *Dasein* is not permanently either fallen prey to the world or a free projection. Man exists only at very few moments at the peak of his own potentialities, according to Heidegger.¹⁸¹ All greatness in the existence of the human being is at the same time also small, a disparage, Heidegger argues. The average character of everydayness needs this disparage and mediocrity. Without it, man cannot exist in the everydayness.¹⁸² The appearance of everydayness belongs to being like the mountain belongs to the valley, according to Heidegger.¹⁸³ Heidegger would later write that authenticity is only necessary in the sphere of the task of laying the ground for the question of being. In other words, inauthenticity is for Heidegger never a practical or moral problem, but a philosophical problem. The aforementioned task is not restricted to philosophy. Futural creative human beings can know of it, according to Heidegger.¹⁸⁴ Within this context, one may think of the artist and the poet e.g.. What is at issue is that everydayness and inauthenticity provide a lead to appropriation. Already in *Being and Time* the appropriation of one's being prepares one for his destiny. Heidegger writes:

Only an entity that is essentially futural in its being so that it can let itself be thrown back upon its factual There, free for its death and shattering itself on it, that is only a being that, as futural, is equi-primordially having-been, can hand down to itself its inherited possibility, take over its own thrownness and be in the instant for 'its time'. Only authentic temporality that is at the same time finite makes something like destiny, that is authentic historicity, possible.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991 GA 3 p. 290.

¹⁸² HEIDEGGER, M. *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. p. 22.

¹⁸³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 35.

¹⁸⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 224.

¹⁸⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 352.

2 The appropriation of Being

2.1. The turning

As long as we stand in the entrance, we will not enter.

Meister Eckehart, *Sermon 37*

It has become clear from the reconstruction of the ontological argument in the last three chapters that Heidegger regards in the period around *Being and Time* being as ‘presencing’ (*anwesen*). Heidegger argues that Greek thought, and the history of metaphysics following in its footsteps, had regarded being as presence (*etwas anwesendes*) and not so much as ‘presencing’, that is to say from its temporal aspect, which we will examine more closely in the next chapter. In the period around *Being and Time* Heidegger interprets ‘presencing’ not as the presencing of the present, i.e. the presence of the mere extant, but as the presence of *Dasein*. Being, as the presence of entities, i.e. their ‘being with’ (*mitsein*), is possible thanks to *Dasein*’s temporal ‘being with’. In other words, Heidegger understands being from presence as presencing in the sense of *Dasein*’s ecstatic temporality as projecting upon *praesenz*. Yet, presence implies from the perspective of *praesenz* also the presence of absence, namely the presence of the futural possibility of *Dasein*’s absence, which is *Dasein*’s death on which it, either fleetingly or resolutely, existentially projects itself. However, formulated this way, the impression might arise that being can simply be equated with *Dasein*. We will show why this cannot be the case and how the conclusion of its discussion points away from *Dasein* towards Being itself.

Being comes to expression in *Being and Time* as the being of *Dasein* and the being of entities that do not have the character of *Dasein*. In the concept of *Dasein* and therefore with the very existence of *Dasein*, the being of entities is always already presupposed. *Dasein* existentially presupposes itself as a being-in-the-world. The world is never an empty form or container, but inhibited by entities

that form a world by their specific way of relating to each other in *Dasein*'s understanding. This implies, in turn, that the concept of *Dasein* presupposes the being of entities that do not have the being of *Dasein*, as the 'facticity' of the entities among and with which *Dasein* exists in a world, which is, in turn, part of *Dasein*'s own facticity as its thrownness in a world. Hence, *Dasein* presupposes being in a broader sense than only its own being precisely in the way it presupposes itself. However, as we will argue in the following paragraphs, neither the understanding of being, nor the being of entities can yield entirely from mere presupposing. Although presupposing is explained as self-supposing in the compartment of self-projection, the being of entities is in the end not so much given, as Heidegger suggests, in the naked 'that' of *Dasein*, but rather as the 'that' of the being of entities.

Now, firstly one should bear in mind that *Dasein* designates the *relation* between entities and the human being. *Dasein* is at the same time regarded as the human being, but always in the way in which it practically relates to entities by being 'with' those entities, outside and beyond itself. As such, Heidegger presumes the ontic, and therefore *Dasein*'s alterity, as entities that can be met, on the one hand, due to the way in which they show themselves from themselves as phenomena and, on the other hand, thanks to *Dasein*'s ecstatic eccentric way of 'being-with' those entities by being always already outside and beyond itself. To put it simple, regardless to which extent *Dasein* is responsible for transcendence, the very concept of transcendence presupposes a beyond of *Dasein*.

Although phenomena and temporal disclosure are, according to *Being and Time*, related by the way in which both form the condition for each other, they are never simply the same, but must be interpreted as a 'meeting' (*Entgegnung*).¹⁸⁶ If not, transcendence as openness and phenomena that show themselves from themselves render meaningless. It is now merely a matter of nuance where the epistemological centre of gravity is located. *Dasein* as an entity encounters inner-worldly entities because it exists 'ontological', i.e. temporal. *Dasein*'s ecstatic existence implies that one has to regard *Dasein* always from its inherent ambiguity. Hence, *Dasein* must be regarded from two places, as an entity that is present and, secondly, in ontological sense, as the open transitive past that is

¹⁸⁶ Compare *Entgegnung* HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 20.

coming towards itself from the open future, thereby en-presenting innerworldly entities. The second sense of *Dasein* signifies its transcendence, which opens *Dasein* for its alterity as *Dasein's* possibility of en-presenting present entities by projecting itself upon *praesenz*. However, initially Heidegger seems to marginalize the role of being that lies beyond *Dasein* in the way he works out the concept of transcendence and, as such, in the phenomenon as phenomenon. This happens most radically in the text *On the Essence of Ground*, written in 1928 shortly after *Being and Time*. In *On the Essence of Ground* (1929), Heidegger distinguishes more radically than metaphysics had done the ontical from the ontological, but he regards at the same time the ontological still to be the presencing of *Dasein's* temporal ways of self-projecting.¹⁸⁷ Although added later, in note 55 of the work Heidegger says that the ontical contexture of tools cannot simply be identified with world. Consequently, being-in-the-world cannot simply mean to be engaged with these tools, since in this regard, transcendence as being-in-the-world, which is the basic constitution of *Dasein*, can never become clear.¹⁸⁸ In other words, *Being and Time* must not be interpreted just as a philosophy of pragmatism, but transcendence and world have to be understood primarily from *Dasein's* temporality. The ontological structure of the being of entities is in as far as it is discovered rather the first characterization of the world phenomenon that had been analysed only to prepare the transcendental problem of world, Heidegger argues. Heidegger now states that this has been the only intention of the analyses of the surrounding world. This had been made sufficient clear, according to Heidegger, by the ordering and structuring of the paragraphs §14-§24. From the whole and perspective of the leading goal, the particular analysis from these paragraphs had therefore only a subordinate significance. Already in the original text of *On the Essence of Ground* Heidegger argues clearly that the phenomenal character of entities has to be sought primarily in the domain of *Dasein* as transcendence. Comporting itself towards entities, *Dasein* projects its world without explicitly grasping that which it projects and casts therefore the projected world over the entities. This casting-over (*Überwurf*) first makes it possible for entities to manifest themselves.¹⁸⁹ *Dasein's* transcendence, as the passing from

¹⁸⁷ *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (1929) in (1919-1961) GA 9.

¹⁸⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Wegmarken*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. GA 9, p. 155.

¹⁸⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 123.

something to something, passes not from *Dasein* to objects, as if *Dasein* were a subject. But *Dasein* rather passes from itself ‘over’ entities towards itself. In a letter addressed to his teacher Hussler concerning the central place of the human being in the project of *Being and Time* Heidegger writes in 1927:

It needs to be shown that the mode of being of the human existence is totally different from all other entities and that it as the one that it is, harbours already in itself the possibility of a transcendental constitution. The transcendental constitution is a key possibility of the existence of the factual self.¹⁹⁰

It remains, however, a question why the aforementioned explanation of transcendence will not be only a more radical form of subjectivism, since *Dasein* transcends not so much to a domain of objects, but towards itself, leaving thereby unclear in what sense *Dasein* is able to leave itself and transcend itself. Heidegger argues that *Dasein* transcends itself in self-anticipation by being the ‘for the sake of’ of its own being. Therefore, it has to be seen which ontological role remains reserved for entities, if their tool-being can in the end not be regarded as that which yields the transcendence of being. Subsequently, Heidegger explains in the same text that entities need to find a possible and occasional entry in the world.¹⁹¹ However, this is something that ‘happens’ (*geschieht*) ‘with’ the entities, pointing therefore at *Dasein*’s temporal ‘being-with’ character. As such, occurrence, i.e. presence is the existing of *Dasein* that as existence ‘transcends’, according to Heidegger. He writes:

Only if, amid entities in their totality, entities come to be ‘more in being’ (*seiender werden*), in the manner of the temporalizing of *Dasein* are there the hours and days of the entry of entities into the world.¹⁹²

It is clear that Heidegger understands being, its understanding and its transcendence not yet from the perspective of Being at large here. Heidegger adds later in the publication of the text in the collected works a note in which he asks:

But *Dasein* and Being itself? Not yet thought, not until *Being and Time*, Part II. *Dasein* belongs to Being itself as the simple onefold of entities and being; the

¹⁹⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Zur Sache des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007. GA 14 p. 131.

¹⁹¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 123.

¹⁹² *Idem* p. 123.

essence of the ‘occurrence’ - temporalizing of temporality as a preliminary name for the truth of Being.¹⁹³

What keeps one from equating being with *Dasein* then? In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger argues that the position of Kant’s transcendental idealism cannot mean that the subject would first create the thing and bring it into being out of its own self.¹⁹⁴ In a like manner, one must be careful of a reification of *Dasein* as some sort of subject thing that brings forth objects or entities. *Dasein* is never given neither to itself, nor to other *Daseins* as an object. Any explanation of subjectivity in terms of something extant signifies the dead end of metaphysics. In contrast, the way *Dasein* is present to itself (*Existenz*) signifies its ontological projection. The transcendental approach of *Being and Time* implies that *Dasein*’s ‘being-with’ cannot merely mean ‘being the same’ or ‘being identical’ with respect to the being of entities, as, in contrast, e.g. holds true in an inauthentic sense for the world and the co-presence (*Mitdasein*) of other *Dasein*’s. Hence, although *Dasein* is regarded in *Being and Time* as the ground of intelligibility, it can never entirely be constitutive for being in as far as the being of entities do not originate in *Dasein*.

With this in mind, the question arises how the existential horizontal ontology from *Being and Time* is altogether different from the position of transcendental idealism; a position that is not sheer idealism and that claims to explain how objects of experience are made possible by means of the action of the human being, who is at once restricted in the ability of determining entities in themselves. *Prima facie*, the response would be that Heidegger would emphasize how subject and object meet each other by means of temporality in practical action, instead of a cognitive act of judgment. In other words, the principal of transcendence is temporality, instead of a synthesis yielding from the subject. Moreover, the subject-object structure is, in Heidegger’s view, not the basic structure of ontology, whence all other relations first should be regarded. On the contrary, care as being-in-the-world should instead be taken as starting point.

However, as far as Kant is concerned, the practical first enables the theoretical as well. Theoretical reason is in the final analysis grounded in practical

¹⁹³ Idem footnote a, p. 123.

¹⁹⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. p. 317.

reason. Firstly, in as far as theoretical judgement brings objects of experience under concepts of understanding, which is in itself an act. Secondly, in as far as the context of theoretical reason points to practical reason. Theoretical reason is part of pure reason, which goal is ultimately practical, according to Kant. Heidegger emphasises that Kant does not explain how theoretical and practical reason are related. More precisely, Kant omits an explanation of the way in which concepts of thought apply to the world of experience, or in other words, the way the faculty of understanding is related to the faculty of intuition.¹⁹⁵ According to Heidegger, Kant only suggests that both ways of representing must be founded in the faculty of imagination, leaving the faculty of imagination, however, without foundation. Imagination is, according to Heidegger, in turn, only possible not because of a rational subject, but because of *Dasein*'s ecstatic temporality.¹⁹⁶ Concerning Kant Heidegger writes: "The transcendental action of the faculty of imagination is grasped as the synthetic influence of understanding on inner intuition, i.e. time."¹⁹⁷

Although Heidegger admits that his interpretation of Kant has like any other philosophical interpretation a violent character, the alleged omission of the relation between the faculties of reason in the work of Kant is simply incorrect.¹⁹⁸ Perhaps not by means of providing a foundation of the faculty of imagination, but in the *Transcendental Doctrine of Method* from *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) Kant most certainly motivates how practical reason and theoretical reason are related.¹⁹⁹ Theoretical reason is possible because of transcendental knowledge of transcendental principals and the activity of those principles is in broad sense called 'pure reason', as expressed in the title of the work. Hence, imagination and pure forms of intuition, viz. time and space, belong to pure reason as well. Pure reason is the unity of all rational faculties. As a method, pure reason is primarily negative, because it has a limiting and restricting use.²⁰⁰ In general, negative statements do not expand our knowledge, but prevent one from

¹⁹⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991 GA 3 167.

¹⁹⁶ Idem p. 202.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J New York: State University of New York Press, 1996 p. 138.

¹⁹⁷ Idem p. 164.

¹⁹⁸ Idem p. XVII, 3, 202, 302.

¹⁹⁹ *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781).

²⁰⁰ KANT, I. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998. B737, p. 760.

errors, Kant argues. Reason restricts one's temper, discursive reasoning and imagination. According to Kant, it is reason's indignation that it has to be disciplined and restricted with respect to its speculations.²⁰¹ However, somewhat Baron von Münchhauseneseque, Kant argues also that it is at the same time reason's elevation (*Erhebung*) that it is able to fulfil this task by itself. Reason is therefore in the court of reason, the metaphor Kant uses to typify the project of *The Critique of Pure Reason*, the judge and at once the judged. Kant calls the collection of all a priori principles concerning the correct use of any faculty of cognition the 'canon' of pure reason. But if such a positive canon exists at all, it is only by means of the practical use of reason, since the discipline of pure reason is in a restricting and regulating sense purely negative, according to Kant. One can clearly see here how Hegel's notion of negative determination and Heidegger's notion of 'projecting upon absence', rendering afterwards in the concept of 'concealing clearing', are already prepared in the works of Kant. But to resume, since every practical use always anticipates a futural goal, the question arises concerning the ultimate goal of pure reason in Kant's transcendental edifice. The unifying element of reason and therefore the unity of theoretical and practical reason consists, according to Kant, in the 'use' of reason and the way reason anticipates its ultimate goal. As it turns out, the ultimate goal of pure reason has a threefold character. Pure reason has three speculative goals: the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God.²⁰² The goals are speculative (*specere*: to look at, view) in the sense that they guide the glance without being itself an object that comes into view, or making the glance, in the sense of an objective experience, first possible. The three goals have a negative character in as much as they discipline reason. The speculated goals form the intentionality of the subject as the way in which it is directed towards objects, however, without creating them or making them first intelligible. Kant argues therefore that in order to have objective knowledge, one can do without the ideas of speculative reason. Unlike the categories of understanding, the three ideas do not necessarily make experience intelligible and are therefore in strict sense not necessary for objective knowledge. However, this does not mean that they are not part of science in broad sense as an anthropological phenomenon. Speculative

²⁰¹ Idem B824, p. 830.

²⁰² Idem B826, p. 833.

reason and thus the speculative ideas first have a practical instead of a theoretical goal. They transcend objective knowledge and describe the way reason in practical sense has to go beyond objectivity. Reason must go beyond objectivity. Firstly, in ethical sense, in as much as the human being is not always able to oversee objectively the consequences of his actions, but must act nonetheless. Reason is thereby in need of an orientation that cannot have an objective nature again, but which must be of a guiding nature. Secondly, reason must go beyond objectivity for the sake of the rational integrity of the faculties of reason in order to avoid conflicting, i.e. irrational goals of the sub-faculties. Reason follows therefore not merely the law of non-contradiction, but is orientated, fairly in Heidegger's terms, by a projection of being in terms God, soul and freedom. This means that also the pursuit of theoretical knowledge must be guided by these ideas. For example, one could ask why one should pursuit truth as objectivity and not provide one's neighbour or oneself with false truths. According to Kant, pure reason anticipates in the end the practical situation wherein one asks oneself: 'What must one do assumed that these three ideas are true?'. Theoretical reason depends just like practical reason on pure reason and is therefore in some sense led back to practical reason, in as much as the three ideas turn out to be practical moral imperatives of pure reason, wherein theoretical reason is finally situated as well. Kant speaks therefore of the primacy of pure practical reason. This means that the rational driven enterprise for objective knowledge is in itself to be regarded not as an objective, but as a normative element of the human being. The need of objectivity is a scientific attitude. It is not first made possible by the speculative goals, but from the perspective of the integrity of reason, as part of the human compartment in broad sense, nevertheless, moved and guided by these practical ideas. In other words, it is possible to distinguish within practical reason between the objective and the ideal. This means that objective knowledge is to be seen in the transcendental light of theoretical reason, both enabling and delimiting objects of experience, which, in turn, must be regarded as a part of pure reason that is in itself nothing but a practice and, as such, part of practical reason. Hence, rational beings always experience something as something by means of disciplined and restricted speculation. Conceptualizing, or to bring an object of experience under a concept, means to restrict it as the conceptual determination in view of the totality of what is regarded as reasonable in which the subject finally

seeks its own rational integrity. Since the human experience is finite, he must help himself with re-presenting objects in view of its subjectivity and the goals of subjectivity as the rationality of schematic understanding, in order to make these objects intelligible as far as transcendental understanding is concerned and, secondly, to make oneself intelligible in its integrity as pure reason enabled, in turn, by pure reason. Precisely because the mere transcendental understanding of objects of experience is insufficient for human beings to act in a world, because the objective world provides no orientation or sense of history, reason must provide and contain in itself guiding ideas that transcend the world and provide time with a sense and direction. Kant is therefore one of the first thinkers outlining a philosophy of history.

Kant's transcendental idealism presupposes things in themselves, and although ontologically marginalized, their co-participation in transcendence is already presupposed in order to avoid sheer idealism. Therefore, what has to be explained by Kant is not so much how faculties are related, which Kant indeed elaborates, but the relation between man and the being of its alterity. The former comes precisely to expression in Kant's difficulties with the proof of the outer world and the ambiguity of the concept of things-in-themselves, which, on the one hand, are thought as stimulus, which means that causality must in some sense be ascribed to them intrinsically, while on the other hand, causality ought to be regarded as a category of transcendental understanding. Here it becomes evident that already Kant presumes the being of entities in the process of transcendence without justifying this assumption. To assert that one meets entities by the way one acts in view of a self-understanding in relation to the world by going beyond the world, lacks ultimately explanatory power concerning the origin of the being of entities. The notion of things in themselves is nothing but another name for the ancient Greek concept of *apeiron*; the absolute, or Being at large. What reason has Kant to assume the existence of the absolute, albeit being unknowable? A matter which Hegel subsequently sought to solve by arguing that a being in itself is still a being for us, i.e. part of the conceptual (*begriff*). At any rate, just as much as realism or idealism, transcendental idealism lacks foundation.

In contrast, Heidegger's concept of being-in-the-world ought to provide an intelligible alternative for the concept of transcendence as the practical temporal way in which self and world are related. Heidegger thinks that instead of having

speculative goals, it is purposeful self-presupposing by means of temporal self-projection that makes it possible for the human to dwell and act in a world. The only place where Heidegger mentions Kant's ideas of speculative reason in relation to the unity of reason is in the text *On the Essence of Ground*. Heidegger does not mention here an omission in Kant's ontological epistemology anymore. But while strongly emphasizing in the process of transcendence the role of *Dasein* over the phenomenological role of the being of entities, Heidegger takes a stance that is considerable closer to Kant than his initial transcendental stance from *Being and Time*.²⁰³

Heidegger would confess again in *Contributions to Philosophy* that the way he worked out a more original version of the transcendental project in its unity, through an exposition of the transcendental imagination in the *Kant Book* had a violent character.²⁰⁴ Heidegger asserts here that his interpretation was of course 'historiologically' incorrect, but it has been essentially 'historically'. This means that the interpretation had been a preparation in the development of a history of Being. One should regard therefore, like all Heidegger's interpretations, his Kant interpretation as an integral element of his philosophy. From this perceptive, Heidegger's problematization of the notion of time in the works of Kant must obviously be regarded as an important contribution. In a genuine interpretation violence is inevitable, according to Heidegger. He writes:

Every interpretation must certainly not only be able to let the case derive from the text, it must also without insisting, imperceptibly, give something genuine to it from its case. This addition is that which the layman, measured to what he takes without interpretation to be the content of the text, necessarily criticises as an arbitrarily way of reading something into the text.²⁰⁵

Pushing the argument further from the perspective of the case itself, one could argue that Heidegger as well acknowledges that one's actions are guided by the idea of immortality in as far as *Dasein* has fallen prey to the world and exists first of all as the 'everyman'. Secondly, Heidegger presupposes freedom in *Being and Time* as well in as far as *Dasein* understands itself as freely existing for its

²⁰³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 117.

²⁰⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 199.

²⁰⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsches Metaphysik, Einleitung in die philosophie: Denken und Dichten*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990. p. 9.

own possibilities and ultimately its own-most possibility of being released to the possibility of its own death, which has, however, never an objective character. *Dasein* presumes as a projecting entity its freedom within the limits of thrownness. Moreover, after *Being and Time*, Heidegger regards Being, the notion that leads all his questioning, in terms of freedom itself. Thirdly, to relate to the ‘Godhead’ is also in Heidegger’s view an inevitable tendency of the human existence, which is, as a poetic projection, never an objective affair as well. However, after the mid-thirties Heidegger starts to emphasize that language and the ground, in contrast to reason and rationality, should be located in and from the domain of Being instead of the domain of the human being where Kant had located them and Heidegger initially as well. Finally, in what sense would the assertion that *Dasein* exists and makes its choices for the sake of itself be altogether different from the notion of man as a goal in itself? Obviously, it is precisely in the elaboration of time as temporality that Heidegger pursues a significant step beyond Kant. We will conclude our comparison here with the words of Cassirer addressed to Heidegger in Davos: “I have to confess that I have found in Heidegger more of a Neo-Kantian than I had expected.”²⁰⁶ At the same time, we should in the context of Heidegger’s thinking be careful with claims of influence in philosophy.²⁰⁷ Heidegger writes:

It is with these great ones always at all a mistake to try to work out in detail who said what first and influenced the others, because only those who are great and open themselves can become truly influenced. True influence is therefore extremely rare, while the common understanding certainly thinks that everything is influenced by everything. This is also correct where everything is just small and mediocre and excluded from the great.²⁰⁸

Conclusively, whether in Kant’s transcendental idealism or in the transcendental existential ontology from *Being and Time*, a gap remains between the ontological and the epistemological. This would in particular be a failure with respect to the aim of the project of *Being and Time* that in the development of a fundamental ontology asks about the meaning of being, instead of the mere

²⁰⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991 GA 3 p. 274.

²⁰⁷ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin’s Hymne Der Ister*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1984. p. 62.

²⁰⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. p. 85.

conditions for knowledge in the form of a priori synthetic judgments. In other words, with what right can Heidegger ascribe to the ontical its self-employed phenomenal character, if neither substantive, nor subjective, nor merely by means of *Dasein*'s transcendental projections imposed on the world?

One could argue that Heidegger merely presupposes the being of entities in *Being and Time* like Kant had presupposed things in themselves. Surely, the ontic, as the mere extant, points in the failure of the functionality of gear; the break of the inconspicuousness of the world, negatively away from the world towards *Dasein* as the goal of all functionality and the ontological counterpart of the ontological difference. As such, being comes only into view from the perspective of the being of *Dasein*. Yet, the being of entities can never be equated with the being of *Dasein*, which leaves the being of the ontical therefore beyond the limits of *Dasein*'s finitude. Hence, the human being as the starting-point for ontology, which actually never had been regarded as single starting point, but a relation as the 'inbetween', falls short in the quest of Being. Heidegger would later understand this inbetween as an insertion (*Fügung, einfügen, Eingerücktsein*) of Being.²⁰⁹ Distancing himself from the transcendental approach he writes: "But all conditioning is abysmally different from the appropriating event (*Er-eignis*)."²¹⁰

In a dialogue on language between a Japanese and an inquirer from *On the Way to Language* (1959) Heidegger reflects on the course of his own thinking. Heidegger says here that being and language have been the central themes of his questioning since the beginning and cites from Hölderlin's poem *The Rhine*: "For as you began, so you will remain", hinting at the circularity of a starting point.²¹¹ Heidegger writes:

Reflection on language and on Being has determined my path of thinking from early on, therefore their discussion has stayed as far as possible in the background. The fundamental flaw of the book *Being and Time* is perhaps that I ventured forth too far too early.²¹²

²⁰⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p. 81, 303, 308, 335.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Besinnung*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997 GA 66 p. 53, 97, 100.

²¹⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 193.

²¹¹ *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (1950-1959) GA 12.

Der Rhein (The Rhine)

HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. p. 7.

²¹² Idem p. 7.

The passage shows how Heidegger had understood the question of Being as his only original question. The expression ‘their discussion’ must refer to the relation of Being and language, since the matter of Being, as such, has not stayed in particular far in the background. Clearly, Heidegger criticises here the project of *Being and Time* mainly from the perspective of language in which, as we will see, particularly the metaphysical determination of language will become problematic. We will examine the turning in relation to language more closely in chapter 2.3.

Eventually, it becomes apparent in the failure of a transcendental approach of ontology that it is not only *Dasein* that is sought and presupposed from the beginning. That which is presupposed in the ontical that shows itself from itself as phenomenon, is neither merely the presence of the ontical, nor it being present solely thanks to *Dasein*. That which is ontologically sought and presupposed since the beginning is nothing but being itself, to which *Dasein* in retrospection had only been preliminarily and provisionally disclosed as access and horizon. One should recall that the original question of *Being and Time* concerns the meaning of ‘being’ instead of the mere meaning of *Da-sein*. *Dasein* is in the end, albeit an exceptional one, solely a mode of being. Being remains therefore always presupposed in the term ‘*Da-sein*’.

Hence, the ontical in as far as it is ‘out there’, standing over, present, possible to meet and even able to show itself from itself, has to be more radically distinguished from the ontological in the restricted sense of *Dasein*’s temporality. But how is the being of the ontical regarded if no longer from the perspective of *Dasein*? Obviously, the answer must be that it has to be regarded from Being. Therefore, also the openness of the clearing must not be regarded only from the perspective of the human being, but primarily from Being as the transcending and mediating element between man and entities. Hence, Being must be regarded as the ‘inbetween’ instead of *Dasein*. Heidegger writes between 1938 and 1940:

Being is appropriation (*Ereignis*). It has no ground, thus it is the essential abyss of the in between of appropriation.²¹³

²¹³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 134.

That where *Dasein* transcends towards, in contrast with the being of *Dasein* and which had initially been understood as the being of the ontic, must be regarded now as nothing but Being itself. However, from this perspective, we must assert that the ontic, the being of entities and the being of *Dasein* all belong first to Being. In the same way, the gap between Being and the human being, the impossibility to determine and originate beings in themselves, has to be regarded from Being itself as the ‘abyss’ of Being, as Heidegger expresses in the citation above. Even by the most radical rejection of subjectivism, the ontology from *Being and Time* must in the end conclude the failure of *Dasein* as constitutive element of being and thereby the failure of a fundamental ontology. This means that a transcendental horizon can never be thought as an ultimate origin. The ontical as ontical or being qua being, consist not in the fact that entities are present, as the presence of the being of entities, or the way in which entities are mediated by *Dasein* towards *Dasein*, but, in contrast, consists solely in the granting nature of Being itself. Heidegger will henceforth call this granting nature of ‘Being itself’ the ‘truth of Being’. In the shift of ontological focus on *Dasein* to Being, the question of the meaning of being transforms into the question concerning the truth of Being. Now, the whole ontological scheme becomes reversed in a radicalisation of the failure of *Dasein*’s original futural self-regression regarded as constitutive element. *Dasein* will, in Heidegger’s later reflections, no longer anticipate only itself, but the advent of Being.

Solely based upon the line of argumentation of *Being and Time*, one can conclude already at the end of the work that the meaning of being must remain permanently obscured, if *Dasein*, as the temporal horizon, is fundamentally finite and therefore the perspective on being principally limited. At the same time, Being, as the being of the entities, does not coincide with the being of *Dasein*, thereby transcending *Dasein*’s finitude. Being must therefore itself be concealed. The horizon remains finite, but its limit withdraws itself from *Dasein* instead of *Dasein* simply being unable to transcend it. It is therefore not first of all *Dasein* that must be presupposed, but it is Being that had been presupposed since the start of Heidegger’s ontological project and more precisely in the notion of the being of entities. If the presupposition of Being remains grounded in the presuppositions of *Dasein*, subjectivity remains inevitable. If the presupposition of Being remains bound to the being of entities, the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time* would

have failed to make a step beyond metaphysics. This gives rise to the question how being comes into view if neither by means of the being of entities nor by means of *Dasein*. In Heidegger's view from the period after *Being and Time*, the purport of his magnum opus consists precisely in its failure of founding ontology and metaphysics, as expressed in the experience of 'bottomlessness'; the oblivion of Being. Precisely in the experience of the oblivion of Being 'as oblivion', thinking can open itself for Being and turn itself towards Being, according to Heidegger after the turning.

Consequently, the being of the ontical becomes in Heidegger's thinking radically distinguished from the ontic. The being of the ontical designates not the ontical qua ontic, but the ontical belongs instead to Being. Hence, the being of the entity has to be regarded from Being as well. Heidegger writes: "Then Being is not the other in relation to entities, but is it itself the entities and it only."²¹⁴ This means, however, neither that Being is an entity nor the sublation of the ontological difference, but only that the being of entities means that entities are the entities of Being.

If the ontical is the present that is radically differentiated from Being, Being must be divided from it by an abyss by being itself absolute absent. From this perspective, *Being and Time* is still metaphysical in as far as it suggests that the presence of the ontical is enabled and grounded by the ontological entity *Dasein*. Although being is regarded to be possible because of the ontic-ontological existence of *Dasein* instead of its mere ontical presence, this exceptional mode of being nevertheless belongs to an entity. In other words, *Being and Time* still prioritizes the present in as far as the being of entities belongs to entities, which is also the case with the entity *Dasein*. Moreover, as we have mentioned before, Heidegger writes explicitly in *Being and Time*: "Being is always the being of an entity".²¹⁵

Hence, the original quest for a positive notion of the unity in the manifold meaning of being has to be given up, when Being bifurcates ambiguously in presence and absence. Accordingly, Heidegger writes in *Basic Concepts* (1941) that Being is both the emptiest and abundance, the most general and also singular

²¹⁴ Idem p. 53.

²¹⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 7.

(*Einzig*), the most comprehensible and at once concealment, both the most exhausted (*Abgegriffenste*) and the origin, the most abandoned and also the abyss, the most uttered and at once held back (*Verschweigung*), both the most forgotten and the commemorated, the most binding (*Verzingendste*) and at once the release (*Befreiung*).²¹⁶ While in *Being and Time* ambiguity had been counted among curiosity and idle talk, as a moment of *Dasein*'s way of being fallen-prey-to-the-word that covers *Dasein*'s authentic structure, ambiguity forms after *Being a Time* a structural feature of Being's presencing, and, as such, an essential feature of Being.²¹⁷

Heidegger 'turns' or returns therefore, as we will see, after *Being and Time* to a more original notion of being.²¹⁸ 'Being' cannot mean 'presence' any longer, neither in metaphysical sense, nor in the sense of *Dasein*'s presencing as temporality. Heidegger starts to write being therefore in a crossed out manner to express its absolute negative sense.²¹⁹ He writes in *On the Question of Being* (1955):²²⁰

If a turning (*Zuwendung*) belongs to 'being' and indeed in such a way that the latter resides in the former, then 'being' dissolves into the turning.²²¹

Heidegger will start to write a history of the concealment of Being analogues, as is often compared, to Hegel's history of spirit. But whereas, according to Hegel, being as spirit travels from absence to presence, Heidegger lets Being return from nothingness back to nothingness. This means that any positive meaning of being implodes by the way absent Being, through its presence within the human being, turns back towards its absent and concealed self. Presence is therefore, as the instant, the momentary lightning of darkness, yielding from concealment, returning to concealment. As such, Being in its full spectrum can no longer mean presence. In the turning, Being makes a journey from its

²¹⁶ *Grundbegriffe* (1941) GA 51.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Grundbegriffe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981 GA 51 VII.

²¹⁷ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 166.

²¹⁸ Compare *Basic Questions of Philosophy: selected problems of logic*. trans. Rojcewicz, R., Schuwer, A. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. p. 44.

²¹⁹ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Wegmarken*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. p. 370, note d.

²²⁰ *Zur Seinsfrage* (1955) in *Wegmarken* (1919-1961) GA 9.

²²¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *On the question of Being* in *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 310.

oblivion towards the safekeeping of the ‘presencing’ of Being, i.e. the way in which past and future hold back in concealment that which is yet to come as futural having-beenness. As such, Being waltzes from nothingness to presence to nothingness.

In view of the foregoing, the question of Being must understandably yield from the matter of its own question, i.e. Being itself. Likewise, the sense of being must prompt from its essence. That which is present is in a certain sense evident and will not provoke an aporia or be an object of philosophical wonder, because its answer would already be given by its extantness. However, Being is not being; not presence; not present; neither in metaphysical otherworldly sense, nor as the temporal presencing of *Dasein*. Likewise, the later Heidegger admits that the attempt to arrive from the existentiell to the existential is insufficient.²²² The turning yields not from presence, but from Being itself. “The clearing-concealing turning point of the turning is the openness of the truth of Being”, Heidegger argues in *Contributions to Philosophy*.²²³ This openness is itself, however, not present.

The former dynamics of Being has been determined by Heidegger in the text entitled *The Turning* from 1949 as what he had called the ‘in-turning’ (*Einkehr*) of Being into ‘what ever is’, also called a turning ‘homewards’ of Being back to itself.²²⁴ Being turns into the entity as what it is not, namely present. As such, the entity is the presence of absence, wherein absence becomes present to itself as absence and, as such, returns back home to itself. The turning of Being in and from its absence is nothingness that by means of its presencing turns back to nothingness, which is, however, not nothing and therefore called by Heidegger a ‘nihilating’ (*nichten*). Heidegger argues in *The Turning* that Being turns about into the oblivion of its presencing, turns away from this presencing, and in that way simultaneously turns counter to the truth of its presencing.²²⁵ In its presencing, Being conceals itself and is therefore at the same time responsible for the oblivion of Being. However, this turning brings, according to Heidegger, also the

²²² HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 194.

²²³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p. 29.

²²⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *The turning*. in *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977. p. 41.

²²⁵ Idem p. 41.

possibility of a turning in which the oblivion belonging to the presencing of Being will turn itself so that, with the turning, the truth of the presencing of Being will expressly turn in, turn homeward, into whatever is.²²⁶ This means that Being and entities can only be what they are when Being awakes its own questioning in the human being, who, in turn, must respond to Being - in contrast with the attempt of metaphysics and technological thinking of presencing Being - by letting Being turn homeward as that which Being is, concealed i.e. not present. Heidegger writes in this regard:

The origin is only originating, if thinking itself and the human being in its essence thinks originally.²²⁷

Hence, being must be experienced in its oblivion in order to let Being turn homewards into the safekeeping of its concealment. To put it simply, Being can, according to Heidegger, only be what it is, in as far as it is appropriate at all to assert that Being 'is', when Being grants the human being the experience of Being, not only as the presencing of Being, but also as its concealment, i.e. is the oblivion of Being as oblivion. When the oblivion will be experienced as oblivion, Being remains not merely in oblivion, but turns 'homeward' as the way Being grants the human being the possibility of letting Being be, namely as presencing 'and' concealing. The human being must thoughtfully experience in the turning 'essencing' (*wesen*) both as presencing (*anwesen*) and nihilation (*abwesen*). In this regard, Heidegger asserts six years later that in the turning the sense of being has returned and been taken up (*ist aufgegangen*) into its essence.²²⁸ Heidegger argues that a thoughtful look ahead (*denkenden Vorblick*) into this original realm (*Bereich*) of being can lead to writing 'being' only in the following way: ~~being~~. The crossing out has initially only a preventive role, to prevent that being will be represented as something standing somewhere on its own that then on occasion first comes face-to-face with human beings, Heidegger explains. Words provoke us to think that that which they gather in their saying has always been the case and suggest ineradicably a constant presence of that which is named. Heidegger experienced the same problem concerning static language in relation to the

²²⁶ Idem p. 41.

²²⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 p. 249.

²²⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Of the question of Being in Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 310.

dynamics of thought as Plato described in his seventh letter, as we have discussed in the first chapter. Subsequently, Heidegger argues that presence as the presencing of Being is turned (*wendet sich*) toward the human essence, wherein such turning first finds its consummation (*Vollendung*) insofar as the human essence thoughtfully commemorates (*gedenkt*) this turning.²²⁹ Heidegger argues that the human being is essentially the thoughtful remembrance (*Gedächtnis*) of Being, that is to say of ~~being~~. Heidegger writes:

Presence (*An-wesen*) is grounded in the turning (*Zuwendung*) that, as such, turns the human essence in toward it (*in sich verwendet*), so that this essence may expend itself (*für sie sich verschwende*) for such turning.²³⁰

Hence, the presence of entities must be regarded as the way Being is turned towards the human being. More clearly, Heidegger states later in his well known interview with *Der Spiegel* from 1966 that Being needs man, as the clearing, for its revelation, protection and structuring.²³¹ After the turning, the human being will continue to have an exceptional place among other entities. The human being belongs uniquely to Being insofar its being is ‘drawn out’ of such belongingness as his understanding of being, according to Heidegger. Heidegger will call the human being now the ‘deputy’ (*Statthalter*) of the projection of Being.²³² At one point he asserts that the ‘stewardship’ (*Wächterschaft*) of the truth of Being constitutes the essence of the human being that is grasped ‘only’ out of Being.²³³ Thanks to language man is the ‘witness’ of Being, Heidegger declares at another point.²³⁴ More prevalently, Heidegger will call the human being the ‘shepherd’ of Being.²³⁵ The human being is now regarded as the one that is appropriated by Being itself for the sake of the grounding of its truth. Heidegger writes:

²²⁹ Idem p. 310.

Compare Heidegger on ‘consummation’ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 309.

²³⁰ Idem p. 311.

²³¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Interview with der Spiegel*. in *The Heidegger Reader*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009. p. 326.

²³² Compare Heidegger on the *polis* in chapter 3.10.

²³³ Idem p. 393.

²³⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 62.

²³⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977. p. 42

HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 260.

As so appropriated, the human being is consigned to Being, and such consignment indicates the preserving and grounding of this human essence in that which human beings themselves must first make their explicit property.²³⁶

Hence, the appropriating of the human existence must be regarded from the appropriation of Being by Being.

Conclusively, we have found in the turning four turning moments, which, however, should not be regarded in a linear way, but rather as four dynamics of Being in relation to time that has its say as the appropriating event. The moments constitute the ecstatic character of Being itself. Firstly, the turning of Being towards the human being in the presencing of Being as the way in which Being grants being, as presence and essence, to entities in the openness of the clearing, which is man. Secondly, the way Being in the concealment of its presencing turns away from the human being fostering the oblivion of Being. Thirdly, the turning of man when called towards Being by Being, away from the oblivion of Being as the ‘commemoration’ of Being’s concealment. Fourthly, the in-turning of Being as its turning homewards, back into the safekeeping (*bergung*) of its concealment and ‘into whatever is’.

Before crossing out the term being, Heidegger already refers to the negative sense of Being in 1934, when he writes for the first time on the poetry of Hölderlin in *Hölderlin’s Hymns Germania and the Rhine* (1934-1935) by spelling the word in an archaic way as ‘*Seyn*’, whereas ‘*Sein*’ would be the common German spelling.²³⁷ The spelling of Being as *Seyn*, suggests a more originary notion than the metaphysical sense of being as the presence of the being of entities. Whether this way of spelling is derived from Schelling or Hölderlin remains a matter of speculation, since Heidegger does not comment on the issue. At any rate, the way of spelling appears for the first time in his writings on Hölderlin.²³⁸ Hitherto, we have spelled Being as *Seyn* consequently with a capital letter and the notion designates radically the absent and obscured meaning of being.

In the above paragraphs we have merely stipulated the meaning of the turning, which we will examine more closely now. Firstly, what does the former

²³⁶ Idem p. 393

²³⁷ Hölderlin’s *Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’* (1934-1935) GA 39.

²³⁸ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. on Schelling and ‘*Seyn*’ *Wass heisst denken?*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002. GA 8 p. 95.

mean with respect to time? Could we motivate the shift of focus on *Dasein* to Being more profoundly from the notion of time as the linchpin of Heidegger's ontology, which has been the leading element of our ontological reconstruction hitherto?

An objection and reply concerning the ontological primacy of temporality is already to be found in *Being in Time*. Heidegger opposes time as temporality by asking:

But, in spite of my no longer being there, 'does time not go on?' And can there not be an unlimited number of things that still lie 'in the future' and arrive from it?²³⁹

Time as endless time is an inauthentic notion of time, according to Heidegger in *Being and Time*. Endless time is never my time and therefore nobody's time. Hence, endless time is never authentically *Dasein*'s time, which is principally finite, regardless whether *Dasein* exists accordingly or not. Consequently, Heidegger asks how one knows that time after one dies will continue on and concludes that this knowledge must firstly be handed over to us in existential time, i.e. in the context of care. The concept of endless time must therefore be considered from the perspective of one's being-towards-death. Only as such, a mortal being can think of the time after his death and, subsequently, time that lingers on endlessly. Endless time must therefore be a 'derived' concept, Heidegger argues.

However, what is at issue is not so much endless time as eternity, whereof one has indeed neither logical nor empirical certainty, let alone a phenomenological lead. But what is verily at issue is time that surpasses one's authentic temporality. Is it possible that time shows itself phenomenologically within *Dasein*'s finite temporality in a way in which it exceeds *Dasein*'s finite horizon, without being a mere derivation or having necessarily an inauthentic character? *Dasein* transcends itself by the way it in its en-presenting ecstatically 'stands out' and 'stands open' to the world as projecting upon *praesenz*, i.e. presence in broad sense including the presence of absence. If it is possible that *Dasein* can truly 'be' with other entities, can it also truly experience another time than its own authentic finite time?

²³⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 303.

Surely, this possibility has to be ruled out from the perspective of *Being and Time* and in a derived sense be characterized as 'inauthentic world-time'. *Dasein's* temporality means that it transcends itself, however, always only within the limits of its finitude. Hence, time beyond finite temporality can be nothing but derived from temporality, which is the only 'original' time. Time beyond finite temporality must be assigned to one's vulgar understanding of time, which is, ontologically speaking, at once the misunderstanding of temporality as originary time.

Nevertheless, one can ask: In which time is *Dasein* factually thrown? Or in other words, from which time is *Dasein* factually thrown into temporality? *Dasein's* thrownness, whether authentic or inauthentic, can never be a temporal self-projection. Its thrownness must at the same time be the condition for both *Dasein's* ontical presence and ontological presencing. To put it simply, birth, whether as possibility or occurrence is never a self-projection of the self, which is only afterwards born out of that birth. However, thrownness signifies in *Being and Time* precisely *Dasein's* inability to project itself freely, that is to say infinitely, which holds true for the moment of its birth, but at the same time for every moment of being in the world that is already conditioned by facticity. Hence, one could reply that our critique seems to regard thrownness in a rather linear or causal way and, secondly, that *Dasein's* thrownness, consists merely in the meaning of its finite begin in relation to its end, as the in-between character of *Dasein's* birth and death that is taken into account by *Dasein* in all its ways of projecting. In other words, one should distinguish symbolic death from actual death, like symbolic birth from actual birth, that is to say, we should distinguish the meaning of the possibilities and impossibilities of *Dasein's* existence from the actual possible. However, this would not be a sufficient reply, since one cannot satisfy oneself with the mere meaning of *Dasein*, since existence is not merely a semantic issue, but ought to be precisely an ontological matter in *Being and Time*. In other words, the mere meaning of *Dasein* as mortality leaves open the question concerning the origin of temporality.

Again one can see the ambiguity of *Dasein* as singular *Dasein* and collective *Dasein*. Singular *Dasein* exists between its birth and death. Collective *Dasein* surpasses that period and signifies, as such, *Dasein* in an inauthentic sense. We might ascribe the history of metaphysics to inauthentic world time, but

would the same hold true for the complete way in which the tradition is historically handed over? What to think of art and poetry, for example? Ought they to be considered from inauthentic world time as well?

Furthermore, is in-authentic *Dasein* merely derived from authentic *Dasein* as world time is derived from temporality? At any rate, this cannot be the case. *Dasein* 'is' and exists foremostly in-authentically and fallen prey-to-the-world. Moreover, authentic and inauthentic *Dasein* are equi-primordial, according to the ontology of *Being and Time*. A relation of equi-primordiality can never be regarded as derivation.

Again we ask: In what time is *Dasein* thrown into the world? In what time is it possible for the horizon of temporality to come into play? How would this be possible from the perspective of *Being and Time*? In other words, how does temporality relates to that which transcends the human horizon, which one cannot understand otherwise than Being?

Heidegger argues in *Being and Time* that history is possible because of *Dasein*. Stones, plants and animals have no history. Only in reference to *Dasein* they can enter history. *Dasein* is the only temporal being that is dwelling historically in a world. But should Heidegger not admit, without determining *Dasein* necessarily and immediately in an inauthentic sense, that just as *Dasein* lives as the being that will come to an end one day, *Dasein* equally originally comes precisely not to an end in as far as *Dasein* has offspring, moreover, is itself its own offspring and at once the historical transmission of tradition? Heidegger says already in *Being and Time* that *Dasein* has not yet come to an end after its physical death in as far as it is still an object of care of other *Daseins* in terms of burial, mourning and remembrance. Thus authentic *Dasein* that has passed away has not left the world yet. This means that the care of *Dasein* by means of the care of the co-presence of other *Daseins* transcends *Dasein*'s own authentic existence between birth and death. Or in other words, the meaning of *Dasein*'s death is not its biological death. Due to the ambiguity of singular and collective *Dasein*, existence (*Existenz*) and co-presence (*Mitdasein*), *Dasein* cannot be related only to the poles of birth and death of singular *Dasein*. Hence, one could ask if one should conclude that the co-presence of others must be regarded from the perspective of existence (*Existenz*) by definition as inauthentic. Are these others merely everybody and nobody? It is important to realize that the distinction

between authentic and in-authentic being corresponds respectively with the ontological self-disclosure of *Dasein* and the ontological covering of the possibility of self-transparency.

Should Heidegger not admit that inauthentic world time must be just as original as finite time in terms of temporality as being-towards-death, instead of understanding world-time merely as a derivation? Heidegger will admit this from the mid-thirties on precisely by the way he consequently refers to *Dasein* as the ‘people’. However, the people is not necessarily a inauthentic notion like the everyman. In the concept of *Dasein* as the people, authenticity and in-authenticity are not principally distinguished, since the essence of the people as a collective is first regarded as ‘poetic’. The distinction between authentic and inauthentic *Dasein* will be worked out by the distinction between mortals and gods, two ‘existentials’ or ways of existence that by their opposing relatedness determine *Dasein* as *Dasein*, i.e. in its authenticity.²⁴⁰ We shall examine the poetic nature of the people more thoroughly in chapter 3.6 and 3.7.

Consequently, one can ask: what is the time of the people? Is it based solely on the notion of being-towards-death or does it equally mean relating to birth and origin, and not necessarily only one’s own birth, as Hannah Arendt argues? One can think, for instance, of the way in which people commemorate existence by celebrating birthdays. In other words, why is *Dasein*’s way of relating to its own finitude not equally explored in *Being and Time* from the perspective of relating to its origin as an essential feature of human existence? From the perspective of *Being and Time* one could reply that existential time has the future as the first phenomenon and, as such, death is what is up. Since and due to its birth, *Dasein* is a being-towards-death. However, as it turns out in Heidegger’s reflections, it is impossible to think of temporality without a notion of origin.

From the perspective of the turning, Being in relation to time as the history of Being, the origin and therefore in existential sense beginning as birth, gain more relevance. The later Heidegger writes: “Death is the downfall (*Untergang*) and that is the highest origin, the outermost concealment, it is Being.”²⁴¹

Like Heidegger in *Being and Time* had regarded temporality as occurring

²⁴⁰ Compare Heidegger on the existential nature of the gods HEIDEGGER, M. *Seminare*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1986 GA 15 p. 180.

²⁴¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 139.

from the future, Heidegger now understands time as the origin coming from its futural sending destiny (*Geschick*). Heidegger will explain after *Being and Time* in *Contributions to Philosophy* that the essential context for the projection of death is the original futurity as the projection of the truth of Being itself.²⁴² Being towards death reveals itself as being towards the origin. Hence, from the perspective of the broader context of Being in relation to time that has its say as the appropriating event, we are dealing in the notion of the turning with a deepening of the concept of temporality by regarding it from its origin.

If, according to *Being and Time*, the ‘mineness’ of *Dasein*’s ways of relating to its possibilities, its understanding and its experience concerns equally authentic and inauthentic existence, ‘mineness’ is not to be understood as the egoism of singular *Dasein* that lives its particular time between birth and death, but in broad sense, as the care for the human being and, as such, already precluding the concept of the people. Just as *Being and Time* is not primarily a philosophy of existence, but instead a work that is firstly concerned with ontology, *Dasein*’s care for the human being must, as Heidegger later explains in *Letter on Humanism*, not be regarded as a form of humanism but, firstly from the perspective of the question of Being. From the perspective of Being, *Dasein* is thrown into a world and as such into language, which is always part of ‘our’ history and therefore ‘our’ language creating *Dasein* as a people. In as far as there is not just one language or one world, there exists a plurality of peoples. Heidegger will after *Being and Time* explain the care of the human being in terms of *Dasein* as the ‘shepherd of being’. *Dasein*’s selfcare becomes care for the openness towards Being. Heidegger writes in this regard: “It is in this direction alone that *Being and Time* is thinking when ecstatic existence is experienced as ‘care’.”²⁴³ We must interpret the concept of the people therefore as an ontological notion as well.

With regard to the concept of thrownness, one can ponder the question why it is impossible for *Dasein*’s self-projection to project itself equally on the past as on the future. This possibility appears to be simply not given by time itself, in other words, by the way in which *Dasein* facticity has been thrown from beyond its own temporality into a world that forms the openness to its alterity. Heidegger

²⁴² HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 223.

²⁴³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 252.

will explain the ‘directionedness’ of *Dasein*’s time after the turning from the throw of Being. Heidegger writes: “The very projector, *Da-sein*, is thrown - i. e., appropriated - by Being.”²⁴⁴ *Dasein* must have been thrown in the world by a time that transcends anthropological temporality. The limits of *Dasein*’s finitude must border a more originary time, which *Dasein*, nonetheless, cannot infinitely enter due to its finite essence. By the same token it is impossible to determine this time as eternity, since this conception of time defies any comprehensible determination. After the turning Heidegger continues to think time in terms of finitude. Being in relation to time that has its say as the appropriating event is never constant present, but only transient from nothingness back on its way to nothingness and, as such, constantly ending, i.e. finite. Whether thought as temporality or time as the appropriating event, the movement of the wheel of time implies finitude.

In conclusion, time remains finite, but is not necessarily based in *Dasein*’s temporality. But what else would border at the other side of *Dasein*’s limit than time thought from the perspective of Being at large? This time is in the most possible original sense ‘the origin’ (*der Anfang*), which is not so much unlimited in the sense of infinite, but rather veiled over *Dasein* due to its concealment. Consequently, it becomes apparent that Heidegger does not think the opposition of finitude and infinity in terms of a linear continuation of the structure of Being, which would be nothing but the linearity of a representation, but from presencing, which as beginning and ending excludes the idea of infinity.

Thinking that approaches the whole has necessarily a circular and provisional character. When philosophy asks about the totality of the relation between the human being and things, the possibility of that question must be included in that very relationship, therefore always begging the question. This holds true for *Dasein*, as the totality or ultimate horizon of the human existence, just as well as for Being itself. However, to notice logical circularity is neither yet the same as to make the circle all the way explicit for understanding, nor to understand the structural ground of that circle. Heidegger regards circularity as an intrinsic aspect of interpretation of any structure as a whole. In interpretation, one always approaches the parts based on a preliminary interpretation or

²⁴⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p. 304.

presupposition of the whole. At the same time one revises one's understanding of the whole in the light of new findings concerning the parts. This circle of interpretation is commonly named the 'hermeneutic circle', which in *Being and Time* is existentially understood from the fore-structure (*Vor-struktur*) of *Dasein*.²⁴⁵

Since part and whole, figure and background can never be completely separated, the circle of understanding will sooner or later appear in any hermeneutical situation. However, it is, according to Heidegger, important to enter the circle and be aware of the circle. The circle should not be avoided as a fundamental philosophical problem, but regarded instead from its opening and clearing dynamics in the back and forth of interpretation. In particular with respect to circularity in philosophy Heidegger once mentions the philosopher Wittgenstein writing:

Wittgenstein says the following. The difficulty in which thinking stands compares with a man in a room from which he wants to go out. At, first he attempts to get out through the chimney, which is too narrow for him. If he simply turned around, he would see that the door was open all along.²⁴⁶

Heidegger's thinking attests of the experience that the whole or context is always already given and 'at work' without necessarily becoming explicit or even without the possibility of becoming completely explicit and comprehensible at all. Methodologically, thinking should not speak 'about' the element as a whole, but speak 'from' the supposition of that whole.²⁴⁷ As such, it should submit itself to the power of that supposition in as far as the power can be experienced. Thinking does not have the whole in its possession, but is by its questioning, nevertheless, in a certain sense related to it and has been in interpretation on its way to the whole always already send on a way. Here, the whole can only be circularly approached as a clearing or elucidation and never be proved in the usual conception of proof as logical or empirical demonstration. Heidegger writes in *On the Way to Language*:

²⁴⁵ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 152.

²⁴⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. & FINK, E. *Heraclitus Seminar 1966/1967*. Alabama: The university of Alabama Press, 1979. p. 17.

²⁴⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 Compare p. 190.

Every question posed to the matter of thinking, every inquiry for its nature, is already borne up by the grant of what is come to come into question. Therefore the proper bearing of the thinking which is needed now is to listen to the grant, not to ask questions.²⁴⁸

Although thinking and philosophizing are associated with questioning, questioning presupposes, in turn, first listening to the realm that, as the questionable, first grants questions. Thinking is therefore not active by posing questions or by being critical, but first receives its questions. Hence, thinking that approaches the whole must make the widest circle in and from its starting point, which with respect to the development of Heidegger's thought implies that in ontological sense *Dasein* had initially not been thought 'wide' enough.

Whether as *Dasein* or Being, Heidegger presumes transcendence. Already in *Being and Time* Heidegger presupposes being that transcends *Dasein* by means of the concept of the being of entities that show themselves from themselves as phenomena. However, this presupposition remains part of the way in which *Dasein* presupposes itself. *Dasein* as *ecstasis* has to be presupposed in *Being and Time* and is rather 'cleared' than proved, whether logical or empirical. This clearing is, in turn, a phenomenological demonstration. This means that the categorical is shown phenomenologically as well. Quite circularly, that which is demonstrated phenomenologically is also the condition for phenomena being discovered or disclosed.

With regard to *Being and Time*, one can ponder the question in which sense it is justified to speak of entities that show themselves from themselves if transcendence is, subsequently, entirely regarded from *Dasein*'s eccentric temporality. One could argue that after *Being and Time* precisely the phenomenological character of entities emancipates, while the original and independent role of *Dasein* disappears. At the same time, from the perspective of Being at large the being of entities can only be understood as the gift from Being, and the phenomenological character of existence consists now in the truth of Being. If one thinks in terms of the comparison of Wittgenstein, Heidegger has seemed to experienced that the door to Being does not first have to be opened by means of an act of 'disclosure' (*Erschlossenheit*) of *Dasein*, but has been open all

²⁴⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. p. 75.

along as the ‘revelation’ (*Entbergung, Verhüllung*) of Being. Hence, the shift of focus from *Dasein* to Being seems to occur in Heidegger’s thinking primarily in the domain of truth and only secondly with respect of the problems of time. That is to say, Heidegger does not link truth and time in a very explicit manner, which we will, however, try to do in our interpretation of the turning. After *Being and Time* Heidegger writes:

But while the understanding of Being, i.e. the relation to Being itself, characterizes the essence of *Dasein*, precisely this relation itself must be taken as the indication of the essential origin of any structure. This relation occurs, however, from Being as the Event.²⁴⁹

We will inquire now our findings concerning the course of Heidegger’s ontological argument in a closer comparison with Heidegger’s own words concerning the turning, and to which our former analysis will provide an interpretation key.

In *Letter on Humanism* Heidegger defends his philosophy of being against a variety of possible misinterpretations. The seminal letter forms therefore a great source of clarification concerning the motives of the main shifts in his thinking. One of the first things that strikes, is the way in which the letter trivializes the way in which the formulations of *Being and Time* give intrinsically rise to what Heidegger apparently regarded as obvious misinterpretations and in particular a reading of *Being and Time* that interprets being from the perspective of *Dasein* and the being of entities instead of Being itself. Likewise, Heidegger somewhat theatrically complains in *Contributions to Philosophy* that the determination of *Dasein* in *Being and Time* from the perspective of the truth of Being (*Sein*) has even now not been sufficiently unfolded and made prominent in the knowledge of those who are questioning.²⁵⁰

But verily, Heidegger merely re-interprets himself in *Contributions to Philosophy* just like he would do in *Letter on Humanism*. Heidegger has regarded by itself, of course, every right to reinterpret himself, since he is after all the author of his own works. But it is, however, philosophically relevant that his reinterpretation shows that *Being and Time* not necessarily loses its relevance

²⁴⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 152.

²⁵⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 39.

from the perspective of Heidegger's later thoughts on being. As a matter of fact, Heidegger remains referring to his *magnum opus* up to his last writings and ascribes to the work a transitional character for thinking. The entire discussion whether there is a turning in Heidegger's thinking and to what extent that turning must be regarded as a radical turning, depends therefore on the question whether one philosophically agrees with the way Heidegger after the mid-thirties starts to situate his earlier thoughts on being.

Heidegger asserts that he intended to work out the step from *Dasein* towards being and abandon any form of subjectivism in the third division of the first part of '*Time and Being*' from the original project of *Being and Time*, which in his own words, had, however, been 'held back'.²⁵¹ This formulation implies that Heidegger admits that despite its attack on traditional explanations of subjectivity, *Being and Time* had still been too subjective. More subtly, Heidegger argues that the division in question was held back because thinking failed in the adequate saying of the turning (*Kehre*) towards being, due to the inherent metaphysical determination of language. In other words, Heidegger had already 'thought' ahead from and towards the perspective of being itself all along, but could not yet 'express' being as such, firstly due to a lack of the development of an adequate philosophical vocabulary back then and, secondly, because metaphysics first had to be de(con)structed in relation to the notion of being, as he would later do in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*.

Obviously, this claim cannot be in any way supported and is above all most implausible, firstly, considered the course of the argumentation of the actual published part of *Being and Time*, as we have examined in the last five chapters, in which presence is entirely thought from the perspective of *Dasein* instead of Being. Secondly, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* had been the work that Heidegger wrote instead of the third division of *Being and Time*, which still interprets being as the being of entities and completely from the perspective of the primacy of *Dasein*. Thirdly, the distinction between thinking and language, which is presupposed by saying that being already had been thought ahead, but could not come to expression, is exactly what Heidegger experienced as problematic in as much as the metaphysical determination of language had prompted a failure of

²⁵¹ Heidegger, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 249, 250.

expressing the turning. Lastly, the fact that *Being and Time* by its main question literally asks about the meaning of ‘being’ makes it not yet evident that the work had been asking all the time about being itself, all the more when being had consequently been explained from *Dasein* as temporality.

In *Letter on Humanism* Heidegger writes:

The introduction to *Being and Time* says simply and clearly, even in italics, Being is the transcendens pure and simple. Just as the openness of spatial nearness seen from the perspective of a particular thing exceeds all things near and far, so is being essentially broader than all entities, because it is the clearing itself.²⁵²

The ‘transcendens’ is that which transcends in the movement of transcendence. However, both in *Being and Time* and in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* transcendence is exclusively explained and approached from the perspective of *Dasein* in terms of its eccentric ecstatic temporality. *Dasein* had been determined as that which is ‘casting over’ its projections. There is therefore from the works themselves not a single reason to not interpret the aforementioned notion of being as the ‘transcendens pure and simple’ as a movement from out of Being. Moreover, the very next sentence after Heidegger mentions in *Being and Time* being as the ‘transcendens pure and simple’, he speaks about the being of *Dasein* suggesting that being, as the transcendent, is able to transcend because of *Dasein*’s transcendence. Although in contradiction with the way in which Heidegger reinterprets himself later, the anthropological interpretation of the concept of transcendence in *Being and Time* finds its clearest affirmation in *On the Essence of Ground*. Transcendence is here simply identified with *Dasein*. It is only after the turn towards Being itself that the clearing will be understood and expressed by Heidegger as the truth of ‘being’ itself, instead in terms of *Dasein* as the ‘*lumen naturale*’. Whereas *Dasein* in *Being and Time* still had been ‘cleared in itself,’ *Dasein* will now be reinterpreted as the ‘throw’ of Being that stands in the clearing of Being without entirely being that clearing itself.

In *Contributions to Philosophy* Heidegger shows how the step from *Dasein* to Being at large in retrospective could be already read in *Being and Time*. Since understanding (*verstehen*) in *Being and Time* is taken to be ‘thrown projection’, transcendence means to stand in the truth of Being, without, of course, at first

²⁵² Idem p. 256.

knowing this or questioning it.²⁵³ Our analysis of the line of argumentation of *Being and Time* had already problematized the concept of thrownness from *Being and Time* in relation to temporality, which is in *Being and Time*, however, not mentioned as problematic at all. Moreover, being had in *Being and Time* not yet been clearly distinguished from *Dasein* since the ontological points exclusively at the ontic-ontological *Dasein*.

Concerning the relation of *Dasein* and Being, Heidegger writes more clearly in *Letter on Humanism*:

As ek-sisting, the human being sustains *Dasein* in that he takes the *Da*, the clearing of being, into 'care'. But - *Dasein* in that he takes the *Da*, itself occurs essentially as 'thrown'. It unfolds essentially in the throw of Being as a destinal sending.²⁵⁴

In the *Origin of a Work of Art* (1935-1936) Heidegger regards projecting no longer from the perspective of *Dasein* as self-projector, but *Dasein* is now the throw of Being, writing: "Projecting is the release of a throw by which unconcealedness submits and infuses itself into what is as such."²⁵⁵

Apart from *Being and Time*, Heidegger has worked out the relation of being and time most profound and laboriously in *Contribution to Philosophy*, often considered as his second *magnum opus*, this time not in terms of *Dasein*'s temporality, but in terms of the appropriating event. Although the language of the work is difficult, dense and concise, one can clearly see in the following citation how temporality is to be seen from the appropriating event now as the truth of Being. Heidegger writes:

The tacit presentiment of the event offers itself prominently and at once in historical recollection (*ousia* = *parousia* (presence)) as 'primordial' temporality: the occurrence of the having-been/preserving and futural/anticipating transporting, i.e. the occurrence of the opening and grounding of the 'there' (*Da*) and thus of the essence of truth.²⁵⁶

Based on the course of the argumentation of *Being and Time*, our interpretation had come to the same conclusion that it can never become clear how

²⁵³ Idem p. 170.

²⁵⁴ Idem p. 249.

²⁵⁵ *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (1935-1936) in *Holzwege* (1935-1946) GA 5.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 71.

²⁵⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 59.

Dasein is related to being, i.e. *Dasein*'s alterity, solely from the perspective of *Dasein*'s temporal horizon, if one does not start from Being itself. Heidegger says that the turning does not imply a change of standpoint from *Being and Time*, but first means the arrival at the locality of that dimension out of which the work is experienced, namely the experience of the oblivion of being.²⁵⁷ This means that the philosophical purport of the work consists precisely in the failure of the work of providing a positive and univocal sense of being. Being comes into view not because of *Dasein* as horizon, but from and out of Being itself and indeed firstly in the experience of its oblivion. Obviously, the turning cannot mean a change of standpoint, since the project of *Being and Time* had never been presented as a standpoint, but preliminarily and provisionally as a starting point, in other words, only as a 'question on its way'. Hence, we will interpret the turning at most as a change of starting point and, secondly, as a radicalisation of the original question of being, which could, however, before the turning never have been thought ahead in the way it has been worked out after the turning.

Heidegger writes in *Contributions to Philosophy*:

The temptation is strong to believe that the entire meditation in the first (published) half of *Being and Time* is limited to the sphere of an anthropology, one that merely takes a peculiar direction.²⁵⁸

But here Heidegger dumbs down his critics again. *Being and Time* is obviously not an anthropological work in a scientific sense, but primarily a philosophical work. What is at issue is the question to what extent being can be determined from time and whether it should be merely regarded from anthropological time, since such is not merely tempting to believe, but explicitly the main thesis of the work itself. In a footnote later added to the publication of *On the essence of Ground* as published in the collected works, Heidegger defends himself against the critique of having an anthropocentric viewpoint in *Being and Time* by bringing into mind the fact that *Dasein*'s ecstatic existence is 'eccentric'.²⁵⁹ In other words, *Dasein* is out of its centre and temporality can therefore never be a mere anthropocentric position. However, this defence is

²⁵⁷ Idem p. 250.

²⁵⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 55.

²⁵⁹ Heidegger, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. note 59 p. 162.

rather weak if one calls to mind that in *Being and Time* and all the more in *On the essence of Ground*, the question of being is explicitly approached and understood as a transcendental question concerning *Dasein*, which is the human being that forms the very essence of transcendence. *Dasein* might be eccentric, but the beyond towards it transcends turns out to be *Dasein* again. To put it simply, how does the human being get beyond the human perspective? If the answer is: never at all, the critique of anthropocentrism is not yet refuted. Hence, Heidegger must take the phenomenon of transcendence seriously and consider the nature of that which is at the other side, each time when *Dasein* passes over to the beyond. But again, one should refrain carefully from representing *Dasein* as a subject that is reaching out to the world. Concerning the turning, Heidegger writes: “The essential occurrence of Being, is first and is not merely the ‘whereto’ a transcendence is supposed to attain.”²⁶⁰

This means that *Dasein*, as transcendence, can never break through to the other site of being or truth. The movement of its transcendence belongs, in contrast, to the dynamics of Being, which occurs essentially as the appropriating event that first grounds the ‘there’ (*Da*). Hence, Being transcends in and towards *Dasein*. As such, *Dasein* is itself merely the breakthrough of Being from Being out of its oblivion back to its oblivion. However, in *On the Essence of Ground* Heidegger still addresses the notion of transcendence in a way that is practically indiscernible from Kant’s transcendental idealism. Heidegger explains *Dasein* around the period of *Being and Time* still from its own ground, as *Dasein*’s temporal way of projecting itself ‘between’ subject and object. Heidegger therefore initially merely revises the subject. This becomes clear in the following formulation from *The Essence of Ground*:

Transcendence cannot be unveiled or grasped by a flight into the objective, but solely through an ontological interpretation of the subjectivity of the subject, an interpretation that must constantly be renewed and that actively opposes ‘subjectivism’ in the same way that it refuses to follow ‘objectivism’.²⁶¹

In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Heidegger still writes:

²⁶⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 144

²⁶¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 125.

Philosophy must perhaps start from the ‘subject’ and return to the ‘subject’ in its ultimate questions, and yet for all that it may not pose its questions in a one-sidedly subjectivism.²⁶²

It is clear that already in *Being and Time* Heidegger explicitly argues against an one-sidedly subjectivism, of which Descartes serves as spokesman. But it remains, nevertheless, a question to what extent a return to the subject, although in a more sophisticated manner, establishes not once more a new form of subjectivism. To put it simple, how does *Dasein* reach Being if not by being already reached by Being?

After the turning has been made explicit, Heidegger will radically distance himself from any attempt of arguing against traditional interpretations of subjectivity in view of a more original explanation of subjectivity as transcendence in terms of temporal ecstatic eccentric existence. Heidegger writes in this regard:

If *Being and Time* says that what first becomes determinable through the ‘existential analytic’ is the being of non-human beings, then this does not mean the human being would be what is given primarily and first of all and would be the measure according to which all other beings receive the stamp of their being. Such an ‘interpretation’ assumes that the human being is *still* to be understood as understood by Descartes and by all his followers and mere opponents (even Nietzsche is one of the latter), namely, as a subject.²⁶³

Regardless Heidegger’s later warnings against a subjective interpretation of *Dasein*, the question remains to what extent the formulations from *Being and Time* give inherently rise to a subjective and anthropological interpretation. At any rate, from a critique of revised subjectivity, the need becomes clear of an emphasising on the openness of world, as the space or region, in which *Dasein* already has been ‘let’ in, in which it is thrown and that is never only *Dasein*’s own projection. We will therefore examine in the next chapter the notion of being not only from the perspective of time, but from space as well.

Heidegger often creates a straw man when he explains or defends his original philosophical motives and a great many times he defends himself not against the strongest possible critique. Not without a lack of pathos, Heidegger

²⁶² HEIDEGGER, M. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 155.

²⁶³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 385.

writes that the concept of being-towards-death has been ‘pathetically and cheaply’ explained as a philosophy of death and a crude ‘worldview’.²⁶⁴ Although Heidegger omits specific references or notes to this critique in question, it would not take much discussion to agree that this particular interpretation is rather poor indeed and, what is more, the critique has obviously never become a serious voice in the discourse on Heidegger’s legacy.

Subsequently, Heidegger argues that in the framework of the task of *Being and Time* death is primarily connected to ‘time’.²⁶⁵ Now this is, of course, even more a trivial statement, since it would be very unlikely that such a connection would be eluded from the understanding of the average *Being and Time* reader. However, further questions concerning the nature of this relation will certainly rise. Heidegger continues saying that the relation between death and time is, in turn, established as the domain of the projection of the truth of Being itself. In the same work Heidegger writes: “Yet the point of *Being and Time* was indeed to expose ‘time’ as the domain of projection for Being.”²⁶⁶ Hermeneutically, the former is truly a step beyond *Being and Time*, since this thought is in any case not immediately clear from the work itself.

Ostensibly, Heidegger locates the lack of understanding and the source of misunderstanding of *Being and Time* at the receptive side of his works, that is to say, his readers. Concerning the section treating the notion of being-towards-death Heidegger writes:

The misinterpretations of precisely this section of *Being and Time* are the clearest signs of the still-rampant incapacity to re-enact the questioning prepared there, which always means to think it more originally and to surpass it creatively.²⁶⁷

In the same work, further ostensible reproaches by the philosopher addressed to the public follow:

No one has yet surmised or ventured to *follow* in thinking what was thought *ahead* by means of the notion of being-toward-death in the context of *Being and Time*.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁴ Idem p. 223.

²⁶⁵ Idem p. 223.

²⁶⁶ Idem p. 355.

²⁶⁷ Idem p. 223.

²⁶⁸ Idem p. 222.

An inquiry such as the one indicated by the title *Being and Time* will be by necessity not be understood, since it calls for a radical transformation of questioning.²⁶⁹

Nevertheless, Heidegger ascribes in the final analysis, as we will examine in following chapters, the thoughtless state of mankind, including his readers, neither to any person in particular nor to a present cultural flaw, but solely to the concealment of Being itself as the oblivion of the Being. Heidegger writes in *What is called Thinking?* (1954):²⁷⁰

Rather, that we are still not thinking stems from the fact that the thing itself that must be thought about turns away from man, has turned away long ago.²⁷¹

Heidegger has shown himself on the other hand to be quite aware of the differences of direction that his thinking had taken after *Being and Time*. In *Contributions to Philosophy* Heidegger motivates the shift of starting point by arguing that every essential questioning must radically change whenever it questions more originally.²⁷² This formulation shows that the way of ontological questioning must radically be different after the turning. Although in a radical different sense, the turning implies at the same time a continuation of Heidegger's original questioning. We will discuss first some further differences between Heidegger's self-reinterpretations and its preceding writings.

Apparently, Heidegger's reinterpretations of his own thoughts can have a violent character as well. Heidegger writes, for example:

In *Being and Time* 'time' is a directive toward (*Anweisung*), and a resonating (*Anklang*) with, that which takes place in the uniqueness of the appropriation as the truth of the essential occurrence of Being.²⁷³

But the word '*Anweisung*' is in *Being and Time* not to be found in relation to the term 'time'. Moreover, the word '*Anklang*' occurs in the work not even once. Of course, based upon the interpretation, as has been presented here before, it is clear what Heidegger means: *Dasein*, as thrown projection, is the response to

²⁶⁹ Idem p. 151.

²⁷⁰ *Was heisst Denken?* (1951-1952) GA 8.

²⁷¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *What is called Thinking?*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 7.

²⁷² HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 67.

²⁷³ Idem p. 59.

Being instead of the other way around and, as such, a ‘resonating’ with Being. According to our interpretation, time as temporality must point beyond itself towards the time of Being. Hence, *Dasein*’s self-projection must from the perspective of Being be regarded as the self-appropriation of Being. It remains, however, questionable, as we have argued before, if such thoughts in *Being and Time* had been already in principle, let alone in detail, thought ahead.

Heidegger describes the shift from the thinking of *Being and Time* to the thinking of the appropriating event as a way whereupon thinking keeps falling and getting up.²⁷⁴ Therefore, the positions of the questioning are constantly different and radical changes are necessary. Despite preparations there is no gradual ‘development’ (*gradweise Entwicklung*) here, according to Heidegger.²⁷⁵

Regardless the fact that in the history of thinking there must always be a relation between the earlier and the later, there is, in Heidegger’s view, no relation according to which the later would already lie ‘enclosed’ in the earlier. Heidegger writes: “Since everything in the thinking of Being is directed toward the unique, to fall down is, as it were, the norm here!”²⁷⁶

This also rules out a histological procedure that renounces the earlier as ‘false’ or that proves that the later was ‘already meant’ in the earlier, according to Heidegger. Heidegger argues here implicitly against Hegel’s logo-centrism that regards the history of being as a dialectical and, as such, a logical process.²⁷⁷ Dialectics is the dictatorship of the questionless, Heidegger comments.²⁷⁸ Being as the appropriating event happens as the freedom of Being, this means that Being never destines in a regulated and therefore calculable way. Concerning the relation of history, metaphysics and thinking, Heidegger speaks, however, of an ‘interplay’.²⁷⁹ If time, as has been argued before, has always meaning, new moments of meaning will always refer back to the meaning of the past and rewrite the past in the light of the future. Hence, the absolute new is in Heidegger’s ontology impossible. If time has meaning, history cannot escape the hermeneutic

²⁷⁴ Idem p. 67.

²⁷⁵ Idem p. 67.

²⁷⁶ Idem p. 67.

²⁷⁷ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *On Time and Being*. in *Works*. Toronto: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972 .p. 6.

²⁷⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 13. p. 212.

²⁷⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 133.

circle and therefore never be merely regarded as linear unfoldment or continuous iteration. Accordingly, the turning can also not be a smooth transition between the thinking of *Being and Time* and the thinking afterwards. One should therefore interpret that which had ‘already been thought ahead’, solely in a formal, thematic, preliminary and provisional way. According to Heidegger, the ‘changes’ are so essential that their scale can be determined only if in each case the question of being is pervasively asked out of its own domain of questioning. These changes are not prompted by outer objections, because the question of Being is itself after all still not clarified, but rise from the abyss of the question of Being itself, according to Heidegger. As such, Heidegger regarded his philosophical way not in a personal manner, but from “the exertion that brings the truth of Being to its truth in the entities.”²⁸⁰

In the light of the relevance of *Being and Time* as a preparation of a history of Being, the relevance of certain passages of the work have become relative, Heidegger admits. Therefore, all ‘contents,’ ‘opinions,’ and ‘itineraries’ within the particulars of the first attempt, including *Being and Time*, are contingent and can disappear.²⁸¹ The step from being in *Being and Time* to the appropriating event means therefore the interpretation of *Dasein*’s temporality from the perspective of the history of Being. As such, *Dasein* must not be interpreted as the current human being, but as a destinal sending. *Dasein* is therefore a futural notion. Since this sending occurs from Being, *Being and Time* does in retrospective not present an ‘ideal’ or a ‘program’.²⁸² Heidegger admits, nevertheless, that *Being and Time* provides insufficient clarity on this.²⁸³

Again we see that Being, as the appropriating event, is single in its origin, but still happening from the future. Hence, after *Being and Time* Heidegger not simply reverses the primacy of past and future, but a different starting point result in different ontological accents. Just like in *Being and Time* the past occurs out of the future, a turn to the futural destiny of *Dasein* must after *Being and Time* be sought in and from the origin. Just as *Dasein*’s essence as being-towards-death consisted in the way *Dasein* relates to its futural death and its essence is to be regarded from the future, Being as the origin becomes manifest in *Dasein* as a

²⁸⁰ Idem p. 68.

²⁸¹ Idem p. 191.

²⁸² Idem p. 191

²⁸³ Idem p. 212.

futural notion. Heidegger writes in *On the Origin*: “Only from the forthcoming (*das Kommenden*), Being, as the other origin, lets experiencing the present as the being that it is.”²⁸⁴

Important to realize is that Heidegger understands the turning not just as a step within an explicit ontology or merely as a step in his own philosophy, but the turning is an ontological happening itself as a moment in the history of Being. If thinking and ontology become the saying of Being itself instead of the expression of the human being, they become the saying and the essential way in which Being, as self-revealing and self-appropriation, relates to itself. Like Hegel, Heidegger cannot leave the development of thinking, his own thinking included, aside from the history of Being. Thinking is in his view always the occurrence of Being.²⁸⁵ As such, philosophy means to be addressed by Being itself.²⁸⁶ Heidegger writes:

On the contrary, philosophy and philosophers exist only when and how the truth of Being itself comes to pass, a history which is withdrawn from every human institution and plan, since it itself is the very ground for the possibility of human historical Being.²⁸⁷

Conclusively, thinking turns in the ‘turning’ towards Being itself. But Being itself? What is Being itself? If Being is not to be regarded as the way entities are present thanks to transcendence as *Dasein*’s temporal ecstatic eccentric way of being in a world, does the danger not lurk that Being will after *Being and Time* be grasped as something in itself that is objectively present? Heidegger argues that even after in *Being and Time* the decisive naming of the ontological difference and afterwards a more careful use of language had been zealously pursued, nothing has changed and the former is in no way testimony that a knowledge and a questioning of Being have come to life.²⁸⁸ Hence, the oblivion of Being continues and the question of Being must continuously be reawakened. But how is Being itself to be determined when in oblivion?

²⁸⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. p. 66, 67.

²⁸⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 13 p. 30.

²⁸⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 p. 179.

²⁸⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Basic Questions of Philosophy: selected problems of logic*. trans. Rojcewicz, R., Schuwer, A. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. p. 105.

²⁸⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. Idem p. 367.

Heidegger writes in *Letter on Humanism* “Being it ‘is’. It itself.”²⁸⁹ But this formulation still runs the risk that Being will be interpreted as an entity again, like the position in favour of which Guzzoni has been arguing. Guzzoni states that although in another way as entities, whose being being is, being is itself a being (*ein Seiendes*) i.e. an entity.²⁹⁰ Moreover, Guzzoni argues that it is not evident at all that the term entity can only be predicated of things and substances. Hence, everything of which we can give an essential determination, everything of which we can ask about its essence, including everything of which we can say that it ‘is’, is an entity. Being must therefore be regarded as an entity as well. Instead of supporting Heidegger’s critical stance towards metaphysics, Guzzoni argues in favour of the tradition of metaphysics. Guzzoni thinks that it is not the case in metaphysics that one seeks entities that serve as foundations for all other entities, but when the ground of everything is sought this ground simply becomes itself an entity.²⁹¹ However, Guzzoni keeps us dangling with respect to the question how and why this would necessarily happen. The title of Guzzoni’s essay ‘*Ontological Difference and Nothingness*’ gives us however a clue. Guzzoni’s thoughts are completely indebted to Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, in which Hegel intends to show how negative determination, that is to say ‘pure being as nothingness’, is the unity of identity and difference, i.e. the ontological difference. Heidegger argues, in contrast, in the text *Identity and Difference* (1955-1957) that the bifurcation of the distinction between being and entities is due to the appropriating event instead of reason’s capacity of distinguishing.²⁹² Based on Guzzoni’s Hegelian tone, Guzzoni presumably makes his claim under the assumption that all essential distinctions are finally determinations of the human subject. Speculative thinking is always identifying and therefore grounding by its very nature. In other words, reason cannot help but grasp being as something, since it is after all not merely nothing. The former thought echoes Hegel’s critique on Kant that absolute being as the ‘things in themselves’, deprived from all conceptual determinations, is still a determination in as far as things in themselves are things for us, that is to say, as such, still related to one’s understanding. Hence, a negative determination is still a

²⁸⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 252.

²⁹⁰ GUZZONI, A. *Martin Heidegger Zum Siebzigsten Geburtstag. Tübingen: Neske, 1959.* p. 39.

²⁹¹ Idem p. 39.

²⁹² *Identität und Differenz* (1955-1957) GA 11.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Identität und Differenz*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006. GA 11 p. 47-49.

determination. However, Hegel asserts so and can only claim so given the basic assumption of idealism that regards determinations ultimately as determinations of the human subject. Guzzoni subsequently denies that according to Heidegger being determines the entity.²⁹³ Being is neither ground nor origin in Heidegger's view, according to Guzzoni. Being is, in contrast, completely undetermined and indeterminable. Guzzoni provides a completely Hegelian interpretation of Heidegger here, which is plainly wrong. Although initially regarded from the being of *Dasein*, Being is precisely ground and origin, arguably already in *Being and Time*. There, as we have been pointing out, the question is only to what extent this is due to the being of entities, the being of *Dasein* or being pure and simple. According to Hegel, pure being equals pure nothingness by being completely undetermined. Hence, pure being is distinct from determined being and, consequently, distinct from the entity (*Dasein, etwas/anderes*). Since the notion of ground implies determined being, undetermined being as pure being cannot be the ground of the entity. However, Hegel determines 'pure being' and 'pure nothingness' in broader philosophical sense as categorical concepts, which are, in turn, moments of understanding (*das Begriff*) of the absolute spirit, which is the subject as the true substance. Therefore, Hegel's notion of pure being as undetermined being is contextually, that is to say, by a metaphysical pre-interpretation of being as subject, determined just as well. Pure being is nothing but the unity or basic form of absolute spirit itself. In Heidegger's view, being is precisely determined in as much as it is present as entity. At the same time, as we will examine in chapter 3.1, neither the 'formal indicative' understanding of Being nor a poetic projection of Being lays the ground for an ontological reification of Being itself and it is precisely for this reason that Heidegger initially distinguishes disclosedness from discoveredness. The entity is discovered while being is disclosed. Being itself, in as much as it is not regarded as an entity, is a negative determination that has in Heidegger's thinking, nevertheless, its saying through a variety of words, such as death, concealment, fugue, origin, silence, et cetera. Moreover, Being is solely ground as 'grounding' which has to be regarded from positive presencing and positing as well from its negativity as concealment. Subsequently, Guzzoni brings to mind that being cannot remain all together

²⁹³ GUZZONI, A. *Martin Heidegger Zum Siebzigsten Geburtstag*. Tübingen: Neske, 1959 p. 40.

undetermined by Heidegger, since Heidegger also asks about the meaning of Being and determines being in terms of the possible and having-beenness and so on. But Heidegger's writings contradict nothing except the overt misrepresentation of Guzzoni. Although Guzzoni touches cursorily and superficially upon the matter of language and time, Guzzoni does not think these matters through in their consequences with respect to the ontological difference. To speak with Wittgenstein, Guzzoni's interpretation 'hangs in the air along with what it interprets' and unwittingly follows the rules of grammar. Guzzoni says: "Each and everything is an entity, something that is."²⁹⁴ Accordingly, Guzzoni determines entities merely in a logical and grammatical way as the negation of nothingness. But according to Heidegger in *Contributions to Philosophy*, Being as nothingness is not merely the negation of entities, which would imply the judgment of a subject and a determination of Being starting from the primacy of entities.²⁹⁵ Conclusively, Guzzoni makes no substantial step beyond Hegel. Guzzoni finishes his text by saying that each time when one says 'in itself' or 'for us' -not an arbitrarily chosen examples, but completely Hegelian- one already assumes the entity, which is in its original facticity neither actual nor possible, real nor ideal, particular nor general, and implicitly referring to Heidegger, present nor absent, but before anything an entity that is *not* nothing, i.e. unconcealed (*entborgen*).²⁹⁶ But it is precisely the entity as a whole or the totality of entities that is concealed, in Heidegger's view and arguably already conceived as such in *Being and Time*. Hence, the entity is indeed that which is unconcealed and present. But that which un-conceals the un-concealed entities as 'presencing' is, nevertheless, absent and concealed. Obviously, the peculiar verbal use of 'presencing' (*anwesen*) points to time and temporality, which is not essentially taken into account by Guzzoni.

Conclusively, it has become clear that in as far as one considers Being in itself, it has to be determined as absent and in as far as we regard the entity in itself, it has to be regarded as present. That which in philosophical sense can be predicated of Being and the entity must be revised, which is, however, precisely what Heidegger had already done in *Contributions to Philosophy* twelve years

²⁹⁴ Idem p. 42.

²⁹⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 193, 194.

²⁹⁶ Idem p. 48.

before *Letter on Humanism*. Here, Heidegger writes ‘for the sake of clarity, especially over and against the ‘idle talk of ontology and being’: “The entity ‘is’ (*Das Seiende ist*), Being ‘essences’ (*Das Seyn west*)”.²⁹⁷ Heidegger says at one point that ‘Being is’ and that entities are not, the entity is instead only entity.²⁹⁸ But in the same work he emphasises the unique verbal use of the expression ‘Being is’ by saying that Being ‘*istet*’, which literally renders into Being ‘*ises*’.²⁹⁹ As what one can take as a possible response to Guzzoni’s critique, Heidegger asserts more than thirty years later in *On Time and Being* (1962) in reference to the way in which the ‘it is’ in the saying of Parmenides “*esti gar einai*”, “For being is” had been addressed in *Letter on Humanism*:³⁰⁰ “Anything of which we say “it is” is thereby represented as an entity. But Being is not an entity.”³⁰¹ Heidegger writes now: “Being is not, ‘there is’ (*es gibt*).”³⁰²

The former has to be elucidated from the relation of time and Being, which we will examine in the next chapter. Heidegger holds open the distinction of the ontological difference precisely in view of the notion of time. It is time itself where absence and presence, the present, past and future are distinguished and at the same time ‘stand open’ to each other.

In summary, we have come across three motivations concerning the change of starting point from *Dasein* to Being. Firstly, that of time, secondly, that of truth and, thirdly, that of language. Obviously, the three must philosophically be related. We will inquire the turning from the perspective of time more thoroughly in the following chapter and from the perspective of truth and language respectively in chapter 9 and 11.

²⁹⁷ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 59, *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p. 30. Compare *The history of Being* where Heidegger still writes: “Being is” (*Das Seyn ist*) HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 142.

Compare *Basic Questions of Philosophy: selected problems of logic*. trans. Rojcewicz, R., Schuwer, A. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. p. 4.

²⁹⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. p. 11.

²⁹⁹ Idem p. 69.

³⁰⁰ *Zeit und Sein* (1962) in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (1962-1964) GA 14.

HEIDEGGER, M. *On Time and Being*. in *Works*. Toronto: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972. p. 8.

³⁰¹ Idem p. 8.

³⁰² Idem p. 6.

2.2. The appropriating event

*You darkness from which I come,
I love you more than all the fires
that fence out the world,
for the fire makes a circle
for everyone
so that no one sees you anymore.
But darkness holds it all:
the shape and the flame,
the animal and myself,
how it holds them,
all powers, all sight
and it is possible: its great strength
is breaking into my body.
I have faith in the night.*

Rainer Maria Rilke, *The book of hours*

After the turning Heidegger will interpret being in terms of the appropriating event (*Ereignis*) as the way in which Being, as origin (*Sein*), occurs futurally in its destining sending (*Geschick*). Heidegger poetizes in a poem entitled *Companions* (*Gefährten*) about the truth of Being. The companions that dare saying of the truth of Being are presumably the kindred spirits of poets and thinkers.³⁰³ The poem runs as follows:

(...) They dare saying of the truth of Being:

Being is appropriation (*Ereignis*)
Appropriation is origin
Origin is releasement (*Austrag*)
Releasement is parting (*Abschied*)

³⁰³ Hölderlin poetizes in the poem *Remembrance*: “But where are the friends? Bellarmin with his companion?” which Heidegger explains as the futural poets of the homeland who head shyly at the origin. HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. trans. Hoeller, K. New York: Humanity Books Prometheus Books, 2000 p. 149.

Parting is Being.³⁰⁴

We will reconstruct the ontological journey starting from Being (*Seyn*) as origin in its destining sending (*Schicken*), which is a presencing (*anwesen*) and essencing (*wesen*) of entities in the openness of presence of the clearing (*Lichtung*) namely, the human being, and at the same time the self-concealment of the origin that is parting from the presence of the present into the concealment of past and future, fostering the oblivion of Being as origin, all the way towards Being's return homewards through man's remembrance of the origin, who lets in serenity the origin finally be the concealed destining future by understanding his own finite parting from Being as its own finitude. However, the parting is more originally a parting from out of Being in the departure of its history as sending and destiny. The stipulative determination of the journey of Being is of course not clear in itself and therefore in need of further clarification. Heidegger writes:

The being of the entities collects itself (*legestai, logos*) in its last sending. The previous essence of being (*Sein*) falls down in its yet unrevealed truth. The collection in this parting as the collection (*logos*) of the most outer (*eschaton*) of its previous essence is the eschatology of being. Being (*Sein*) itself is as a sending in itself eschatological.³⁰⁵

The revealing of Being has an eschatological character. Previous ways of being are futural, yet unrevealed. The origin is the most outer previous way of being that is yet unrevealed. Being in relation to time is a becoming in the sense of the self-appropriation of Being from its center to its periphery and from its periphery to its centre. The instant of the appropriating event is the time of being.³⁰⁶ Heidegger writes: "The originary historicity from Being is that which is coming at us."³⁰⁷ As such, the origin is futural. At another text Heidegger argues:

Future (*Zu-kunft*) and origin (*Herkunft*) come towards each other. In this meeting (*Entgegenkunft*) they pass each other alternately (*wechselweise*) in each different expanse. From out of the meeting of the future and the origin the present first

³⁰⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 13 p. 31.

³⁰⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Holzwege - Wozu Dichter?* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977. GA 5 p. 327.

³⁰⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p.508.

³⁰⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 20.

springs forth. (...) The present is only the alternating transition of that which comes to that which has been and that which has been to that which comes. Therefore, every present is an ambiguous ambiguity (*zweideutiges Zweideutiges*).³⁰⁸

In the appropriating event, the present is an ‘ambiguous ambiguity’ because it has a Janus head looking at once to past and future. The present is merely appearance of the concealed past and future and, as such, always more than only the present. This ‘more’ is the essence, i.e. concealed Being.

In the text *On Time and Being* Heidegger asks once again: What prompts us to name time and being together?³⁰⁹ Heidegger addresses time no longer in terms of temporality now, but straightforwardly as ‘time’. Heidegger responds to the question by arguing that philosophy since its inception has expressed the essence of things with an implicit reference to the notion of time. Since the dawn of West-European thinking, which Heidegger identifies as the history of metaphysics, being means the same as ‘presencing’ (*anwesen*).³¹⁰ Heidegger takes a step back and mentions being in this text initially not in the sense of Being (*Sein*) or the appropriating event, but being as it had been regarded by the Greeks and metaphysics.³¹¹ Only at the end of the essay the term being starts to refer to the appropriating event as the essence of being in the sense of presence thought from absence. ‘Presencing’ or presence speaks of the present (*Gegenwart*), which refers to time, Heidegger explains. The Greeks have experienced being mostly as presence (*Anwesenheit*), namely as ‘*parousia*’, albeit not ordinarily expressed as such.³¹² Socrates and Plato thought the essence of something in the sense of what endures and remains permanently (*das Fortwährende*). The ‘*idea*’ as eternal truth (*aei on*) was discovered in the aspect (*Aussehen*) as that which tenaciously persists

³⁰⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsches Metaphysik, Einleitung in die philosophie: Denken und Dichten*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990. GA 50 p. 147.

³⁰⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *On Time and Being*. in *Works*. Toronto: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972. p. 2.

³¹⁰ Idem p. 2.

³¹¹ Of the sense of a ‘step back’ in this text compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Zur Sache des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007. GA 14 p. 38.

³¹² HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 189.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsche II*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997. GA 6.2 p. 138.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsche I*. Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1961. GA 6.1 p. 598.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978. p. 183-184.

p. 150.

ARISTOTLE. *Metaphysics IV*. trans. Tredennick, H. London Cambridge Harvard University Press, 2003. p.151.

throughout all that happens.³¹³ The ‘*ontos on*’, the being entity, is ‘*to eidos*’, the outlook wherein something shows its visage, what it is, its ‘what-being’. Heidegger translates Aristotle’s concept of being as substance, namely ‘*ousia*’, for constant presence (*ständiges Anwesen*) and argues that metaphysics has been thinking being that way ever since.³¹⁴ When the Greeks thought being as idea or substance, they thought the essence as the unity in the manifold that ‘remains’ the same in every change. Basic ontological notions like ‘idea’ and ‘substance’ turned later on in the history of metaphysics into ideas in God’s mind, subject, reason, monads, spirit or will to power, as expressions of the essence. However, the same basic ontological model remained intact.

The term ‘presence’ can be analysed in two senses, viz.: in a temporal and in a spatial sense. The present indicates the time of something to distinguish it from the past, the future or the mere possible. There exists e.g. the present tense in grammar. On the other hand, something can be present in a spatial sense as ‘appearing somewhere together’ or ‘being somewhere with the others’ as e.g. in: ‘All the recruits were present at the roll call’. Heidegger deals in *Being and Time*, as we have seen in chapter four, with the latter sense of presence by means of an analysis of being-with-others (*Mitsein*), the spatiality of innerworldly things at hand, and in his later writings by means of concepts like place (*topos*), building and dwelling. However, it is the analysis of time that initially prevails upon the analysis of space in Heidegger’s work as a way of rethinking metaphysics, since in the history of metaphysics rather the reverse has been the case. ‘Constancy’ and ‘presence’ refer to the present as a mode of time that gives entities a specific mode of being. One’s vulgar understanding of the present is, according to Heidegger, that of the ‘now’ as part of one’s vulgar understanding of time, stemming from the use of time in clock time, which, in turn, provokes a linear and spatial representation of time.³¹⁵ This way of understanding time represents time as a sequence of homogeneous nows that become countable and, subsequently,

³¹³ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977. p. 30.

³¹⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 175.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsche I*. Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1961. GA 6.1 p. 542.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Basic Questions of Philosophy: selected problems of logic*. trans. Rojcewicz, R., Schuwer, A. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. p. 113.

³¹⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Grundbegriffe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981 GA 51. p. 120.

datable. But, phenomenologically speaking, the present has no definite borders dividing it from past and future, and the linear representation of time reduces time conceptually to space. Being encompasses, in Heidegger's view, not only the present, but also the 'earlier' and 'later' as the not-anymore and the not-yet of past and future. Heidegger writes: "Nor is Being in any way opposed to being-no-longer and being-not-yet; these two belong themselves to the essential nature of Being."³¹⁶

As such, Being implies negativity, nothingness, or temporal and thus verbally expressed: 'nothinging', 'nihilating' (*nichten*).³¹⁷ What makes present or is 'presencing' is not only the present, rather do past, present and future reach into the wider unity, or gathering of Being, in the sense of future that makes present in the process of having-been (*Gewesenheit*). Time regarded from the appropriating event is the past that is happening from out of the future. Being is the past that occurs from out of the future, its destiny is therefore the departure of and from its origin. Being in relation to time that has its say as the appropriating event has the character of a journey. From the perspective of the whole journey, presence is distinct from the present as a single mode of time and that which is merely present in an ontical sense. Time, as that which makes present, or that which is itself presencing, is not a present entity. Time grounds entities therefore in an abyssal way. Time reveals, but conceals as well. Heidegger cites from Sophocles' *Aias*:

The broad, incalculable time lets emerge everything that is not un-concealed as well as it conceals again in itself what has appeared.³¹⁸

In *On Time and Being* Heidegger argues that everything has its time.³¹⁹

Every entity comes and goes at the right time and remains for a time during the

³¹⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Thing in Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 181.

³¹⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Was is Metaphysik?* in *Wegmarken* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. GA 9. p. 114. Heidegger approaches here the 'nihilating' of nothingness by means of an elaboration of the disposition of human angst. One should bear in mind that the text is an 'introduction' that speaks therefore from the receptive side of Being, namely the human Being. We introduce the theme, however, from the dynamics of Being itself to indicate it from its proper place without pretending that 'nihilating' thereby becomes less unintelligible than it is in the experience of anxiety. Heidegger makes in the text the transition from the human being to nothingness itself by stating "In anxiety there occurs a shrinking back before . . . that is surely not any sort of flight but rather a kind of spellbinding calm (*gebannte Ruhe*). This 'back before' takes its departure from the nothing. The nothing itself does not attract; it is essentially repelling". Idem p. 144.

³¹⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 p. 209.

³¹⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *On Time and Being*. in *Works*. Toronto: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972. p. 3.

time allotted to it. This ‘remaining’ indicates the presence of the entities. However, being is not a thing and, as such, not in time, Heidegger argues. Yet, Being as presencing remains determined as presence by time. But time passes away without passing away itself. As such, Heidegger writes around 1969, that time is itself not temporal. Heidegger writes:

Being and time determine each other reciprocally, but in such a manner that neither can the former -Being- be addressed as something temporal nor can the latter -time- be addressed as an entity.³²⁰

One can see clearly now how this approach of time and the relation of Being and time is radically different from the approach in *Being and Time*. Since time had been before explicitly understood as temporal, i.e. as *Dasein*'s temporality. *Dasein* as an entity exists in time and is therefore temporal, secondly, it understand its being in time from its intra-temporality as its own finitude. *Dasein* exists by ‘standing out’ in its own time and for its own time, and exists as such ontologically. As we have seen, time that surpasses temporality had been explained in *Being and Time* merely as a derivate notion of originary time as temporality.

But as we have seen, the *Dasein*'s finitude implies that the totality of Being withdraws itself from the experience of the finite human being, who cannot freely and infinitely oversee past, present and future, i.e. the totality of time. Terms like ‘eternity’ – not understood as timelessness but as an infinite mode of time – and (thus) ‘infinity’ must remain empty notions from the perspective of man's own finite experience. the totality of Being withdraws itself from the experience of the finite human being, who cannot freely and infinitely oversee past, present and future, i.e. the totality of time. Terms like ‘eternity’ – not understood as timelessness but as an infinite mode of time – and (thus) ‘infinity’ must remain empty notions from the perspective of man's own finite experience. Man remains essentially a finite being, also when Heidegger after the turning starts to interpret *Dasein*'s way of being thrown into the world from the primacy of Being. Heidegger writes somewhere between 1961-1972:

³²⁰ Idem p. 3.

The human being's finitude consists in the fact that he is not able to experience the presence of beings as a whole, as what has already been, and as what is still to come as an immediately given presence. He is not able to experience the presence of being in a *nunc stans*, standing now.³²¹

Heidegger calls to mind that infinity is traditionally distinguished as *sempiternitas* and *aeternitas*.³²² The first is the continually going on of time without a latest now, and the latter as a *nunc stans*, a constant now, the ever lasting present. However, both notions are based upon the conception of time as the pure fading of now into its successor.³²³ Regarded as such, there is no break, no rift, no parting and no concealment in time.

Since Being comes only into view within a 'clearing' (*Lichtung*), which is man as 'finite thrown projection', the totality of Being, i.e. Being in exhaustive sense as the forth-bringing origin, withdraws itself from man's finite experience. Being in relation to time that has its say as the appropriating event refuses to coincide with man's finite time and remains therefore ultimately an abyss. However, Being in relation to time does not mean 'linear' time. Hence, it is not the case that the time of Being simply endures, or lasts longer than the finite temporality of man, as if man had missed the boat of Being, so to speak. Man's finite temporality rather means his impossibility to bring about an event or happening from out of himself, whereas the appropriating event, in contrast, is capable of doing so. Likewise, as a process, his understanding depends on the revelation of the appropriating event along the history of being. Man's ways of projecting and his bringing forth in the sense of *poiesis* remains designated to the un-concealment of Being. Man is not an origin, although *Being and Time* still seems to suggest this as we have seen. Man's finitude does not primarily consist in the fact that his life will come to an end one day and the constant possibility of knowing this whether by confronting or fleeing death, but in the fact that he is finitely 'disclosed' by Being, according to the later Heidegger. Heidegger writes:

³²¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Zollikon Seminars*. Evanston, Illinois: NorthWestern University Press, 2001. p. 179.

³²² Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 145.

³²³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 55.

Finitude, end, limit, its own - into its own shelteredness. In this direction - i.e. from the event itself, the concept of appropriation - the new concept of finitude is intended.³²⁴

Man as the clearing projection remains finitely thrown by time as revelation. Man as the self-mediation of Being is, therefore, a finite mediation. Heidegger writes:

The finitude of *Dasein* however, the instaneity in the clearing of the releasement of confrontation and conflict, follows essentially from its essential appropriating occurrence through Being.³²⁵

Being in relation to time that has its say as the appropriating event means history as 'revelation'. Heidegger argues that Being doesn't have history in the way that a people or a city has history. What is history-like in the history of Being is determined by the way in which Being takes place, which Heidegger understands as 'It gives Being' (*Es gibt Sein*).³²⁶ In *On Time and Being* Heidegger writes:

We do not say: Being is, time is, but rather: there is (*es gibt*) Being and there is (*es gibt*) time.³²⁷

'There is' translates to German as '*es gibt*', which literally means 'it gives'. Consequently, Heidegger will ask about the 'it' that gives in the 'there is'. Being provides the entity its being, but never as a present cause. Being's granting has not the character of entities that cause each other as conceived in notion of *causa efficiens*, but remains instead absent as origin.³²⁸ With regard to the difference between appropriation and causality Heidegger argues that Being appropriates

³²⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Zur Sache des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007. GA 14 p. 64.

³²⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Besinnung*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997 GA 66 p. 88.

³²⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Zur Sache des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007. GA 14 p. 8.

³²⁷ Idem p. 5.

³²⁸ Notice that already David Hume criticizes the notion of causality precisely because of its absent and therefore metaphysical character calling causal relations 'secret' powers. At the same time, Hume reduces causality to human habit, which is conceived as a present structure. Hume's fork grants only being to that which is present, whether as matter of fact or relation of ideas. Hume's critique of the metaphysical status of the notion of causality would, nevertheless, awakens Kant, according to his own account, from his dogmatic slumber and to which the transcendental horizontal position forms subsequently his philosophical response. The transcendental horizontal position, in turn, renders into Heidegger's notion of the 'way of being' which is initially grounded not in human habit, but in *Dasein*'s temporality. Compare HUME, D. *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. p. 17.

Dasein, but is not its ‘origin’ (*Ursprung*).³²⁹ Heidegger uses here the word ‘*Ursprung*’ and not ‘*Anfang*’.³³⁰ In contrast with a first cause (*Ursprung*), the origin (*Anfang*) maintains an open and free relation to the openness of *Dasein* because of which *Dasein*, on the hand, can know the origin as the concealed origin, but, on the other hand, no necessity is implied in the way the origin brings forth. Being’s giving is therefore a freely letting appear and letting come into existence. Being as presencing is from the perspective of its giving element characterized by Heidegger therefore as a ‘letting-presencing’.³³¹ Hence, Heidegger explains to let presencing as to ‘un-conceal’, to bring to openness.

From the perspective of the access of Being, existence as temporality means ‘disclosure’ (*Erschlossenheit*), whereas from the perspective of Being (*Seyn*), Being in relation to time that has its say as the appropriating event, means ‘revelation’ (*Entbergung*). As such, Being is the coming to pass and the coming to light of entities in their specific way of being in the free region of the openness of presence. Therefore, it is up to Being to what extent, or even whether or not, Being makes itself present in its open spot called the clearing, wherein man stands as thrown projection. Being in relation to time that has its say as the appropriating event points therefore at the structure of truth, which we will examine in chapter 2.3.

Hence, it would be a simplification to explain the turning as a simple replacement of the notion of constant presence by the notion of time. In this case time would still be thought in an ontical sense and everything would merely be intended in a ‘more temporal’ and more existentiell (*existenzieller*) way, which would make no difference, according to the later Heidegger.³³² But being stands in relation to time as the appropriating event, where time has its say as that which holds entities together, as that from which entities receive their specific way of being and in which the unique place of the human being continues to be reserved in as far as the human being stands open towards Being. Hence, Being in relation to time that has its say as the appropriating event is a destining as the placement of

³²⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65. p. 471.

³³⁰ Notice that Heidegger in *Besinnung*, nevertheless, uses the term ‘*Ursprung*’ to indicate Being as origin. HEIDEGGER, M. *Besinnung*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997 GA 66 p.12, 53.

³³¹ Idem p. 5.

³³² HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 144.

entities in their being. It is not the human being that posits entities as a subject, but their presence is due to the presencing of Being from out of its openness. Still on the way, time had been a name for the truth of the Being, according to Heidegger.³³³ As such, Being means time as ‘temporalizing’ or ‘timing’, but just as well as space as spacing and ‘placement’. Heidegger speaks therefore in *Contributions to Philosophy* of the ‘interplay’ of being as ‘time-space’. Space and time represented for itself in their usual conjunction arise and occur out of time-space that is therefore more originary. Time-space arises out of and belongs to the essence of the truth of Being as the appropriating event and is thereby the grounded structure of the ‘there’, a structure of transport-captivation, Heidegger asserts³³⁴ The interplay or constellation of time-space yields *Dasein*’s thrownness as the between determining itself as the ‘there and now’ in the uniqueness of *Dasein*.³³⁵ Heidegger writes:

Time-space is the appropriated sundering of the turning paths of the event, the sundering of the turning between belonging and call, between abandonment by being and beckoning intimation (the trembling in the oscillation of Being itself!). Nearness and remoteness, emptiness and bestowal, verve and hesitation- in these the hidden essence of time-space resides, and so they cannot be grasped temporally and spatially on the basis of the usual representations of time and space.³³⁶

Notice that the above structure concerns Being’s grounding element, which is therefore positive. However, time and space are just like Being never extant entities, but explained by Heidegger from absent Being. Time-space is not an entity but the way the appropriating event takes place. To put it simply, time is present in the way it is given in the coming to presence of entities, their change and movement, while time itself remains at once hidden behind these phenomena. The same holds true for world, space and more originally for time-space. They are present as absent, i.e. ‘presencing’.

In *Basic Concepts* Heidegger characterizes the coherence between Being and time as a transition wherein the present turns its strife (*Unfug*), giving up thereby its character of constant presence (*Beständigkeit*), while each entity inserts

³³³ Idem p. 143.

³³⁴ Idem p. 294.

³³⁵ Idem p. 294.

³³⁶ Idem p. 294.

itself into its own presence finding its own being.³³⁷ Entities ‘turn in’ (*einkehr*) their own being, which is, in turn, granted by Being. As such, the turning (*Kehre*) is an ‘in-turning’, as the way Being in relation to time that has its say as the appropriating event, lets entities arrive in their own essence as the ‘essencing’ (*wesen*) and ‘presencing’ (*anwesen*) of Being.³³⁸ The appropriation of Being, *Dasein* and entities is ‘in-turning’. Entities fulfil in this way their ‘when,’ and ‘for how long’ allotted to them. In the turning of the strife (*Unfug*) of the entities, that which is present corresponds to its allotment by the timing (*zeitigen*) of time. Metaphysics has explained time and space as a parameter due to the calculating character in which its historical course has cumulated. However, Heidegger returns to a more original notion of the relation between being and time as he explains in his interpretation of the ancient Greek ‘*chronos*’.³³⁹ ‘*Chronos*’ means that which corresponds to *topos*, the place to which an entity always belongs. *Chronos* is always proper (*günstige*) and granted time in contrast with the untimely (*Unzeit*). *Taxis*, as the arrangement of time never means merely a series of now points arrayed after each other, but the allotment character of time, as *chronos*, lies in its appropriate, (*Schicklichen*) sending (*schickenden*), granting (*gönnenden*) and settling (*fügenden*) character. It is now clear from the originary interpretation of *chronos* why we have avoided the term ‘chronological time’ and used instead the term ‘linear’ time. Hence, time directs (*anweisen*) and allocates (*zuweisen*). One says therefore, according to Heidegger, e.g. ‘It is time’ as in, e.g. ‘It is time to eat’. Time is therefore the allocating of the present in its respective presence. Furthermore, time is always the convergence (*Entbreitung*) of the disposal of the ‘while’ (*Weile*), which accordingly in the present is always respectively something or a moment (*jeweiliges*). The fact that the entity in each time and each case in its being corresponds to time, means nothing else than that being is itself ‘dwelling’ (*Verweilung*) or presence (*Anwesenung*).

Heidegger often uses the term ‘conjuncture’ (*Fuge*) to indicate the dynamics

³³⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Grundbegriffe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981 GA 51. p. 120.

³³⁸ Compare ‘essencing’ (*Wesung*) in HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 136.

³³⁹ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 p. 209-210.

of Being.³⁴⁰ Heidegger speaks of the ‘free conjuncture of the truth of Being’.³⁴¹ ‘*Fuge*’ means also ‘fugue’. The fugue is a poetic musical image for the arrangements of time. A fugue in music is a contrapuntal compositional technique in multiple voices, built on a theme that is introduced at the beginning in imitation, i.e. repetition at different pitches, and recurs frequently in the course of the composition.³⁴² The composition has the character of fleeing (*fugere*) and chasing (*fugare*). In time as the appropriation of Being, the earlier and the later never form an indifferent sequence, but are always meaningful related. The earlier and the later show themselves always as my earlier and later, or Being’s earlier or later, wherein moments become moments and time becomes time in the way the earlier and later become related. The earlier as the present in relation to the later future chases the future in as far as *Dasein* chases its futural possibilities. At once the present, as the later to the earlier past, flees from the past into the future. Present *Dasein* flees his past as throwness in self appropriation, but also flees from his futural death into the present of everydayness. *Dasein* flees from the impossible and chases the possible. *Dasein* also flees from the essential and chases the inessentiality of everydayness. Temporality means removal and carrying off as fleeing, but also nearing and coming-towards-oneself as chasing. In terms of Being as the appropriating origin, one can say that the origin flees from itself by chasing the oblivion in its outflow. Presencing always means a chasing movement from past and future towards the present, whilst at once past and future flee from the present into the absence of past and future. As such, Being and *Dasein* flee from themselves and chase themselves at the same time. The chasing never catches up with the flight leaving therefore the open gap, the latitude, marge or play (*Spielraum*) of the presence of the present. Heidegger calls to mind that ancient philosophy already characterized *orexis*, practical behaviour as *dioxis* and *phuge*.³⁴³ *Dioxis* means following in the manner of pursuit, *phuge* signifies a yielding; fleeing; retreat from; striving away from. Heidegger writes:

³⁴⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p. 4, 18, 45, 59, 81.

³⁴¹ Idem p. 4.

³⁴² *Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English* Hornby, A.S. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. p. 478.

³⁴³ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. p. 136.

All originating and all genesis in the field of the ontological is not growth and unfolding but degeneration, since everything arising arises, that is, in a certain way runs away, removes itself from the superior source.³⁴⁴

As such, fleeing and chasing are the nearing and distancing dynamics of Being as the appropriating event. Being differentiates itself by the distancing flight from the origin. In conclusion, Heidegger interprets the presence of an entity here as a moment of time instead in terms of substance.

Being as the appropriating event is the interplay of time-space that gives time and space and, as such, place to entities as the way in which it lets them presencing as the arrival of entities in their own being. Being is therefore the 'it' that gives entities both of that which in the tradition of metaphysics had been understood as *existentia* and *essentia*.

In *On Time and Being*, Heidegger writes that 'time-space' is the name for the openness that opens up in the mutual self-extending of futural approach, past and present.³⁴⁵ This openness exclusively and primarily provides the space in which space as we usually know it can unfold. The self-extending, the opening up, of future, past and present is itself pre-spatial; only thus can it make room, that is to say, provide space. One could say that time-space is 'timing' and 'spacing' as placement. Heidegger writes:

The time-space of the clearing as place (*Stätte*) is indeed the carrying out of the release, the abyssal in between: abyssal timing and spacing as appropriation.³⁴⁶

As such, time-space is preceding time and space as isolated measurable dimensions (*dimensio* 'measuring', *dimetri* 'to measure out'). Heidegger admits after *Being and Time* that the attempt of this work to derive human spatiality from temporality is unattainable.³⁴⁷ Being can only take place as the appropriating event if room has been made for the occurrence in and from out of the openness of the occurrence as a self-opening. In time-space there is a mutual reaching out and

³⁴⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. p. 308

³⁴⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *On Time and Being*. in *Works*. Toronto: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972. p. 15.

³⁴⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 108.

³⁴⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *On Time and Being*. in *Works*. Toronto: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972. p. 23.

opening up of future, past and present, according to Heidegger. This reaching out opens up. Firstly, as the way in which futural approaching brings about that which has been. Secondly, as the way in which that which has been brings about futural approaching. Thirdly, this reciprocal relation of both brings about the opening up of openness. One can see a similar structure as the retaining, expecting en-presenting of temporality from chapter 1.5, but now explained, however, from Being in relation to time that has its say as the appropriating event, in the interplay of time-space. The threefold giving proves to be three-dimensional, according to Heidegger. Heidegger emphasizes that ‘dimension’ is not thought as the possibility of measurement, but as the ‘reaching throughout’, as giving and opening up. Dimension belongs therefore to the openness of presence. Only as such, dimension in terms of measurement first becomes possible. Measuring means measuring nearness or distance, which is primarily qualitative and only secondly quantitative or exact. Heidegger understands the unity of the three dimensions as their interplay, the true extending, playing in the very heart of time. Originary ‘true time’ is as such the interplay of time-space, which only in a secondarily sense fosters time and space as dimensions of measurability. Heidegger calls the interplay even the ‘fourth dimension’. A few lines after calling true time three dimensional, Heidegger states that true time is four-dimensional.³⁴⁸ Heidegger’s way of counting the dimensions seems rather arbitrary. However, what is important is Heidegger’s interpretation of each time relation. At the same time, time has its say as the paradoxical ‘many-oneness’ in which time is a unity and at once differentiated in dimensions. But the fourth parameter is verily the first and the interplay of past, present and future has to be interpreted as the ‘giving’ that determines all, according to Heidegger. The giving interplay that is at once a dimension reflects Heidegger’s earlier notion of ‘*praesenz*’ as a more original temporality among past, present and future. Heidegger argues that the first dimension of time is the incipient extending in which the unity of true time consists as the ‘nearing nearness’, ‘nearhood’ (*Nahheit*), which brings future, past and present near to one another, precisely, although paradoxically by distancing them. Heidegger writes: “This nearing of nearness keeps open the approach

³⁴⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *On Time and Being*. in *Works*. Toronto: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972. p. 15.

coming from the future by withholding the present in the approach.”³⁴⁹ Heidegger argues therefore that nearing nearness is a denial and withholding and writes: “It unifies in advance the ways in which what has-been, what is about to be, and the present reach out towards each other.”³⁵⁰

Being in relation to time that has its say as the appropriating event, regarded precisely as the giving ‘there is’ (*Es gibt*), gives time. Being gives being to entities by allotting their time and place. As time-space it gives time and makes space. In its timing it gives, but denies and withholds nearness at the same time as well. The giving ‘it’ grants openness of time-space and preserves what remains denied in that which has been and withheld in futural approach. Hence, being opens and conceals. As such the ‘it’ that grants is nothing but the movement of truth which Heidegger had called before the ‘truth of Being’. Although true time considered from the perspective of the ‘there is’ (*Es gibt*) transcends the mere temporality of *Dasein*, Heidegger states: “There is no time without man.”³⁵¹ As the granting that withholds itself in its giving, Being cannot be what it is without the entity man that receives the gift of being. In other words, time needs for its presencing the present and man standing in the openness of the clearing open towards that present. Hence, truth as revelation and therefore Being in relation to time that has its say as the appropriating event are also impossible without the human being. Heidegger writes:

True time is the nearness of presencing out of present, past and future- the nearness that unifies time’s threefold opening extending. It has already reached man as such so that he can be man only by standing within the threefold extending, perduring the denying, and withholding nearness which determines that extending.³⁵²

Again Heidegger emphasises that Being as the ‘it’ that gives is not simply time, but rather time is itself the gift or giving of Being as the preserving of the extending of presence. Being in relation to time can only mean the appropriating event as origin and not time as measurable dimension, the remaining of presence, duration or iteration. Being in relation to time that has its say as the appropriating event lets one therefore not simply assert that being is time. Time is rather the last

³⁴⁹ Idem p. 15.

³⁵⁰ Idem p. 16.

³⁵¹ Idem p. 16.

³⁵² Idem p. 16.

foreword of being (*Sein*).³⁵³ Time, as history, temporality and epochs, has to be regarded as the gift or the timing of Being. The ‘it’ that gives is the happening, the event as appropriation. However, Heidegger had identified Being at one point before literally with time. Heidegger writes between 1938 and 1940: “The having-beenness and the coming especially that which comes as the originary. Being is ‘time’.”³⁵⁴ But in the same work Heidegger denies that time is temporal (*Zeitlich*).³⁵⁵ When Heidegger identifies Being with time here, he means Being as the appropriating event, and not being in the metaphysical sense of presence. This means that Being is ‘timing’. It is itself not historical but transhistorical. It occurs from out of itself instead of the human being, his history and temporality. Being as appropriation is time as ‘true time’, both being (*sein*) as presence and time as history or temporality belong to Being (*Seyn*) as the appropriating event. Being, in the sense of presence, and time stand therefore in the relation of appropriation as the ‘it’ that grants. Both belong to the appropriating event. Being as the origin or the appropriating event is therefore itself no longer historical. Heidegger emphasises that appropriating is neither a property, nor a species of Being, nor the other way around, and yet they belong together. To state that ‘Being is time’ is in Heidegger’s view problematic in as far as time in the period of *Being and Time* is rather the horizon of Being, and in the period after *Being and Time*, both have a distinct sense by their own way of relating to the appropriation of the event (*Ereignis*). Being (*sein*), time and space must be thought from appropriating (*ereignen*). Just as less as Being ‘is’, the appropriation ‘is’. Heidegger asserts therefore: “The appropriation appropriates.”³⁵⁶ This is not a mere trivial tautology, according to Heidegger, but by saying the same about the same, the ‘Same’ has its say, which is the oldest of the old in Western thought.

Being in relation to time means the appropriating event as un-concealment, which points at the structure of truth. We have examined Being in this chapter merely as ‘presencing’ (*anwesen*), since this characterisation is more obviously related to time. In the next chapter we will examine being as ‘essencing’ (*wesen*) in order to finally see the way they are related from the perspective of Being as

³⁵³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 145.

³⁵⁴ Idem p. 142.

³⁵⁵ Idem p. 145.

³⁵⁶ Idem p. 24.

appropriation.

2.3. Truth and method

All is way

Heidegger, *On the way to language*

Heidegger's most extensive inquiry into the history of the concept of truth in the sense of *aletheia*, truth as 'un-concealment', is to be found in *Plato's Sophist* (1924/1925).³⁵⁷ The work dates from before *Being and Time*. Because the work is not yet emphatically concerned with the ontological problems that come to expression in *Being and Time* and later in the turning, we will leave the work out of consideration here.³⁵⁸

In *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language* (1934) Heidegger relates truth to finitude and as such indirectly to time. Heidegger argues that it is about time that we finally get serious with the fact that we are before anything else human beings instead of gods.³⁵⁹ Since our thinking remains finite, absolute truth is impossible. However, from a lack of absolute truth we must not conclude that there is no truth at all for us. Heidegger asserts that we understand truth as the 'un-concealment' of entities, traditionally expressed as '*aletheia*'. Its un-concealedness binds us and transports us into the realm of the being of entities in a way that is corresponding to their being. What is true for us is in this sense of truth, is sufficient and complete for a human life, Heidegger states.³⁶⁰ As such, truth is always relative, which means related to *Dasein* and, as such, related to time. Heidegger writes:

³⁵⁷ *Platon: Sophistes* (1924/1925) GA 19.

³⁵⁸ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Platon: Sophistes*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992.

A notion of truth as un-concealment prior to correspondence can already be found in Hegel's Science of Logic. Hegel writes: "As such, logic is to be grasped as the system of pure Reason; as the realm of pure thoughts. This realm is the truth, as it is unconcealed (*ohne Hülle*) in and for itself." HEGEL, G.W.F. *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2008. p. 33.

Compare "In Hegel's Phenomenology of spirit *aletheia* presences, while at the same time transformed" HEIDEGGER, M. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. GA 7 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 7 p. 186.

³⁵⁹ *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* (1934) GA 38.

³⁶⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 38 p. 79.

There is not a single valid reason for presupposing eternal truths. It is even more superfluous if we were to presuppose that there were such a thing as truth.³⁶¹

Truth is, in Heidegger's view, in its own being historical.³⁶² Truth has the character of an occurrence and not of an object or entity.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger had discussed the concept of truth under the title of 'Care as the being of *Dasein*' in §44 of chapter 6. Heidegger argues here that truth has been regarded together with being in a primordial connection since the dawn of philosophy.³⁶³ Truth has been associated with what shows itself in itself. The relation between truth and being comes most simply to expression in the saying "there is truth" (*Es gibt Wahrheit*). Heidegger characterizes the traditional concept of truth in *Being and Time* by three theses:

1. The 'locus' of truth is the proposition (judgment)
2. The essence of truth lies in the 'correspondence' (*Übereinstimmung*) of the judgment with its object.
3. Aristotle, the father of logic, attributed truth to judgment as its primordial locus, he also started the definition of truth as 'correspondence'.³⁶⁴

The third thesis concerns the history of the concept of truth in the sense of the correspondence of the proposition, as is expressed by the first two theses. Thomas Aquinas' famous formulation of the essence of truth as *veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei*; truth is the adequation of things and intellect, is according to Heidegger based on Aristotle's saying "*pathemata tes psyches ton pragmaton homoiomata*"; the experiences of the soul, the *noemata* (representations) are correspondences to things.³⁶⁵

In general, correspondence or agreement means 'agreement of something with something', which has therefore the formal character of a relation. But not every relation is an agreement. Heidegger gives the example of a sign that points to what is shown. Showing is a relation, but not in the sense of an agreement between the sign and that what which is shown. When one points at something

³⁶¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. p. 221.

³⁶² HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsches Metaphysik, Einleitung in die philosophie: Denken und Dichten*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990. GA 50. p. 3.

³⁶³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 196, 197.

³⁶⁴ Idem p. 198.

³⁶⁵ Idem p. 198.

with one index finger one makes a sign, but the index finger agrees not in any sense with the object to which it points. Heidegger gives another example of the number 6 that agrees with 16 minus 10.³⁶⁶ Here the numbers equal with regard to the question of how much. Equality is one kind of agreement. Consequently, Heidegger asks: “What is that with regard to which what is related in the *adequatio* agrees?”³⁶⁷ Because *intellectus* and *res* are not of the same species, it is impossible for them to be equal. They can also not be merely similar, since knowledge is supposed to ‘give’ the matter just as it is and agreement has the relational character of ‘just as’. Heidegger argues that the matter of correspondence cannot be clarified if the relational totality of truth will not first be clarified from the supporting context of ‘being’. The question of truth is therefore firstly an ontological question, according to Heidegger. From the traditional perspective of metaphysics the question concerns the subsisting relation between the ideal and the real. However, Heidegger approaches the matter phenomenologically and writes:

When does truth become phenomenally explicit in knowing itself? When knowing proves to be true. By demonstrating itself, it is assured of its truth. Thus the relation of agreement must become visible in the phenomenal connection of demonstration.³⁶⁸

Heidegger gives the example of the statement “The picture on the wall is hanging crookedly”.³⁶⁹ Here, knowledge and what is known are not related in the sense that the speaker is related to representations, which subsequently may or may not correspond, but the speaker is related to the real picture on the wall. Should one be permitted to speak in terms of a mind at all, one can conclude at most that what one has in mind is nothing else but the real picture. Heidegger asserts: “Making statements (*Das Aussagen*) is a being toward the extant thing itself.”³⁷⁰

What is to be confirmed concerning a statement is whether it discovers the entity toward which it is. Asserting has a discovering nature that is demonstrated by the act of asserting. Here knowing remains related only to the entity itself,

³⁶⁶ Idem p. 199.

³⁶⁷ Idem p. 199.

³⁶⁸ Idem p. 199.

³⁶⁹ Idem p. 200.

³⁷⁰ Idem p. 201.

Heidegger argues.³⁷¹ This means that what is to be demonstrated concerning the concept of truth is solely the discoveredness of the entity itself in the how of it being discovered. Heidegger argues that what is stated in a statement is nothing but the entity itself. Conformation by statement means therefore that entities show themselves in their ‘self-sameness’.³⁷² This is, in turn, only possible if the ‘knowing’ that asserts and confirms accordingly to its ontological sense is itself a discovering ‘being toward real entities’. Hence, the predicate structure of the proposition says that the being that is predicated is discovered to be the same as the being expressed in the subject term. This nexus of the copula of the proposition can only be a derivative of the truth of original discovering. Heidegger regards therefore the nexus of the adequation in the statement from the perspective of the phenomenon firstly from *Dasein*’s ‘discovering’ (*Entdeckend sein*). To say that a statement is true means that it discovers the entities in themselves. A true statement asserts; shows; it let’s entities ‘be seen’ (*apohansis*) in their discoveredness.³⁷³ Therefore, truth has not the structure of an agreement between knowing and the object, in the sense of a correspondence of one entity (subject) to another object. Heidegger had already in §33 determined the statement as derivative mode of interpretation (*Auslegung*), which, in turn, is based upon understanding (*Verstehen*) as disclosure and discovery. The original discovering being is in *Being and Time*, of course, to be regarded as *Dasein*. Being true as discoveredness is, in turn, only possible on the basis of *Dasein* as a being-in-the-world. Primarily true is the discovering existence of *Dasein* as ‘being discovering’ (*Entdeckend-sein*).³⁷⁴ Things that are discovered (*Entdeckt-sein*) are true only in a secondary sense. Although disclosure and discovery are equi-primordial, disclosure is always directed toward discoveredness. Discoveredness cannot occur without the transcendence of the disclosure of *Dasein*. Heidegger asserts therefore that only with the disclosedness of *Dasein*, the most primordial phenomenon of truth is attained. *Dasein* is itself first disclosed and, as such, *Dasein* can disclose and discover. *Dasein* is therefore essentially truth; *Dasein* is ‘in the truth’, Heidegger asserts.³⁷⁵ Hence, to speak truly means to exist truly.

³⁷¹ Idem p. 201.

³⁷² Idem p. 201.

³⁷³ Idem p. 201.

³⁷⁴ Idem p. 203.

³⁷⁵ Idem p. 203.

Heidegger argues that the former interpretation of the essence of truth is nothing but arbitrary, but provides a key to understand the history of the concept of truth in the history of metaphysics. The interpretation does not shake off the tradition but rather concerns a primordial appropriation.³⁷⁶ Concerning the concept of *logos* in Greek ontology, which *inter alia* means language, word, argument or statement, Heidegger writes:

The being-true of the *logos* as *apophasis* is *aletheuein* in the manner of *apophainesthai*: to let entities be seen in their un-concealment (*Unverborgenheit*) (discoveredness (*Entdecktheit*)) taking them out of their concealment.³⁷⁷

According to Heidegger, Aristotle equates *aletheia* with *pragma* and *phainomena*, which signify ‘things themselves’; that which shows itself; entities in the how of their discoveredness.³⁷⁸ Heidegger interprets the term ‘*logos*’ from the oldest fragments of ‘philosophical doctrine’ of Heraclites also in the sense of discoveredness and un-concealment.³⁷⁹ His explanation of the relation of *aletheia* and *logos* in the fragments of Heraclites runs as follows:

Those who do not understand are contrasted with the *logos* and with him that speaks the *logos* and understand it. The *logos* is *phrazon hokos echei*, it tells how entities behave. In contrast, to those who do not understand, what they do remains in concealment, *lantanei*; they forget (*epilanthanontai*), that is, for them it sinks back into concealment. This un-concealment, *aletheia*, belongs to *logos*.³⁸⁰

Heidegger warns already in *Being and Time* for a translation of *aletheia* merely as ‘truth’, because truth is since Aristotle regarded as the truth of the proposition.³⁸¹ Therefore, Heidegger uses the more literal translation of *aletheia* as ‘un-concealment’. Un-concealment appoints to ‘concealment’. The Greek word ‘*aletheia*’ is a composite of ‘*a*’, a negating suffix and ‘*letheia*’, derived from ‘*lethe*’, which means ‘oblivion’ or ‘forgetting’.³⁸² Truth as un-concealment means then: *anamnesis*; not forgetting; remembrance.

In *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger indicates the essay *On the Essence of*

³⁷⁶ Idem p. 202.

³⁷⁷ Idem p. 202.

³⁷⁸ Idem p. 202.

³⁷⁹ Idem p. 202.

³⁸⁰ Idem p. 202.

³⁸¹ Idem p. 202.

³⁸² HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 p. 38-39.

Truth (1943) published in *Pathmarks* as a transition text that prepares the shift of focus on *Dasein* and the being of entities towards Being.³⁸³ The essay *On the Essence of Truth* was written already in 1930 and provides, according to Heidegger, a certain insight into the thinking of the turning from ‘*Being and Time*’ to ‘*Time and Being*’.³⁸⁴ Heidegger analyses here the history of the concept of truth in a similar way as he had done in *Being and Time*. Heidegger argues again here that the traditional conception of truth points at the proposition, but, nevertheless, not only at the proposition. One says e.g. that a piece of gold is genuine gold; true gold.³⁸⁵ ‘True gold’ is in accordance with what we, already in advance, properly mean by gold. In this instance the ‘matter’ (*Sache*) is in accord. However, we also and above all ascribe truth to statement about entities. Heidegger asserts: “A statement is true if what it means and says is in accordance with the matter about which the statement is made”³⁸⁶ Here the statement (*Satz*) is in accord. Heidegger distinguishes therefore propositional truth (*Satzwahrheit*) from material truth (*Sachwahrheit*). In both cases the true is what corresponds; the accordant. Being true and truth signify accord, whether as the consonance (*Einstimmigkeit*) of a matter with what is supposed in advance regarding it or the accordance of what is meant in the statement with the matter.³⁸⁷ Both have their say in Aquinas’ formulation of truth as *veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei* in as far as *intellectus* can refer to the knowing of the meaning of a concept or the knowing as the understanding of the statement.³⁸⁸ This way of thinking goes back to Aristotle who conceived truth to be the accordance (*homoiosis*) of a statement (*logos*) with a matter (*pragma*). Heidegger clarifies this notion of truth as correctness (*Richtigkeit*). Accordingly, un-truth has been regarded as disagreement, i.e. non-accord. Since any propositional truth concerns a statement about entities, which, in turn, are conceived to be corresponding to their ideas or being, material truth has been in the metaphysical history of the concept of truth a more original notion than propositional truth. Hence, the traditional focus on propositional truth has always presupposed material truth, which points at truth as the disclosure or

³⁸³ *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (1930) in *Wegmarken* (1919-1961) GA 9.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989 p. 246, 266, 267, 250.

³⁸⁴ *Idem* p. 249.

³⁸⁵ *Idem* p. 137.

³⁸⁶ *Idem* p. 138.

³⁸⁷ *Idem* p. 138.

³⁸⁸ *Idem* p. 138.

revealing of a matter itself. Truth point no longer first to *Dasein* but to the being of entities. Like he had done in *Being and Time*, Heidegger asks about the possibility of accordance and therefore the possibility of truth as correctness. Heidegger asks: “How is the statement able to correspond to something else, the thing, precisely by persisting in its own essence?”³⁸⁹

Again, Heidegger explains asserting as a way of relating to entities. The proposition is a way of re-presenting. Representing is a way of presenting. The statement says something of the presented thing in just such manner as that thing, as presented, is. The proposition is a representation that contains concepts, which are, in turn, also representations. These representations can correspond or agree because they share the same representing nature. However, this does not clarify how the concept can agree with a matter, or in general, a representation with the represented. Hence, the truth of a representation, whether as concept or proposition is only possible on the condition that a representation can be related to that which is represented in a way which provides measure for the correctness of the representation and therefore for the proposition as well.³⁹⁰ The ‘such as’-character of the presenting statement means that we are letting the thing stand opposed as object in the act of asserting.³⁹¹ Hence, asserting means intrinsically objectification and representation. However, that which stands opposed must traverse (*durchmessen*) or measure out an open field of ‘opposedness’ (*Entgegen*) and remain at the same time an object. That is to say, show itself as something withstanding (*ein Ständiges*). The openness of the between of the opposed is not first created by presenting or representing, but stems, according to Heidegger, from ‘relatedness’.³⁹² Every form of relating is, in turn, characterized by the way it abides in the openness (*Offenen*) and adheres to something revealed (*Offenbares*), Heidegger argues. That which has been opened up in this sense is that which is present and traditionally understood as ‘being’.

At any rate, comporting towards entities occurs not only by making statements, but in all ways of human existence. Subsequently, the openness of comportment or relating to entities provides a standard for presenting and representing. Hence, truth cannot reside originally in the proposition, but must be

³⁸⁹ Idem p. 140.

³⁹⁰ Idem p. 145.

³⁹¹ Idem p. 141.

³⁹² Idem p. 141.

derived from open compartment. If we assert: 'It is raining' the determination of the correctness of this statement depends on the possibility of the experience of the situation in which it is actually raining. Firstly, the expressed statement represents a situation that can be the case or not. Secondly, we could experience the situation in which it is actually raining or not. Subsequently, one's understanding of the experience in which it is actually raining is a representation again that is able to correspond with the representation of the statement. However, the representation of experience is not merely an imagination but must stand open to the situation. This standing open towards the situation, entities or being, is what we understand by the very concept of experience, which Heidegger regards as the openness of presence. The object of experience presents itself, in contrast with being re-presented e.g. merely in asserting that it rains. The open compartment of experience is therefore in Heidegger's terminology not merely a representation but an 'open' or 'free' projection. Every form of *re*-presenting presumes therefore that something is already originally presented within the openness. Hence, whether a statement is correct depends on the possibility of experience, but the truth of experience is not a matter of corresponding, but a matter of standing open to the world as the openness of experiencing presence. Heidegger associates this openness with freedom, which first gives measure to experience on the basis of which the correctness of the proposition is subsequently possible. Heidegger writes:

And how can the initiation into an accord occur? Only if this pre-giving has already entered freely into an open region for something opened up that prevails there and that binds every presenting. To free oneself for a binding directedness is possible only by being free for what is opened up in an open region.³⁹³

That which is from itself already free, the still concealed essence of the openness as the originary self-opening is freedom, Heidegger argues.³⁹⁴ Heidegger characterizes therefore the essence of truth in the sense of un-concealment as freedom. This freedom points, according to Heidegger, to the heretofore uncomprehended essence of freedom, an observation which must refer not only to the history of metaphysics, but also to Heidegger's own thinking from *Being and*

³⁹³ Idem p. 142.

³⁹⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 p. 213.

Time, since transcendence had been regarded there primarily from the perspective of the temporality of *Dasein*.

The understanding of Being is never a mechanical or causal process. In order to act or assert, whether correctly or not, the actor must be free and unimpeded. This does not mean that truth depends on arbitrary human caprice, but experience transposes us in advance into the originally essential domain of truth, which Heidegger calls the ‘concealed essential ground of human beings’.³⁹⁵ The unconcealed (*das Offenbare*) to which a representative statement, whether correct or not, corresponds, means the entities that are disclosed in open compartment. Freedom for what is disclosed in an open region lets entities be what they are and, as such, reveals itself as ‘letting beings be’. Hence, the mediating element is now regarded as ‘freedom’ instead of the human being.

The openness of truth has according to Heidegger a fourfold structure: firstly, the openness of the thing. The thing must be able to show itself from itself. The thing must first be released by Being as an entity. Secondly, the openness of the region between thing and man, the thing must be able to traverse time and space to near man and the other way around. Thirdly, of man himself with regard to the thing, man must be open to the openness of being. Fourthly, the openness of man to fellow man. Man’s essential sustaining in the open clearing is not subjective or individual, but is the publicness wherein every man has been thrown.³⁹⁶

The ‘letting be’ means an engagement with entities. In other words, to engage (*einlassen*) oneself with the open (*das Offene*) and its openness (*Offenheit*) wherein every entity comes to stand by bringing that openness along with itself.³⁹⁷ In these formulations we see that the openness of transcendence is no longer understood from *Dasein*’s temporality. Heidegger argues that since its beginning Western thinking has conceived the open region of experience as *aletheia*, i.e. unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit*). Freedom is a ‘letting be’ and intrinsically exposing; ‘ek-sistent’. It is the engagement (*Eingelassenheit*) in the unconcealment of entities as such. Disclosedness (*Entborgenheit*) itself is conserved

³⁹⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989 p. 143.

³⁹⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Basic Questions of Philosophy: selected problems of logic*. trans. Rojcewicz, R., Schuwer, A. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. p. 18-19.

³⁹⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.p. 144.

in ek-sistent engagement, through which the openness of the open, i.e. the ‘there’ (*Da*) is what it is.³⁹⁸

However, the freedom as the whole of entities that are unconcealed remains itself concealed. In the ek-sistent freedom of *Dasein* that is passed (*Zuspiel*) to him; in every here or there particular way of letting-be, at the same time a concealing of the whole intrinsically comes to pass (*ereignet sich*). Unconcealment comes forth from concealment and truth belongs therefore essentially to untruth as concealing. Heidegger calls the domain of concealment the ‘mystery’ (*Geheimnis*).³⁹⁹ The mystery is the non-essence of truth. Un-truth is therefore more original than the non-accord of the statement. Precisely because *Dasein* takes its measure from that which is presented from the domain of freedom, *Dasein*’s errancy yields from freedom too. Errancy is the counter essence of the ordinary essence of truth. Concealment, i.e. un-truth becomes forgetfulness and errancy, which subsequently forms the ground for error, incorrectness of judgement and false knowledge. The mystery is not merely the irrational that can be left behind, but because the human being must relate to his own being and thus also to his concealed being, it is a riddle.⁴⁰⁰ Heidegger summarizes the central thought of the text in a statement saying: “The essence of truth is the truth of essence”.⁴⁰¹ However, the term ‘essence’ signifies the way metaphysics has asked about the being of entities, which is, however, misleading and the question in original sense springs instead from the question of Being.⁴⁰² As such, the essence of truth is the truth of Being. Heidegger will therefore ask from now on about the ontological structure of the ‘truth’ of Being. Since truth as the un-concealment of Being points by means of the concept of concealment at the non-present retrieval and withholding of Being into past and future, the term ‘forgetfulness of being’ as the oblivion of the past occurring from the future becomes more intelligible, since it is a common phenomenon that we tend to forget the past, which Heidegger, however, understands as nothing but the essence of truth as un-truth i.e. concealment of Being from out of Being.

In contrast with the philosophical tradition that since Aristotle regards the

³⁹⁸ Idem p. 145.

³⁹⁹ Idem p. 150.

⁴⁰⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 235.

⁴⁰¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 153.

⁴⁰² Idem p. 151.

essence of truth as the correctness of the correspondence of the proposition, Heidegger thought that the pre-Socratics still pre-eminently thought truth as *aletheia*, i.e. un-concealedness. However, others have pointed out to Heidegger that Homer already used ‘*alethes*’ only in the *verba discendi*; in statement and therefore already in the sense of correctness.⁴⁰³ But in Heidegger’s response, thinking should think even more Greek than the Greeks had done. Thinking should not think the presence of Being as constant presence, like Plato and Aristotle had done, but as the concealed ‘other’ origin that in un-concealment ‘presences’ and ‘essences’ entities by letting them arrive into their specific way of being. Heidegger comes finally to the point of putting the ‘truth’ of truth as *aletheia* within quotation marks, saying that un-concealment has nothing to do with truth, which is here obviously meant as truth in the sense of correctness.⁴⁰⁴ Within the experience of truth as *aletheia* the Greeks had not experienced and thought the openness, as such, and therefore not the concealment of un-concealment. They had instead experienced it as light, because of which they tended to explain truth in terms of brightness, lightning, shining and appearing and therefore as something present.⁴⁰⁵

At any rate, un-concealment is initially in *Being and Time* not yet thought from the perspective of Being, but still regarded as the disclosure and discovery of *Dasein*. Heidegger writes in *Contributions to Philosophy*:

The previous attempts, in *Being and Time* and the ensuing writings, to implement *this* essence of truth (the truth of Being) (in opposition to correctness in representing and asserting) as the ground of *Dasein* itself had to remain insufficient. For they were always carried out as a *rejection* and so always took their orientation from that which they rejected. Thus they made it impossible to know the essence of truth in a radical way, i.e., from the ground (and the essence itself essentially occurs as that ground). For such knowledge to succeed, saying of the essence of Being must no longer be withheld due to the mistaken opinion that, despite insight into the necessity of a projection which leaps ahead, ultimately there

⁴⁰³ HEIDEGGER, M. *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking*. in *Basic Writings*. San Francisco: HarperSanfrancisco, 1977. p. 390.

⁴⁰⁴ Idem p. 391

⁴⁰⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 p. 214. Sheehan formulates unfortunately that the Greeks have discovered the ‘hidden’ clearing. But the point is that they discovered it precisely not as ‘hidden’, but as something present although not in the usual way as a thing present at hand. They discovered ‘truth’ as unconcealment, but not in its open and therefore hidden character. Despite the negating formation of the word *a-leitha*, its concealment had not been thought through, truth had rather been regarded under the principle *ex nihilo nihil fit*, nothingness had been regarded as present otherness. SHEEHAN, T. *Making sense of Heidegger: A paradigm shift*. Rowman & Littlefield International, 2015. p.252.

still could be built a way to the truth of Being that would proceed step by step from the earlier views. The attempt to build such a way must always fail.⁴⁰⁶

In Heidegger's view, every thought that is turned against something else is still determined by that which it is turned against. The same holds true for thinking that is turned against metaphysics and, consequently, the attempt of contrasting, by a 'primordial appropriation', the truth of Being with the metaphysical notions of truth as correctness and even truth as un-concealedness in the sense of the Greek *aletheia*. Un-concealedness as the truth of Being has to be thought in an original way and radically different from metaphysics. This means, in Heidegger's view, that through a preparatory destruction of metaphysics, thinking should turn towards the origin of the manifestation of being, which Heidegger calls the 'first origin' (*archè*), namely the Greek dawn of metaphysics and especially the pre-Socratic 'thinkers' that still thought truth as *aletheia*.⁴⁰⁷ However, in the regression of thought on the way to the origin, metaphysics can never be the terminus. Concerning the Greek concept of *aletheia* Heidegger writes:

The concealedness and the concealing, their origin and their ground—these never become a question. What is taken into account is only, so to speak, the 'positive' aspects of un-concealedness, what is freely accessible and the bestowal of access; and therefore *aletheia* in this regard as well loses its original depth and its abyssal character, assuming *aletheia* was ever thoughtfully interrogated along those lines.⁴⁰⁸

The first beginning, as the clearing and un-concealment of being, points originary thinking towards the concealment of Being, and thinking should transitively move on towards a region of thinking, if opened up by Being, which Heidegger calls 'the other origin' in which thinking must think even more Greek than the Greeks had done.⁴⁰⁹ Thought that thinks the other beginning, 'thinks of' or remembers (*andenken*) Being as the absent and concealed origin, which he calls

⁴⁰⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 278.

⁴⁰⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 137 *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. p. 94, 148.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Basic Questions of Philosophy: selected problems of logic*. trans. Rojcewicz, R., Schuwer, A. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. 95-97, 101.

⁴⁰⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 263.

⁴⁰⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Basic Questions of Philosophy: selected problems of logic*. trans. Rojcewicz, R., Schuwer, A. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. p.108-109.

the mystery or the appropriating event. This remembering thinking is precisely to start from the experience of the concealment of being as the oblivion of the Being.

Heidegger writes:

The concealment announces itself, insofar it is a transition to the other origin. Therein lies, that every inceptional and the whole of its proceeding is now only determined from the other origin.⁴¹⁰

Hence, the transition from the first origin to the second origin is a transition of thinking: between origins themselves there is no transition, according to Heidegger. The first and the other origin occur simultaneously, albeit not both have been thought through. Therefore, the transition of thought to Being (*Seyn*) rather requires a 'leap' in its abyss than that it concerns a logically consistent smooth transition in which the first origin leads thinking into the other origin. Every transition is a leap, according to Heidegger.⁴¹¹ Genuine thinking occurs by leaps (*sprunghaft*).⁴¹² Heidegger writes:

Yet the abyssal ground is also, and primarily, the originary essence of the ground, of its grounding, of the essence of truth.⁴¹³

Heidegger's aim of overcoming metaphysics does not stand alone, but stems from the quest for Being, from where it solely should be interpreted. Heidegger identifies philosophy with metaphysics. His relation to the history of philosophy is ambiguous because the history of metaphysics has itself a twofold character, due to the revealing (*Entbergung*, *Enthüllung*) and concealing (*Verbergung*) dynamics of Being.

Concerning the overcoming of metaphysics Heidegger writes in *Contribution to Philosophy*:

The first step toward the creative overcoming of the end of metaphysics had to be carried out in such a way that in one respect the directionality of thinking is maintained, although in another respect it is thereby at the same time radically raised beyond itself. To maintain that directionality means: to inquire into the *being*

⁴¹⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. p. 87.

⁴¹¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsche I*. Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1961. GA 6.1 p. 522.

⁴¹² HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 p. 223.

⁴¹³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 299.

of beings. The overcoming means: to inquire first into the *truth* of Being, into what *never* did become, or even could become, a question in metaphysics.⁴¹⁴

Transitional thinking is, according to Heidegger, not an opposition to metaphysics, since that would simply bring metaphysics back into play. What is sought is an overcoming of metaphysics out of its ground. The end of metaphysics results not from asking too much, too uncritically and too intensely about the beingness of entities, but yields from the retrieval of the first beginning. Hence, the mode of questioning of metaphysics could never interrogate that which was basically sought, i.e. Being (*Seyn*).⁴¹⁵

Metaphysics only shows the possibility of fore-thinking as inceptional thinking in the transition to the other origin.⁴¹⁶ Metaphysics attests the way in which being (*sein*) as the being of entities historically unfolds itself. While attempting to uncover the foundations of being, metaphysics describes the way Being makes itself positively manifest in each different epoch of the Being. Already in the account of phenomenology from *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues, that despite the fact that entities show themselves from themselves as phenomena, we do not behold them naively in an immediate and unreflective way.⁴¹⁷ It is the extant metaphysical language and explanation of being that orientates one's reflections and thus mediates the way entities are approached, experienced.

Metaphysics itself considered as a phenomenon or happening takes part in the concealment of Being, whence the forgetfulness of Being stems.⁴¹⁸ Being hides itself through metaphysics by showing itself not in its absent but in its present character. Consequently, Being is forgotten in its proper absent character, since metaphysics has taken Being itself as a present entity or at least approaches being and entities from the primacy of the present entity. Showing the covering up of metaphysics by uncovering the traditional layers of ontology implies a *via negativa* through the history of philosophy as the destruction or deconstruction of metaphysics in order to prepare an answer for the question of the meaning of

⁴¹⁴ Idem p. 143.

⁴¹⁵ Idem p. 136

⁴¹⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. p. 96.

⁴¹⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 32.

⁴¹⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsches Metaphysik, Einleitung in die philosophie: Denken und Dichten*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990. GA 50. p. 4.

being in *Being and Time*, and in the following period a preparation of a thinking that thinks the truth of Being as the origin (*Anfang*) of Being (*Seyn*) in terms of the appropriating event. Heidegger later explains the destruction of metaphysics as:

‘Destruction’ is not a dismantling in the sense of a demolishing. It is a *purification* aimed at laying bare the basic metaphysical positions. Yet all of that is mere prelude with respect to the carrying out of the resonating and interplay.’⁴¹⁹

The former does not imply that there is no thinking implied in the works of the metaphysicians whatsoever. Since metaphysics is included in the way in which Being makes itself manifest and comes into view, it cannot be disregarded in relation to the question of Being. Heidegger writes:

Metaphysics is the fundamental occurrence in our *Dasein*. It is that *Dasein* itself. Because the truth of metaphysics dwells in this abyssal ground it stands in closest proximity to the constantly lurking possibility of deepest error.⁴²⁰

Metaphysics is an error from the perspective of the truth of Being, but a necessary one as well since the truth of being implies its oblivion as well. Heidegger argues therefore that thinker has to become aware (*innewerden*) of the history of being.⁴²¹ He writes: “Both the reflection on the first beginning and the founding of its end, an end equal to it and to its greatness, belong together in the turning.”⁴²² Concerning the metaphysical philosophers thinking should therefore pay attention to that which is still ‘unthought-of’, i.e. still concealed for thinking, by being reserved and still in store.⁴²³ Thinking Being is above all a futural occurrence, which is in need of preparation. Heidegger writes at one point: “We barely know the nature of metaphysics and are not experienced travellers in the land of the saying of Being.”⁴²⁴

At any rate, the questioning of metaphysics, which asks about the ground of

⁴¹⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 173.

⁴²⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 96.

⁴²¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 161.

⁴²² HEIDEGGER, M. *Basic Questions of Philosophy: selected problems of logic*. trans. Rojcewicz, R., Schuwer, A. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. p. 110.

⁴²³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Wass heisst denken?*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002. GA 8 p. 82.

⁴²⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 96.

entities does not reach far enough into Being as *Seyn*, the appropriating event, from the perspective of the futural task of thinking that is orientated towards Being as absence. Heidegger's initial talk of the 'overcoming' (*Überwindung*) of metaphysics is later replaced by terms like 'leaving' (*verlassung*) and 'twist' (*Verwindung*) as the movement from the first to the other origin.⁴²⁵ The term 'overcoming' is still metaphysical. It gives the impression that the movement goes 'over' from one place to another, while *Ereignis*, and thus the first origin, means self-appropriation, wherein one and the other are not separated realms of being. The other origin has already begun in the first origin. The term gives also the impression that the transition from metaphysics to the thinking of the appropriating event could yield from thinking as a human induced activity. But instead of bringing out an internal movement or movement of being on its own merits, thinking can only keep what Being from out of the other origin alludes to thinking. Thinking has therefore a character of 'waiting' (*warten*). Heidegger writes:

To think Being without entities means: to think Being without regard to metaphysics. Yet a regard for metaphysics still prevails even in the intention to overcome metaphysics. Therefore, our task is to cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself. If overcoming remains necessary, it concerns that thinking that explicitly enters appropriation (*Ereignis*) in order to say 'It' (*es*) in terms of 'It' about 'It'.⁴²⁶

Nihilism and calculative technological thinking ultimately result from metaphysics when the forgetfulness of Being has almost reached completion by the furthest retrieving of Being into concealment.

So the truth of Being refers to the un-concealment of the entities and at the same time to the self-concealment of the origin that grants those entities there being. If entities are understood as the present, or that which is present, and Being is regarded as the absent complete history of the appropriating event, the question

⁴²⁵ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 36, 131. *Besinnung*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997. GA 66 p. 89. HEIDEGGER, M. *Zur Sache des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007. GA 14 p. 30.

⁴²⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *On Time and Being*. in *Works*. Toronto: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972. p. 24.

risers concerning the being of entities, or their mode of being. Is the being of the entities present or absent?

The mode of being is the way of being. Being at large is differentiated in entities. Entities are differentiated by their different ways of being. Maybe with exception of some members of the classic school of cynics, the mode of being of the human being is not the same as the mode of being of a dog. For any given object, we will not find its essence; its mode of being alongside its features, but all its features are rather included and co-understood by its way of being. Both *essentia* and *existentia* can be understood as modes of being of the entity. Since the being of entities is intelligible in its differentiations, it must in some sense be present. If we think e.g. of a present chair, we will find that its function and history is not present in the same way as the chair as a thing is present. However, they are at the same time not completely concealed. But the function and history of a specific entity points already to its historical context and, therefore, to what Heidegger calls 'Being'. Must we conclude that the being of entities is therefore transient, somewhere between present and absence?

According to Heidegger after the turning, every mode of being springs from the ways of Being as the decision (*Entscheidung*) and abundance (*Überfluss*) of the origin (*Anfang*).⁴²⁷ If we bring into mind the phenomenology of time from chapter 1.5, although there still understood from *Dasein*'s temporality, time is used up without itself ever getting used up. The same holds true for being. Since the being of entities is sent from Being as the origin, the being of entities can also no longer be understood metaphysically, that is to say merely from the present. The being of entities must, in contrast, solely belong to concealed Being. Therefore, the whole journey of their sending is nothing but the appropriating event itself that must therefore be concealed as well. What lights up in the present is the entity, but always finite, forgotten, hackneyed (*Abgegriffen*) and abandoned (*Verlassen*) by the whole of Being. Heidegger writes in *On Time and Being*: "The history of Being means a destiny of Being in whose sendings both the sending and the 'It' which sends forth hold back with their self-manifestation."⁴²⁸

⁴²⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Grundbegriffe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981 GA 51. p. 50.

HEIDEGGER, M. *On Time and Being*. in *Works*. Toronto: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972. p. 8.

⁴²⁸ Idem p. 9.

So both the sender, which is Being, and the sending, which is the mode of being of entities as the way of the being of entities on the way of Being, are concealed. Hence, the mode of being (*Seinsweise*) of an entity must always be seen from the way of being of the totality of present entities, that in turn has to be regarded from Being, which are both held back in and by Being. To hold back as a stop or interruption is in Greek *epokhé*, of which the word ‘epoch’ is derived, which indicates a distinctive period of time. Each sending is therefore at the same time a holding back. Heidegger writes: “Always retained in the withdrawing sending, Being is unconcealed for thinking with its epochal abundance of transmutations.”⁴²⁹

Although Heidegger himself did not work out this distinction very clearly, we could distinguish between the being of entities and the being of the being of entities as the different determinations of the epochs of Being. Heidegger thought e.g. that being had been present for the Greeks as presence, in the Middle Ages as creation and in modernity as stock (*Bestand*). Hence, we have come across the differentiation of Being in the order of present to absence as the entity, the being of entities, the epochal being of the being of entities and Being (*Seyn*). Like each current epoch becomes concealed in the light of its present entities, in each new sending (*Geschick*) of the Being, or epoch of the Being (*Seinsgeschick*), former epochs become concealed in the light of the presence of the present epoch. As such, Being as a whole that sends the present and holds back past and future is held back by itself in the distancing by its parting from the origin. Since Being as the appropriating Event denotes a dynamic notion, presence and absence, presencing and nihilating are always a matter of nearing and distancing. The entity is never absolute present as something constant present and thus only transient present. It is at most remaining for the time being, but always on its way and, as such, always somewhere between nearing and distancing.

If truth points to un-concealment and un-concealment points, in turn, to concealment, truth and untruth must lie at the heart of the phenomenon as phenomenon. We will examine now the truth of the Being in relation to the phenomenon. Concealment takes place in every form of un-concealment, phenomenon, occurrence of truth, or happening, according to Heidegger. He

⁴²⁹ Idem p. 9.

writes:

Each entity which we encounter and which encounters us maintains this strange opposition of presence in that at the same time it always holds itself back in a concealment.⁴³⁰

Heidegger asserts that concealment is the main feature of history.⁴³¹ His concept of phenomenon as that which shows itself from itself escapes a dualistic and rigid essence-appearance distinction. Heidegger writes already in *Being and Time*: “However, where there is semblance there is ‘being’ (*Wieviel Schein jedoch, soviel ‘Sein’.*)”⁴³²

The phenomenon is the way the essence of an entity ‘essences’ in the totality of its moments, without hiding itself as it were behind the appearance in another metaphysical realm of Being. Hence, presence and absence, the ontical and the ontological, never occur in an isolated sense. This does, however, not mean that the essence reveals itself exhaustively always and everywhere in the present, in all its possibilities and as itself. For example, on a quantum level there is in the discovery of the atom much still concealed for us. Hegel had already characterized thinking as a dynamic process, which is worked out by Heidegger as the overall problem of time. The understanding of the being of entities as a gradual process of disclosure and discovery has, in the first place, a historical character. Un-concealment as disclosure and discovery is historically determined, which means that it has been made possible by temporality and time as the sending from Being.

Heidegger speaks of a ‘double concealment’ as ‘refusal’ (*versagen*) and ‘dissembling’ (*verstellen*) in the phenomenon.⁴³³ One can discover a specific mode of being of an entity or the mere presence of an entity. Likewise, one can discover an absence of a specific mode of being of an entity or the absence of an entity. We can detect e.g. a loss of quality with respect to used things, or detect a state of being-not-yet-finished of things that are still in production, or we can

⁴³⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Off the Beaten Track*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 30.

⁴³¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 181.

⁴³² HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 32.

⁴³³ HEIDEGGER, M. *The origin of the work of art in Basic Writings*. Sanfrancisco: HarperSanfrancisco, 1977. p. 179.

notice e.g. that a biological species has gone extinct. As such, absence can be present and belongs therefore to the openness of the clearing too. Heidegger calls this kind of concealment ‘refusal’. Furthermore, an entity has the possibility of showing itself as something else, as that which it is not. Heidegger calls this kind of concealment ‘dissembling’, which is the possibility of error, illusions and hallucinations.⁴³⁴ Thus, we can distinguish in Heidegger’s double concealment of un-concealment three forms of concealment. Firstly, concealment as dissembling, secondly, concealment as a refusal concerning the appearance of an entity and, thirdly, concealment as a refusal concerning the un-concealment, as such.

The ontical does not equal the ontological. In cases of phenomena like illusion, hallucination and error, the essence is not its illusive manifestation. A present entity could be mistaken for another present entity, or that which is absent could be taken for something present, and vice versa. The illusive phenomenon has clearly a concealing nature concerning its being, not strictly in an ontical sense, but rather in an ontic-ontological sense, since whatever we essentially assert concerning the ontical would by definition also have an ontological character. The concealment of illusion is, however, only possible because of the concealing clearing character of the phenomenon in which the ontological difference renders itself in absence and presence. Therefore, we could, secondly, from an ontological perspective, conclude that the essence is concealed in as far as the essence as ‘essencing’ does not equal its present manifestation. Appearance means ‘appearing’ which extended over time might transcend the present. Heidegger calls already in *Being and Time* being the ‘transcendence pure and simple’. Hence, the being of any entity can be concealed in as far as the entity is not yet manifested in its essence and in as far as the entity is only the way being is present (*gegenwärtig*), while the totality of the being of the entity withdraws itself and refuses to give itself to actual experience. This is, thirdly, related to the concealment of Being (*Seyn*) as the origin whence entities receive their specific mode of being, assumed that they do not come forth from themselves as a *causa sui*. Phenomenologically, our access to entities might be through phenomena that show themselves from themselves, but ontologically entities owe their being to Being. As such, Being is also characterized by Heidegger as the ‘there is’ (*Es*

⁴³⁴ Idem p. 40.

gibt) - literally 'it gives', which indicates presence as that which grants entities their being. It remains a question to what extent phenomenology, which seeks access to Being through phenomena, yields an ontical focus, or at least a focus on the being of entities, remaining therefore determined by the perspective of present human experience, which is subjectivity. The phenomenology from *Being and Time* still takes explicitly the ontical as the possibility of the ontological. It is noticeable that Heidegger's ontology of the appropriating event does not have a phenomenological character anymore. Heidegger abandoned the form of phenomenology that takes *Dasein* as the transcendental condition for the understanding of being. Although meant as a way of overcoming Cartesian subjectivity the method had still been too subjective. Heidegger admits in 1963 that philosophical phenomenology has become outdated. However, he reformulates phenomenology now: "The at times changing and only as such a permanent way of thinking, corresponding with the claim of the case itself that must be thought".⁴³⁵ The rubric 'phenomenology' can disappear in favour of the case of thinking, which un-concealedness remains, however, a mystery.⁴³⁶

⁴³⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Zur Sache des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007. GA 14 p. 89.

⁴³⁶ Compare Martin Sheehan in *Making sense of Heidegger: A paradigm shift* as an example of the ontological confusion that emerges if Heidegger is read from the beginning to the end as a plain phenomenologist. SHEEHAN, T. *Making sense of Heidegger: A paradigm shift*. Rowman & Littlefield International, 2015. p. Xii. The problem lies presumably already in the central metaphor the work uses for Being, namely the 'paradigm'. The paradigm is the 'example' that presumes, as such, the ontic that points towards the ontological. But precisely this ontological route has been cut off in Heidegger's later thought. Albeit having his complete vocabulary at their disposal, Heidegger scholars, apparantly, do not easily overcome the metaphysics of presence. *Making sense of Heidegger* is an 'outstanding' academic work, but a failure from the perspective of thinking through the case of Being. Heidegger's ontology is in Sheehan view a matter of semantics (sense and meaning), also in its privation and failure. The title of the work 'making sense of Heidegger' is indicative here. The senseless must made intelligible instead of remaining mysterious; the work is therefore, unwittingly and perhaps unintended, a rationalisation of ordinary thought and, as such, one-sided, moreover, inessential. Being includes in Heidegger's view both essencing (*wesen*) as presencing (*anwesen*). 'Presencing' and the 'truth' instead of the mere 'sense' of Being, suggest that the quest for Being is not merely a case of semantics. Being 'occurs' and in and from this occurrence entities occur, which is only in a second sense 'intelligible', that is to say 'partially'. Out of all Heidegger's determinations of Being, Sheehan takes 'the appropriated clearing' (*die ereignete Lichtung*) as a basic expression, which he regards as 'meaningful presence'. We prefer, however, in our argumentation to make use of the notion 'clearing concealment' as the basic dynamics of Being. In Sheehan's formulations Heidegger would be nothing but a Hegelian again. Sheehan obviously deals in the context of Heidegger's thinking extensively with all forms of absence, but never in a clear difference, however, with Hegel who treats being as well as appropriation (becoming) and nothingness that in some sense transcends chronological time and temporality. However, in Heidegger's view, the clearing 'occurs' (indeed as appropriation), but is also and above all 'nihilating' on its way, which is therefore still arriving and coming so that even the 'nihilating' is hidden. What is essential concerning the phenomenon, according to the later Heidegger, is un-concealment, which implies, in turn, concealment or, in other words, the clearing

Heidegger now refers back to *Being and Time* where phenomenology had been determined as a discipline that is not determined by its ‘reality’, but by its understanding of the possible. Since the possible transcends the mere present and is later approached by Heidegger in terms of Being itself, the later Heidegger does not need to distance himself radically from his phenomenological past, which on the other hand does not justify calling the latter Heidegger still a phenomenologist. Heidegger’s phenomenology had initially been identified with the transcendental approach of fundamental ontology. Both are left behind in as far as Heidegger leaves any method behind on the path of originary thinking. Leading for thinking is freedom as the openness of presence, which has not one single way, one particular method.

Concerning truth, the phenomenon, the clearing, the epochal onset and the

implies in its presencing ‘openness’ or ‘opening’ to absence all the way back and forth from the origin to its futural return. This means that the phenomenon is hiding its own phenomenological character, it comes rather ‘not’ to light and is therefore rather ‘not’ meaningful. Sheehan could in a Hegelian way reply that this negative meaning is still meaningful. However, Heidegger’s ontology can firstly not be a case of semantics if nihilating is not conceptual. Secondly, if the meaninglessness of Being yields from the appropriating event, the refusal and retrieval of Being can essentially not be intelligible determinations of human thought or something that can be contrasted with the ontical. Nevertheless, refusal might, be experienced in Heidegger’s view. This experience consists not in ‘making sense’ of Heidegger or being, but, rather in the experience of parting, pain, anxiety, silence, senselessness, the implosion of meaning, nihilism, the rift, limit, finitude and death. Sheehan deals with the latter in ‘protreptic’ sense, but still from out of Heidegger’s earlier existential ontological orientations instead of taking concealed being as the starting point for thinking. It remains unclear how the analytic and the protreptic are related or what the essence is of thought that thinks the appropriating event in Sheehan’s work. The appropriation of the event means ‘clearing’, but the openness of clearing implies its own refusal as well, and, as such, its senselessness. If thinking is taken here from the understanding of traditional concepts merely in a new play, but not regarded from the riddle of time, the case remains doomed to remain outside of the essential occurrence of Heidegger’s thinking. Perhaps one should take seriously what Heidegger writes concerning one’s ‘resonating of Being in its refusal’ in the opening of *Contributions to Philosophy*: “No one understands (*versteh*) what ‘I’ am here *thinking*: to let *Da-sein* arise out of the *truth of Being* (i.e., out of the essential occurrence of truth) in order to ground therein entities as a whole and as such and, in the midst of them, to ground the human being.” HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 9. As such, one cannot go immediately to the content of this thoughts, because what would justify ignoring the warning and taking the content instead for granted? A philosopher cannot be eager for ‘content’ and negate the warnings about the access (i.e. the way, Being!) to that which is sought. Sheehan opens his work with an enumeration of inconsistent and obscure formulations of being by Heidegger, which shows that the principle of non-contradiction, i.e. rules of common thought are leading in his analysis, representation and speaking, thereby not attesting Heidegger’s experience of the rift of time. Our concern with poetry here is, however, precisely concerned with the nature of the possibility ‘and’ the impossibility of what Heidegger calls ‘understanding’ (*verstehen*) in this context. Although Sheehan finally comes to the conclusion that Heidegger’s thinking embraces the hidden appropriating event, he does not seem to think of the implications for Heidegger’s method of phenomenology as formulated in *Being and Time*, Heidegger’s way of speaking and Sheehan’s own way of speaking ‘about’ Heidegger’s thinking. A clearing is ultimately not ‘making sense’ by means of propositions, but rather provoking the poetic attunement that enables experiencing the refusal of Being. The language of Being is in conclusion ‘suggesting’ and maddening (*mania, verrückt*) instead that it makes sense.

relation between man and Being, it is, according to Heidegger, most important to experience freedom as the openness of Being. Openness has a revealing as well as a concealing character. Notice that the German ‘*offen*’ has also the connotation of ‘free’. However, philosophy knows nothing of the opening, Heidegger states in *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking*.⁴³⁷ Heidegger writes:

The quiet heart of the opening is the place of stillness from which alone the possibility of the belonging together of Being and thinking, that is presence and apprehending, can arise at all.⁴³⁸

Metaphysics demonstrates how entities always appear within a projection of being and determines that grounding element. However, metaphysics does not ask how it is possible that one projection of being, one historical epoch of being shifts to another. The open between remains not noticed, thought or experienced by metaphysics.⁴³⁹ In what sense is the projection of being a free and open projection? Thinking can ask: What is the space, the open play whence that which is epoch-making, suits and destines entities? In what free region is it possible for light to change and, in the first place, to pass through? Heidegger calls that free region the ‘opening’ of the clearing. It is the openness that grants a possible letting appear and show. The opening of un-concealment is the phenomenal character of every phenomenon itself, and therefore the primal phenomenon. To un-concealment belongs self-concealment, the opening grants entities in their being, but without granting that which grants. The opening ‘presences’, but is itself not a present entity. By bringing entities to our attention, Being distracts the attention from itself. Being is the concealed theatre of entities as a self-concealing happening. The clearing of Being can show, on the one hand, the absence and concealment of the being of entities, while Being, on the other hand, as un-concealment conceals itself. Heidegger speaks therefore of the ‘clearing concealment’ (*lichtende Verbergung*) and writes: “The abyssal ground is the primessential clearing concealment, the essential occurrence of truth.”⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking*. in *Basic Writings*. Sanfrancisco: HarperSanfrancisco, 1977. p. 386

⁴³⁸ Idem p. 387.

⁴³⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 76.

⁴⁴⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 300.

Because the understanding of Being (*Seinsverständnis*) includes equally seeing as hearing, the clearing is not only free for brightness and darkness, but also open for resonance and echo, for sound and the diminishing of sound.⁴⁴¹ The free region of the clearing is, in auditory terms, the space of resonance and absence that is present as silence. The clearing must ground itself in its openness.⁴⁴² Heidegger writes: “The disclosure (*Eröffnung*) of this openness is the concealed and history that essences as the appropriating event.”⁴⁴³ In the same work Heidegger writes:

The origin originates and stays in the origination (*Anfängnis*). Originating it takes on the parting (*Abschied*) and carries as such the clearing in its single openness, whence it has its pointless middle in nothingness.⁴⁴⁴

What does the turning mean in relation to the ontological difference? The ontological difference is now situated in Being. This means that being in contrast with entities cannot mean the same as Being (*Seyn*). Being and entities gain now both a positive meaning in contrast with Being as the concealed origin. Being as the being of entities; the way of being of entities as their beingness, belongs now to the revealing moment of the truth of Being. Heidegger writes:

The differentiation no longer contains anything of what is without foundation and of what is meant and needed only in the logical-categorical-transcendental sense. The mere representation of being and entities in their differentiation is now vacuous and misleading insofar as it holds fast to mere representation.⁴⁴⁵

The question of the difference between being and entities has a character that is totally unlike anything in the domain of the guiding question, that is to say in the domain of Heidegger’s former fundamental ontology. The later Heidegger states that the concept of the ‘ontological difference’ is merely preparatory, transitional from the guiding question concerning the meaning of being to the

⁴⁴¹ Idem p. 384.

⁴⁴² HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p. 399.

⁴⁴³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 77.

⁴⁴⁴ Idem p. 152.

⁴⁴⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 215.

basic question, which concerns the truth of Being.⁴⁴⁶ After the turning Heidegger's thinking can no longer be understood as ontology in traditional sense. Ontology that deals with the being of entities in terms of entities themselves can be characterized as metaphysical ontology. Ontology that deals with the being of entities as that which is without foundation and therefore distinct from entities can be characterized as a fundamental ontology. But in as far as both forms of ontology still ask about being as the being of entities and from the primacy of the entity, ontology is inherently metaphysical and distinct from thinking that thinks the truth of Being. Heidegger admits after *Being and Time* that the term fundamental ontology still suggests that it concerns an ontology among others.⁴⁴⁷ After the turning, Heidegger's way of thinking can no longer be typified as 'transcendental horizontal', a fundamental ontology or phenomenology. The title 'fundamental ontology' can be dropped, according to Heidegger, since the term fundament contradicts the preliminary character of the analytics of *Dasein* from *Being and Time*.⁴⁴⁸ Its fundament is rather a *fundamentum concussum* than a *fundamentum inconcussum*, since Being shows itself abyssal.

According to the later Heidegger, three dangers threaten thinking.⁴⁴⁹ The first danger is the 'good and thus wholesome' danger of the 'nightness' of the singing poet. Thinking can become endangered when poetry remains in oblivion, which gives, however, in a good sense also food for thought. Another danger is 'philosophizing', which Heidegger characterizes as the bad and thus muddle danger. This threat takes place in the third danger as the 'keenest' danger of thinking itself, when thinking fails to think against itself, which it can only seldom do, according to Heidegger.⁴⁵⁰ Hence, Heidegger's thinking can also not be characterized as philosophy anymore after the turning.

In as far as the later Heidegger remains to speak of Being (*Seyn*), we will continue to use the term ontology to indicate the thinking of Being, although in a sense distinct from metaphysics. Heidegger must therefore seek a domain of language that, unlike the metaphysical basic forms of thought, does not reificate, objectify, represent or express. Sought is a domain that does not regard Being

⁴⁴⁶ Idem 203.

⁴⁴⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Wegmarken*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. GA 9, p. 380.

⁴⁴⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Zur Sache des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007. GA 14 p. 40.

⁴⁴⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 8.

⁴⁵⁰ Idem p. 8.

from the presence of the present. This domain of language is poetry. We will interpret the way Being has its say in thinking that is in dialogue with poetry as ‘onto-poetology’ and name it from hereon in as such. The later Heidegger writes:

In thinking, there is neither method nor theme, but rather the region, so called because it gives its realm and free reign to what thinking is given to think. Thinking abides in that country walking the ways of that country. (...) This country is everywhere open to the neighbourhood of poetry.⁴⁵¹

The method and the way of thinking are not the same, according to Heidegger. Heidegger brings to mind in this regard the Greek saying ‘*he hodos – mepote methodos*’ meaning ‘the way is never a proceeding (*Verfahren*)’.⁴⁵² To proceed means the arrangement of thoughtful anticipation ‘against’ (*gegen*) something. But to enact a case as object (*gegen-stand*), to persecute (*verfolgen*), to grasp it as concept and to make it as such into a utility is alien to the way of thinking, according to Heidegger. Poetically he writes:

The way is way
that is on the way (*unterwegs*),
which leads and clears,
brings while poetizes.⁴⁵³

⁴⁵¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. p. 74, 75.

⁴⁵² HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 13 p. 233.

⁴⁵³ *Idem* p. 234.

2.4. The hidden spiral in the epoch of modern technology

We can see now that information is what our world runs on: the blood and the fuel, the vital principle. It pervades the sciences from top to bottom, transforming every branch of knowledge.

James Gleick, *The information*

In this chapter we will discuss the development of Heidegger's technology analysis. Heidegger turns towards poetry shortly after *Being and Time*, namely already in 1934 in *Hölderlin's Hymns Germania and the Rhine*, while his technology analyse would only come to full articulation in 1949 and was published even only in 1954 in the lecture entitled: *The Question Concerning Technology* (1954).⁴⁵⁴ Since Heidegger continuously opposes from the mid-thirties on a technological way of relating to Being by emphasising the necessity of a thoughtful engagement with poetry, we cannot disregard the case of technology with respect to our inquiry into the poetic nature of Heidegger's ontology. Heidegger attests of the relevance of thinking through technology by saying:

It has happened to me more than once, and indeed precisely with people close to me, that they listen gladly and attentively to the presentation of the jug's nature, but immediately stop listening when the discussion turns to objectness, the standing forth and coming forth of production—when it turns to framing. But all this is necessarily part of thinking of the thing, a thinking that thinks about the possible advent of world, and keeping it thus in mind perhaps helps, in the humblest and inconspicuous matters, such an advent to reach the opened-up realm of man's nature as man.⁴⁵⁵

We will continue following our line of interpretation here, which regards Heidegger's turn to poetry from the perspective of the task of overcoming metaphysics, in other words, overcoming the philosophical tendency of explaining Being in terms of entities or the mere present. As such, we inquire here further into the nature of the oblivion of Being, as Heidegger's most important experience in his initial quest for being. Poetry offers thinking another way of thinking Being

⁴⁵⁴ *Die Frage nach dem Technik* (1949) in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936-1953) GA 7.

⁴⁵⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 183.

than metaphysics does. As we will see, poetry remains free from modern technology, which Heidegger regards as the extreme consummation or 'presencing' of metaphysics. While metaphysics and modern technology render Being into oblivion, poetry might conserve its remembrance.

Heidegger thought that technology was a way of revealing (*Entbergung*). Modern technology has the character of a 'challenge' (*Herausforderung*) that conceals the disclosing essence of the human being. As we have pointed out before, Heidegger calls the human essence a 'clearing' (*Lichtung*), which is disclosed by Being, according to his later writings. Hence, man discloses and discovers entities and is himself, in turn, disclosed by Being. The clearing is the open spot of Being in which entities come to light and to pass by arriving in their specific way of being. However, modern technology and technological thinking heedlessly and inconspicuously challenge the human being to think that it is he, instead of Being, who brings forth everything into clearing and existence, which historically has come to expression in the metaphysical notion of subjectivity. Hence, 'presencing' is regarded as a making of the human being instead of a sending (*Geschick*) from Being. The ontologically misplaced self-esteem turns man into a calculating un-eccentric un-ecstatic isolated subject who is alienated from 'Being' and mirrors everywhere solely himself.⁴⁵⁶ Consequently, Heidegger deems it highly important to experience technology in its limitation in order to find a free relation to the essence of technology. With this in mind, Heidegger leaves the possibility open that the human being might experience his own finitude in the midst of technology as the possibility of a remembrance of his belongingness to Being.

Heidegger has experienced in his own time the homogeneity of modern technology mainly by the emergence of cybernetics. In *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking* he writes:

No prophecy is necessary to recognize that the sciences now establishing themselves will soon be determined and steered by the new fundamental science which is called cybernetics. This science corresponds to the determination of man as an acting social being. For it is the theory of the steering of the possible planning and arrangement of human labour. Cybernetics transforms language into an

⁴⁵⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977. p. 27.

exchange of news. The arts become regulated-regulating instruments of information.⁴⁵⁷

Cybernetics is an interdisciplinary study of regulatory systems with a closed signalling loop. The action of a cybernetic regulatory system generates change in its environment, which is reflected in that system as feedback that triggers and adjusts the same system. The home thermostat is a simple illustration of that principal. Cybernetics has a technological nature that appears to be at odds with ontology. Because there is a ‘circular causal’ relationship the entire traditional causal structure becomes reversed, Heidegger argues.⁴⁵⁸ Cybernetics shows how the ostensible open character of rational decision-making can be mechanically explained without recourse to a transcendent mind. Rationality in terms of a self-steering feedback system is self-explanatory. One does not have to look for causes outside the system to understand its rationality and functioning. Moreover, cybernetics offers a non-metaphysical explanation of intelligent systems based on factual present elements. Heidegger gives an example in the *Zollikon Seminars* (1978) of antiaircraft cybernetics that can be regarded as a model to explain the human being.⁴⁵⁹ The antiaircraft gun observes the statistically determined course of a targeted airplane by itself. With aid of this information it adjusts itself to the motion of the airplane by bringing the position of the gun rapidly towards the direction of the observed airplane.⁴⁶⁰ In a similar way, the rationality of man and his use of language can be described in terms of a feedback system adjusting itself to its environment. Hence, man’s cognition can be psychologically explained as information management and his comportment as biologically conditioned by the steering of his genetic code. Heidegger understands information as stocked being (*Bestand*). The genetic code is regarded as an alphabet of a store of information, which stores up in itself a definite quantity of information and is even thought of being capable of learning like a computer. The genetic code conditions man’s behaviour including his rationality by means of which he is able to adapt himself successfully to his environment. Cybernetics abolishes a fundamental distinction between man’s language, rationality, and technology, on the one hand, and the

⁴⁵⁷ Idem p. 376.

⁴⁵⁸ HEIDEGGER, M & FINK, E. *Heraclites Seminar 1966/1967* Alabama: The university of Alabama Press, 1979. p. 14.

⁴⁵⁹ *Zollikoner Seminare* (1978) GA 89.

⁴⁶⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Zollikon Seminars*. Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2001, p. 91 (119).

mechanisms of nature on the other hand, regarding man no longer as an exception in the course of nature. Cybernetics is therefore no longer conceived as a metaphysical explanation. Unlike metaphysics, as the ‘first origin’, cybernetics points ostensibly not at all to Being. Absence becomes present as information that informs us on that which is not case or as simply as the known unknown. In Heidegger’s analysis, cybernetics points as a technological notion to the consummation of metaphysics. Heidegger regards cybernetics as the basic manifestation of modern technology, which, is in turn, the manifestation of the consummation of metaphysics, yielding the oblivion of Being, which he interprets, in turn, as a movement that has been originated from Being.

Heidegger interprets contemporary scientific thought and proceeding in terms of cybernetics as well. Scientific investigations formulate ‘working hypotheses’.⁴⁶¹ Their truth is measured in terms of the effects their application brings about within the progress of research. The effects of scientific applications are monitored that steer as feedback the directions of new research. Because the sciences are judged by their success in terms of the useful applications they create, their truth becomes the success of any desired effect in a feedback loop of information. Hence, scientific truth is equated with the efficiency of its effects. But this notion of scientific truth as functionality yields from the metaphysical interpretation of being as the ‘real’ (*Das Wirkliche*) resulting once more into the oblivion of Being.

The cybernetic description of man in relation to his world as a technological being appears to be satisfying from the standpoint of calculative thinking. Consequently, the question concerning technology disappears, because technology becomes simply the main determination of the nature of entities, including the nature of the human being. Technology becomes naturalized and nature becomes technologized. Hence, technology is no longer conceptually opposed to nature. Heidegger writes:

⁴⁶¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking*. in *Basic Writings*. Sanfrancisco: HarperSanfrancisco, 1977 p. 376.
Compare Heidegger on the scientific hypothesis in HEIDEGGER, M. *Holzweg*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977. GA 5 81.

The need to ask about modern technology is presumably dying out to the same extent that technology more definitely characterizes and regulates the appearance of the totality of the world and the position of man in it.⁴⁶²

Whenever there is no technological problem, technological thinking remains questionless. Assumed that the essence of modern technology is itself nothing technological, let alone a technological problem, technological thinking is unable to ask about its own nature, because it makes no sense to ask about technology from its own perspective. In other words, understanding the essence of technology is useless. The sense of the question concerning technology can therefore never be technological itself. In order to ask about technology in a free manner, its question must seek a more original realm of sense than functionality. The problem of technology is for Heidegger therefore first a philosophical problem and not a technological problem.

In Heidegger's onto-genealogy the phenomenon of cybernetics points to the history of metaphysics. Heidegger argues that the increasing success of cybernetics is not accidental, but foreshadowed in the historical origin of modern knowledge and technology.⁴⁶³ However, cybernetically generated truth selects out 'useless' and thus 'senseless' disciplines like philosophy and metaphysics. But as possibly might be experienced, in the notion of modern technology, as the origin of cybernetics, something is withdrawing itself from the cybernetic explanation. It is the essence of modern technology itself that is withdrawing itself in Heidegger's view. Modern technology can therefore neither cybernetically nor technologically be determined in its essence. The universal description and deployment of man and nature as feedback systems remain incomprehensible without the history of meaning. Cybernetics as coercive pre-calculated regulation is a 'steering', according to Heidegger. This steering is the bringing-into-control, intervening and transfiguring of movement. Heidegger discusses the concept of steering as '*oiakizei*' and *ekubernêse* from the fragments of Heraclites, without, however, pretending to establish a direct relation between modern cybernetics and these Greek words.⁴⁶⁴ But what is said by these words concerning the relation

⁴⁶² HEIDEGGER, M. *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking*. in *Basic Writings*. Sanfrancisco: HarperSanfrancisco, 1977. p. 376.

⁴⁶³ HEIDEGGER, M & FINK, E. *Heraclites Seminar 1966/1967* Alabama: The university of Alabama Press, 1979. 12.

⁴⁶⁴ Idem p. 11.

between ‘one’ (*hen*) and ‘everything’ (*ta panta*) prepares the origin of the meaning of cybernetics, provided that the possibility that the steering of cybernetics is itself steered by something that is neither cybernetic nor technological.⁴⁶⁵

Heidegger obviously cannot, and pretends not, to establish a causal relation between the history of meaning and contemporary phenomena like cybernetics, since this relation is held back as well in the mysterious history of the truth of Being. However, Heidegger understands meaning as the essencing of Being. Heidegger’s question concerning technology must therefore be located from the core of his thinking, namely the question of Being. Somewhat simplified, Heidegger attacks a rigid traditional metaphysical distinction between technology and nature. Technology belongs instead to nature (*physis*) in its broadest sense, namely Being. Hence, Heidegger has to demonstrate how technology in broad sense and modern technology in strict sense, are related to Being and at the same time how Being cannot simply be reduced to technology as cybernetics suggest by positing being as information. Leading in Heidegger’s technology analysis is the oblivion of Being that comes to expression as nihilism in the extreme consummation of metaphysics, which becomes, in turn, historically present in the epoch of modern technology. The essence of technology is, according to Heidegger, nothing technological. It is, according to Heidegger, therefore above all important to catch sight of what comes to presence, instead of merely staring at the technological.⁴⁶⁶

Concealed Being can only come into view through the experience of the oblivion of Being and therefore by means of a confrontation with the essence of technology. Modern technology obscures Being, but is at once the possibly of an experience with Being. In the European nihilism, concealed Being that is present as absence has become forgotten. Being as absence loses, therefore, finally its presence. Nihilism is, according to Heidegger, nothing but Being’s furthest way of retrieving and self-concealing. The furthest self-retrieval of Being in its absence is the danger of the complete forgetfulness of Being and, therefore, also the oblivion of the being of the human being. Standing in the clearing of Being, man is essentially open to Being, which means that he is engaged with his own being and

⁴⁶⁵ Idem p. 16.

⁴⁶⁶ Idem p. 32.

the being of non-human entities. When man loses this openness he loses his essence and he will become a mere entity that is self-observed for himself and his world, like the animal, plant or stone, or even worse, just a file in an archive. The ‘extreme’ danger exists therefore that man loses his illuminating gift, when the self-retrieval of Being in itself and away from man has come to completion in the epoch of modern technology, according to Heidegger. Heidegger writes: “The design of self-assertion itself extends the realm of the danger that man will lose his selfhood to unconditional production.”⁴⁶⁷ As such, modern technology has an expropriating character with respect to the human essence. However, the experience of the danger as danger harbours as well the possibility of man opening up for Being. Like angst in *Being and Time* pointed existentially at the possibility of *Dasein*’s own absent being as its own death, the danger of technology points now to the possibility of a confrontation with man’s essential relation to absent Being.

Although technology has only for the later Heidegger become an explicit subject of thinking, *Being and Time* suggests already implicitly that man is a technological being. This gives rise to the question to what extent human existence is *not* technological and modern technology merely the culmination of man’s technological nature. As we have seen in chapter 1.4, *Being and Time* characterizes the human existence by its daily ‘care’ in the environment of the work-world.⁴⁶⁸ Heidegger argues that our vulgar and un-reflected understanding of being stems from the way in which we deal on a daily basis with ‘innerworldly’ entities that we discover by our way of being disclosed as a caring being-in-the-world. Human beings tend to explain being and, therefore their own being, from the context of their encounter with present-at-hand and ready-to-hand entities in the surrounding world in action. This anthropocentrically orientated ontology is an interpretation of the way in which the human being is mediated to being and, subsequently, the way being comes into view from the perspective of the concrete determinedness of its access. Heidegger argues that by their serviceability and usability the entities that surround us have a ‘what-for’ and ‘wherefor’ character, which forms the possibility of reference and, consequently, the ‘significance’

⁴⁶⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 113.

⁴⁶⁸ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *History of the Concept of Time*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. p. 194.

(*Bedeutsamkeit*) of the world as the totality of references. Hence the being of entities has a tool-character, as Graham Harman radicalizes Heidegger's approach from *Being and Time* in *Tool-being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects* (2002).⁴⁶⁹ *Dasein* tends to understand its own being from the world, in the same way as it understands innerworldly entities, according to Heidegger. It understands itself therefore commonly from the perspective of serviceability and functionality and explains itself as what it does in the world, resulting in an inauthentic way of being-in-the-world. But also our authentic being and understanding is based upon this inauthentic self-understanding, since *Dasein* is in the first place a being-in-the-world that lives and communicates with others. Being-in-the-world is always a matter of being thrown in a world in the way of a 'being-with-the-others' and, as such, as a being 'falling-prey-to-the-world'. Being, including our own being, whether authentic or in-authentic, would in that case have essentially a technological character. If the being of entities has a tool-character, being, as a means to an end, would be technological as well and result ultimately from human action. After abandoning a type of ontology based upon the being of entities, the later Heidegger determines the former determination of technology as 'anthropological' and 'instrumental'.⁴⁷⁰ Hence, the later Heidegger needs to explain to what extent the human being is a technological being and to what extent not.

The later Heidegger thinks Being (*Sein*) as absence. Concerning a liberating experience in relation to the overwhelming power of modern technology Heidegger writes:

The experience of this absence is not nothing, but rather a liberation of human beings from what I called the "fallenness amidst beings (entities)" in *Being and Time*.⁴⁷¹

In *The question concerning technology* Heidegger distinguishes modern technology from technology in broad sense as e.g. technology in *Being and Time* and technology in the ancient Greek sense of *technè* and *poíesis*. Modern

⁴⁶⁹ HARMAN, G. *Tool-being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects*. Illinois: Open Court, Caris publishing company, 2002.

⁴⁷⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977. p. 5.

⁴⁷¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Interview with der Spiegel*. in *The Heidegger Reader*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009. p. 327.

technology has determined man differently than technology ever had done before, and forms, according to Heidegger, a distinct and last epoch in the history of Being. Heidegger speaks of the unheard ‘gigantism’ (*Riesenhaften*) of modern technology, a reminiscence to the ‘*gigantomachia*’ character of the dispute concerning the question of Being.⁴⁷² Modernity is in German called ‘*Neuzeit*’, literally ‘new time’. However, ontologically, that is to say from the perspective of the history of Being: *nihil sub sole novum*. Hence, in the eschatology of Being nothing is without origin. Heidegger writes:

Man stares at what the explosion of the atom bomb could bring with it. He does not see that the atom bomb and its explosion are the mere final emission of what has long since taken place, has already happened.⁴⁷³

This brings us to the question how it is possible that modern technology is a new phenomenon, but at once nothing new from the perspective of its historical essence, as the question concerning the old and the new in ontological sense. According to Heidegger, it is not in any way possible to show how different epochs dialectically and necessarily follow from each other, however, a ‘free continuity’ (*freie Folge*) of thought along the different epochs of Being is possible.⁴⁷⁴ In *Contributions to Philosophy* Heidegger writes:

Every juncture stands in itself, and yet there exists a hidden interweaving among them and an opening grounding of the site of the decision for the essential transition into the still-possible transformation of Western history.⁴⁷⁵

Concerning the paradoxical novel character of modern technology Heidegger writes in *Science and Contemplation* (1954):⁴⁷⁶

That which has been thought and poetized in early Greek antiquity is itself still present today. It is present in such a way that its essence that is still concealed is becoming our present and is coming at us, mostly there where we least expect it,

⁴⁷² HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 78.

⁴⁷³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 164.

⁴⁷⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Identität und Differenz*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006. GA 11 p. 18.

⁴⁷⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 65

⁴⁷⁶ *Wissenschaft und Besinnung* (1954) in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936-1953) GA 7.

namely in the power of modern technology that is alien to antiquity, but where it finds its origin at the same time.⁴⁷⁷

Ontically, the epoch of modern technology represents history ‘histologically’ as a sequence of periods of changing power configurations accumulating in the age of modern technology. Contemporary historical science explains history as the continuously changing settlement of conflicting economic, political and military power structures. As such, the modern epoch regards its own essence, namely the challenging will to power, i.e. machination (*Machenschaft*), as the universal ground of every other historical period.⁴⁷⁸ This universal determination is, nevertheless, unhistorical, or rather ‘un-onto-historical’, since Being has, in Heidegger’s view, not always been manifest as will. Being has e.g. in the Middle Ages and the scholastic period been present as ‘creation’ and earlier for the Greeks as ‘presence’ (*das Anwesende*). Ontically, the epoch of technology appears universal and its history seems linear and accumulative. However, ontologically or onto-historically, modern technology implies a disruption, which is, nevertheless, not without metaphysical precedence. Hence, the essence of modern technology remains only a mode of being, i.e. an epoch in the history of Being. Heidegger’s thinking does a step back and invites us to see the framework of modern technology in the free light of the history of Being. Instead of looking immediately from the perspective of the framework of modern technology resulting in a universal closed and rather crude worldview, a ‘free relation’ to technology should be prepared.

The epoch of modern technology can be associated with modern philosophy, but is also by Heidegger often called ‘the atomic age’. Historically, the atomic age starts only in 1945, whereas Descartes had developed his metaphysical ideas circa three hundred years before. Heidegger has never worked out an exhaustive list of the different epochs of Being. A historiographical presentation is genuinely impossible if the history of Being is not a chronological homogeneous history.⁴⁷⁹ There exists a discrepancy between the history of

⁴⁷⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 7 p. 41.

⁴⁷⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 82.

⁴⁷⁹ Compare Heidegger on historiography in *Basic Questions of Philosophy: selected problems of logic*. trans. Rojcewicz, R., Schuwer, A. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. p. 12.

meaning yielding from the primal time and the chronological way entities present themselves to the human being. The first is inceptional (*anfänglich*), the second has at most a datable begin (*Beginn*).⁴⁸⁰ The history of Being is therefore not an empirical history, but concerns rather a collection of voices from the historical clearing of Being that reaches the human being under the names and rubrics of the metaphysical thinkers in a collection of philosophical writings. Although the ways of Being are temporal, they are certainly not linear or sequential and therefore rather ‘mysterious’ (*geheimnisvoll*) instead of logical. Heidegger gives an example related to technology. Chronologically, modern technology follows from the preceding discoveries of the modern natural sciences. But the modern natural sciences were, nevertheless, already the essential mark of the essence of that very same technology. Heidegger writes: “Modern science and the total state, as necessary consequences of the nature of technology, are also its attendants.”⁴⁸¹

In the run-up to a determination of modern technology as ‘en-framing’ (*Gestell*), Heidegger asserts that Being appears to man in the modern epoch omnipresently as ‘production’ or ‘machination’ (*Machenschaft*).⁴⁸² Man’s representing is a way of placing (*stellen*) as a producing.⁴⁸³ There where nature is not satisfactory to his representations he reframes or redispes it. The earth and its atmosphere become merely raw material for production. Heidegger writes:

Man produces new things where they are lacking to him. Man transposes things where they are in his way. Man interposes something between himself and things that distract him from his purpose. Man exposes things when he boosts them for sale and use. Man exposes when he sets forth his own achievement and plays up his own profession.⁴⁸⁴

Man becomes incorporated in machination. He becomes human material, which is disposed of with a view to proposed goals. By multifarious producing, the world is brought to stand and into position. In the process machination entities are exclusively regarded from their potential for functionality. Heidegger writes:

⁴⁸⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39, p. 3,4.

⁴⁸¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 109.

⁴⁸² HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 99.

⁴⁸³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 109p. 107.

⁴⁸⁴ Idem p. 108.

The entity is real (*wirklich*) as functioning. Everywhere there is functioning (*Wirkung*) and nowhere the worlding of the word and nevertheless still, although forgotten, being (*Sein*).⁴⁸⁵

This technological presence of being is, in turn, based upon the metaphysical interpretation of being as 'will', according to Heidegger. Being as will means the will to will, will to know, will to represent, will to power, etc. Consequently, in this way of appearing of entities, entities are regarded as products of a will, whether of a singular or a world will. Heidegger writes:

The basic form of appearance in which the will to will arranges and calculates itself in the unhistorical element of the world of completed metaphysics can be stringently called 'technology'.⁴⁸⁶

The metaphysics of the will has a universal character resulting in the planetary hegemony of modern technology. Since it yields from European metaphysics, modern technology is essentially Western and European. The Europeanization of the world with the Americanization in its wake, must imply its inevitable technologization.⁴⁸⁷ Heidegger writes:

This Europe, in its unholy blindness always on the point of cutting its own throat, lies today in the great pincers between Russia on the one side and America on the other. Russia and America, seen metaphysically, are both the same; the same hopeless frenzy of unchained technology and of the rootless organization of the average man.⁴⁸⁸

Nietzsche's metaphysics of the will to power is the completion of the aforementioned kind of metaphysics, which has been prepared, in turn, by modern, scholastic and Greek ontology.⁴⁸⁹ The will is self-willing and therefore self-assertion. Heidegger writes:

⁴⁸⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 7 p. 91.

⁴⁸⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *The End of Philosophy*. Chicago: The university of Chicago press, 2003. p. 93.

⁴⁸⁷ On Americanism and technology: HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 111. HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin's Hymne Der Ister*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984. GA 53 p. 68.

⁴⁸⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Introduction to Metaphysics*. New Haven & London: NB Yale university Press, 2000. p. 40.

⁴⁸⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Basic Questions of Philosophy: selected problems of logic*. trans. Rojcewicz, R., Schuwer, A. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. p. 109.

The unconditioned establishment of the unconditional self-assertion by which the world is purposefully made over according to the frame of mind of man's command is a process that emerges from the hidden nature of technology. Only in modern times does this nature begin to unfold as a destiny of the truth of all entities as a whole.⁴⁹⁰

From the perspective of the epoch of modern technology, each other epoch has merely been a representation of Being instead of a manifestation, because Being as representation is a product of the will. We say e.g. 'In the Middle Ages people 'believed' and 'thought' that nature was God's creation', or 'The Greeks 'represented' the Olympus as the table of the Gods.' But according to Heidegger, the Greeks had no faith in their gods in the sense that they held true a dogmatic representation.⁴⁹¹ Representational thinking is only possible because of a 'subject' who thinks in 'concepts'. Subjectivity and concepts are metaphysical constructs that yield from the history of metaphysics, which Heidegger understands, on the one hand, as the un-concealing tendency of the history of Being in as far as metaphysics expresses the way in which entities become present and, on the other hand, a concealing tendency in as far as metaphysics takes absent Being itself for a present entity.

Being as will is absolutized subjectivity. Although in strict sense the subject, regarded as origin or ground of Being, has been an anachronism for Greek thinking, metaphysics has prepared since Plato the turn from 'idea' and 'substance' towards the subject and subjectivity, according to Heidegger. The metaphysical epoch of Being as will has been prepared and unfolded roughly by Plato's concept of 'idea', which is only noetically known by the soul, subsequently, by Descartes' concept of truth as 'certitude', which posits the subject as the securing ground, and, finally, by German idealism that declared subjectivity to be the absolute. But the subject-object relation has been itself already modern technology historically on its way. Heidegger writes:

Even this, that man becomes the subject and the world the object, is a consequence of technology's nature establishing itself, and not the other way around.⁴⁹²

⁴⁹⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 109.

⁴⁹¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Heraclites Seminar 1966/1967* Alabama: The university of Alabama Press, 1979. p. 13.

⁴⁹² HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 110.

The concept, as such, stems from the history of metaphysics as well and had not always determined the way Being had appeared to man as dominant as in the modern epoch of technological representation. Hegel e.g. finally identifies being with the subject in terms of spirit (*Geist*) as the absolute concept (*das Begriff*). Heidegger held Plato to be the inventor of the concept.⁴⁹³ The ‘idea’ is the eternal outlook as the side of the entity that is turned towards man, which becomes present and intelligible in *nóesis*; understanding as opposed to *aísthesis* as mere sensory perception. The ideas have in Plato’s view ‘being’ in the most and highest possible sense. As such, Plato interpreted being as a present entity.

Being as concealment retrieves itself, *inter alia*, in metaphysics where it has been taken for a present entity. Modern technology is the extreme consummation of the retrieval and the consequently oblivion of Being through metaphysics. As such, metaphysics has always been on its way to modern technology and, therefore, in a certain sense always been technological. Heidegger translates e.g. Plato’s idea of the good (*agathon*) not primarily in an ethical, but technological sense, as that which functions, suits or fits well. Likewise, Plato and Aristotle their interpretation of Being as ‘form’ (*idea, telos*) have a technological character because they are derived from the work-world. The Greek metaphysical concept of ‘form’ is therefore nothing but the production plan of the producer, according to Heidegger.⁴⁹⁴

Heidegger argues in *The Question Concerning Technology* that the instrumental and anthropological conception of technology might be correct, but not necessarily true. These determinations do not get to the heart of the matter, namely the essential origin of technology. What is present can be compared concerning its adequacy and, as such, be correct, however, that which is true stems from un-concealment sent from the concealed destining origin. The ‘instrumental’ points as a means for an end to the concept of causality. It appoints in particular one of the four traditionally distinguished causes, namely the *causa efficiens* that has set the standard for all causality in the history of metaphysics,

⁴⁹³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Heraclites Seminar 1966/1967* Alabama: The university of Alabama Press, 1979. p. 7.

⁴⁹⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. p. 107-109.

according to Heidegger.⁴⁹⁵ Heidegger asserts that the term *causa, casus*, belongs to the verb *cadere*, ‘to fall’, which means: that which brings it about that something falls out as a result in such and such a way. If we recall *Being and Time*, where Heidegger determines *Dasein*’s inauthentic being-in-the world as a falling-prey-to-the-world, the question rises again of an implicit technological determination of the human existence in terms of a fall. *Dasein*’s thrownness is its ‘facticity’, the given fact of the ‘that’ of *Dasein* existing always in such and such way and, as such, fallen prey to the world.

But the original Greek sense of ‘cause’ as *aitia* has nothing to do with bringing about or effecting, but rather means ‘being responsible’ (*verschulden*), Heidegger argues. On the unity of the four causes distinguished by Aristotle he writes:

The four ways of being responsible bring something into appearance. They let it come forth into presencing (*An-wesen*). They set it free to that place and so start it on its way, namely, into its complete arrival. The principal characteristic of being responsible is this starting something on its way into arrival. It is in the sense of such a starting something on its way into arrival that being responsible is an occasioning or an inducing to go forward (*Ver-Anlassen*).⁴⁹⁶

The original Greek sense of ‘cause’ as *aitia* means a way of ‘bringing forth’ as *poiesis*. Even nature as *physis* belongs to *poiesis* as ‘bringing forth in itself’, in contrast with the bringing forth in another as that of the craftsman or the artist, for example. Technology belongs to *poiesis*, a way of revealing by bringing forth. In this original sense, the technological is not at odds with the natural as *physis* or Being.

As a way of revealing (*Ent-bergung*) technology is a mode of truth as *aletheia*, i.e. un-concealment. Heidegger brings to mind that the Greek *technè*, whence the word ‘technology’ is derived, means in the first place a kind of knowledge in the sense of an expertise. Knowledge is related to truth. Since its oldest definition and conception, knowledge cannot be knowledge without being true. To have technological expertise means to be entirely at home in something, according to Heidegger. Such knowing provides an opening up and as an opening

⁴⁹⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977. p. 7.

⁴⁹⁶ Idem p. 9-10.

up it is a revealing, a mode of truth.⁴⁹⁷ Summarily, technology in broad sense ‘presences’ (*west an*) in the realm where revealing and un-concealment take place, in other words, where truth as *aletheia* happens.

Modern technology differs essentially from technology as *poíesis* meaning a ‘making’ or ‘bringing forth’, according to Heidegger. Both are ways of revealing. But while the later discloses Being by letting something come into appearance from its own being, and thus from its relation to Being, the former has the character of a ‘challenging’ (*Heraus-forderung*). Modern technology means a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging forth that puts an unreasonable demand to nature that it supplies energy that can be extracted and stored. This setting-upon that challenges forth the energies of nature is an ‘expediting’ (*Fordern*). Firstly, it expedites in the sense that it unlocks and secondly that it exposes. The process of expediting is always from the beginning itself directed towards driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense. Heidegger writes:

That challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew. Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways of revealing.⁴⁹⁸

Modern technology transforms nature and every entity into stockpiles that stand reserve to deliver and bring forth. The challenging revealing of what stands reserve always has to take place through a manifold of interlocking paths and their course must be regulated, controlled and secured. Regulating and securing have therefore become the chief characteristic of the challenging revealing.⁴⁹⁹ Heidegger writes:

Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve (*Bestand*).⁵⁰⁰

The presence of Being reveals itself in the age of modern technology exclusively in a technological way. This means that everywhere there is only

⁴⁹⁷ Idem p. 13.

⁴⁹⁸ Idem p. 16.

⁴⁹⁹ Idem p. 16.

⁵⁰⁰ Idem p. 17.

functionality and instrumentality to be seen. Heidegger gives an example of the German river the Rhine. ‘The Rhine’ is no longer as it was uttered out in the art of Hölderlin’s hymn ‘*The Rhine*’, but is now, as a water power supplier, dammed up into power works. In as far as the river is still a river in the landscape, it has become an object on call for inspection by a tour group ordered there by the vacation industry.⁵⁰¹ Hence, the ‘being’ of the Rhine has changed and is yet solely present in a technological way.

Ostensibly, the challenging character of modern technology has an omnipresent character completely encompassing and coercing itself in the relation between man and nature. The challenge of modern technology has a magnetizing effect. Nature’s energies are challenged forth, but man is even more originally challenged and ordered. As such, man becomes a challenging and ordering being himself who challenges and orders the entire realm of nature including his fellow men. The challenging revealing has the sense of a setting-upon as a challenging-forth. Man is colonized as a colonizer and orders the colonized to bring forth and produce. The contemporary talk about ‘human resources’ gives evidence that man himself belongs even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve, according to Heidegger.⁵⁰² However, man plays a key role in the process of ordering and, although running this risk he is never transformed into mere standing-reserve. Because man propels technology, he takes part in ordering as a way of revealing, which is at the same time never merely a human doing. Man is himself challenged to order and, as such, not the origin of modern technology. Essentially, modern technology can therefore not be merely a means in the hand of man.

In *On the question of Being* Heidegger writes about the ‘circle’ of the ostensible totality of nihilism. However, the totality of nihilism and technology concern merely the present and therefore not the entire history of Being. Heidegger writes:

It looks as though thinking is continually led around or even chased around the Same as though in a magical circle, yet without ever being able to approach this Same. But perhaps the circle is a concealed spiral. Perhaps this spiral has in the

⁵⁰¹ Idem p. 16.

⁵⁰² Idem p. 18.

meantime become more constricted. This means: the manner and way in which we are approaching the essence of nihilism are being transformed.⁵⁰³

It is therefore important to see not only the plain circle of the presence of technology, but from the perspective of the history of Being also the depth of the spiral that is concealed in it.

As the final epoch of Being, modern technology reveals the eschatological positing revealing structure of Being itself. By means of representation, all other epochs are for the first time present in this epoch. At the same time, this universal epoch remains essentially historyless. History has become e.g. either arbitrary self-propaganda, as e.g. the history of Americanism, or the useful objective output of historical sciences and culture industry. In the epoch of modern technology history does not appear to conceal itself. On the contrary, by means of representing, history can be posited as present in correspondence with the increasing amount of present historical sources. Consequently, the historical and anthropological sciences are completely at home in every alien culture and stage of the world history. Moreover, mankind has never had so much knowledge about the past and never uncovered so many historical sources as in the contemporary technological epoch. However, the age of modern technology is, nevertheless, unable to heed in the midst of the omnipresence of histograms and technology, Being as the absent originary sending destiny. With regard to time, the epoch becomes enclosed in itself. When there is no 'essential' history (*Seinsgeschichte*), but solely historiography (*Historie*), there can also be no future in the sense of a destiny. Hence, mankind's history becomes historyless.

But if 'representing' has become the access to time and history, it becomes important to ask about the origin and history of representing itself. The latter cannot be itself a representation again. We will inquire here in the relation between representing and truth from the perspective of time. The history of the relation between man and entities is the history of metaphysics, which, in turn, partakes in the history of Being. The essence of the representational structure of modern technology is the proposition ostensibly lying at the heart of language. Through *logos*, the intelligibility structure of Being as saying and discourse that indicates (*aufweisen*) and exhibits (*aufzeigen*), entities becomes representable and

⁵⁰³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 310.

can come to expression and articulation in the proposition. In the proposition entities are always addressed in the way of something as something. The ‘*logos*’; the saying, of the proposition is, as we have seen in chapter 2.3, in original sense *apophasis*; *aletheuein* in the manner of *apophainesthai*: to let entities be seen in their un-concealment. The proposition that shows entities in their being belongs to what Heidegger’s calls ‘*apophantic*’ speech. This revealing possibility of the proposition happens from *aletheia*, truth as un-concealment, which expression Heidegger explicitly associates with the structure of representing (*Vor-stellung*). Heidegger writes:

The sentence ‘Language speaks’ is only half thought, as long as the following fact will be overlooked: In order to speak in its own way, language requires human speech, which in turn is used, i.e. employed for the sake of language in the way of correspondence.⁵⁰⁴

Aletheia is the un-concealment of entities as the coming to presence of entities into the open. Thanks to this way of becoming present, thanks to the ‘presencing’ (*anwesen*) occurring from Being, that which has become present can subsequently be ‘re’-presented in a representation, which as proposition can corresponds with that which ‘is’ the case. As we have seen in chapter 2.3, truth as the correctness of correspondence (*homoiosis, orthotes, adequatio, Übereinstimmungen, Richtigkeit*) is founded in truth as un-concealment (*aletheia*).

However, in the history of metaphysics being has primarily been approached from the analysis of *logos*, as the statement, and truth has therefore one-sidedly interpreted as the correctness of the proposition. It is therefore important to see through the proposition that which is un-concealed and which first provides measure for correctness. As we have seen, un-concealment points, in turn, to concealment as the self-concealment of the openness of unconcealment. But the proposition can not make a correct statement about this original concealment, but which, in Heidegger’s view, can be thought and experienced nevertheless. Heidegger writes: “Everything -statements, questions, and answers-presupposes the experience of the matter itself.”⁵⁰⁵ This matter is always given by

⁵⁰⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Zu Hölderlin - Griechenlandreisen*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 75 p. 201.

⁵⁰⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *On Time and Being*. in *Works*. Toronto: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972. p. 25-26.

unconcealment yealding, in turn, from concealment.

By means of a positive or negative statement the proposition can present that which is absent or present. We can say for example: “It is not raining”. The rain is absent according to this statement. The statement can be correct in its correspondence, since we can think of a situation in which it not rains and we can think of a counter example to falsify the statement at the hour of speaking as the situation in which it actually rains. In the given example, when correct the circumstance in which it is not raining is present, which subsequently can correspond with the representation of the proposition. In other word, the negative statement can correspond with the absence of entities or absence of the being of entities. However, the proposition cannot state correct or incorrectly about that which is ‘essentially’ concealed, held back and retrieved in every positive phenomenon or form of un-concealment, whether of something absent or present, namely the concealment of un-concealment itself. The proposition cannot correctly correspond with that which cannot be represented; untruth; nothingness. This means that the concealment that takes place in the un-concealment, to which a proposition or the representation subsequently can correspond, can itself not be represented. To put it simply, the proposition always presents whether something positive or negative. However, it cannot present that which is not re-presentable and principally and permanently absent. Unconcealment, as the essence of the structure of representation, is itself not representable in as far as it is concealed in its essence or origin. The essence of the representing relation between the representing proposition and the represented, i.e. un-concealment is itself never a fact in the world, which can be confirmed correctly in its presence or absence. Hence, by its presenting nature, propositional speech covers un-truth; the concealment of Being, in which, nevertheless, the correctness of every propositional speech is abysmally grounded, according to Heidegger. The proposition is therefore a form of ‘presencing’ in which that which presences remains, nevertheless, concealed. Neither concealed Being nor its oblivion can be expressed propositionally in a way that is correct or incorrect. Hence, Heidegger’s writings on Being should not be read propositionally. They do not represent anything. This means that being as representation of the will can itself not be represented, revealing that its essence escapes this metaphysical determination of present entities as a whole. That which refuses determination is called ‘Being’

(*Seyn*) by Heidegger. Heidegger ends the essay *On Time and Being* as follows:

The saying of appropriation (*Ereignis*) in the form of a lecture remains itself an obstacle of this kind. The lecture has spoken merely in propositional statements.⁵⁰⁶

Propositional statements are incommensurable with the saying of Being. At the same time, thinking cannot avoid the proposition. Heidegger writes therefore: “The point is not to listen to a series of propositions, but rather to follow the movement of showing.”⁵⁰⁷ In *Contributions to Philosophy* Heidegger writes:

In philosophy, propositions are never subject to proof. This is so not only because there are no *highest* propositions, from which others could be derived, but because here ‘propositions’ are not at all what is true, nor are propositions simply that about which they speak.⁵⁰⁸

Through the proposition, although not thanks to the proposition, original truth can be experienced and still reach thinking. After all Heidegger writes still in propositions. Vital remains, however, the open regard concerning the openness in language. Which Heidegger understands in terms of the clearing, as the ecstatic eccentric openness for the being of entities. A pure propositional attention for language reveals the metaphysics of the will, i.e. modern technology, which considers the whole to be a representation. A propositional reading can only ask: What does this represent? As such, language in narrow sense as propositional language cannot say something that is not representing. However, gestures are not representations. Moreover, Heidegger seeks not a sense of language outside of the proposition or representation. But within the representation its proper possibility in terms of the unconcealment, as that which originally presents, might be experienced, albeit in its concealment. The concealment can, however, be experienced in attunement and enacted by thinking in the ‘transporting’

⁵⁰⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *On Time and Being*. in *Works*. Toronto: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972. p. 24.

⁵⁰⁷ Idem p. 2, 25.

⁵⁰⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 13.

(*Entrückung*) und ‘captivation’ (*Berückung*) of *Dasein*.⁵⁰⁹ We will interpret the reading of the proposition that is open to the moods of transporting and captivation as a ‘poetic’ reading that seeks not a representation, but its ‘possibility’ as the originary structuring of its meaning. The poetic reading reads the open projection in the representation of the proposition. The philosophical and poetic proposition provokes itself an attunement of transporting and captivation that opens *Dasein*’s perspective for the being of entities.

In technological sense, the proposition has the possibility of forgoing the way Being conceals itself and makes itself positively manifest. According to Heidegger, the proposition is directed (*gerichtet*) towards un-concealment which, as such, can be correct (*richtig*) or incorrect. This directing is a certain way of putting matters, a way of positing, or proposing that can be in accord or discord. The question is, who is originally directing here, the human being as a speaking and representing subject or the unconcealment from Being? The first is a technological determination of the relation between meaning and truth, the second an onto-poetological. Whenever propositional speech directs itself to the unconcealment of Being by indicating something in and from its essence it has the character of *apophantic* speech. However, the proposition does not necessarily have to be directed towards the un-concealedness of Being in a way of a releasement of the unconcealed, that is to say to let the entities be what they are. The proposition can also forgo the un-concealed by means of a correction or perfection of the unconcealed, which means to straighten and arrange reality in view of its orderability.⁵¹⁰ In this case un-concealment ought to direct itself to the dictation of the proposition instead of the reverse. The proposition is in this sense not *apophantic*, but challenging. Hence, truth lapses into a ‘correcting’ setting and adjusting of reality in accordance with its own challenge. It is therefore possible that the representation represents the un-concealed differently in the proposal of the proposition. The representation that represents Being defiantly, in a none accidental way as a challenge, uncovers the phenomenon of the will. As self-

⁵⁰⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p. 34, 236.

⁵¹⁰ Compare Hölderlin who writes in a letter to his brother on the first of January 1799: “The fore-, middle- and background drawn conform optical rules is by far not yet the landscape, which might place itself at most aside lively nature. But the best under the Germans mostly still think that first when the world would be nice symmetric, everything would have been accomplished (*geschehen*).” HÖLDERLIN, F. *Sämtliche Werke und Briefe*. München: Carl Hanser Verlag München, 1992. Band 2, 727.

willing, the will is turned against Being in as far as it will not let the entities be what they are, namely the free releasement of the sending from Being. The will does not want Being in the way Being ‘essences’ (*west*) and ‘presences’ (*anwesen*), but solely in accordance with its own will. As such, the will is always self-willing in as far as it seeks only selfassertion and its own realisation in the world. On its way to the wanted, the will tries to overcome and master itself by being its own wanted other. As the will to self-exceeding, the will is therefore by definition ‘will to power’. If being becomes metaphysically equated with the will and representing is a way of willing, nothing will be eluded from propositional truth. Hence, the will to power forgoes Being’s way of un-concealment by subjecting all meaning to its own objectives, resulting in nihilism and the oblivion of Being.

An example of forgoing the un-concealment is the scientific hypothesis. The hypothesis proposes a possible truth that does not follow the course of the unconcealed as it is revealed and is therefore essentially technical in Heidegger’s view. The hypothesis in the natural sciences challenges nature to show itself conform the proposed truth, which is nowadays facilitated by means of huge complex technological settings as e.g. the CERN particle accelerator. Quantum phenomena do not encounter us ‘naturally’ from the sphere of un-concealment, but through hypothetical propositions conceptually entangled in a projection of nature and its adequate experimental test settings. When scientific hypotheses become mere working hypothesis, scientific truth will be equated with the desired results and effects of the research. This adds up to the oblivion of Being, because a mere pragmatic truth criterion does not heed the un-concealing course of Being, let alone its concealed origin.

Heidegger locates the structure of representation not in the human subject, but rather in presenting, making present or ‘presencing’ (*anwesen*). This means, paradoxically, that the way the human being represents remains ultimately part of Being as the appropriating event. Technology as a way of revealing is a way of making present, ‘enpresenting’. The German word for representing is ‘*vorstellen*’, which is a form of ‘*stellen*’ that has a variety of meanings as putting, setting, positing, presenting, placing, arranging and standing. To re-present is a way of positing something as present, and, as such, a way of making present. As such, the nature of the proposition is at odds with concealed Being that by its presencing is

eluding itself from that which is present.

Any positive representation of Being, therefore being, is grounded in the collection of different ways of '*stellen*', called '*Ge-stell*' by Heidegger, which is usually translated to English as 'en-framing'. Hence, the proposition as a representation is founded in positing or 'proposing', which has a challenging character. The German verb *stellen*, means *inter alia*, to 'challenge'. '*Ge-stell*' is besides 'en-framing' sometimes translated as the 'con-struct'. As such, en-framing is responsible for language and world as an artificial construct instead of a happening from Being. The destruction and de-construction of metaphysics implies then to let en-framing dismantle itself and to think Being means to think against the mere presenting nature of the proposition, since thinking can never avoid the proposition.

Human projection, representing and horizontal thinking are based upon the structure of putting (*stellen*) as a way of revealing. Any design belongs to the projecting nature of the human being, which belongs to 'en-framing' in as far as it comes not forth from Being in the sense of *poiesis*. Heidegger determines en-framing as the gathering together of the setting-upon, which sets upon man and challenges him forth to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. However, en-framing as a way of revealing is itself nothing technological. In other words, it must be regarded ontologically instead of ontically, that is to say onto-historically.

Heidegger reserves, however, the possibility of another '*stellen*', proposing, presenting or making present and asserts that '*Ge-stell*' as a challenging-setting-upon yields actually from another way of *Stellen*, namely, that of producing and presenting (*her- und dar-stellen*) in the sense of *poiesis*, which 'lets' what presences come forth into un-concealment as releasement. This means that the proposition is not by definition technological and can also have an original *apophantic* character. Although Heidegger does not say this explicitly, *poiesis* must be regarded, in turn, as the historical essence of en-framing. Hence, the proposing of *poiesis* ontologically proceeds en-framing, which at the same time cannot be sought nowadays outside the epoch of en-framing. Within en-framing there is another way of putting entities to be found, which is at the same time altogether different from en-framing. Heidegger says, therefore, that the producing that brings forth and the challenging ordering are fundamentally

different. But, yet they remain related in their essence.⁵¹¹ Both are ways of revealing, i.e. ways of *aletheia*. *Poiesis* heeds Being, whilst en-framing forgoes Being due to its challenging nature. The first points back to its origin, the latter conceals its origin. It remains, however, a question how the difference is to be found within the homogeneity of en-framing. Heidegger will suggest that this possible because of men's ecstatic way of standing in the clearing as the way he is 'standing out' in the history of Being. Man's philosophical, and as we will see in chapter 3, poetic nature points back the history of language, which essence is in Heidegger's view *poiesis*, i.e. poetic. Heidegger makes therefore a regressive movement through the history of meaning to the first origin, and subsequently, the other origin.

Modern technology yields from the consummation of metaphysics as the history of the oblivion of Being. The structure of representing is based upon the subject-object-relation. In the quest for knowledge man seeks objectivity by abstracting from his point of view all that is personal and subjective to let the object appear as object. In objectivity one still heeds Being, albeit in a restricted public and average sense. Objectivity abstracts e.g. from attunement and sanctions only the positive and that which is certain. However, in the furthest self-retrieval of Being in modern technology, entities no longer stand over to man as objects (*Gegen-stand*), but are ordered by man in the sense of 'standing-reserve'. As such, entities appear to man nowadays solely as information (*Be-stand*). Being has, literally, been set on 'stand by' in the epoch of modern technology, ready to be ordered in a controlled and secured way. Descartes truth criterion selects out what is not clear and distinct in order to arrive at truth as *certitude*. This conception of truth is already essentially technological in as far as it sets its own rational criteria upon the unconcealed. Being as standing-reserve is secured being. As such, modern technology has a concealing and blocking character concerning the unsecured free releasement of entities into the open.

Revealing and un-concealing are possible English translations of Heidegger's term '*entbergen*'. *Entbergen* means to bring into the open as the coming to pass and to light of entities. The prefix 'ent' appoints to the reverse of a process. '*bergen*' means to shelter, to conceal or to keep safe. The similar has its

⁵¹¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977. p. 21.

say in the English verb to ‘conceal’, which is related to ‘cell’ from the Latin *cella* ‘small room’, ‘store room’, ‘hut’, related to Latin *celare* ‘to hide’, ‘conceal’, in turn, related to the Greek *kalia* meaning ‘hut’, ‘nest’ and *kalyptein* ‘to cover’ and *kelyphos* ‘shell’, ‘husk’. Concealment gives defence and shelter. The save keeping of Being occurs in the concealment, whence entities are released in the unconcealment, which remains different from the securing of the challenging revealing of en-framing. It is clear that the fixation on security of modern technology is therefore at odds with Being understood as truth and freedom. Heidegger’s technology analysis can be considered as an ontological frontrunner of the contemporary critique of the information and surveillance society. What is in crisis in the surveillance society is truth with its risks.

The danger of modern technology has a twofold character, according to Heidegger. Firstly, it is possible that man might come to the point where he has to be taken as standing-reserve.⁵¹² Modern technology conceals the ontological difference. Entities appear as files and being is considered as intangible information. Hence the ontological difference implodes by the notion of Being as information. Man runs the risk of becoming a bureaucratic being, who solely orders and secures entities and his fellow men as files and information. Finally, man as the ‘undetermined animal’, might be biogenetically determined and, as such, filed as information. It is not incidental that the computer has become the central metaphor to describe the contemporary human being. But despite the fact that man still applies and improves the computer, man has already been defeated by it in various challenges. Man might become indiscernible from other entities when he no longer exists ‘ontic-ontologically’ as the clearing, but solely as a vehicle of information.

Secondly, modern technology harbours the danger that man ascribes the power of technology to his own merits and will consider himself as the lord of the earth.⁵¹³ In both regards of the danger, man might lose his open relation to Being. As such, the danger is the ‘extreme’ danger and man might be destined to be

⁵¹² Idem p. 27.

⁵¹³ Idem p. 27.

essentially exterminated by technology without even noticing. Heidegger writes in *The Turning* (1949):⁵¹⁴

But the danger, namely, Being itself endangering itself in the truth of its coming to presence, remains veiled and disguised. This disguising is what is most dangerous in the danger.⁵¹⁵

En-framing and *poiesis* are two ways of revealing in the sense of a destining. They are not arrayed beside another under the concept of revealing, but related in the destiny of history of Being. Heidegger writes:

Revealing is that destining which, ever suddenly and inexplicably to all thinking, apportions itself into the revealing that brings forth and that also challenges, and which allots itself to man.⁵¹⁶

If en-framing is a destiny it means that it is a veiled form of the way man's Being is needed by Being. Heidegger writes:

Technological en-framing as the revealing of being in the age of technology also sets upon and challenges the human being himself once again, and this is a veiled form of the human being's being needed by being in the age of technology.⁵¹⁷

This means that any exodus from en-framing cannot forgo en-framing and has to seek in the midst of en-framing that which is itself not technological. This radical confrontation with modern technology to see the danger as danger is therefore different from any form of romanticism or venturing outside en-framing and the history of Being. Heidegger says:

It is my conviction that any reversal of the modern technological world can only occur from out of the same location in which it originated. It cannot take place through the adoption of Zen Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the world. In order to achieve a shift in thinking (*Umdenken*) one needs the European tradition as

⁵¹⁴ *Einblick in das was ist. Bremer Vorträge: Das Ding / Das Ge-stell / Die Gefahr / Die Kehre* (1949) in *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge* (1994) GA 79.

⁵¹⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *The turning*. in *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977. p. 37.

⁵¹⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977. p. 29.

⁵¹⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Zollikon Seminars*. Evanston, Illinois: NorthWestern University Press, 2001. p. 179.

well as a new appropriation of it. Thinking will only be transformed through thought that has the same origin and same determination.⁵¹⁸

Because en-framing is a destining, the essence of modern technology cannot be a means in the hand of man. The methodological question how we are to arrive at a relationship to the essence of technology always comes too late, Heidegger argues. We cannot ask if there is a technique to master the essence of technology or if there is a technology to stay free from technology. In that case we would try to 'get' technology 'spiritually in hand' and master it, but we remain obviously at the same time tied to it.⁵¹⁹ Ecology e.g. wishes to understand man and his relation to technology to find a solution for the problems of ecology. But asked in this way, the question is itself already technological. The wish to master modern technology through a comprehension comes always too late, if the wish to master and dominate yields from the very challenging character of the essence of technology itself. The same holds true for resistance against modern technology in an attempt to master it.

Man is continually approaching the brink of the possibility of pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering, according to Heidegger.⁵²⁰ By means of technology one makes present. The representation orders the represented. In the process of making the represented present all distance must be removed and overcome. Therefore, a total mobilization of entities is required and thinking becomes calculative logic and logistics to construct a *nunc stans*, a perspective of maximum control. Heidegger writes:

When the farthest corner of the globe has been conquered technologically and can be exploited economically; when any incident you like, in any place you like, at any time you like becomes accessible as fast as you like; when you can simultaneously 'experience' an assassination attempt against a king in France and a symphony concert in Tokyo; when time is nothing but speed, instantaneity, and simultaneity, and time as history has vanished from all *Dasein* of all peoples; when a boxer counts as the great man of a people; when the tallies of millions at mass meetings are a triumph; then, yes then still looms like a spectre over all this uproar the question: What for? Where to? And what then?⁵²¹

⁵¹⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Interview with der Spiegel*. in *The Heidegger Reader*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009. p. 331.

⁵¹⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977. p. 5

⁵²⁰ Idem p. 26.

⁵²¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Introduction to Metaphysics*. New Haven & London: NB Yale university Press, 2000. p. 8.

All man's standards, the standards of thinking included, are derived on a technological basis. It has therefore become increasingly difficult for man as the techno-animal (*das technisierten Tier*), to see that his essence belongs to revealing. As such, man is endangered from out of destining.⁵²² But here Heidegger provides a clue as well. If we can ask about the essence of modern technology, Being must already have provided a margin of questioning. It must be possible therefore to experience within en-framing, en-framing as a destining out of another origin, namely *poiesis*. Hence, the step back from en-framing leads to *poiesis*. But how is this other way of revealing to be found within the uniformity of en-framing?

Heidegger seeks the other way of thinking within en-framing, while at the same time a displacement from en-framing is required. En-framing must therefore contain its own negating counterpart. This is only possible if en-framing can be experienced as a destiny appointing away from its actuality to its other concealed origin. However, how is this possible if en-framing is the last epoch of Being that cannot transit into a next epoch? The exodus of en-framing must therefore be a return to its genesis. But the return cannot mean to travel back in time or a recreation of the past. Rather should time itself turn, in the sense that the origin must reveal itself as futural destiny in the coming to presence of concealed Being. Hence, the turning takes place in thinking that experiences Being as a destining absence. En-framing must therefore firstly be experienced as destiny instead of being the universal nature of man and entities.

The former is indeed the case, according to Heidegger, when en-framing, as the structure of representation, can be regarded as a metaphysical moment in the development of the history of Being. The metaphysical expresses itself in the presence of entities. En-framing, as a challenging-forth into ordering, sends into a way of revealing, according to Heidegger.⁵²³ We can think, for instance, of all the minerals that are dug up to produce smart phones. These entities would never have seen the daylight if it was not for modern technology. En-framing is an ordaining of destining, just as bringing-forth as *poiesis* is a way of destining.

⁵²² Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 78.

⁵²³ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977. p. 23.

The turning point of man in relation to technology becomes apparent in the experience of man's limitation of the possibility of mastering technology. This begins with an experience of the fact that we do not master what we say and mean as an experience with language. It is important that man starts to question thoughtfully. "For questioning is the piety of thought", are the words with Heidegger ends the text *The question concerning to technology*.⁵²⁴ Piety is meant here in the sense of obedient, or submissive, and in this case submitting to what thinking has to think about, Heidegger explains in *On the Way to Language*.⁵²⁵ If the essence of modern technology is en-framing (*Ge-stell*), the challenging, proposing and positing character of propositional language, its turning point has to be found in language as well. This is indeed the case if language has essentially a 'poetic' character and positing is only one of the ways of using language, in other words, if en-framing is only one of the ways in which 'language speaks'. There might be another way of thinking that has a *poietic* nature instead of a technological. This thinking is in dialogue with poetry.

The free relation to technology comes not from man as a free subject, but Being as freedom, according to Heidegger. Revealing is a way of freedom. From this freedom redemption might arise just as the danger has arisen. Being releases entities into the open and man is released into the open too, provided that he does not block the open releasement in en-framing, but lets instead truth as unconcealment occur. The freedom governs the open in the sense of the cleared and lighted up, according to Heidegger.⁵²⁶ All revealing comes out of the open, goes into the open, and brings into the open, Heidegger argues. Being is itself the freedom, but that which frees and releases remains a mystery. Heidegger writes:

Freedom is that which conceals in a way that opens to light, in whose clearing there shimmers that veil that covers what comes to presence of all truth and lets the veil appear as what veils. Freedom is the realm of the destining that at any given time starts a revealing upon its way.⁵²⁷

If the human being is one day able to open himself explicitly to the essence of technology, he might find himself unexpectedly taken into a freeing claim,

⁵²⁴ Idem p. 35.

⁵²⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. p. 72.

⁵²⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977. p. 25.

⁵²⁷ Idem p. 25.

according to Heidegger.⁵²⁸ The essence of technology must therefore harbour in itself the growth of the saving power. Heidegger cites Hölderlin: “But where danger is, grows the saving power also.”⁵²⁹ Subsequently, Heidegger writes: “All saving power must be of a higher essence than what is endangered, though at the same time kindred to it.”⁵³⁰

Questioning the essence of technology means to make a leap into the danger to see the danger as danger. Technology refers to language as the historical structure of un-concealment, the locality of appearance, the house of Being, which is essentially *poiesis*, i.e. poetic. Around 1934/35 Heidegger had already located the danger in language. Heidegger reflects on Hölderlin’s words who had called language the ‘most dangerous of all goods’ (*der Güter gefährlichste*).⁵³¹ Language has been given to man so that history may be possible. As such, it is one of man’s goods. But regarded as a good among other goods, it is rather a consequence of the essence of language.⁵³² Heidegger writes: “Language is not a tool at man’s disposal, but that primal event which disposes of the highest possibility of man’s being.”⁵³³ Only where there is language reigns world, and only where there is world the highest danger of the threat of Being by nothingness, Heidegger writes.⁵³⁴ Language is not dangerous because it brings about a danger to human beings, it is itself the most dangerous, the danger of dangers, because it first creates and holds open the threat to Being. As such, language is ambiguous; it places the human being in the zone of the highest achievement and keeps him at once in the range of abyssal deterioration. Language necessarily shelters within itself a continual danger to itself. In language has its say, on the one hand, what is purest and most concealed and, on the other hand, to what is confused and common. Hence, the everyday decay of poetic language, i.e. the essential word is necessary for language to become the common possession of everyone. On the other hand, it is solely by virtue of language at all that man is exposed to entities that make themselves manifest and whose non-being is deceiving and

⁵²⁸ Idem p. 26.

⁵²⁹ Idem p. 42.

⁵³⁰ Idem p. 34.

⁵³¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 217.

⁵³² Idem p. 54

⁵³³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. trans. Hoeller, K. New York: Humanity Books Prometheus Books, 2000. p. 56.

⁵³⁴ Idem p. 62.

disappointing him. Language is charged with the task of making beings manifest and pre-serving them as such—in the linguistic work. As such, language first creates the possibility of a danger of the threat that beings pose to being itself. The forgetfulness of Being as the danger itself occurs therefore first in language.⁵³⁵

Unlike modern technology in ontical sense, the essence of modern technology points to revealing, which, in turn, appoint *poíesis*, as the original way of revealing, as a bringing forth, from and in the openness of the truth of Being. Basically, the contemplation on the fact that there might be an ‘essence’ of technology, already refers to Being and its revelation. Heidegger writes: “The granting that sends in one way or another into revealing is as such the saving power.”⁵³⁶

Hence, the margin between the totality of en-framing and Being as its origin, the space between the concealment of un-concealment and the un-concealment of concealment yields from Being as the saving power. Both the danger and the saving power stem from Being. Rather poetically Heidegger writes: “The irresistibility of ordering and the restraint of the saving power draw past each other like the paths of two stars in the course of the heavens.”⁵³⁷

In *From the experience of Thinking* (1947), from which fragments are published in English in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (1975) Heidegger writes: “To head toward a star—this only. To think is to confine yourself to a single thought that one day stands still like a star in the world's sky.”⁵³⁸ At the background we can hear the voice of Nietzsche, who wrote:

The greatest events and thoughts -the greatest thoughts, however, are the greatest events- are longest in being comprehended: the generations which are contemporary with them do not experience such events -they live past them. Something happens there as in the realm of stars. The light of the furthest stars is longest in reaching man; and before it has arrived man denies-that there are stars there. “How many centuries does a mind require to be understood?”- that is also a standard, one also makes a gradation of rank and an etiquette therewith, such as is necessary for mind and for star.

⁵³⁵ Idem p. 55.

⁵³⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977. p. 32.

⁵³⁷ Idem p. 33.

⁵³⁸ *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (1910-1976) GA 13.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 4.

Concerning the death of God, Nietzsche thought that we are living in the light of a star that has already faded out. As such, the essence does not equal presence. The same holds true for modern technology. Heidegger thought that the present course of irresistibility of technological ordering at one point might be seen together with the sent course of the restraint of the saving power. This can only happen through a transformation of thinking towards the openness of presence. Man's dignity in the epoch of modern technology lies, in Heidegger's view, in keeping watch over the un-concealment - and with it, from the first, the concealment -of all coming to presence on this earth. As such, man is the 'shepherd of Being', instead of the 'lord of the earth'.⁵³⁹ After a confrontation with the danger as danger, man is led back to *poíesis*, the other way of putting matters. Heidegger returns, subsequently to the Greeks, to elucidate *poíesis* as the other way of revealing, and calls the Greek period marked by *poíesis* a 'brief' and 'magnificent' time. It was the revealing of *poíesis* that held complete sway in all the fine arts, in poetry, and in everything poetical that obtained *poíesis* as its proper name.⁵⁴⁰ *Poíesis* appoints at the poetical that thoroughly pervades every art and every revealing of coming to presence into the beautiful. The poetic brings the true into the splendour. Heidegger calls to mind Plato's *Phaedrus* where the true is called 'to *ekphanestaton*'; that which shines forth most purely.⁵⁴¹ The poetic revealing points to the poetic projection of Being instead of the projection of en-framing. As such, modern technology also belongs essentially to poetry, as language that has forgotten its original poetic or '*poietic*' character. Language has a concealing and revealing character, poetry is its revealing character, en-framing indicates its concealing character. However, this concealing 'as concealing' points to revealing. Modern technology can therefore, from Heidegger's perspective, be understood as degenerated poetry. The essence of modern technology as en-framing is often discussed, but its deeper belongings to *poíesis* and poetry appears less intelligible. Heidegger cites from often from Hölderlin: "Full of merit yet

⁵³⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *The turning*. in *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977. p. 42.

⁵⁴⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977. p. 34.

⁵⁴¹ *Idem* p. 34

poetically man dwell upon this earth.”⁵⁴² Merits belong to en-framing, dwelling belongs to *poíesis* and poetry. Heidegger writes:

Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art.⁵⁴³

However, Heidegger also comments that it remains doubtful whether a renaissance of the magnificent time of *poíesis* can be reached through art. Art has become big business as culture industry. It is not the case that art, in the sense of a discipline among the human disciplines, possesses a more adequate language than metaphysics, philosophy, mathematics or science, but language is in itself *poíesis*, poetic or creative. It would therefore be a mistake to search art in this sense only in the museum or the gallery instead of nature, politics, philosophy or the classroom. Heidegger finally returns in the essay *The Question concerning Technology* to the basic disposition of philosophy, namely wonder. We can be astounded before the possibility that some day in the midst of technology, technology might show itself as the happening of truth. Only when man does not shut its eyes to the constellation of truth, ‘poietic’ art could be a privileged realm whence technology might be thought in its historical essence. By wonder we finally might be displaced from en-framing to *poíesis*. Heidegger writes:

Yet the more questioningly we ponder the essence of technology, the more mysterious the essence of art becomes.⁵⁴⁴

Hence, in the age planetarium dominion of technology it becomes crucial for Heidegger to open one’s eyes for the truth of poetry and art. This means that Heidegger favours poetry and art as, the original language of Being, over the representing proposition. Poetry or the *poietic* becomes the name for the domain where the truth of Being occurs. Heidegger argues in this regard that the title of ‘philosophy and art’ is presumably not sufficient to think that which is given over

⁵⁴² Idem p. 34.

⁵⁴³ Idem p. 35.

⁵⁴⁴ Idem p. 35.

to the human being, but what is important is the 'word of Being'.⁵⁴⁵ As such, art and the *poietic* point back at poetry as the language of Being.

⁵⁴⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 162.

3 The appropriation of the word

3.1. Language

To invent new words where the language has no lack of expressions for given notions is a childish effort to distinguish oneself from the crowd, if not by new and true thoughts, yet by new patches on the old garment.

Immanuel Kant, *Critique of practical Reason*

Heidegger composed in 1972 a poem on language entitled ‘*Language*’, which has been published in the *From the Experience of Thinking*. Aesthetics is in Heidegger’s view founded in poetry instead of the other way around. Heidegger places himself as a poet thereby beyond aesthetical critique. Nevertheless, the poem is notably ugly. It runs as follows:

Language

When do words become word again?
When carries the wind of the directing turn?

When the words, distant donation,
say -not mean by denoting-
if they showingly carry
to the place of age-old owning,
-mortals appropriating the custom-
whereto the peal of stillness is calling
where that which was early thought
clearly and compliantly steps towards determination.⁵⁴⁶

Despite of its poor aesthetic qualities, some key elements of Heidegger’s thought with regards to language become clear from the poem. “When do words become word again?” hints at the appropriation of language. Its appropriation occurs from Being as the appropriating event. Language originates not in the

⁵⁴⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 13 p. 229.

human being, but is given to him from far, i.e. from the origin. Language is not denoting as referring to something present, but saying and showing that transcends the present, implying past and future as well. It is an appropriating calling from out of silence wherein remembrance of the origin futurely comes to determination.

As one might expect, Heidegger approaches language from the question of Being as well. From the onset, language must therefore be considered as an ontological notion. To discuss language means to locate it as the gathering of ourselves into the appropriation event, Heidegger argues.⁵⁴⁷ Heidegger most famous, and clearly poetic, determination of language reads that language is the ‘house of Being’.⁵⁴⁸ This determination provides, on the one hand, a hint where to look for the truth of Being and explains, on the other hand, Heidegger’s shifting away from the domain of everydayness towards the domain of language.

Heidegger has never developed a traditional ‘philosophy of language’ in the sense that a specific field of knowledge becomes delimited in contrast with other fields and subsequently analysed in its systematic features. Much less will we present his thoughts on language in such manner, let alone explain the over the years increasing interest he took in language as part of the so-called ‘linguistic turn’. To reduce philosophical problems to language problems would in Heidegger’s view be a form of metaphysics. The linguistic turn, most explicit logical positivism, seeks a final criterion for sense including ontological sense, in a present, i.e. ontical structure of language.⁵⁴⁹ But Heidegger argues, in contrast, in *Logic as the Question concerning the Essence of Language* that the essence of language should emphatically be left open. If language is approached ontologically instead of ontically, language cannot be regarded from the present, but must be regarded from an onto-historical perspective. Like history always implies absence (future) coming into presence (present) from out of absence (past), language is a self-calling that calls from out of the silence (absence) of the past beyond that which is present, into the silence (absence) of which is yet to come. One can see now on an ontological level the same dynamics from *Being*

⁵⁴⁷ Idem p. 188.

⁵⁴⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 239.

⁵⁴⁹ One can think here of Carnap’s notion of ‘frameworks’, or Wittgenstein’s logical picture theory of language. Notice, however, that the latter becomes problematic for the later Wittgenstein precisely because of its absent character. Logical relations are not factual, but have to ‘take care of themselves’ comparable to Heidegger’s expression that ‘language speaks’ and the ‘world worlds’.

and Time where Heidegger had determined *Dasein*'s consciousness as a silent calling of the self towards itself, as the way *Dasein*'s absent nature becomes present to itself.

From a historical perspective, language has a Janus head. The English word 'saying' and the German word '*sagen*' are both derived from the Indo-European root '*seku*' meaning to 'wind', to 'scent', to 'smell' (*wittern*), to 'notice' as to 'trace something' (*spüren*). This original notion develops on the one hand into 'showing, 'announcing' and 'saying', and, on the other hand, into 'following', the Latin '*inseque*'; to tell, sequel, sequence, but also as following with the eyes, as '*sehen*' and 'seeing'⁵⁵⁰ To say is therefore to foretell, to dictate in advance and at once to repeat and narrate or report what has been. Saying and seeing as showing and following are etymologically related. To say as to follow means a hearing. Heidegger often says that to hear means '*gehörig sein*', to belong to something, to be the attendant.⁵⁵¹ To say as to show means to see. In and by language we show and see. Accordingly, Heidegger argues that it is essential to language that it brings entities into the open.⁵⁵² However, the whence and whereto of this open is itself nothing present, since the now as the openness of the clearing stands open towards past and future, which are absent. Heidegger writes around 1934/1935:

In language happens the revelation of entities, not first as an emphatic expression of that which is revealed, but the originary unveiling itself, but for that very reason the concealment and its predominant modification, the appearance as well.⁵⁵³

The showing of language is therefore also appearance and concealment. Language is itself a letting occur and, as such, not only a saying but also a following. As such serenity, '*Gelassenheit*' is itself the heart of saying by means of which the bringing forth from out of Being occurs. Saying lets spring forth from the origin. As such, language is *poiesis*, *poietic* or poetic. 'En-framing' (*Gestell*), as we have discuss in detail in the last chapter, is the positing non-essence of language that opposes itself to the destining course of Being. En-framing is therefore the bringing forth by Being in the way of challenging Being.

⁵⁵⁰ <http://www.dwds.de/?qu=sagen> consulted at 22-01-2016.

⁵⁵¹ *Identität und Differenz*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006. GA 11 p. 38.

⁵⁵² HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 71.

⁵⁵³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39, p. 62.

However, before positing, language is ‘nihilating’ i.e. concealment as silence. Language reaches, as such, over and beyond the present and is therefore never a positive, but essentially a mystic notion, which Heidegger understands, however, primarily as ‘poetic’. Heidegger was in particular not fond of the typification of onto-historical thinking as mystic thought. By being contrasted to metaphysics mysticism is still determined by it.⁵⁵⁴ However, one can ask if Heidegger’s talk of Being in terms of being, which is not pure poetically, is not contrasted to metaphysics and therefore determined by metaphysics as well. Heidegger would deny this, since the other origin is more original than the first origin, i.e. metaphysics, so the determination is determined the other way around. However, by the same token mysticism as e.g. that of Judaism can be regarded as a more originary notion of thinking than metaphysics. Furthermore, Heidegger seems to treat the term mysticism merely as a label among others that determines a kind of philosophy, which does, however, not do much right to the thought that has its say in mysticism, namely that the essence is essentially unspeakable. The latter reflects precisely the core of Heidegger’s thought. Heidegger writes:

Being is the need of the gods and, as needing *Da-sein*, is more abyssal than anything which may be called an entity and by means of which Being can no longer be named.⁵⁵⁵

One could argue from Heidegger’s perspective that with the term ‘mystic’ the danger lurks of intending to make the mystery intelligible, while the openness remains, however, withdrawing itself abysmally. If language yields from silence, the genuine way to talk about or to show it is to remain silent about the essence of language by leaving its central determination open just as it is. The essence of language can therefore only be approached indirectly as a dance around its empty centre and poetry is that indirect language. Accordingly, Heidegger argues that he does not intend to reduce the nature of language to a concept that provides a

⁵⁵⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Besinnung*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997 GA 66 p. 403-404. Compare Fink on the philosophical tradition on *arreton* (the unspeakable) *Seminare*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1986 GA 15 p. 89.

⁵⁵⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p. 471.

generally useful view of language and writes: “Still, to talk about language is presumably even worse than to write about silence.”⁵⁵⁶

The indirect approach of language is in formal sense a *via negativa*. Heidegger ridicules an objective philosophical approach of language by asking if language can be found in the dictionary in the sense that it can be delimited by a finite amount of words. The influential linguist Saussure called e.g. the latter notion of language ‘*la langue*’. Heidegger concludes ironically that the collection of words from a dictionary relates to living language as a charnel house on a cemetery.⁵⁵⁷ Living language occurs, in contrast, obviously in discourse, Heidegger argues. This sense of language Saussure called ‘*la parole*’. But Heidegger asks if language is only there, fulfilled and real when the people of a language community simultaneously speak together. This would not guarantee at all that language comes to full articulation and satisfies therefore not a determination of language in complete sense. Much will remain unarticulated in colloquial speech and this determination of language includes e.g. not poetry. Heidegger writes at one point:

We are always speaking, even when we do not utter a single word aloud, but merely listen or read, and even when we are not particularly listening or speaking but are attending to some work or taking a rest.⁵⁵⁸

The notion of language determined as *langue* and *parole*, signs and sounds, would, in Heidegger’s view, be derived from that which is present and is as such metaphysical in as far as meaning and Being are taken from the present. Heidegger’s argumentation shows that the understanding of language, just like the understanding of notions like being and time, can never be derived from the present, that is to say the sole explicit or articulated mode of language. Language is rather implicit and on its way. We can illustrate this with an excerpt from James Gleick’s *The information* (2011) discussing the emergence of the dictionary:

It no longer seems finite. Lexicographers are accepting the language’s boundlessness. They know by heart Murray’s famous remark: “The circle of the English language has a well-defined centre but no discernible circumference.” In

⁵⁵⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Besinnung*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997 GA 66 p. 188.

⁵⁵⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. p. 23.

⁵⁵⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 187.

the centre are the words everyone knows. At the edges, where Murray placed slang and cant and scientific jargon and foreign border crossers, everyone's sense of the language differs and no one's can be called "standard."⁵⁵⁹

But on closer examination the well-defined centre appears to be untenable as well. Gleick cites lexicographer Samuel Johnson:

My labour has likewise been much increased by a class of verbs too frequent in the English language, of which the signification is so loose and general, the use so vague and indeterminate, and the senses detorted so widely from the first idea, that it is hard to trace them through the maze of variation, to catch them on the brink of utter inanity, to circumscribe them by any limitations, or interpret them by any words of distinct and settled meaning; such are bear, break, come, cast, full, get, give, do, put, set, go, run, make, take, turn, throw. If of these the whole power is not accurately delivered, it must be remembered, that while our language is yet living, and variable by the caprice of every one that speaks it, these words are hourly shifting their relations, and can no more be ascertained in a dictionary, than a grove, in the agitation of a storm, can be accurately delineated from its picture in the water.⁵⁶⁰

Language can therefore, in Heidegger's view, in essence also not be regarded as a form of communication that serves for verbal exchange and agreement. Language is not only and not primarily an audible and written expression of what is to be communicated, but in the first place a mode of truth.⁵⁶¹

This perspective of Heidegger on language differs, however, from the earlier approach of language in *Being and Time* where Heidegger writes that language is the way in which discourse gets expressed.⁵⁶² Especially from the perspective of his later stance on language it might strike one as odd that Heidegger reserves initially the term 'language' solely for what is explicit and expressed as discourse, without dealing with the wider phenomenon of the significance (*Bedeutsamkeit*) of the world under the rubric of language. Although hearing and remaining silent belong, according to *Being and Time*, to the possibilities of discourse, discourse remains the articulation of intelligibility, a 'talking about something' and expression.⁵⁶³ In *Being and Time* history is still grounded in the finite time of

⁵⁵⁹ GLEICK, J. *The Information*. New York: Pantheon books, 2011. p. 78.

⁵⁶⁰ Idem p. 79.

⁵⁶¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 71
Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Wass heisst denken?*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002. GA 8 p. 132, 133.

⁵⁶² HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 151.

⁵⁶³ Idem p. 151

authentic *Dasein* instead of the ‘long time’ of historical Being (see chapter 3.6). Heidegger determines in the work only the grey shaded items of the following table as language.

-Tool-being	Understanding	Discourse Articulation Interpretation	Communication Expression Statement Idle talk
-Signs			
-Meaning	Attunement		
-The significance of the world			

But there are no grounds to maintain that meaning, as the very condition of discourse and articulation, is itself not already language. The ostensible naivety of not dealing with the wider conditions for discourse in terms of language can be explained from the yet un-emancipated state of the phenomenological method of the work. In *Being and Time*, language is that which can be positively experienced in the phenomenon of discourse, while its full, albeit concealed, conditions belong to *Dasein*, which in is disclosed in this work as ‘thrown projection’ and inquired rather in its temporal than its lingual nature.⁵⁶⁴ Moreover, the German word for language is ‘*Sprache*’, derived from ‘*sprechen*’ meaning ‘to discourse’, ‘to talk’ or ‘to speak’. However, already in *Being and Time* Heidegger comments that the Greeks had no specific word for language but only the word ‘*logos*’, derived from ‘*legein*’: to ‘speak’, which also means ‘word’, ‘argument’, ‘account’, ‘reason’ or ‘ground’, suggesting that language can indeed be conceived in a broader sense than only what its name suggests.⁵⁶⁵

Concerning language, Heidegger admits in *On the way to Language* that he ventured too far too early in *Being and Time*, which might even be the ‘fundamental flaw’ of the book.⁵⁶⁶ The work contains many neologisms and Heidegger admits later that he had later learned from Hölderlin that it is not necessary for thinking to create new terms. Thinking should rather follow language than create language. However, *Being and Time* presents language

⁵⁶⁴ ‘Lingual’ means concerning language in general and not ‘linguistic’ as belonging to the scientific discipline and practice of linguistics.

⁵⁶⁵ Heidegger, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 155

⁵⁶⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. p. 7.

merely from a phenomenological point of view. It is, therefore, still very concerned with the ontical structure of language. Heidegger writes: “This totality of words in which discourse has its own ‘worldly’ being can thus be found as an innerworldly entity, like something at hand.”⁵⁶⁷ Furthermore, language still has the character of ‘expression’, which suggests the metaphysical idea that before language there is already something internal present that subsequently can become externally expressed. But the later Heidegger argues that the origin of language is silent and absent.⁵⁶⁸ Moreover, language and world cannot be inquired separately. Language is first of all occurrence of Being.

A phenomenological approach of language pays attention to how language shows itself. *Being and Time* demonstrates how, *inter alia*, language shows itself in *Dasein*’s daily existence. Heidegger explains, for instance, the proposition as a mode of relating of *Dasein* and entities, signs as ‘gear’ and approaches discourse in the form of idle talk, rather than that he reflects on the poetic essence of language. However, language can only show itself through language, since there is no way of showing or indicating that is not meaningful and therefore already language. The meaningfulness of the world is, in broad sense of the term, already language, without it being actual discourse.

Concerning a determination of the essence of language, the problem arises that one cannot say what language is without using language. One cannot step outside language, watch it from above and determine it as an object. So if language is speaking ‘about’, it is unable to say itself. By being in a world one is always already in language. One presupposes therefore always already language in some sense. Hence, one can only give the floor to language in thinking and poetry and pay attention to the original emergence of meaning and the historical course of language, as e.g. in etymology. The latter seems the path of Heidegger after *Being and Time*.

Heidegger reflects in *Being and Time* not yet on how language speaks, but how *Dasein* speaks and his own way of speaking, which he typifies as ‘formal

⁵⁶⁷ Heidegger, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 151.

⁵⁶⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985. GA 12 p. 12. Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Was heisst denken?*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002. GA 8 p. 132, 133.

indication'.⁵⁶⁹ This means that the work points to that which it intends to disclose, which is, however, only possible in a formal way. The indication is in itself empty and lacks fulfilment. Philosophical propositions are formal in the sense that they lack an objective sense. But that does not mean that they are subjective, let alone that they have no sense whatsoever. The formal indication needs the fulfilment of the existential understanding, experience and enactment of the reader in order to successfully indicate being and the being of *Dasein*, since *Dasein* is itself a condition for the understanding of Being, although it is never an object. Since being comes only into view by means of the understanding of Being, i.e. *Dasein*'s existence, the work points at the existence of the reader himself. Heidegger writes at the last page of *Being and Time*:

We must look for a way to illuminate the fundamental ontological question and follow it. Whether that way is at all the only one or even the right one can be decided only after we have followed it.⁵⁷⁰

The formal indication is projective saying pointing at *Dasein*'s own projection. Heidegger calls the formal indication at one point a particular methodological level of 'phenomenological' explication.⁵⁷¹ As such, the manner of speaking of the formal indication is one that shows a 'way', which remains thereby open to being shaped concretely in actual research.⁵⁷²

At any rate, language becomes problematic for Heidegger not because of the impossibility of a final definition of its essence, but firstly because of its directing and autonomous power. In the mini text *What is called Reading?* (1947) Heidegger states: "Proper reading is the collection from that which has already set a claim on our essence, whether we agree or not".⁵⁷³ In the activity of reading we follow meaning and do not decide or create meaning altogether. We could argue that this is not the case with acts prior to reading like speaking and writing. But here holds true as well that we can only speak or write in a way that can possibly be heard or understood by following the grammar, logic and semantics of a

⁵⁶⁹ Heidegger, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 290.

⁵⁷⁰ Idem p. 378.

⁵⁷¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 26.

⁵⁷² Idem p. 8.

⁵⁷³ *Was heisst Lesen?* (1954) in *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (1910-1976) GA 13.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 13 p. 111.

language, which we do not invent, but rather have inherited. In general, the hearing, reading or interpretation of language as hermeneutics precedes any particular deployment of language. Meaning as the totality of significant relations determines the meaning of one's own essence as well. Language as a whole transcends therefore the individual speaker or any actual group of speakers. Heidegger lets this insight have its say by the famous phrase: 'Language speaks'.⁵⁷⁴ It is not I, you or us that can speak as subjects, but we are first spoken by language. Heidegger writes:

Language is not something that the human being among other faculties and tools possesses as well, but that which the human being has that one way or another structures and determines his existence from the ground up.⁵⁷⁵

At another place Heidegger writes: "Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man."⁵⁷⁶ Hence, Heidegger speaks of the 'ruling' of language (*Walten der Sprache*).⁵⁷⁷ If language reigns over the human being, his thinking must be determined by language as well. Heidegger had showed in this regard already in *Being and Time* that *Dasein* is always already part of a metaphysical tradition that it more or less explicitly grasps. The work suggests therefore that phenomenology should go hand in hand with a destruction of metaphysics. In *Pathmarks* Heidegger writes:

What these problems indicate and lead us to acknowledge is that preconceptions 'are' at work 'everywhere' in the factual experience of life (and therefore also in the sciences and in philosophizing), and that what we need to do is simply, as it were, join in the experience of these preconceptions wherever they operate, as they do, for example, in providing direction for any fundamental type of knowledge about something. Moreover, we need simply to proceed in light of how such preconceptions themselves call for their own clarification.⁵⁷⁸

But Heidegger had experienced difficulties with language already in 1925, writing:

⁵⁷⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 188.

⁵⁷⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 67.

⁵⁷⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 144.

⁵⁷⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsches Metaphysik, Einleitung in die philosophie: Denken und Dichten*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990. GA 50. p. 149.

⁵⁷⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 8.

But this clumsiness in formulation and definition lies in the theme and in the very nature of the investigation. For to give a narrative account of an entity is one thing, and to comprehend that entity in its being is another. For the latter task, often not only the words are lacking but the very grammar as well. For our language, for reasons which we shall have to consider, in following its natural bent, first addresses and says the entity as a world and not the entity which is speech itself, so that our stock of words and expressions is first oriented in its sense to entities which we in our case here really do not have as our theme.⁵⁷⁹

In *Being and Time* it is noticeable that Heidegger discusses everyday phenomena in an anything but everyday language. Phenomenological thinking cannot imply a mere harvesting of phenomena. A mere representation of phenomena will not be sufficient for phenomenology, since it would lack interpretative and explanatory power and such a representation would not even be possible without language. Hence, the language of the phenomenological articulation will inevitably be metaphysically coloured. Phenomenological investigation and metaphysical destruction have to pay therefore also attention to the word as the *logos* in which phenomena make themselves manifest and by means of which they will be articulated. Phenomenological thinking must therefore also be a destruction of the concealing effects of metaphysical language in order to gain ontological transparency.

To create a meta-language in order to speak about language would not be philosophically satisfying. A meta-language would be metaphysical again in as far as it presupposes a distinct place outside language from where language can be overseen. This is in itself nothing but a metaphysical idea presupposing a universal and timeless perspective. Heidegger writes in this regard: “Meta-linguistics is metaphysics of the universal technologization of all languages into a solely functional interplanetary instrument of information.”⁵⁸⁰

After *Being and Time* Heidegger makes a turn from language as phenomenon towards the phenomenon as language. Two years before *Being and Time* Heidegger writes:

⁵⁷⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *History of the Concept of Time*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. p. 151.

⁵⁸⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1985. GA 12 p. 150.

It is not so much that we see the objects and things but rather that we first talk about them. To put it more precisely: we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what one says about the matter.⁵⁸¹

However, in the same writing Heidegger still stresses the need of a phenomenological method, exhorting: “Before words, before expressions, always the phenomena first, and then the concepts!”⁵⁸²

Although the later Heidegger abandons the idea of a method for thinking, in particular that of phenomenology, and does not understand philosophy as a science anymore, the word and discourse were already for the early Heidegger part of the phenomenon, i.e. that which shows itself from itself. Due to what Heidegger calls the ‘significance’ (*Bedeutsamkeit*) of the world - the way entities are meaningful by the way they refer to each other as tools in a referential cohesion of serviceability and usability - the phenomenon possesses an intrinsic connection with verbal meaning and discourse.⁵⁸³ However, language is initially not approached as a mode of the truth of Being.

A reflection on language and Being has, in Heidegger’s own words, determined his path of thinking from early on, but their discussion has stayed as far as possible in the background.⁵⁸⁴ However, when Heidegger’s thinking turns itself towards the question of the access of Being and dismisses at the same time entities as starting point, an explicit reflection on language becomes ultimately inevitable. Heidegger writes:

So the concealment (*Verschweigung*) must surely come from the Being. Then the Being itself is the concealment of itself, and this is probably the only constitution of the possibility of the silence and the origin of silence. Primarily, in this region each time the word becomes.⁵⁸⁵

We have come to the point that we need to ask about the language of Being. To what extent can the essence, i.e. Being, be indicated? If Being is not a present-

⁵⁸¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *History of the Concept of Time*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. p. 56.

⁵⁸² Idem p. 248.

⁵⁸³ Idem p. 202.

⁵⁸⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1985. GA 12 p. 89.

⁵⁸⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Grundbegriffe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981. GA 51 p. 77.

Compare *die Sighetik* HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p. 78-79.

at-hand entity, how is it then possible to show Being? How could nothingness be indicated? If Heidegger finally loses after *Being and Time* entities as the starting point for the question of Being, whence should thinking take its hints (*Winken*) and directions? It is obvious that language itself becomes the main focus now.

Heidegger approaches language basically in two ways. In the period of *Being and Time* and the writings preceding this work, he discusses language in terms of what he calls ‘apophantic speech’ as letting something be seen in and from out of its being, which is the essence of discourse. It is clear that already in this notion of language, language has a direct relation to truth as un-concealment. After *Being and Time*, his writings start putting emphasis on language as a ‘poetic founding’ (*Stiftung*), which remains essentially an open determination of language precisely because it partakes in openness of presence as *aletheia*. Before something can indicate or something can be let seen from out of its being, Being has through language already established a foundation that provides a measure for truth and a possibility of its intelligibility and one’s indicating and showing. The poetic founding character of language is as such ‘showing’ in a more original sense. This founding remains, however, based in ‘untruth’ and the concealment of the clearing. The shift from *apophantic* speech to poetic founding springs from a radicalization of the question of Being.⁵⁸⁶ When Heidegger starts to ask about Being (*Seyn*) itself, the ontological is no longer encountered in dealing with the ontical as the innerworldly entities of *Dasein*’s daily care and the discourse yielding from it, but rather when thinking gets ‘homely’ in ‘the house of Being’, which is language. A house is where one resides and dwells in familiarity. Being does not become firstly apparent in the ‘working-world’, but rather in language. Language is the house of Being. The house, however, has no object character but is an occurrence as ‘housing’ and ‘dwelling’ (*wohnen*), which is the essence of the human being according to the later Heidegger. However, thinking is not immediately at home in language as its originary region and the human being is therefore not at home in its own essence. Heidegger writes already in *Being and Time*: “Not-being-at-home must be conceived existentially and ontologically as

⁵⁸⁶ In as far as the poetic saying has an apophantic character, it shows not the being of entities, but concealed being as the mystery.

the more primordial phenomenon.”⁵⁸⁷ To be at home in what is proper and ownmost must be learned in thoughtful poetry, according to the later Heidegger. If we recall the argumentation from *Being and Time*, it was demonstrated there how man flees away in the inauthentic everydayness from its mortal nature instead of by being resolutely prepared for angst holding out in his mortal essence. As such, man is initially not at home in its proper essence. We will discuss the development of becoming home in what is proper more thoroughly in chapter 3.9 and 3.10.

With respect to ontology, we might compare two ways in which ‘language speaks’. Hegel regards in *The science of Logic* the terms that indicate the categories of being as the final expression of being as absolute spirit and presents the categories as such. But in what sense are these terms more adequate for Being than e.g. Hölderlin’s poetizing of Being in terms of rivers? Concerning the question of Being, Heidegger writes after *Being and Time*: “The ways of previous metaphysics, its way of asking, its concepts, are not sufficient to ask this question.”⁵⁸⁸ Heidegger experiences poetry and not the concepts of philosophy as the language of essence. That which is spoken purely by language is the poem, which we will examine in chapter 3.4.⁵⁸⁹

The present part of the spectrum of language is always the language of a people. Language in general does not exist, according to Heidegger.⁵⁹⁰ There exists only the language of a people, which is therefore related to their historical being. The totality of significances within a language relate to what happened, happens and will happen to a people as its collective ecstatic experience. Language attests the history of a people. As such, language transcends its mere present mode. Language has itself the character of ‘being’, whereto it opens the people and which it brings to people.⁵⁹¹ Heidegger writes: “To reflect on language means to reach the speaking of language in such a way that this speaking takes

⁵⁸⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. 177.

⁵⁸⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 270.

⁵⁸⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 192.

⁵⁹⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 392.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 13, p. 155.

⁵⁹¹ Idem, p. 66.

place as that which grants an abode for the being of mortals.”⁵⁹² In the late work *On the Way to Language*, Heidegger writes that the human is in its nature given to speech, it is in itself ‘lingual’ (*sprachlich*).⁵⁹³ Language and the human being determine each other reciprocally.⁵⁹⁴ Man is determined by language in the sense that he is thrown into a world of significations as language, which he did not first project but that determines him nevertheless. Language speaks and man only speaks in as far as he corresponds to language. Corresponding means ‘hearing’ language’s behest of silence, Heidegger argues.⁵⁹⁵

On the other hand, man deploys language and can be creative with language. Heidegger writes:

The sentence ‘Language speaks’ is only half thought, as long as the following fact will be overlooked: In order to speak in its own way, language requires human speech, which in turn is used, i.e. employed for the sake of language in the way of correspondence.⁵⁹⁶

Although they are not thought in their true relation to Being, Heidegger acknowledges the metaphysical analyses of the positive structures of language as correct.⁵⁹⁷ However, that which is correct is not necessarily true, i.e. essential. The essential relation of language to the human being becomes clear in the following words of Heidegger:

‘The’ language is ‘our’ language: ‘ours’ not only as the mother tongue but also as the language of our history. Thereby we are overtaken by what is ultimately question worthy within meditation on ‘the’ language.⁵⁹⁸

In poetry language becomes appropriated as our language, which is as such the appropriation of *Dasein* and Being. ‘Our’ language is in Heidegger’s view neither the language of the ‘I’ as the subject, nor the language of ‘we’ or society as a collection of subjects, but belongs to the self of a people. The unity of the self

⁵⁹² Idem p. 190.

⁵⁹³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 205.

⁵⁹⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 393.

⁵⁹⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985. GA 12 p. 30.

⁵⁹⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Zu Hölderlin - Griechenlandreisen*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 7 p. 201.

⁵⁹⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. 394.

⁵⁹⁸ Idem p. 394

of a people is never racial in the sense of a generative shared inherited bloodline.⁵⁹⁹ Heidegger's notion of the people also signifies not the cosmopolitical human being. 'A' people means not 'the' people, according to Heidegger, which implies therefore a plurality of peoples as different historical projections. A people is united by itself and differentiated from other peoples by being the historical resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) for its own future, according to Heidegger. Resoluteness or being determined means itself an outstanding occurrence in an event. Hence, being a historical people means being related to one's own future and destiny from out of the truth of Being. According to Heidegger, we are destined (*bestimmt*) which means that we are all the time attuned (*durchstimmt*) by dispositions (*stimmung*).⁶⁰⁰ As such, a ground disposition rules our task, sending and work. Finality (*Bestimmtheit*) is always present in one of these as a carrying attunement and disposition. This disposition tells where and as whom *Dasein* finds itself in its history. We will inquire in chapter 3.5 the relation between attunement and poetry.

To be overtaken by language signifies that man is not merely the origin of his language in as much as his history yields from the occurrence of Being. In the history of Being, the destiny of one people is tied to the destiny of other peoples. 'Our' history is not the historiologically familiar course of our capacities and accomplishments, according to Heidegger, but we ourselves in the moment of our relation to Being.⁶⁰¹ As such, the essence of language points to man understood in terms of the people in its historical relation to Being. On the statement from *Being and Time*: "Discourse is existential language because the beings whose disclosedness it significantly articulates have the kind of being of being-in-the-world which is thrown and reliant upon the world." Heidegger remarks in a footnote of the publication in the collected works: "Thrownness is essential to language", illustrating the historical essence of language.⁶⁰² Historical *Dasein* is a

⁵⁹⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. p. 65.

⁶⁰⁰ Idem p. 129.

⁶⁰¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 394.

⁶⁰² *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 151.

thrown projection that Heidegger will determine in terms of language as a ‘poetic projection’. The primal language of a people is poetry.⁶⁰³

Hence, Heidegger argues that language originates precisely out of Being.⁶⁰⁴ The essence of language can never be determined otherwise than by naming Being the origin of language.⁶⁰⁵ The essence of language is the language of essence.⁶⁰⁶ Heidegger leaves the essence of language open, which means that its determination as a whole is held back in the silence of the origin as the concealment of Being. Just as less as Being or the whole can be defined, that is to say brought under a final concept, language cannot be defined. Nietzsche says: “All concepts in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated defy definition; only something which has no history can be defined.”⁶⁰⁷ This is all the more true for language itself. Language in broad sense regarded as meaning and not as the mere study object of linguistics is never a present-at-hand object. Hence, the quest for being does not concern only a semantic issue or a particular feature of Indo-European languages.⁶⁰⁸ Meaning ‘is’, emerges and happens, rather than that Being yields from meaning. Language essentially occurs in the essential occurrence of Being.⁶⁰⁹ Like time, language has an open character and its full spectrum can never be determined as a present entity, since the totality of relations as the historical development of a people that has its say in language remains concealed and held back in the origin of Being. Heidegger argues that language in its widest sense accompanies all representing and extents therefore over the entire domain of entities as a mode of expressing them. As such, language shows itself as a being towards entities and this ‘towards’ concerns the relating of the human being to other relations. Language is in this sense already posited free of all particular relations and at the same time pointing towards man as *Dasein* who can be a being towards entities. In other words, man relates by means of language to entities as

⁶⁰³ Heidegger, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 GA Band 39, p. 74.

⁶⁰⁴ Idem p. 393.

⁶⁰⁵ Idem p. 393, 394.

⁶⁰⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. p. 80.

⁶⁰⁷ NIETZSCHE, F. *Of the Genealogy of Morality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. p. 53.

⁶⁰⁸ Compare a counter position in *Heidegger’s ontological difference and language*, LOHMANN, J in *Heidegger and language*. KOCKELMANS, J. Evanston, 1972, Northwestern University Press.

⁶⁰⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 394.

the way in which they are related in and out of their being.

Language is grounded in silence.⁶¹⁰ The origin of language is the concealed Being that speaks silently as the ‘peal’ (*Geläut*) of stillness’.⁶¹¹ Heidegger writes:

Language originates in remaining silent (*Schweigen*). It must first have collected itself in this something like Being and then has its say as world.⁶¹²

Being as the concealed origin is the silence whence language springs forth. Heidegger writes in *Contribution to philosophy*:

The call to the leap into the appropriation is the great stillness of the most concealed self-knowledge. Every language of *Dasein* originates here and is thus in essence silence.⁶¹³

In the *History of Being* Heidegger writes: “The concealment (*Die Erschweigung*) is the originary word. The word is the essencing of Being.”⁶¹⁴ And in *On the Origin* Heidegger writes: “Everything is uniquely (*Einzig*) put into the word as being towards the unique and belonging to it. Whose silence is the site (*Stätte*) where ‘it turns around’.”⁶¹⁵ As such, the appropriating ‘turning’ stems from the silence of language as the concealment of Being as well.

⁶¹⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 281.

⁶¹¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985. GA 12 p. 27.

⁶¹² HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39, p. 218.

⁶¹³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 323.

⁶¹⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 140.

⁶¹⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 168.

3.2. Heidegger's concept of poetry

I talk like a fool

Hölderlin, *Homecoming*

It is arguably impossible to represent Heidegger's concept of poetry by means of a collection of summarizing propositions. His writings on poetry are in the first place contemplations. They have a performative character, which require the reader to think actively along in order to disclose their meaning. Heidegger develops his notion of poetry by interpreting and comparing a handful of poems and passages from letters of poets as a way of giving the floor language itself.⁶¹⁶ The possibility of presenting the proper meaning of his account of poetry without the original poems in their actual discussion remains rather questionable. According to Walter Benjamin, to quote a text implies interrupting its context, which holds true in general for any form of representation of someone else his words and thoughts. Hence, the interoperation runs the risk here of merely talking about passages without being able to transmit the original thought. The latter is presumably the risk of language itself. Heidegger writes in this regard:

The unlimited possibility of a report like derivation of originary saying entails that language constantly endangers its own essence and remains, as such, in itself dangerous, the more unconditional, the more essential saying is.⁶¹⁷

Much will be lost by an interpretation of an interpretation. All the more, if Heidegger, as we will see, calls Hölderlin's poetry itself already an interpretation (*Auslegung*).⁶¹⁸ Violence seems to a certain extent inevitable concerning interpretation and representation. But, nevertheless, we will make an attempt of sketching Heidegger's contemplative walk through poetry.

The main focus will here be on the philosophical conditions that urge Heidegger to step aside from philosophy as metaphysics, in favour of an engagement of thinking with poetry and, secondly, on Heidegger's concept of

⁶¹⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. p. 59.

⁶¹⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 65.

⁶¹⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 149.

poetry in relation to the openness of presence as *aletheia*.

Heidegger's speaking about interpretation is from the onset ambiguous. In wide sense, interpretation can be that of the meaning of Being, but in strict sense the interpretations of individual poems as well. Heidegger never becomes explicit on this ambiguity, which must, however, be inevitable when the interpretation of poetry is, on the one hand, taken as a model for the hermeneutics of Being and, on the other hand, the essence of the poem and any given piece of poetry cannot be disclosed without ontological considerations. A similar ambiguity can, on the one hand, be experienced in Heidegger's speaking of poetry as an ontological occurrence that takes place in each manifestation of Being, due to which things, works of art and philosophical thoughts can have a poetic character, and, on the other hand, the deployment of poetry by means of the founding poets, which is, however, a vocation sparsely distributed among the poets, in Heidegger's view, to the extent that maybe only Hölderlin can be characterized as such, which leaves the poetic origin of the present German language, people and a pre-Hölderlinian area completely obscure, but to which Hölderlin's poetry makes an appeal nonetheless. Certainly, the German being that is prepared by Hölderlin concerns a futural notion and the Greek existence had been founded by Homer and Sophocles, but this satisfies not the gap that is left between poetry as an ontological notion and its enunciation by so few founding poets. The ambiguity has only indirectly its say in Heidegger's thought when discussing the relation between thinking and poetry and the poem among other works of art. Heidegger argues in *On the Origin of the Work of Art* that, the poem as a linguistic work has a privileged position among the arts. Poetry plays a fundamental role in art because of the founding/revealing character of the poetic word. Although the poetic does not simply coincide with a lingual structure, Heidegger suggests that the poetic is, nevertheless, most present in a linguistic work. However, this statement is later put into perspective in the same work. Heidegger writes:

Poetry is here thought in such a broad sense, and at the same time in such an intimate and essential unity with language and the word, that it must remain open whether art, in all its modes from architecture to poesy, exhausts the nature of poetry.⁶¹⁹

⁶¹⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 71.

The ambiguity between poetry in strict and broad sense brings us immediately at the track of poetry as an ontological notion that shows itself as the ambiguity of Being and the entity. In essence poetry is historically determined and belongs therefore to the timing of Being. Poetry has therefore an occurrence character, which has been on its way throughout history. Hence, we cannot compare and determine it as merely an object among other objects. We will call the ontological perspective on poetry ‘ontopoetology’. The ontological character of Heidegger’s reading of poetry becomes apparent when Heidegger writes about the poetry of Hölderlin:

The poetic approach to his poetry is only possible as a thoughtful confrontation (*Auseinandersetzung*) with the revelation of Being won in this poetry.⁶²⁰

Around the same period in 1934 Heidegger writes:

Poetry and thereby proper language, takes only place where the reign of Being has been brought into the superior untouchability of the original word.⁶²¹

Succinctly, Heidegger writes in *What are poets for?* (1946).⁶²²

But there would be, and there is, the sole necessity, by thinking our way soberly into what his poetry says, to come to learn what is unspoken. That is the course of the history of Being. If we reach and enter that course, it will lead thinking into a dialogue with poetry, a dialogue that is of the history of Being.⁶²³

Regarded as an ontological occurrence, poetry must be held far from its conception as a mere imaginative representation of the real or an expression of lived experiences of the soul. Such notions render poetry into something unreal (*Nichtwirkliche*), Heidegger argues.⁶²⁴ In contrast, he writes:

⁶²⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 6.

⁶²¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. p. 170.

⁶²² *Wozu Dichter?* (1946) in *Holzwege* (1935-1946) GA 5.

⁶²³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 93.

⁶²⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 32.

The rose blooms in the poem of the poet and only there, but this ‘blooming’ is not simply that which is said after some supposedly reality, entity, but it alone is that which is (*das Seiende*).⁶²⁵

Heidegger becomes first explicit on the nature and relevance of poetry in a lecture from 1934/1935, entitled *Hölderlin’s Hymns Germania and the Rhine*. He addresses the case of poetry indirectly here by starting off with a negative determination of poetry as a de(con)struction of its common conception. Concerning an interpretation of poetry that seeks the sense of poetry outside the poem, Heidegger first attacks poetics conceived as aesthetics. Heidegger asserts that poetry is no reassurance for swooning little girls, no stimulation for the aesthetes who think that art exists for enjoyment (*Genuß*) and pleasure.⁶²⁶ The basic relation to a work of art is not that of mere enjoyment as the ‘shuffling movements of the soul’ or the ‘ripple of nice feelings’.⁶²⁷ Heidegger cites in this regard a letter from Hölderlin to his brother in which Hölderlin speaks about the influence of fine arts on the development of the people. Hölderlin complains that poetry is generally not regarded as a serious matter, but merely as play and recreation.⁶²⁸ Accordingly, Heidegger argues that poetizing means, in contrast with its ordinary conception, the ‘awakening’ and the ‘discipline’ of one’s own being by means of which one reaches back into the ground of one’s own existence.⁶²⁹ This formulation echoes Heidegger’s earlier cursory determinations of poetry that emphasize the disclosing character of poetry regarding the human existence. Heidegger writes in *Being and Time*: “The communication of the existential possibilities of attunement, that is, the disclosing of existence, can become the true aim of ‘poetic’ speech.”⁶³⁰ In a like manner Heidegger had written two years earlier:

⁶²⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 117.

⁶²⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 5.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. p. 170.

⁶²⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 5.

⁶²⁸ Idem p. 7, 8.

⁶²⁹ Idem p. 8.

⁶³⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 152.

Thus discourse, especially poetry, can even bring about the release of new possibilities of the being of *Dasein*. In this way, discourse proves itself positively as a mode of maturation, a mode of temporalization of *Dasein* itself.⁶³¹

And in the same year of the publication of *Being and Time*:

Poetry, creative literature, is nothing but the elementary emergence into words, the becoming-uncovered, of existence as being-in-the-world.⁶³²

At any rate, the understanding of poetry is to be held far from mere play and a poetic interpretation requires ‘bright seriousness’ (*helle Ernst*), according to Heidegger⁶³³ If poetry is to be discussed in terms of beauty at all, it has primarily an ontological meaning.⁶³⁴ In *What is called Thinking?* Heidegger writes about Hölderlin’s poetry:

Its saying consists in its own truth. It is called beauty. Beauty is a sending (*Geschick*) of the essence of truth, whereby beauty means the un-concealment of self-concealing (*die Entbergung des Sichverbergenden*). Beauty is not that which is enjoyed, but that which is subjected to any epoch (*Geschick*) of truth that takes place when the eternal inconspicuousness (*Unscheinbare*) comes to the most irradiating appearing (*erscheinendste Scheinen*). We must comply with letting the poetic word be in its truth and in beauty. Which does not exclude, but include that we think the poetizing word.⁶³⁵

Secondly, Heidegger attacks a philosophical form of poetics. Philosophy is commonly known for the cold audacity of its concepts, which can subsequently be applied to poetry.⁶³⁶ The danger that lurks here, according to Heidegger, is not of talking too much, but of thinking too much. A philosophical analytical approach would converse the poem into a set of related concepts, whereby one solely seeks philosophical opinions and doctrines and explains a poet in terms of a presupposed philosophical system. But Hölderlin’s poetry has nothing to do with such general and common proceeding, Heidegger argues. Moreover, such an

⁶³¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *History of the Concept of Time*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. p. 272.

⁶³² HEIDEGGER, M. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. p. 172.

⁶³³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 8.

⁶³⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Holzwegen*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977. GA 5, p. 69.

⁶³⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Wass heisst denken?*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002. GA 8 p. 21.

⁶³⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 5.

interpretation would in philosophy not be welcomed at all, since philosophers will consider the dialogue with poetry to be a helpless aberration into fantasy.⁶³⁷

Thirdly, Heidegger criticizes the conception of poetry as a form of literature. When poetry is counted with literature it becomes either denied as a ‘playful languishing’ or a ‘fluttering away into the unreal’⁶³⁸. As such, it is negated in its essence as a flight into the idyllic and its value is only estimated by the measure of the present. But the present is, in turn, made and steered by the organizations that form social and public opinions, i.e. the literature business. In this business, albeit being propelled themselves, authors become ‘officials’ (*Funktionäre*) as ‘boosters’, and poetry can only appear as literature. There where poetry is culturally or scientifically considered, it is the object of the history of literature and Western poetry becomes collected under the title of European literature.⁶³⁹

Fourthly, and in line with the aforementioned critique, Heidegger criticizes the metaphysical scheme of form and content. The metaphysical distinction is often regarded as universal, but according to Heidegger, historical and actually Greek.⁶⁴⁰ The content of a poem can be reported easily by means of some topics and their relations and forms, like e.g. verses, can be counted easily. Forms can in poetics also be regarded as the visual images by means of which the abstract content can be expressed. The eagle represents, for instance, the bode of the gods or a dreamy child represents Germany, et cetera. Subsequently, one could compare such representations with the annunciation of Maria by the angel and compare the different historical artistic transfigurations of this motif. Afterwards one can inquire the eagle form in the works of different poets, e.g. Homer or Stefan George, somewhat like the camel is studied in Arabic literature, Heidegger argues.⁶⁴¹ Heidegger speaks obviously with irony here. At any rate, he makes no effort to hide his disdain for comparative literature and writes at one point that historical uniqueness can never be proved by the history of literature.⁶⁴² What is

⁶³⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 94.

⁶³⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 7 p. 191.

⁶³⁹ Idem p. 191.

⁶⁴⁰ One can read here an implicit critique of Heidegger’s master Husserl, who ascribed in particular importance to the distinction that Heidegger regarded as superficial. Compare WELTON, D. *The origins of meaning*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhof publishers, 1983. p. 213.

⁶⁴¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p.

16.

⁶⁴² HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 21.

said in a poetic saying has no content, according to Heidegger, but is ‘formed’ (*gebildet*) or brought forth.⁶⁴³ As such, it has the character of an occurrence instead of an analysable object. Dryly, Heidegger concludes that analyses and inquiries into forms and similarities of content result generally in nothing.

Fifthly, Heidegger argues that poetry should not be regarded as a mere expression of feelings. Poetizing is not before anything else something that occurs by means of the faculty of imagination, as if the poet makes a visual image of inner and outer feelings and experiences.⁶⁴⁴ In accord with this conception, ordinary poetics is able to describe the soul of the poet with the aid of depth psychology and distinguishes types like the epic poet, the lyrical poet or the dramatist. The misconception of poetry as the expression of lived experiences (*Erlebnissen*) is based on the thought that poetry is the expression of the soul, whether individual or collective. As such, a cultural value is often ascribed to poetry.⁶⁴⁵ But poetry is, in Heidegger’s view, not essentially a cultural expression that can be founded alongside e.g. other arts or sports.⁶⁴⁶ Heidegger refutes the concept of poetry as cultural expression by means of a joke, which is, however, quite uncommon in his writings. Humour in particular is not one of the dispositions that Heidegger had at his disposal and cracking a joke corresponds not really with the aforementioned stance of ‘bright seriousness’, although Churchill’s saying that a joke is a very serious thing is in this context worth contemplating. Heidegger quotes the Nazi author Kolbenheyer who wrote “Poetry is a biologically necessary function of the people” and commends that it does not take much intelligence to notice that the same holds true for the digestive system, which is especially healthy.⁶⁴⁷ Subsequently, Heidegger mentions how also Oswald Spengler regards poetry as an expression of the cultural soul, but to which the production of bicycles and cars belongs in Spengler’s view too. But this

⁶⁴³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 13, p. 172.

Compare also HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 166.

⁶⁴⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 23.

⁶⁴⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 60.

⁶⁴⁶ Idem p. 36.

⁶⁴⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 27.

determination is superficial and not essential, according to Heidegger, since it essentially regards poetry as a human activity and in particular an individual one, which he characterizes therefore as ‘liberal’.⁶⁴⁸

Heidegger indicates poetry in a formal sense and rather from the side of thinking as a ‘saying in the way of a showing revealing’ (*weisenden Offenbarmachens*).⁶⁴⁹ The determination is not proposed as a final definition, but has only an auxiliary function to provide a better understanding of Hölderlin’s poetry.

But the etymology of the German word for poetry ‘*Dichtung*’ points also in the direction of the aforementioned determination of poetry. ‘*Dichtung*’ comes from the Old High German ‘*tihtôn*’ and is related to the Latin *dictare*, which is a strong form of *dicere* meaning ‘saying’.⁶⁵⁰ ‘*Dictare*’ means ‘to say something again’, ‘to prompt’, ‘to dictate’, ‘to compose something lingual’, ‘to draft’, whether as essay, message, treatise, complaint, petition or song. *Dictare* means to write down, to say in advance (*vorsagen*) to be written down, to say something that has not been said before.⁶⁵¹ It is only since the 18th century that the word ‘*dichten*’ is limited to the type of drafting of a linguistic structure that we call ‘poetic’, Heidegger informs.⁶⁵² Heidegger concludes that etymology provides, however, no clues concerning what kind of saying poetry is. To oppose the ‘poetic’ to the ‘prosaic’ would lead back to the Greek ‘*poiein*’, ‘*poíesis*’, to ‘produce’ as a ‘bringing forth’, related to the OHG ‘*tihtôn*’, which direction, however, is even wider, according to Heidegger. Subsequently, he argues that ‘*tihtôn*’ has a similar root with the Greek ‘*deiknumi*’, meaning to ‘point out’, to ‘show’, to make something visible or public according to its own way. Conclusively, etymology tells that poetry is a way of saying as showing. As such, poetry belongs to the revealing of truth. But propositions, arguments and syllogisms are also ways of saying and showing, which leaves open the question what kind of saying and showing poetry is and how poetry as a way of truth presences and grounds.

⁶⁴⁸ Idem p. 28.

⁶⁴⁹ Idem p. 30.

⁶⁵⁰ Idem p. 29.

⁶⁵¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin’s Hymne Der Ister*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1984. p. 8.

⁶⁵² HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 29.

Thus, Heidegger seeks to find a determination of poetry in and from poetry itself and gives consequently the floor to the poet. This poet must be a poet who knows and poetizes what poetry itself is, which is Hölderlin, according to Heidegger.

3.3. Hölderlin – the herald of the mystery

I speak mysteries, but they are

Hölderlin, *Hyperion*

Concerning the relevance of Hölderlin in comparison with other laurelled poets Heidegger declares: “And yet I choose him, and him alone.”⁶⁵³ It is important to notice that this is one of the rare moments in which Heidegger speaks in the first person. However, this preference is not only a matter of personal taste, but a preference of Heidegger as the thinker of the history of Being. Heidegger values poetry essentially not by means of its philosophical, i.e. metaphysical content, but solely from the perspective of the task of ‘thinking’ Being. Heidegger ascribes an onto-eschatological relevance to the poetry of Hölderlin writing:

The poet thinks into the place (*Ortschaft*) that is determined from that clearing (*Lichtung*) of Being, which has been stamped as the realm in which Western metaphysics is fulfilled. Hölderlin’s thoughtful poetry has also stamped this realm of the poetic thinking. His poetry dwells in this place more intimately than any other poetry of his time. The place into which Hölderlin came is one where being is manifest, an un-concealment which itself belongs in the destiny of Being; out of this destiny, the manifestness is intended for the poet.⁶⁵⁴

We will interpret the unique relevance that Heidegger ascribes to Hölderlin as a founding poet, from the way in which Hölderlin, in our words, is eminently a poet of ‘absence’. Heidegger calls Hölderlin ‘German’s greatest’. He is the thinking poet and the thinker of the Greeks.⁶⁵⁵ Hölderlin has an original relation to the Greeks that is neither classic nor romantic, nor metaphysical, but ‘intimate’.⁶⁵⁶ He is the futural ‘thinker’, because he is the greatest poet.⁶⁵⁷ Like the kindred thinker, the poet wants to -or rather must- think and know in his highest creation

⁶⁵³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. trans. Hoeller, K. New York: Humanity Books Prometheus Books, 2000. p. 52.

Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin’s Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 220.

⁶⁵⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Holzwege - Wozu Dichter?* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977. GA 5 p. 273.

⁶⁵⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsches Metaphysik, Einleitung in die philosophie: Denken und Dichten*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990. GA 50. p. 150-151.

⁶⁵⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin’s Hymne Der Ister*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1984. GA 53 p. 67.

⁶⁵⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin’s Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 6, 30.

‘what’ thinking is and ‘who’ the thinker is. Hölderlin thinks about thinking and poetizes on poetry.⁶⁵⁸ Hölderlin is the ‘poet of poets’ who puts the very essence of poetry into poetry.⁶⁵⁹ His poetry is therefore sustained by his whole poetic mission, which means to make poems solely about the essence of poetry.⁶⁶⁰

According to Heidegger, Hölderlin had considered Homer to be the ‘poet of poets’. Heidegger asserts that, Homer first founded the being of the West and at another place Heidegger calls Homer the founder of the first origin, while Hölderlin is the founder of the other origin.⁶⁶¹ But Heidegger makes, however, not the slightest effort to justify or elaborate on this rather bold claim.⁶⁶² Moreover, in the same work Heidegger confusingly asserts also that Sophocles’ *Antigone* projected the whole Greek existence.⁶⁶³ It remains unclear in which sense the Greeks existence and the first origin are thought different here. At any rate, Hölderlin is, according to Heidegger, the founder of the futural German being, because he has projected the German being in its widest sense. His poetry has projected the German being by ‘throwing it back and ahead’ in its widest future.⁶⁶⁴ Hölderlin is the ‘herald’ and ‘caller’ for the concerned ones that are placed in the vocation of being ‘builders’ of a ‘new world’.⁶⁶⁵ His poetizing provides not a timelessly valid concept, but belongs to a definite time, Heidegger argues. This time is, however, not something already existing and by the poet merely poetically conformed. Hölderlin first determines a new time, as the time of the ‘fled gods’ and the god who is coming. This time is a destitute time because it stands in a double lack and a double not: in the no-longer of the gods who have fled and in the not-yet of the god who is coming.⁶⁶⁶ Like Heidegger’s thinking of Being, Hölderlin’s poetry is permeated by, absence, nothingness as the ‘nihilitating’ (*nichten*) of time. Hölderlin’s poetry creates for the Germans the meaning of ‘their’ time as a new sense of history. Like language is always ‘our’

⁶⁵⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. trans. Hoeller, K. New York: Humanity Books Prometheus Books, 2000. p. 30.

⁶⁵⁹ Idem p. 65.

⁶⁶⁰ Idem p. 52.

⁶⁶¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 195.

⁶⁶² HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 188.

⁶⁶³ Idem p. 216.

⁶⁶⁴ Idem p. 22.

⁶⁶⁵ Idem p. 221.

⁶⁶⁶ Heidegger, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. trans. Hoeller, K. New York: Humanity Books Prometheus Books, 2000. p. 64.

language, history is always our history, as the history of a people. Heidegger promotes initially exclusively Hölderlin as the founding poet regarding the futural German being and the history of Being in general and emphasis at several places his unique role in the history of Being. Heidegger even wrote in 1943 a text wholly dedicated to the argumentation of the uniqueness of Hölderlin as the founding poet of the futural German being, entitled *The uniqueness of the poet*.⁶⁶⁷ However, in an early work *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* from 1927, Heidegger had already cited a complete poem of Rilke in order to elucidate the character of *Dasein* and around 1946 in *What are poets for?* Heidegger seems to suggest that Rilke can be counted among the founding poets as well. Like Hölderlin, Rilke thinks and poetizes the absence of the divine radiation in a destitute time as the poetic saying of the oblivion of Being. Nevertheless, Heidegger states in the same writing that Rilke's poetry does not come up to Hölderlin's in its rank and position in the course of the history of Being.⁶⁶⁸ In *On the Way to Language* from 1959, a work which deals extensively with poetry, Hölderlin's poetry plays no longer exclusively the lead role and Heidegger interprets also poems from George Trakl and Stephan George in relation to the essence of language and poetry. Heidegger seemed to have tempered his tone concerning the exclusive futural character of Hölderlin's poetry when there were on the actual world stage no signs to be found indicating that the human being was responding to Hölderlin's poetry in the way that Heidegger had believed and expected. Hölderlin did not become to German thinking what Homer had been to Greek thought, but was instead abused as suitable material for Nazi propaganda. However, Heidegger had condemned Nazi romanticism already 1939 writing:

First when the Germans by their fewest burning contemplation have become hard and collected, steady and rich enough for the sobriety of the hardest knowledge of the simplest decisions, only when all 'psychology' and 'history' - the political as well as those of the spiritual including the works - as yet prevailing forms of acknowledgment and knowledge have become overcome and the urge for lived experiences has been broken, will the questioning glance no longer avoid that which 'is': before the abandonment of entities by Being that is confirmed with

⁶⁶⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Zu Hölderlin - Griechenlandreisen*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 75 p. 33.

⁶⁶⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 96. Compare also HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 158.

shocking testimony by the concealment in the romanticism of ‘blood’, ‘soil,’ ‘peoplehood’ and ‘regime’.⁶⁶⁹

Furthermore, we should take into account that, in Heidegger’s view, Hölderlin’s poetry has primarily a founding character for the ‘German’ being. Language and history are always ‘our’ language and history. Heidegger writes in *Letter on Humanism*:

‘German’ is not spoken to the world so that the world might be reformed through the German essence; rather, it is spoken to the Germans so that from a destinal belongingness to other peoples they might become world-historical along with them.⁶⁷⁰

From a destinal belongingness to other peoples the Germans might become world-historical, along with other peoples. According to Heidegger, the authenticity of a people is the creating that is allocated to it and by means of which it has grown beyond itself in a historical sending so that it first comes towards itself.⁶⁷¹ From the perspective of this historical sending, the French, Descartes for instance, and the Germans share a common destiny in the history of metaphysics and thus in the history of Being.⁶⁷² The Germans, as the people of thinkers and poets, have found their authenticity in their dialogue with the Greeks.⁶⁷³ Those Greeks could, in turn, not have become the place that they forever will be through encapsulation, Heidegger argues. Only because of the sharpest, but creative dialogue with what was the most difficult and alien to them, namely the Asians, they were formed in the short course of their historical uniqueness and greatness.⁶⁷⁴ Thought from the case itself, by analogy, other peoples presumably have their own founding poets and, as such, Hölderlin might turn out to be the not the single founding poet of Being. Hölderlin is the poet of

⁶⁶⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Zu Hölderlin - Griechenlandreisen*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 75 p. 8.

⁶⁷⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 257.

⁶⁷¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 13 p. 15-16.

⁶⁷² Idem p. 15, 19.

⁶⁷³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 48. *Nietzsches Metaphysik, Einleitung in die philosophie: Denken und Dichten*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990. GA 50. p. 95, 142.

⁶⁷⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 13 p. 20-21.

the German people, according to Heidegger.⁶⁷⁵ However, he is not yet the power in the history of the German people and as long he is not yet that power, he still must come to power. To keep up (*mitzuhalten*) with this means, according to Heidegger around 1934/1935, politics in its 'highest' and most 'authentic' sense, such that even speaking of the political is not necessary.⁶⁷⁶ Nothing could be further from the rhetorics and the propaganda of the Nazis who came to power shortly before in 1933. We will discuss more thoroughly the initial unique onto-historical role of Hölderlin in chapter 3.5 in a discussion of the relation between poetry and thinking.

⁶⁷⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 214.

⁶⁷⁶ Idem p. 214.

3.4. The elucidation - snowfall on a bell

In Hölderlin's *Hymns Germania and the Rhine* Heidegger seeks to borrow a notion of poetry from poetry itself. Heidegger opens the work by stating that the aim of the lecture is to let Hölderlin himself begin and determine the following interpretation. This gives rise to the question about its possibility. Hölderlin has long past away and an interpretation is commonly thought to begin with the one who actually interprets or the poem as a text object present at hand. Heidegger asks therefore what 'beginning' in this context means and subsequently distinguishes 'origin' (*Anfang*) from 'begin' (*Beginn*), which he illustrates with two examples.⁶⁷⁷ A new weather condition begins e.g. with a storm, but its origin concerns, however, the preceding activities of the complete transformation of atmospheric conditions. The second example Heidegger gives is that of WWI, which began with skirmishes but originated in the intellectual political history of the West.⁶⁷⁸ Heidegger argues that in the proceeding of history, a beginning is left behind and disappears. But an origin comes first completely to light at the end and maintains, in contrast with a begin, a permanent relation to that which springs forth from it.⁶⁷⁹ Chronological time can be broken up in equal units, but the appropriating event names the unity of past, present and future. Hence, a begin means merely a chronologically datable prior event, whereas an origin concerns the complete first conditions that only manifest their complete power in the end.⁶⁸⁰ This end remains for the human being that lives in time, i.e. exists between the earlier and the later, a futural notion. An origin means, according to Heidegger, that from where and through which a thing is what it is and how it is.⁶⁸¹ The origin of something is the source of its nature. Hence, a beginning is in Heidegger's view an ontical notion, while an origin an ontological notion. What is at issue here, is the ontological relation between time and history, on the one hand, and language and meaning on the other hand. In order to experience the origin that becomes

⁶⁷⁷ Idem p. 3, 4.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Wass heisst denken?*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002. GA 8 p. 128.

⁶⁷⁸ Idem p. 3.

⁶⁷⁹ Idem p. 3.

⁶⁸⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsches Metaphysik, Einleitung in die philosophie: Denken und Dichten*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990. GA 50. p. 9-10.

⁶⁸¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Off the Beaten Track*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 1. Notice, however, that Heidegger speaks here of *Ursprung* instead of *Anfang*.

only completely apparent in the end, one must oversee the complete course of time, which requires a God's-eye point of view. Hence, Heidegger argues that human beings cannot begin with the origin, but suggests that one can begin with something that first leads towards the origin. One can begin one's way to the origin.⁶⁸² Heidegger argues in this regard that the task of a poetic interpretation would be a 'prognostication' (*Vordeutung*) of the origin, which is, in Heidegger's view, of course nothing but Being (*Seyn*) itself. As such, poetry has initially a preparing role in relation to the thinking of Being. In as far as poetry, as the echo of the origin, is able to give voice to the origin and poetic thinking is on its way to the origin, the meaning, and therefore the essence of poetry, must transcend the present. Heidegger argues therefore that the saying of poetry is 'untimely' (*unzeitgemäss*), which holds true in his view for philosophy and thinking as well.⁶⁸³ As such, one should not assimilate poetry to our present time or our everydayness, according to Heidegger, but submit oneself, like the futural ones should submit themselves, to the 'measure' of the poet. Heidegger writes around the same time in *Logic as the question of the essence of language*:

True poetry is the language of that being that has since long ago been spoken to us in advance and with which we have not yet caught up. Therefore, the language of the poet is not today's language, but always 'having-been' and futural.⁶⁸⁴

Since the essence of poetry transcends the present and is never merely an object or thing, the being of poems and poetry must be concealed to us. Heidegger states in this regard that the dialogue of thinking with poetry is long and has barely begun.⁶⁸⁵ The poem of a poet remains therefore something unsaid. None of the poet's individual poems, nor their totality, says it all.⁶⁸⁶ Likewise, Heidegger argues that despite having the names 'hymns' and 'elegies' we still do not exactly know what Hölderlin's poems truly are.⁶⁸⁷ Because its historical essence, poetry in broad and strict sense cannot be separated and individually defined. Heidegger

⁶⁸² HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 4.

⁶⁸³ Idem p. 4.

⁶⁸⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. p. 170.

⁶⁸⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985. GA 12 p. 34.

⁶⁸⁶ Idem p. 33.

⁶⁸⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 21.

argues that in a poetic saying lies a particular ‘beginning’ (*Beginn*).⁶⁸⁸ Notice that Heidegger uses here the term ‘beginning’, but to indicate an epoch. There is therefore something like a determined time stemming from poetry, which is a poetic time. Poetic time does neither equal the time of the calendar nor a particular time of a poem.

Heidegger typifies the interpretation of a poem as ‘elucidation’ (*Erläuterung*). In the elucidation the poem becomes accessible. The elucidation is perhaps not so much more than the ‘distuning of snowfall on a bell’, an image Heidegger borrowed from the draft of Hölderlin’s *Columbus*:⁶⁸⁹

Put out of tune
By humble things, as by snow,
Was the bell, with which
The hour is rung
For the evening meal.⁶⁹⁰

The ringing of the bell is the timing that decides, divides and determines time and tells us what time it is. Like we have discussed in chapter 1.5, time has always the character of ‘time for’, which is in the poem *Columbus* the time of the evening meal as an image of human dwelling. The elucidation freezes time and causes it to stand, by means of which the poetic occurrence of a poem becomes intelligible. The elucidation is distuning as a way of attuning, it provokes a disposition so that the poem can manifest itself. It is somewhat violent to the occurrence it befalls, but at the same time ‘humble’. Heidegger writes:

A thinking dialogue with poetry can serve the poetic saying only indirectly. Thus it is always in danger of interfering with the saying of the saying instead of allowing it to sing from within its own inner peace.⁶⁹¹

Concerning the distuning of the elucidation Heidegger writes:

Whatever an elucidation can or cannot do, this is always true of it: in order that what has been composed purely into a poem may stand forth a little clearer, the

⁶⁸⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin’s Hymne Der Ister*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1984. GA 53 p. 8.

⁶⁸⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 22.

⁶⁹⁰ Idem p. 22.

⁶⁹¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1985. GA 12 p. 34, 35.

elucidating speech much each time shatter itself and what it had attempted to do. For the sake of preserving what has been put into the poem, the elucidation of the poem must strive to make itself superfluous.⁶⁹²

An interpretation of poetry does not imply to talk ‘about’ a poem, but implies to talk ‘from’ it, since it is first the poem that speaks as what is spoken ‘purely’ by language.⁶⁹³ To speak ‘about’ the poem means to consider what the poem truly is from above, and thus, from the outside.⁶⁹⁴ This would imply a perspective that is alien to the poem. Rather should the poem tell us itself about its proper character, what it consists of and what it is based on. Heidegger suggests therefore the possibility of speaking ‘poetically’ from poetry, albeit not in verse and rhyme, as a way to submit oneself to the ‘power’ of poetry.⁶⁹⁵ Since Heidegger will not let thinking, and definitely not philosophy, decide one-sidedly on the nature of poetry, Heidegger’s thinking must initiate an open dialogue with poetry, which requires to let poetry itself rule as an essential occurrence from the history of Being. Heidegger seeks therefore a determination of poetry in and from poetry itself and finds most clues and indications concerning the essence of poetry in the poetry of Hölderlin. The essence of a poem is never merely a text object present at hand. Heidegger intends therefore to show the way and dynamics of poetry, rather than to define it as if it were an object. Heidegger asserts that poetry must transform itself and become first revealed as poetry.⁶⁹⁶ This concerns not a mere tautology, but shows that poetry belongs to revealing truth of Being. Poetry must reign over us so that our existence becomes the life carrier (*Lebensträger*) of its power, Heidegger states.⁶⁹⁷ This requires a ruthless scrutiny, if it is true that the existence of a people sprouts from poetry and, when great, even its downfall is determined by poetry. Heidegger cites in this regard from Hölderlin: “Art is the transition from nature to culture (*Bildung*) and from culture to nature.” Heidegger interprets culture here not as the product of culture industry, but as the historical

⁶⁹² HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. 22.

⁶⁹³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin’s Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 5.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 192.

⁶⁹⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 209.

HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. p. 85.

⁶⁹⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin’s Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 5.

⁶⁹⁶ Idem p. 19.

⁶⁹⁷ Idem p. 19.

being of a people and interprets art essentially as poetic. Heidegger writes in the origin of the work of art: “All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of entities, is, in essence, poetry.”⁶⁹⁸ Building and plastic creation always and only occur in the open of saying and naming that permeates and guides them, Heidegger argues.⁶⁹⁹

However, everydayness hinders one to submit oneself to the reign of poetry. As such, the engagement with poetry, as a labouring passage through the poem, implies a struggle against our selves.⁷⁰⁰ The struggle against ourselves calls to mind how Heidegger in *Being and Time* had explained the way in which inauthentic everyday existence conceals one’s authentic mortal nature. Likewise, poetry, as essential language, remains concealed to the compartments of everydayness. Poetry appears from the perspective of everydayness in the words of Hölderlin as the ‘most innocent of all occupations’. Poetry is commonly considered as romantic, not quite lucrative and, as such, not powerful or important. Concerning language, an inherent danger looms that the poetic saying decays first to real and then to poor prose and, subsequently, to mere chatter (*Gerede*), which Heidegger regards as the non-essence of language.⁷⁰¹ However, the essential is for Heidegger always embedded in the non-essential, the appearance (*Schein*), everydayness and vulgar understanding as ways of concealment. At the same time Heidegger finds the everydayness in poetry as well, writing:

Poetry proper is never merely a higher mode (*melos*) of everyday language. It is rather the reverse: everyday language is a forgotten and therefore used-up poem, from which there hardly resounds a call any longer.⁷⁰²

But more essentially Hölderlin calls it also the most ‘dangerous good’ (*Güter Gefährlichstes*), which Heidegger explains from its revealing/concealing character as the truth of Being. As we will discuss, the future is in Heidegger’s view designed and shaped by the poets and if the poet is not heard, Being remains in oblivion. The figure of the poet plays therefore a crucial part in the

⁶⁹⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Off the Beaten Track*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 44.

⁶⁹⁹ Idem p. 46.

⁷⁰⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 22.

⁷⁰¹ Idem p. 64.

⁷⁰² HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 205.

appropriating event.

The elucidation seeks the essence of poetry and the poem. The German word for ‘*Erläuterung*’, contains the word *lauter*, which means ‘only’, ‘sheer’ or ‘pure’, suggesting an interpretation that lets that which is interpreted appear in and from its pure originary essence.⁷⁰³ Heidegger writes that the elucidation brings first to shine the pure (*das Lautere*) that shines through everything that is poetically said.⁷⁰⁴ Notice that the peal of a bell is called in German ‘*Ge-läut*’. ‘*Laut*’ means ‘loud’, ‘widely heard’, from the MHG ‘*lūt*’ which means ‘bright sounding’, ‘light to the eye’, ‘clear’ from the OHG ‘*lūt*’, which means ‘distinctly’, ‘roaring’, ‘resounding’ and ‘known’.⁷⁰⁵ The elucidation would be a more sophistic notion of what Heidegger had called ‘formal indication’ before. It is the phenomenon itself that shines, the poem that speaks, the bell that rings, but it is the snowfall, the break of its inconspicuousness and everydayness, the sudden strangeness that had come over it, that can call our attention in the moment (*Augenblick*) to the originary phenomenon. The elucidation is, as such, poetic estrangement that shows. The elucidation is a clearing (*klären*) of the thought that is wakened by the word in the free readiness for following the word, Heidegger argues. What is called ‘thought’ here can never be isolated from thinking nor its history, which is, as such, something distuning in relation to the pure essence of the poem. The elucidation must provide access, but preserve at the same time a distance to the poem. Heidegger writes:

It is easy to see that any right elucidation itself already presupposes explanation (*erörterung*). The individual poems derive their light and sound only from the poetic place (*Ort*). Conversely, the explanation of poetry must first pass through the precursory elucidation of individual poems.⁷⁰⁶

The interpretation must finally disappear along with its elucidations before the pure presence of the poem so that it stands in its own right, directly throwing

⁷⁰³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 7 p. 191.

⁷⁰⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1985. GA 12 p. 34.

⁷⁰⁵ <http://www.dwds.de/?qu=laut>, consulted on 03/01/2016.

Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1985. GA 12 p. 241.

⁷⁰⁶ *Idem* p. 34.

light on the other poems as well.⁷⁰⁷ Heidegger makes himself humble in the face of the poem by ascribing to all his signposting only an auxiliary function that might disappear in the end. He argues that thinking forms only an occasion (*Anlaß*) to bring brightness in poetry.⁷⁰⁸ As in each case of knowing, forgetfulness reigns with respect to the way. This might, however, not always be problematic in Heidegger's view, at least not when it comes down to his own auxiliary elucidations. If one rereads the poems after one has made use of the aid of his elucidations, one thinks that one has understood them accordingly all along and "it is well for us to believe this", Heidegger comments.⁷⁰⁹ The proper reception of the saying of the poet depends, in Heidegger's view, on the help of the thinker and writes:

First a thinking that has in itself the character of a way can prepare the experience of a deficit. As such, it can help understanding the poet that has to say the need of the deficit.⁷¹⁰

Thinking must help the poet by heeding the spoken word so that it may be properly interpreted and preserved.⁷¹¹ Heidegger cites from Hölderlin:

(...) But alone he cannot easily preserve it,
And a poet gladly joins with others,
So that they may understand how to help.⁷¹²

Poetry in and by itself, even that of Hölderlin, cannot establish the overcoming of metaphysics in favour of the advent of the truth Being. Heidegger writes between 1936 and 1938:

Nevertheless, the historical moment of the transition must be carried out in the knowledge that all metaphysics (founded on the leading question: what are entities?) remained incapable of transposing the human being into the basic relation to entities. And how should it be capable of that? Even the will to do so finds no

⁷⁰⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 22.

⁷⁰⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 160.

⁷⁰⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 22.

⁷¹⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 13 p. 234.

⁷¹¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 49.

⁷¹² Idem p. 49.

hearing as long as the truth of Being and the uniqueness of Being have not become needful. Yet how is thinking supposed to succeed in what was previously denied the poet (Hölderlin)?⁷¹³

The poet demands the thinker. Heidegger asserts that the thinking of the poet is grounded in the poetizing of the thinkers. This brings us more urgently to the question of the relation between thinking and poetry.

⁷¹³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 9.

3.5. On distant peaks

In *Hölderlin's Hymns Germania and the Rhine* from 1934-1935 Heidegger names the kinship of poetry and thinking by determining their unity as a 'poetically thoughtful knowing'.⁷¹⁴ As such, the poet thinks and the thinker poetizes. Shortly after, Heidegger writes in *Nietzsche I* (1936-1939):⁷¹⁵

All philosophical thinking, and precisely the most rigorous and most prosaic, is in itself poetic, and yet is never poetic art (*Dichtkunst*). The other way around, a poet's work—like Hölderlin's hymns—can be thoughtful in the highest degree, and yet it is never philosophy (...) Because all real, i.e. great philosophy is in itself thoughtful poetic, the distinction between theoretic and poetic cannot serve distinguishing philosophical distinctions.⁷¹⁶

Despite their kinship the thinker and the poet are not interchangeable figures. Already in *Hölderlin's Hymns Germania and the Rhine* from 1934-1935 Heidegger asserts that the historical time of the people is founded and grounded by means of three figures, viz. the poet, the thinker and the statesman. They are the authentic creative ones, but they dwell on separated peaks. Heidegger borrows this image from Hölderlin's *Patmos*:

Therefore, since round about
Are heaped the summits of time
And the most loved live near, growing faint
On mountains most separated.⁷¹⁷

The peaks are separated, but as the summits of time they are also near. Likewise, each of the creative ones that dwell on the peaks carries out his own highest destiny, whence he is able to understand the other creators on separated tops. However, the time of the creators is at once separated abysmally. This means that the time in which the thinking of a thinker or the poetry of a poet comes to power is never predictable, foreseeable or logically related. Heidegger's thinking meets e.g. Hölderlin's poetry as an occurrence in the history of Being, which is far

⁷¹⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 286.

⁷¹⁵ *Nietzsche I* GA 6.1.

⁷¹⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsche I*. Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1961. GA 6.1 p. 329.

⁷¹⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 52.

from logical or obvious, but a coincidence (*Zu-fall*) allotted by Being.⁷¹⁸ The meaning that emerges in the works of the creators is historically on its way and remains therefore partly concealed waiting to be picked up by other creative ones. Again, Heidegger distances himself implicitly from Hegel's view of history in which e.g. the metaphysicians more clearly came to understand that which religion, mythology and the poets had been thinking in a seminal way before. The poet, the thinker and the statesman are from the perspective of originary thinking 'relatedly' engaged in the history of a people that is first 'founded' by the poet. According to Heidegger. Unconcealed as such, Being is understood, structured and first 'opened' by the thinker.⁷¹⁹ Finally, by means of the state creator, a people can be 'brought to itself' as a people. However, these three moments happen in their own history and timing as their own way of being related to Being.⁷²⁰ For example, a poet from ancient Greece can very well influence a modern or contemporary statesman. Concerning the nearness of the summits of time we reflect on what Heidegger says about nearness in general. According to Heidegger, the greatness of nearness consists not in smallness of distance, but in the wideness of that which is far and the transparency of that wideness.⁷²¹ Concerning nearness to the origin Heidegger writes:

We usually understand nearness as the smallest possible measurement of the distance between two places. Now, on the contrary, the essence of nearness appears to be that it brings near that which is near, yet keeping it at a distance. This nearness to the origin is a mystery.⁷²²

To say that something is near while it remains distant means violating the rules of logic, i.e. ordinary thought. Heidegger quotes in this regard Hölderlin's poetry as a saying of the mystery: "I talk like a fool."⁷²³ But such is the character of poetic thinking. Heidegger asserts in *What is called Thinking?* that no poet or

⁷¹⁸ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 39.

⁷¹⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 51.

⁷²⁰ Idem p. 144.

⁷²¹ Idem p. 237.

⁷²² HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry..* New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 42.

⁷²³ Idem p. 43.

thinker understands himself.⁷²⁴ They are therefore always in need of the interpretation of other poets and thinkers.

The transparency of wideness as nearness presumes a common region, which is the history of Being that is worth questioning in Heidegger's view. The poet, thinker and statesman form different highlights in history and relate in their own ways to Being. This means that poetry and thinking must be intertwined in the history of Being. Heidegger writes:

Therefore, there does not exist for us a pure poetic becoming of existence, just as less as a pure thinking one, just as less only an active one. From us it is demanded not to establish only adequate and common comparisons between the poetizing, thinking, and acting powers, but to take seriously its concealed peaking separation and to experience therein their originary belongingness and to form originally a new and unprecedented structuring (*Gefüge*) of Being.⁷²⁵

Like in the above citation, Heidegger grounds in *Anaximander's Saying* from 1946 thinking in poetizing and poetry, in turn, in thinking, because both belong essentially to the 'thoughtful poetizing' of Being, although the poet and the poem in strict sense remain distinct from the thinker and thinking.

Thinking is, however, poetizing – though not in the sense of poesy or song. The thinking of being is the primordial form of poetizing in which, before everything else, language first becomes language, enters, that is to say, its essence. Thinking says what the truth of being dictates. Thinking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesy. But it precedes, too, the poetic in art insofar as art's becoming an artwork happens within the realm of language. All poetizing, in both this broader and narrower sense of the poetic is, at bottom, thinking. The poetizing essence of thought preserves the sway of the truth of being. Because it poetizes thoughtfully, the translation, which wishes to allow the oldest saying of thinking to speak, necessarily appears violent.⁷²⁶

However, in the same year Heidegger distinguishes in *Letter on Humanism* from 1946 poetry and thinking quite radically. Heidegger compares poetry and thinking again with two mountaintops that are separated by an abyss.⁷²⁷ The poet and the thinker live nearby on separated peaks. Many words could be said about

⁷²⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Wass heisst denken?*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002. GA p. 188.

⁷²⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 184-185.

⁷²⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Off the Beaten Track*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 247, 248.

⁷²⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 237.

the relation between poetry and philosophy but, essentially, we know nothing of the dialogue (*Gespräch*) that takes place between the poet and the thinker. This implies again that the poet and the thinker have some understanding of each other, but that their relation is generally unknown. Presumably, they understand themselves as creators, but their essential relation to the historical truth of being remains concealed to them as well. In *From the Experience of Thinking* Heidegger states that singing and thinking are the stems neighbour to poetry, which grow out of Being and reach into its truth.⁷²⁸ Heidegger cites from Hölderlin: “And to each other they remain unknown, so long as they stand, the neighbouring trunks.”⁷²⁹ To neighbour each other does not imply to know each other in essential sense. Heidegger comments in a footnote in *The History of Being* that founding poetry knows nothing of Being (*Seyn*).⁷³⁰ The shape of the origin is concealed such that it is only thought and poetized by the rare and futural ones, but in an ‘unknown knowing’.⁷³¹ This unknown knowing consist in the fact that the poet does not know Being, as such, but names it as the ‘holy’, ‘nature’ or the ‘all living’.⁷³² Heidegger writes about the poetic saying:

Such a projection of the essence has its own bindings and grounds and springs not from unbound imagination and that which comes without any reason to mind. Moreover, this thinking remains a thinking of the poet. The projection is not comprehensive, Being as such, and that means put in concepts, but founding – in poetic saying.⁷³³

Heidegger argues therefore that the experience of the truth of the poet cannot be identical with the anticipatory thought of the thinker.⁷³⁴ Concerning the obscured self-knowledge of the poet Heidegger writes:

Also the poet himself knows not the complete scope of saying (*Sagebereich*). This not knowing is not a sign of a deficit, but signifies the essentiality of his words, that

⁷²⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 13.

⁷²⁹ Idem p. 13.

⁷³⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 144. footnote a.

⁷³¹ Idem p. 211.

⁷³² HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 166, 167.

⁷³³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 146.

⁷³⁴ Idem p. 160.

is in itself strong enough to carry an own history of disclosure of the concealment named by him.⁷³⁵

But had Heidegger not regarded Hölderlin as the poet that knows the essence of poetry and thinking? Knowing appears to be gradual or ambiguous and is always knowing in a certain sense. Hölderlin knows what poetry is in poetic sense, but not as onto-poetology from the perspective of the history of Being. Nevertheless, his poetry excels its own ways of understanding by means of which it enters the history of Being, Heidegger argues. In other words, an artist or poet says always more than his own account of what he is saying. Heidegger argues in this regard that the higher possibilities of the truth of poetry and thinking belong to essential saying. Since this saying is essential, it is always inexhaustive and excelled by its own origins, which it cannot all master properly and explicitly. It is in the direction of this ‘concentration’ (*Gehalt*) where the interpretation goes.⁷³⁶ Moreover, Heidegger asserts that Being, as the appropriating event, is itself a saying.⁷³⁷ In one of his readings of poetry, Heidegger writes that the point of an engagement with poetry is to find, in the neighbourhood of the poetic experience with the word, a possibility for a thinking experience with language.⁷³⁸ This experience of language says that the essence of language is the language of essence.⁷³⁹ As such, essential language is the language of Being that is poetic stemming from Being itself. The domain of poetry is language. Language is, however, itself essentially poetic.⁷⁴⁰ Heidegger writes:

Poetry never takes language as a material at its disposal; rather, poetry itself first makes language possible. Poetry is the primal language of a historical people. Thus the essence of language must be understood out of the essence of poetry and not the other way around.⁷⁴¹

Heidegger argues that the saying of Being, is ‘say-like’ (*sagenhaft*) i.e. poetry in originary sense, which can solely be determined from Being as the

⁷³⁵ Idem p. 153, 154.

⁷³⁶ Idem p. 163.

⁷³⁷ Idem p. 55.

⁷³⁸ Idem p. 83.

⁷³⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. p. 80.

⁷⁴⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 60

⁷⁴¹ Idem p. 60.

appropriating event.⁷⁴² The ‘origination’ (*Anfängnis*) of the origin designating the origin in its originary futural occurrence character, because the origin exists only in its originating, is the ground for the poetic character (*Dichtungscharakter*) of Being.⁷⁴³ Since Being speaks poetically, poetry and its interpretation are ontological notions that neither belong solely to thinking nor solely to poetry and which we characterize therefore as ‘ontopoetological’. Being speaks poetically. The removal of the parting (*Der Abschied*) from the origin is at once the closeness of the intimacy of the originary appropriating event, that, as parting, is ‘pure poetry, according to Heidegger. This poetizing by Being remains more originary than all poetizing of the poet and all thinking of the thinker.’⁷⁴⁴

The saying of Being is always attuned. Heidegger argues that the historical interpretation (‘*geschichtliche Auslegung*’ and not ‘*historische Interpretation*’) of the appropriating event, expresses the mood that has already taken over (*überstimmt*) each poet, thinker and builder and which remains at the same time inaccessible to them.⁷⁴⁵ Heidegger plays with the word ‘*Stimme*’, which means voice, and argues that the mood that takes over (*das Überstimmende*) guarantees (*gewährt*) the attunement (*Stimmung*) of its determination (*Bestimmung*), which tune (*Stimme*) is only experienced as an echo, but which lets sound ahead for the discharged (*den Nachkommenden*)⁷⁴⁶. Heidegger calls Hölderlin the ‘voice’ (*Stimme*) of Being.⁷⁴⁷ His work is the echo of the concealed origin and sounds at once ahead, that is to say that its meaning arrives futurely. As such, it points forwards to the futural poets and thinkers by pointing them, in turn, back to the concealed origin. Heidegger argues that the transition of the interpretation (*Auslegung*) of Being from the first origin, which is the origin of presence, to the other origin, which is the origin of absence as concealment, has been ‘decided’ (*entschieden*) by the word of Hölderlin.⁷⁴⁸ The thoughtful saying (*denkerische Spruch*) of thinking alone cannot become the genuine essencing word, but is in

⁷⁴² HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 51.

⁷⁴³ Idem p. 29. Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Zu Hölderlin - Griechenlandreisen*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. p. 19.

⁷⁴⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 24.

⁷⁴⁵ Idem p. 150.

⁷⁴⁶ Idem p. 150.

⁷⁴⁷ Idem p. 167.

⁷⁴⁸ Idem p. 149.

need of the poet who has to grow from the trunk of the generation (*Geschlecht*) Hölderlin has founded.⁷⁴⁹ ‘Being’ and the holy of which Hölderlin poetizes are experienced and anticipatorily thought as the other origin, which names Being’s very own history.⁷⁵⁰ Hölderlin’s poetry is an anticipatory interpretation (*Vorbereitende Auslegung*) and a foreboding (*Deuten*) that dictates (*Vor-sagen*) the other origin.⁷⁵¹ As such, he is the poet of the other origin and our futural history, Heidegger argues.⁷⁵² At the same time, this formulation shows that that his poetry is itself already an ‘interpetation’ of Being and that his poetizing must therefore in some sense already be a thinking. At any rate, Hölderlin cannot be the ‘ahead founding’ (*vorausstiftende*) poet without an interpretation by originary thinking, Heidegger argues. Originary thinking that remembers the first origin is not yet interpretation, since it has no concealment whence the future can sprout as the history of Being.⁷⁵³ Originary thinking is therefore thinking that thinks the other origin in confrontation with the first origin. The word ‘*Aus-legung*’, meaning interperation, literally renders into ‘to lay out’, provoking the association of ‘paving a way’ for the essence to manifest itself. Heidegger writes with regard to interpretation:

Interpreting is each time a laying out (*heraus-legen*) of that which in itself, in its initial essence, preserves the estrangement. The ‘laying out’ brings out into the open, but in such a way that it takes not away the strangeness from that which is originary, but lets it be. This simple being in itself of the origin has the character of putting a way (*wegstellen*) and putting far (*fernstellen*).⁷⁵⁴

In order to be heard, Hölderlin needs the thinker who thinks the history of Being (*Das seynsgeschichtliche Denken*) and takes over the preparation of the ‘origination’ of the other origin by making a leap in it.⁷⁵⁵ Hardly surprising, this originary thinker happens to be Heidegger himself. But the interpretation of a thinker happens out of the truth of Being as the openness of presence in his view. It is Being itself that speaks in the interpretation of poetry and thought. Heidegger

⁷⁴⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Besinnung*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997 GA 66 p. 24.

⁷⁵⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 157.

⁷⁵¹ Idem p. 149, 153.

⁷⁵² HEIDEGGER, M. *Besinnung*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997 GA 66 p. 426.

⁷⁵³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 148.

⁷⁵⁴ Idem p. 148.

⁷⁵⁵ Idem p. 156.

writes:

The originary (*Das Anfängliche*) gets placed back in that which has been and which is coming as its intimate possession. This putting far distinguishes the interpretation and foreshadows its essential relation to the origin. Such standing far is the saying opening of the between, is the saying of Being itself.⁷⁵⁶

Only from Being sprouts the mutual understanding as the thinking of the others (*An-einander-denken*) of the thinkers.⁷⁵⁷ Heidegger's thinking prepares the originary poetry from Being that has been seen already in Hölderlin's hymns, where it 'originally presences'. Originary thinking must first from the grounding of the question of Being, as the question of the truth of Being, anticipatorily think the poetry of Hölderlin and open its historical place and time.⁷⁵⁸ As such, the poetic voice of Being can only be heard by means of the receptivity of originary thinking. Hence, poetry and thinking cannot exist isolated from each other, but appropriate each other in their confrontation (*Auseinandersetzung*) in the confrontation between the first and the other origin. As such, originary thinking must anticipate poetry, by means of which this poetry first poetizes in advance (*vor-dichten*) thinking.⁷⁵⁹ Originary thinking only arrives at this preparation, an interpretation of the poethood of Hölderlin and knowledge of his historical incipience (*Anfänglichkeit*), in and from the history of Being (*geschichte des Seyns*), as the history from out of concealment. Thinking that thinks the history of Being springs, in turn, from the experience of overcoming metaphysics as a historical moment in the history of being (*Seinsgeschichte*), which is the history of presence. The overcoming of metaphysics is itself the thoughtful preparation of the responsibility of the claim of Being, according to Heidegger⁷⁶⁰. In conclusion, the history of metaphysics can show itself as the history of being (*Sein*). Secondly, this history can be experienced as the oblivion of Being, the desertion of entities by Being in the planetary presence of technology as machination (*Machenschaft*), which must itself be a positive and revealing occurrence in the history of being.⁷⁶¹ Subsequently, the oblivion of Being can be experienced and thought as the

⁷⁵⁶ Idem p. 148.

⁷⁵⁷ Idem p. 151.

⁷⁵⁸ Idem p. 159.

⁷⁵⁹ Idem p. 162.

⁷⁶⁰ Idem p. 159.

⁷⁶¹ Idem p. 29, 46, 47, 63, 65, 156.

concealment of Being (*Seyn*).⁷⁶² The remembrance of the concealed origin means the overcoming of metaphysics and the transition of philosophy towards originary thinking, the transition from the first to the other origin, i.e. the concealed origin of the history of being which is as such the history of Being.⁷⁶³ In as far as the history of being yields from the other origin, the origin must have already spoken in advance to thinking, which has happened in the poetry of Hölderlin, according to Heidegger.⁷⁶⁴ As such, the history of Being is prepared by Hölderlin in as far as he is heard and therefore prepared, in turn, by originary thinking that has already overcome metaphysics in a thinking that seeks the poetics of Being, i.e. onto-poetology.⁷⁶⁵ In line with this, Heidegger writes in 1957 in *On the Way to Language* on the reciprocal appropriation and dependency of poetry and thinking:

The lofty poetry of all great poetic work always vibrates within a realm of thinking. (...) Because thinking in turn goes its way in the neighbourhood of poetry. It is well, therefore, to give thought to the neighbour, to him who dwells in the same neighbourhood. Poetry and thought, each needs the other in its neighbourhood, each in its fashion, when it comes to ultimate. In what region the neighbourhood itself has its domain, each of them, thought and poetry, will define differently, but always so that they will find themselves within the same domain.⁷⁶⁶

This same domain is Being as the concealed origin. Thinking must prepare the arrival of what the poetry of Hölderlin has already foreboded, namely the futural advent of the concealed origin, i.e. Being (*Seyn*). The nearness that draws poetry and thinking near is itself the occurrence of appropriation (*Ereignis*) by which they are directed into their proper nature, according to Heidegger⁷⁶⁷. Only when letting go the distance between the tops one brings them to stand and as such they remain different. Thinking must therefore let the poetic saying dwell in its own region as the 'acceptance' (*Zu-sage*) of poetry by thinking.⁷⁶⁸ Interpretation is, as such, a saying of originary thinking that accepts and receives the originary poetic saying. The 'zu' of '*Zusage*' names the direction of this saying that is towards the poetic saying of and by Being. Originary thinking is

⁷⁶² Idem p. 149.

⁷⁶³ Idem p. 149.

⁷⁶⁴ Idem p. 167.

⁷⁶⁵ Idem p. 167.

⁷⁶⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. 69,70.

⁷⁶⁷ Idem p. 90.

⁷⁶⁸ Idem p. 165.

therefore receptive thinking instead of productive thinking. Heidegger advises: “learn to thank and you learn to think”.⁷⁶⁹ In *Letter on humanism* Heidegger writes:

Presumably thanking and poetizing each in their own way spring from originary thinking, which they need, yet without themselves being able to be a thinking.⁷⁷⁰

In this passage Heidegger interprets thinking, the disclosing understanding of Being, as the thankful response to the gift or allusion (*Zuspiel*) of Being.⁷⁷¹ As such, thinking is a thanking and sprouts together with poetry from what Heidegger calls ‘the originary thinking’ (*das anfänglichen Denken*), which thinks the Being as the concealed origin.⁷⁷²

In *What is called Thinking* from 1952, Heidegger emphasize again the abyssal difference between poetry and thinking:

What is stated poetically and what is stated in thought, are never identical; but there are times when they are the same, those times when the gulf separating poesy and thinking is a clean and decisive cleft.⁷⁷³

Heidegger reserves the term ‘the same’ (*das Selbe*) for the ontological overlap between poetry and thinking and the ‘identical’ or ‘the equal’ (*das Gleiche*) to name any ontical similarities. Heidegger writes around the same time in 1951:

Poetizing and thinking only meet in the ‘same’ then and as long if they remain determined in the distinctiveness of their essence. The same never coincides with the equal, also not with something merely identical. The equal is always transferred to something indistinctive in which everything corresponds. The same, however, is that belonging together of what is different from a gathering by difference. The same can be said only when the difference is thought. In the releasement of that which is different, the collecting essence of the same comes to light. The same collects that which is different in an originary unity. The equal, however, scatters in the fading unity of the single uniform one.⁷⁷⁴

⁷⁶⁹ Idem p. 5.

⁷⁷⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 237.

⁷⁷¹ Compare the giving of un-concealment. HEIDEGGER, M. *Zur Sache des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007. GA 14 p. 9

⁷⁷² On originary thinking: HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 19, 79, 108, 126, 148, 150, 151, 159, 183.

⁷⁷³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Wass heisst denken?*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002. GA 8 p. 21

⁷⁷⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 7 p. 196, 97.

Two entities can be essentially the same, but do not have to be necessarily identical. Poetry and thinking are the same in as far as the essential naming of poetry is the pre-condition for thinking and questioning the Being and both are modes of saying. Poetry (poesy) and thinking merely equal each other in as far as they are forms of care for the word. However, they are unequal too and even essentially different. Poetry is elevated, thinking is deep, poetry names the holy and thinking says the Being, thinking is associated with grounding, poetry with founding, poetry speaks in images, essential thinking is imageless, poetry names, while thinking questions⁷⁷⁵. One would miss out on the sameness in their inequality if one would simply reduce one to the other effacing the differences. From Hölderlin's poem Remembrance (*Andenken*) Heidegger has learned that that which is truly proper – as the basis for a relation of sameness between unequal entities – can only be found in a confrontation with its proper other, i.e. in the figure of the stranger or the 'other'.⁷⁷⁶ Heidegger writes:

For first where the alien is known and acknowledged in its essential contrariness there exists the possibility of the first relation, i.e. the unification (*Einigung*) that is not a confused mixture but ordained difference (*fügende Unterscheidung*).⁷⁷⁷

The same holds true for the unity in the difference between poetry and thinking. Heidegger says at one point that the thinker is one who contemplatively says (*sinnende Sagenden*) and the poet one that sayingly contemplates (*sagend Sinnenden*).⁷⁷⁸ Thinking and poetizing are both saying and contemplating (*sinnen*) that conserve the word in language.⁷⁷⁹ Poetry and thinking are in their own way essential related to the advent of Being. Both are ways of remembrance (*andenken*) and anticipation of Being. Remembrance (*an-denken*) shows itself in

⁷⁷⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 162.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 160.

⁷⁷⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 286.

⁷⁷⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin's Hymne Der Ister*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1984. GA 53 p. 68.

⁷⁷⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsches Metaphysik, Einleitung in die philosophie: Denken und Dichten*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990. GA 50. p. 156.

⁷⁷⁹ Idem p. 94.

Hölderlin's poetry at the same time as anticipating thought (*vor-denken*).⁷⁸⁰ But this should not give the impression that poetry is in the end a kind of thinking. Poetry is 'founding ahead' (*vorausstiften*) of Being and originary thinking is anticipatorily thinking (*vor-denken*) of Being. Their intimate relation yields from the origin wherein this relation remains at the same time concealed. The somewhat puzzling relation between thinking and poetizing in Heidegger's writings must in the end be ascribed to the enigmatic character of the case itself and the lack of certainty and complete clarity on the path of thinking Being. Both need each other, reciprocally appropriate each other and originate from concealed Being. Their nature must therefore be entangled and their origins be concealed in the concealment of Being as origin. Thinking and poetry are ways of saying which is always a dialogue. Saying, to dictate in advance and poetizing, on the one hand and hearing, as a following, and thinking, on the other hand belong equi-primordial to language as a dialogue. Heidegger writes:

We cannot here decide flatly whether poetry is really a kind of thinking, or thinking really a kind of poetry. It remains dark to us what determines their real relation, and from what source what we so casually call the 'real' really comes.⁷⁸¹

It would therefore be presumptuous to settle the matter here in a final and conclusive way. A higher third top from where we can oversee the two peaks is not given to the human being since we cannot step outside language as a historical dialogue. Heidegger writes:

Who today would presume to claim that he is at home with the nature of poetry as well as with the nature of thinking and, in addition, strong enough to bring the nature of the two into the most extreme discord and so to establish their concord?⁷⁸²

The relation between thinking and poetizing must therefore emphatically be left open, just as much as Heidegger leaves the essence of language open. A thinking that wishes a decisive answer would be an example of a philosophy that thinks too much.

⁷⁸⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Zu Hölderlin - Griechenlandreisen*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 75 p. 19-20.

⁷⁸¹ Idem p. 83.

⁷⁸² HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 96

3.6. Founding and grounding

Heidegger often quotes from Hölderlin's poem *Remembrance*: "But what remains is founded by the poets."⁷⁸³ Poetry is the founding of that which remains as the founding of Being in the word. Concerning founding Heidegger writes:

Founding and foundation means here a twofold: On the hand, founding means to project ahead in its essence that which is not yet. In as far this founding as poetry is a saying, it means at the same time: to bring the projection to word, as saying and that which has been said, as to place the Saga (*die Sage*) in the existence of a people so that it first establishes and grounds (*gründen*) this existence.⁷⁸⁴

The poet is the founder (*Begründer*) of Being, Heidegger argues.⁷⁸⁵ Heidegger uses two words to indicate founding, viz. '*gründen*' and '*stiften*'. With some exceptions, like e.g. the above passage, -one should bear in mind that the poet thinks, like the thinker poetizes - Heidegger commonly associates '*gründen*' with thinking and '*stiften*' with poetizing. For example, Heidegger writes between 1938 and 1940:

Truth is in the founding (*Stiftung*) of being (*Sein*) (poetry) and is in the grounding (*Gründung*) of Being (*Seyn*) (thinking). For truth is the clearing of *Being* itself.⁷⁸⁶

The truth of poetry is the founding of being (*Sein*) spelled without 'y' meaning being in positive sense as the presence of entities. As such, the truth in the founding of poetry entertains a relation to metaphysics in as far as being in positive sense means 'determined' being. Truth in thinking, however, relates to Being, which is spelled with 'y', meaning Being as absence, a grounding that is grounded in the abyss. Heidegger comments in *The History of Being* that poetry knows nothing of Being (*Seyn*). However, poetry is, as we have seen, also the saying of Being as the saying of the mystery and often by Heidegger related to Being spelled as *Seyn*. Heidegger distinguishes, as such, poetic knowing from

⁷⁸³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 32.

⁷⁸⁴ Idem p. 214.

⁷⁸⁵ Idem p. 33.

⁷⁸⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 144.

thoughtful knowing.

Heidegger has never become explicit on the difference between grounding and founding with respect to thinking and poetizing. Both ways of the truth of Being are commonly translated to English as ‘founding’. Heidegger distinguishes the terms, however, already in his pre-poetic period, namely in *On the Essence of Ground*, which might provide an indication concerning the difference that both terms connote for Heidegger. Heidegger calls here the originary relation of freedom to the ground, which means cause, reason or motive, ‘grounding’ (*gründen*).⁷⁸⁷ In grounding, freedom gives and takes ground, which is strewn into manifold ways. Firstly, there is grounding as ‘founding’ or establishing (*stiften*), which Heidegger regards as the projection of the ‘for the sake of’, which is in the end *Dasein* itself. Secondly, there is grounding as taking up a basis (*bodennehmen*). This moment of grounding signifies *Dasein*’s way of being absorbed by entities that do not have the being of *Dasein*, but among it always already dwells. *Dasein* finds itself amidst these entities that attune him. As such, *Dasein* finds itself a place, a ground and becomes grounded. Heidegger emphasises that the first two ways of grounding do not take place after each other, but occur simultaneously, not necessarily at once present at hand, but co-constitutively. Thirdly, there is grounding as the grounding of something (*Begründen*), which is the ‘why’ of each entity in its relations that springs forth from *Dasein*’s transcendence as the understanding of being. Conclusively, grounding implies contextual self-understanding (*founding*) as the projection of the why of its own existence, which opens *Dasein* for the being of entities which are taken up in the why of their interpretation, by means of which *Dasein* is able to provide entities with a why as explanation. Founding concerns in terms of *Being and Time* an existential notion, while taking up a basis and the grounding of something have a categorical sense. From this the indication is won that ‘founding’ is related to self-anticipating and self-appropriating *Dasein*, while ‘grounding’ is related to entities and Being as their concealed condition. Founding revers to the opening of Being in its projection, grounding refers to the way Being makes itself manifest in the opening.

In *Contributions to Philosophy* Heidegger argues that the ‘ground grounds’

⁷⁸⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 127.

from the truth of Being.⁷⁸⁸ This means that the grounding ground occurs and must be taken up by *Dasein*, which is, as such, a grasping of the ground (*Er-gründung*). *Dasein* lets the ground ground from the abyss, which means that the known is always understood as yielding from the unknown. Secondly, *Dasein* takes up the ground by building on it and bringing phenomena back to their ground. As such, the human being builds his interpretations ultimately on metaphysical foundations and explains entities from the way they show themselves positively. The grasping of the ground remains however itself grounded in *Dasein*, which is, in turn, grounded in the truth of Being, i.e. the grounding abyss. Since concealment can be, on the one hand, ‘refusal’ as the absence of entities, the absence of their being or the absence of unconcealment as such, and on the other hand that of dissemblance, Heidegger states that the grounding of the ground has a twofold character. ‘Ground’, as the why and what of entities, ‘founding’ as the wherefore and whereto, ‘bearing’ as that which carries and ‘covering’ as the entity that is not disclosed in its presence or being, are based upon the ‘abyss’ (*Abgrund*) and the ‘distored ground’ (*Ungrund*).⁷⁸⁹ The abyss means concealment and nihilation as refusal. The distored ground means the concealment of entities as dissemblance (*verstellung*) and decomposition (*verwesung*).

Accordingly, founding must mean in the history of being *Dasein* as historical projection in its ‘for the sake of’-character, its own *telos* as its historical destiny. The being of a people, ‘our’ being, is the historical way of being-with-the-others (*Miteinandersein*) as being-in-the-world. From the perspective of the history of Being it is not our own death, but our historical being-with-each-other that no one can take away from us.⁷⁹⁰ As such, the poet ‘grounds’ being as the being of entities and ‘founds’ being as the historical essence of a people. In ‘presencing’ founding has an anticipatory role as the projecting ahead and grounding is the establishing of entities in their being out of the poetic projection, which is therefore a ‘rooting’ and a ‘preserving’.⁷⁹¹ Grounding is therefore

⁷⁸⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p. 307.

⁷⁸⁹ Idem p. 308.

⁷⁹⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 175.

⁷⁹¹ Idem p. 216.

associated with the ‘truth’ of Being as its presencing.⁷⁹² Founding means a bestowing (*schänken*), grounding and originating (*anfangen*), Heidegger argues in *The Origin of the Work of Art*.⁷⁹³ These modes of founding become only become actual in preserving as the way being becomes present in and as the entity.

Since thinking and poetizing are intimately related, founding and grounding must be entangled as well. In *Hölderlins Hymnen Germanien und der Rhein* Heidegger distinguishes four moments concerning founding (*stiften*) as poetic attunement, viz.

1. Ecstatic transporting (*entrückend*) into the entities as a whole.
2. Moving into (*einrücken*) the earth.
3. Opening of the entities.
4. Grounding of Being.⁷⁹⁴

Conclusively, grounding is associated with the way the present takes shape while founding projects futural being. Before *Dasein* or an entity receives its constancy (*Beständnis*) its place of arrival must already been opened up by a founding projection of Being through *Dasein* in figure of the poet.⁷⁹⁵

Poetry founds the being of a people as the time of a people. In chapter 3.11 we have discussed that language is always ‘our’ language and therefore language of a people, which is essentially poetic. Poetry is the primal language of a people.⁷⁹⁶ Likewise, time is always the time of a people. Time is always ‘time for’ or ‘time to’ and as such directed and meaningful according to the directions given by the poets. The time of the people is what Heidegger calls the ‘long time’. One can count the amount of years of the existence of the individual as the years between birth and death. However, the time of the years of the people is concealed to us, Heidegger argues.⁷⁹⁷ Heidegger states that we do not know our own historical time and therefore the world of our people is essentially concealed to us. We, the authentic finite ones, do not know who we are when we ask about our

⁷⁹² HEIDEGGER, M. *Zu Hölderlin - Griechenlandreisen*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 75 p. 8.

⁷⁹³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 47.

⁷⁹⁴ Idem p. 181.

⁷⁹⁵ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p. 188.

⁷⁹⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. p. 74.

⁷⁹⁷ Idem p. 49, 50.

own being.⁷⁹⁸ Clearly, Heidegger does not any longer regard exclusively the acceptance of one's own mortal nature as existential authenticity. Self-appropriation is now understood in terms of the poetic destiny of a people. The time of *Dasein* as the historical existence of a people transcends the finite authentic existence of the individual and is no longer like it had been in *Being and Time* considered by Heidegger as 'derived' and inauthentic time. Subsequently, Heidegger argues that if we do not know our historical time and world, we cannot claim that we have distanced ourselves from the old gods. Neither can we claim that we embrace humanism nowadays, nor even that we have already abandoned it.⁷⁹⁹ The past, especially the ancient Greeks, still holds power over us. Destiny has therefore an historical essentiality, Heidegger argues.⁸⁰⁰ Hölderlin's *Mnemosyne* says:

(...) Long is
The time, but
What is true happens.⁸⁰¹

The world time of the people is the originary time.⁸⁰² This history is founded by the poets. The time of the creative ones on the peaks, high in the ether, in the realm of the gods, is essentially long. The long time lets the true, i.e. the un-concealment of Being, once occur.⁸⁰³ The basic disposition wherein the opening of the entities as a whole happens is the origin and determination of the truth of a people. The truth of the people is that un-concealment of entities as a whole, according to which the structuring and leading powers receive their rang and unanimity. The truth of a people is the un-concealment of Being, whence a people knows what it historically wants when it wants itself and wants to be itself.⁸⁰⁴ The time of poetry is long and reaches beyond the present godless age. Heidegger writes:

⁷⁹⁸ Idem p. 50.

⁷⁹⁹ Idem p. 50.

⁸⁰⁰ Idem p. 186.

⁸⁰¹ Idem p. 55.

⁸⁰² Idem p. 51.

⁸⁰³ Idem p. 56.

⁸⁰⁴ Idem p. 144.

To correspond to this long time, the premature words of the poet—waiting in the distance—must also be long. His word must call ‘the great destiny.’ It must put into poetry the advent of the present gods.⁸⁰⁵

The summits of time rise up in the time of the gods as the time of the people. As such, Hölderlin’s founding poetry holds a remembrance of the old gods and an expecting of the new gods. The new gods are not a merely a return of the old gods, but rather the final arriving of the old gods in the experience of their absence. Heidegger’s thinking is never nostalgic or romantic. Romanticism is itself the nostalgia for the past that wishes to recreate the past in its presumed pure and unspoiled character. Romanticism and modern technology are therefore two sides of the same coin in as far as they forgo the destiny of the appropriating event. Romanticism is marked by technology by the way it responds to technology. Romanticism tries to bend the course of time into the direction of the past, which is at odds with Heidegger’s notion of resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) and the take-over of one’s destiny allotted in poetry. Resoluteness is an authentic comportment that faces and sustains Being in the way in which it hides and shows itself, even if that means one’s own death or the ‘extreme danger’ of Being’s technological course. Concerning the possibility of escaping the hegemony of technology Heidegger writes:

As though it were still possible for that essential relation to the whole of beings in which man is placed by the technological exercise of his will to find a separate abode in some side-structure which would offer more than a temporary escape into those self-deceptions among which we must count also the flight to the Greek gods!⁸⁰⁶

The founding ahead of the poetic saying projects the futural truth of Being. Since the essence of entities is unlike entities themselves not up for grabs, it must first be projected in advance.⁸⁰⁷ Heidegger writes:

But because being and the essence of things can never be calculated and derived from what is present at hand, they must be freely created, posited, and bestowed. Such free bestowal is a founding.⁸⁰⁸

⁸⁰⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 211

⁸⁰⁶ Idem p. 114.

⁸⁰⁷ Idem p. 164.

⁸⁰⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin’s Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 59.

Concerning Hölderlin's phrase 'What remains is founded by the poet' Heidegger comments that what remains is transient present. That which remains is therefore not constant present, but belongs essentially to the history of Being. But what endures is never drawn from the transient, the simple cannot be derived from the complex and we never find the ground in the abyss, Heidegger argues. The overcoming of metaphysics results therefore not in a mere nihilism as abandoning the question of Being in the experience of its bottomlessness. Like Nietzsche who argues that after we have come to understand that there exist no absolute values or truths, the human being must create these values himself, Heidegger argues that thinking must engage itself in a dialogue with poetry as the creative founding and grounding of Being, which takes place, however, not by means of the human subject, but by Being itself. The originary thinking and poetizing of Being escapes nihilism in as far as the poetic word is nothing but the saying of Being itself. Whereas metaphysics seeks to ground the being of entities in that which is present, poetry finds being anticipatorily in and from absence. The poetic projection is never a representation of the human subject, but a historical projection from Being itself that happens as its own appropriation. Truth as the clearing and concealing of entities occurs when it becomes poeticized, Heidegger argues.⁸⁰⁹

The poetic saying is a naming that nominates entities to their being. In this projection of the clearing, the announcement is made as what the entity will come into the open. This clearing projection unfolds the un-concealment.⁸¹⁰ As such poetry shows the openness of truth of Being. Moreover, it is itself the open that within the figure projects into the rift of Being, its difference as time broken open.⁸¹¹ Poetry allows the open to occur so that it brings in the midst of them entities for the first time to shine and sound.⁸¹² The essence of truth is itself poetizing, which throws open the open place of the clearing. Heidegger argues that everything in this place is other than it was. As such, the poetic founding forms the cradle of all becoming, shaping, forming and figuring. Since openness is the free release of that which is coming it is a futural notion. The openness of

⁸⁰⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Off the Beaten Track*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 44.

⁸¹⁰ Idem p. 45.

⁸¹¹ Idem p. 45.

⁸¹² Idem p. 45.

time-space is therefore iterative. It is ‘approaching’, but at the same time projected within the thrownness of the past.⁸¹³ This means that what yields from the open future is nevertheless bound by that which has been. *Dasein*, as the projector, oscillates between being thrown and projecting.⁸¹⁴ The projection is the way the openness is projected and opened up. Heidegger emphasizes that the open is only there in the opening up of projecting. He writes:

‘Entrance into the openness’ - that erroneously sounds as if the openness were already there, whereas it comes to be in the first place, and only, with the very dislodgment into it.⁸¹⁵

This means that there is no openness, no truth, without the opening of the poetic projection. Freedom must first be projected in poetry.

⁸¹³ Idem p. 44.

⁸¹⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p. 304.

⁸¹⁵ Idem p. 304.

3.7. Holy names

If it be your will that I speak no more and my voice be still as it was before. I will speak no more. I shall abide until I am spoken for. If it be your will. If it be your will that a voice be true. From this broken hill I will sing to you. From this broken hill all your praises they shall ring. If it be your will to let me sing.

Leonard Cohen, *If it be your will*

Heidegger's onto-poetology describes the open historical revealing/concealing structure of the truth of Being whence the word stems.⁸¹⁶ In far as poetry is related to the concealment of Being, poetry is related to the mystery. Heidegger argues that since the essence of truth has to be sought in the domain of the un-concealment of entities, the concealment must show itself as a proper way of un-concealment, in other words as truth as *aletheia*. In every form of un-concealment concealment takes place as well, because un-concealment yields from concealed Being, as we have seen in chapter 2.3. Heidegger calls the mystery therefore the 'highest shape (*Gestalt*) of truth' and argues that the human being must let the mystery be the concealing preserving of authentic Being.⁸¹⁷ The mystery must be known in its concealing power. The higher the knowing of the concealment, the more real its saying and the more its concealing power remains intact, Heidegger argues. Subsequently, Heidegger determines the poetic saying of concealment as the 'denial' (*Verleugnung*).⁸¹⁸ The denial makes the mystery a mystic notion in as far as Being is never this or that entity and never wholly present. Heidegger argues that it is Being itself that lets poetry originate so that it can find itself originally in it and open itself at once 'closed' as the mystery.⁸¹⁹ As such, the mystery of the saying of poetry consists in the way it denies Being as the way Being denies itself to itself. Hölderlin's poetry is therefore in contrast with the metaphysics of Hegel not the disclosure of the unconcealed, but the disclosure of the concealed as concealed. In contrast with Hegelian metaphysics, Hölderlin's

⁸¹⁶ Compare HEIDEGGER, M. *Grundbegriffe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981 GA 51. p. 77.

⁸¹⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 119.

⁸¹⁸ Idem p. 119.

⁸¹⁹ Idem p. 237.

poetry attests therefore finitude.

The mysterious language of Being hints at the futural origin. Heidegger borrows the concept of the figure of the poet from poetry as well. According to his interpretation of Hölderlin's poem *As on a Holiday*, the poets receive 'gestures' or 'hints' (*Winken*) from the gods and bring those gestures further to the people. Heidegger writes:

The intercepting of hints is a receiving, and yet at the same time, a new giving; for in the 'first signs' the poet catches sight of what has been completed, and boldly puts what he has seen into his word in order to foretell what is not yet fulfilled.⁸²⁰

Heidegger asserts that existence is nothing but the 'exposure' (*Ausgesetztheit*) to the superiority (*Übermacht*) of Being to which the poets in their creation are most immediately exposed.⁸²¹ The poet holds firm in the 'nothingness' of the night, the time of the default of the God, rearranged as the technological.⁸²² The term 'exposure' (*Ausgesetztheit*) points towards the abyss and the way the course of the human existence stands out in the nothingness of absent past and future. The term is also used in alpinism. Sections of a hiking path or climbing route are described as 'exposed' if there is a high risk of injury in the event of a fall because of the steepness of the terrain. The term refers in poetical sense, as vertical notion, to the ratio between the abyss and the height of the mountaintops where the gods dwell. The destination of the poet is, according to Heidegger, the 'throwness' into the existence of the artists that stand between gods and man.⁸²³ In *As on a Holiday* Hölderlin poetizes:

Yet us it behooves, you poets, to stand
Bare-headed beneath God's thunderstorms,
To grasp the father's ray, itself, with our own hands,
And to offer to the people
The heavenly gift wrapt in song.⁸²⁴

⁸²⁰ Heidegger, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. trans. Hoeller, K. New York: Humanity Books Prometheus Books, 2000. p. 63.

⁸²¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 32.

⁸²² Heidegger, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. trans. Hoeller, K. New York: Humanity Books Prometheus Books, 2000. p. 65.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 115.

⁸²³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 275.

⁸²⁴ Heidegger, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. trans. Hoeller, K. New York: Humanity Books Prometheus Books, 2000. p. 61.

Heidegger, subsequently, calls to mind Hölderlin's *Rousseau*: "(...) and gestures are from ancient times the language of the gods."⁸²⁵ The gods speak in gestures. Heraclites has said about Apollo: "The Lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but gives a sign".⁸²⁶ Ordinary saying consists, as such, of gestures that remain far from being clear and distinct, Descartes' rational criteria for truth. Heidegger argues that also in its everyday sense, a gesture is distinct from a sign.⁸²⁷ A gesture does not simply make itself noticeable like a sign, something in its place that can be reached. Gestures do not have fixed material vehicles. Presumably, with the gesture of salute and a goodbye in mind, Heidegger argues that making a gesture means, e.g. in a parting, the holding on to the near in the increasing distancing, and, conversely, at an arrival the revealing of the distancing that is still ruling in blissful nearness.⁸²⁸ Every arrival has come near, but remains at once determined by the distance that has been overcome. Every parting starts from being still near, although already determined by futural distancing. In the gestures of salute and goodbye nearness and farness have their say. If the dynamics of Being imply at once parting and arrival, it is obvious that the suggestions of goodbye and of farewell become archetypes of Being's way of 'saying'.

Heidegger understands language not as a system of signs and symbols, but language's saying is first rooted in gestures. The gesture and the understanding of being based upon it are always in movement, transition or 'swing' between nearing and distancing, in contrast with the sign that has a more fixed and ontical character and on which meaning we have already agreed by convention. The notion of gesture also explains how things, natural phenomena and situations can have a meaning without being sign objects, like words and symbols. Poetry remains therefore a 'suspecting' and open saying and never an exact or certain saying. Heidegger writes on the figure of the poet:

⁸²⁵ Idem p. 32.

⁸²⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 127.

⁸²⁷ Idem p. 32.

⁸²⁸ Idem p. 32.

The more poetic a poet is, the more free he is, i.e. more open and disposed to the unexpected in his saying, the more he exposes his saying to meddling hearing and the further his saying is from mere statement, which one respectively treats as correct or incorrect.⁸²⁹

Hölderlin poetizes in *Bread and Wine* about the destiny of the poet who beholds the open (*das Offene schauen*).

(...) So come! That we may behold the open,
So that we may seek what is our own, however far it may be.
(...) to each also is allotted his own,
Each one goes and comes to the place that he can.⁸³⁰

Heidegger states that the gods simply make gestures while they are.⁸³¹ As such, the basic elements of language are divine. Their gestures wrapped up in words as poetry form the language of the gods. The poet is compelled by the holy so that he may have his own and find what is properly allotted to him as his destiny.⁸³² A poetic attitude is therefore diametrically opposed to a technological attitude. The latter is never compelled at all, but produces and reproduces entities by imposing its own will upon them. Since technology forces its own ordered course upon entities it is ostensibly not an allotted destiny. Challenging is anything but a granting, Heidegger says. Nevertheless, the essence of technology remains in Heidegger's view a destiny sent from Being as its extreme concealment.

Heidegger often speaks in accord with Hölderlin of a 'suspecting' (*ahnen*) in relation to poetry, since the poet cannot provide a concept or comprehension (*begriff*) of destiny.⁸³³ Heidegger regards the destiny of the poet as the 'suspecting orientation' towards the gods and as being directed to the 'revolt' of the human being. Poetry is a creation that has not an object and does not sing about something present at hand, but is always a suspecting, a waiting or a seeing of something coming.⁸³⁴ 'Suspecting' is a 'thrillingly comporting disposition',

⁸²⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 7 p. 194.

⁸³⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 210.

⁸³¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 32.

⁸³² Idem p. 214.

⁸³³ Idem p. 180.

⁸³⁴ Idem p. 257.

wherein the mystery reveals itself as mystery, extends itself in all its width and unites itself where the unbound announces itself in its binding.⁸³⁵ As such, the knowing of a poet is always only a suspecting.⁸³⁶ The last stanza of Hölderlin's *Hyperion's song of Destiny* suggests how the destiny of the human being is concealed:

Holy spirits, you walk up there
in the light, on soft earth.
Shining god-like breezes
touch upon you gently,
as a woman fingers
play music on holy strings.

Like sleeping infants the gods
breathe without any plan;
the spirit flourishes continually
in them, chastely kept,
as in a small bud,
and their holy eyes
look out in still
eternal clearness.

A place to rest isn't given to us.
Suffering humans
decline and blindly fall
from one hour to the next,
like water thrown
from cliff to cliff,
year after year,
down into the Unknown.⁸³⁷

Heidegger quotes from a fragment from Hölderlin that poetizes from the suffering destiny of the poet as a suspecting:

For on earth walk
mighty powers
and it seizes their destiny
who suffer and observe it
and captures the heart of the peoples

For to grasp everything must
a demigod or
a human being, that sufferingly,
while he hears, alone, or
himself changes, from far suspecting the steeds of the lords.⁸³⁸

⁸³⁵ Idem p. 257.

⁸³⁶ Idem p. 258.

⁸³⁷ HÖLDERLIN, F *Hyperion*. Köln: Anaconda Verlag, 2005. p. 157-158.

Heidegger writes with regard to the poetic suspecting:

It remains undecided whether we still experience the holy as the track leading to the godhead of the divine, or whether we now encounter no more than a trace of the holy. It remains unclear what the track leading to the trace might be. It remains in question how such a track might show itself to us.⁸³⁹

Heidegger explains the ‘thrownness’ of the poet in the exposure of Being as a suffering way of relating to his own being, which is his own destiny and the openness to its own destiny. This suffering of his own being is ‘creative’, according to Heidegger.⁸⁴⁰ Suffering and suspecting are ways of knowing, albeit not certain. The poet wants his destiny from out of the mystery. This is not a blind destiny to which the poet is condemned, but a knowing and knowingly wanted destiny, Heidegger argues.⁸⁴¹ Hölderlin writes in a letter to his brother:

I will just see now if I still have something that I can bring to you of that which I recently wanted to say to you about poetry. Poetry unites the people, but not in the way of a game. I said that it unites them namely, when it is real and really works, with all the manifold misery, happiness, aspiring, hoping and with all its opinions and mistakes, all its virtues and ideas, with all the great and small that is among it, ever more, towards a lively thousandfold structured intimate (*innigen*) whole, for it is precisely this that must be poetry itself, and like the cause so the effect.⁸⁴²

The mysterious poetic language of Being speaks, in Heidegger’s view, not in an everyday manner but ‘prosodically’. Heidegger ascribes an essential role to the prosody, diction, rhythm or ‘swing’ (*Swing*) of poetry. He states at one point that language does not consist of sentences with fixed meanings, but its way of ordaining, its substrate is rhythm.⁸⁴³ Besides the choice, placement and order of words it is before anything else the complete structure of the prosody (*Schwingungsgefüge*) of a poem that says the so-called ‘meaning’ of a poem.⁸⁴⁴ That which prompts us to think is, in Heidegger’s view, not that which is explicitly said. What is at issue in poetic saying is, like in philosophical saying,

⁸³⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 180.

⁸³⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 59.

⁸⁴⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 176.

⁸⁴¹ Idem p. 176.

⁸⁴² Idem p. 178, 179.

⁸⁴³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Seminare*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1986 GA 15 p. 94.

⁸⁴⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 15.

never said immediately, but held back and denied. Poetry is an ‘indirect’ and ‘swerving’ way of saying because of which one can hear or rewrite a philosophical lecture, while essentially mishearing it, that is to say without noticing what is actually spoken.⁸⁴⁵ Heidegger asserts that the structure of prosody of ‘saying’ comes first. This means that the poetic way in which meaning futurally occurs from the origin, is the timing of time in wording as the prosody or ‘swing’ of poetry. This swing is the originary syn-taxis of Being (see chapter 2.2 on time and *taxis*). Language is first ‘foreseeing and creative swinging’ (*Schwingen*), Heidegger asserts.⁸⁴⁶ It is the ahead ‘swinging’ origin that always already precedes the wording, not only the distribution and position of words, but also the choice of words. In other words, meaning first sets up the structure of the poem and never results from a mere collection and placement of words. The structure of the prosody of saying is, in turn, determined by the basic disposition (*Grundstimmung*) that provides it its shape in the inner drawing of the whole, Heidegger argues.⁸⁴⁷ The basic disposition sprouts, in turn, from each metaphysical place of each way of poetizing. This means that poetry entertains a relation with the way in which being becomes positively expressed and posited and, as such, the language of metaphysics must also be grounded in poetry.

But how can prosody before anything else yield meaning in the poem?

Heidegger comments on the following passage from Hölderin’s *Germania*:

For shame is fitting for mortals,
And thus to speak most of the time,
Of gods is also wise.

But where abundant...⁸⁴⁸

In the English translation an ambiguity concerning this verse is lost, but in the original German text it is possible to read that it is also wise ‘for’ the gods to speak ashamed in order for them to be wise, interpreted as the wisdom of the gods. But Heidegger refutes this reading and argues that it is wise to speak thus ‘of’ gods. Heidegger justifies this reading by means of the actual disruption

⁸⁴⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. p. 41.

⁸⁴⁶ Idem p. 15.

⁸⁴⁷ Idem p. 15.

⁸⁴⁸ Idem p. 14. *Denn Sterblichen geziemet die Schaam/Und so zu reden die meiste Zeit/ Ist weise auch von Göttern.*

between the two stances of the poem and the way in which the second stance remains silent on the gods. As such, meaning or the direction of interpretation is derived from the prosody of the poem. The course of the prosody is characterized by a ‘hard’ disruption, Heidegger argues.⁸⁴⁹ Mortals and gods are not mentioned in the same breath, but appear two lines apart from each other. By means of a pulling apart of words that normally belong together, that is to say mortals and gods, the reference to the discourse of the gods gets an authentic and large span.⁸⁵⁰ Also the speaking from gods is suspended; sharply cut off at the end of the verse that is followed by nothing else, because afterwards begins a complete other: “But where abundant...” As such, Heidegger argues that Hölderlin’s prosody attests itself the finitude of the human being, for whom it is most of the time, as a mortal being, wisely to remain silent about the gods. Because of its abrupt ending, Hölderlin’s prosody is not a ‘swinging’ by the standard of traditional meter and rhyme and remains e.g. different from the jingling of rhymes (*Reimgeklingel*) of the songs Goethe, Heidegger argues.⁸⁵¹ Concerning the dynamics of poetic meaning, Heidegger writes in *On the Way to Language*:

From the place (*Ort*) of poetry there rises the wave that in each instance moves its Saying as poetic saying. But that wave, far from leaving the place behind, in its rise causes all the movement of Saying to flow back to its ever more hidden source. The place of poetic saying, source of the movement-giving wave, holds within the hidden nature of what, from a metaphysical-aesthetic point of view, may at first appear to be rhythm.⁸⁵²

Heidegger’s reading of poetry pays attention to the prosody, but does not seek traditional patterns to order, classify and compare poetry like aesthetic poetics. Prosody is not a form distinct from content as meaning, but constitutes from its basic attunement meaning before anything else.

Heidegger argues that it is not in the first place the poet who speaks in poetry as an individual, but the poem itself speaks by means of a whirl (*Wirbel*) of different positions like I, us, the city, the man, etc.⁸⁵³ Heidegger does not use the

⁸⁴⁹ Idem p. 14.

⁸⁵⁰ Idem p. 14.

⁸⁵¹ Idem p. 16.

⁸⁵² HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985. GA 12 p. 33, 34

⁸⁵³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 45, 47.

word, but a poem supposes and refers to context. The words of a poem have a meaning within language that is always already on its way. In other words, language is essentially historical, which essence is, in turn, poetic. Heidegger writes *In on the Way to Language*: “We must dare to move back and forth within the neighbourhood of the poem, and of its closing verse into which the poem gathers.”⁸⁵⁴

In accord with Plato’s *Cratylus*, Heidegger deems the poets to be the inventors, makers and original givers of names and asks like Plato about the unity of the name and the thing. Poetry as projective saying is, in Heidegger’s view, the essential ‘naming’ that founds the historical being of a people.⁸⁵⁵ Heidegger writes:

The poet names the gods and names all things with respect to what they are. This naming does not merely come about when something already previously known is furnished with a name; rather, by speaking the essential word, the poet’s naming first nominates entities as what they are.⁸⁵⁶

The name makes known as a saying, it is a showing that discloses what and how something is to be experienced and preserved in its presence. As such, naming reveals and is a showing that allows experience.⁸⁵⁷ Every occurrence always occurs as this or that occurrence. The appropriating event occurs as such never outside language. The poetic naming calls entities, or inner worldly things, into the word. This calling brings not the entity close, but it brings closer the being of what it calls, while letting the entity stay at its distance. The calling is ecstatic and calls therefore not merely entities that are already present but being, which is futural having-beenness. Heidegger argues that the calling of poetic naming brings the presence of what was previously uncalled into a nearness.⁸⁵⁸ Poetry brings entities close in as far as it by means of language first puts their essence to our attention. However, even in a new created saying or poem, words are not used once and for the first time. The calling of the poetic naming is therefore also a ‘recalling’ and in as far as the poetic naming recalls, it has already

⁸⁵⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. p. 85.

⁸⁵⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin’s Hymne Der Ister*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1984. GA 53 p. 24-25.

⁸⁵⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 59.

⁸⁵⁷ Idem p. 215.

⁸⁵⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 196.

called out to what it calls, Heidegger argues⁸⁵⁹. As such, its calling towards is a call back. Language is, as such, a call into the ‘distance’ in which what is called remains, nevertheless, still absent. The distance in which it calls is the openness of time-space. Since poetry founds futural being by projecting ahead, it presences that which is still absent. The essential naming signifies, as such, to project Being. Heidegger regards the calling of the poetic naming as a ‘bidding’, an invitation for arrival. The speaking of language is a calling that bids thing and world to come. Meaning emerges through poetry, although the meaning of everything remains, concealed. Heidegger cites from Stephan George: “Wherein you hang-you do not know”.⁸⁶⁰ The calling that names things calls ‘here’ and ‘there’, here into presence and there into absence, Heidegger asserts. But here and there are not objects, but prepositions of place belonging to the structure of nearing and distancing of ‘world’ as the play of time-space. But world is, in turn, nothing but language. Heidegger concludes therefore that the saying that names the world as a calling that calls here and there, calls into itself. ‘Language speaks’ as a calling into itself.⁸⁶¹ As such, language speaks from itself, about itself and to itself, which Heidegger makes clear by saying that language is ‘simply language’. As such, poetry as the essence of language signifies the self-appropriation of the word. Heidegger leaves language’s speaking therefore to language itself only, instead of grounding it in something else or explain other things by means of language.⁸⁶² Mysteriously, language speaks solely with itself alone, Heidegger states and cites from Novalis: “The peculiar property of language, namely that language is concerned exclusively with itself, precisely that it is known to no one.”⁸⁶³ The ‘poetic’ is therefore primarily a self-dialogue within poetry and its dialogue with thinking comes secondarily. Heidegger writes “Only a poetic dialogue with a poet’s poetry is a true dialogue, the poetic conversation between poets.”⁸⁶⁴

Although language is self-contained is must also entertain an open relation to things. But things do not exist outside or prior to language that consequently relate to language as if they were objects. Things are imbedded in language, but at

⁸⁵⁹ Idem p. 196.

⁸⁶⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. p. 79.

⁸⁶¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 196.

⁸⁶² Idem p. 189.

⁸⁶³ Idem p. 111.

⁸⁶⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1985. GA 12 p. 34.

the same time not language itself. Heidegger argues in this regard that language speaks in the sense that the calling of the poetic naming entrusts world to the things and simultaneously keeps the things in the splendour (*Glans*) of world.⁸⁶⁵ World and things belong together in the way that the world grants (*gönnt*) to things their presence, while things bear world. World and things do not subsist alongside to each other, Heidegger argues. We do not have language and meaning, on the one hand, and things separated from world, on the other hand. A thing appears always only in the structure of *logos*, it appears therefore always ‘as something’, things are always given in and from a world. Heidegger argues that world and things penetrate (*durchgehen*) each other and therefore traverse a middle in which they are one.⁸⁶⁶ At one, they are ‘intimate’. Their middle is ‘intimacy’, in Latin ‘*inter*’ and German ‘*unter*’ (under) as in ‘*Unter-Schied*’ (difference, distinction). Heidegger writes:

The intimacy of world and thing is not a fusion. Intimacy obtains only where the intimate, world and thing, divides itself cleanly and remains separated. In the midst of the two, in the between of world and thing, in their *inter*, division prevails: a *difference*.⁸⁶⁷

Heidegger interprets in the essay *On the nature of language* published in *On the Way to Language* a line of Stephan George’s poem *The Word*: “Where word breaks off no thing may be”.⁸⁶⁸ Only where the word for the thing has been found is the thing a thing and only thus it is. The word alone gives being to the thing.⁸⁶⁹ Something is only where the appropriate and therefore competed word names a thing as an entity, and so establish the given entity as entity. The being of anything that is resides in the word. Language is therefore the ‘house of Being’ Heidegger argues. The word is not something that ‘is’, like a thing or an entity. One should rather say that the word ‘gives’. The word itself is the giver.⁸⁷⁰ As such, the word, *logos* or world belong to ‘it is’ (*Es gibt*), i.e. to Being as the appropriating event. Language is in Heidegger’s view essentially an ontological notion and not an ontical structure. Heidegger writes: “The essence of language –

⁸⁶⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. 199.

⁸⁶⁶ Idem p. 199.

⁸⁶⁷ Idem p. 199.

⁸⁶⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. p. 60.

⁸⁶⁹ Idem p. 62.

⁸⁷⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. p. 88.

the language of essence”.⁸⁷¹ Notice that Heidegger uses not ‘is’ as copula here but the sign ‘-’, because the relation is implicit, omitted as Being itself. Moreover, ‘is’ as copula would not justify to say that the language of essence, i.e. the speaking of and from Being, is also the essence of language.⁸⁷²

Heidegger argues that the difference between world and thing disclosingly appropriates (*ereignet*) things into bearing a world, just as it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of things.⁸⁷³ The difference between world and things is neither distinction nor relation, according to Heidegger.⁸⁷⁴ The first would depend on a subject that makes distinctions abstracted from world and things after the prior fact. The latter presumes things and world, or entities and being, to exist independently, which are consequently able to relate to each other, while only entities can relate, in as far as a uniqueness is granted to them and that relating would already be ‘world’ determining their being. The difference is, according to Heidegger, at most, ‘dimension’ for world and thing. Dimension is a between that is measured out in man’s existence as a historical dwelling. The intimacy of the difference (*dis* ‘away from’, *ferre* ‘carry’) is the unifying element of the *diaphora*, the carrying out that carries through.⁸⁷⁵ As such, dimension is the way the earlier and the later are carried away in time creating history, difference, circumscription and meaning.

One can see here the difference with the concept of poetics of poetry as metaphorical language. Nietzsche stated that concepts are solidified metaphors of which we have forgotten their meaning. But Heidegger was in particular not fond of the term ‘metaphor’ that, in his view, belongs to metaphysics. The metaphor is like the symbol, the allegory and the parable, a ‘sensuous image’ (*Sinn-bild*), which is conceived as something that enables us to speak about that which is immaterial and beyond the senses, reflecting Platonic metaphysics that divides being in two separate realms of essence and appearance.⁸⁷⁶ But language, as difference, does not ‘carry over’ as a smooth passage to eternal static Being yielding its constant presence. Language rather means carrying away as parting

⁸⁷¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1985. GA 12 p. 166.

⁸⁷² $(A \Rightarrow B \neq A \Leftrightarrow B, B \Rightarrow A)$.

⁸⁷³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 200.

⁸⁷⁴ Idem p. 200.

⁸⁷⁵ Idem p. 200.

⁸⁷⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin’s Hymne Der Ister*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1984. GA 53 p. 17-18.

and differentiating. Language as ‘dif-ference’ is dynamic. The carrying away differentiates, between presence and absence, the entity and being. The difference is a middle. Heidegger writes:

Being the middle, it first determines world and things in their presence, i.e., in their being toward one another, whose unity it carries out.⁸⁷⁷

Like Heidegger had determined *Dasein* in *Being and Time* as the in-between of subject and objects that is able to distinguish or ‘understand’ entities in their being thanks to its temporality, Heidegger now proposes Being as the appropriating event that, as between, yields the break of time, the dif-ference between Being and entities, world and things. The difference is, according to Heidegger, ‘stillness’ as the origin of language and the difference between things and world. Stillness is the difference whence ‘world worlds’. Heidegger states that stillness ‘stills’ the things in ‘thinging’ and the world in ‘worlding’⁸⁷⁸. Notice that the German verb ‘*stillen*’ and the English verb ‘still’ are both derived from the PIE root ‘*stel*’, to ‘put’, to ‘stand’. It is related to the English verb to ‘stall’, the German ‘*Stall*’ meaning ‘stable’, and ‘*Stelle*’ meaning ‘place’ and brings, as such, the association to mind with Heidegger’s notion of *Gestell* and the placement of entities by Being.⁸⁷⁹ The German noun ‘*Stil*’ means ‘style’ as a way of putting and placing, which is, however, etymologically related to the Greek ‘*stylos*’.⁸⁸⁰ Stillness is not the same as soundlessness as the mere lack of movement, Heidegger argues. Motionless is always a resting, which is, in turn, and therefore more originally, a stilling. Heidegger writes: “As the stilling of stillness, rest, conceived strictly, is always more in motion than all motion and always more restlessly active than any agitation.”⁸⁸¹ Nothingness is, in Heidegger’s view, not nothing, not the mere privation of something, but rather the concealed origin that brings forth world, word, and entity. Heidegger argues that language speaks in a way that the commanding of the difference calls world and things into the simple onefold of their intimacy. Language speaks as the ‘peal’ (*Geläut*) of stillness.⁸⁸²

⁸⁷⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 200.

⁸⁷⁸ Idem p. 204.

⁸⁷⁹ http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=still, <http://www.dwds.de/?view=1&qu=Stillen>, consulted on 04/01/2016.

⁸⁸⁰ <http://www.dwds.de/?qu=Stil>, consulted on 04/01/2016.

⁸⁸¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 204.

⁸⁸² Idem p. 206.

The peal of stillness is the presence of absence in Being as presencing. Stillness stills by the carrying out, the bearing and enduring, of world and things in their presence, according to Heidegger. Human beings speak only in as far as they respond to the peal of silence. Mortals speak insofar as they listen. Language is therefore never the external expression of what originates in man as a subject, but man speaks in the way that he responds to language by receiving and replying, in hearing and saying. In order to respond, mortals must first of all have listened to the ‘command’, the way language speaks in the stillness of the difference that calls world and things into the ‘rift’ (*Riß*) of its onefold simplicity.⁸⁸³ Heidegger writes:

Every word of mortal speech speaks out of such a listening, and as such a listening.⁸⁸⁴

One can reenact this in the phenomenon of discourse. When listening to a conversation partner, one listens not to isolated elements, but the whole of that which is said. One listens to the meaning, the intention behind the single words. The meaning or the intention is the unconcealment of that which is revealed through that which is said. Listening to the latter is, in turn, listening to the ‘open’, which is nothing in particular, and itself unspoken, still, silent as concealed Being. Although every human being speaks since childhood, dwelling (*wohnen*) in the speaking of language, or the ‘house of Being’, has to be learned, according to Heidegger. Man must therefore first become home in its own poetic historical existence in order to respond to Being. This requires, according to Heidegger a constant examination whether and to what extent we are capable of what genuinely belongs to responding: anticipation (*Zuvorkommen*) in reserve (*Zurückhaltung*), which Heidegger in a footnote identifies with his wellknown methodological ‘step back’ (*Schritt zurück*).⁸⁸⁵ Poetry is an essential naming, however, Heidegger argues at one point that the essence of that essential naming itself cannot be named. In accordance with Hölderlin’s phrase ‘holy names are lacking’, Heidegger argues that poetic singing remains a song without word, since

⁸⁸³ Idem p. 204.

⁸⁸⁴ Idem p. 206.

⁸⁸⁵ Idem p. 207.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1985. GA 12 p. 30.

it lacks the genuine, naming word as in ‘lyre-music.’⁸⁸⁶ To be sure, the ‘song’ of the string-player follows the high one everywhere, Heidegger argues and quotes from Hölderlin:

But lyre-music lends to each hour its tones,
And perhaps gladdens the heavenly ones, who draw near.
This makes ready...⁸⁸⁷

Lyre-music is, according to Heidegger the most timid name for the hesitant singing of the singer who cares, who prepares himself for the messages of the gods. As such, music is mystical language and perhaps more appropriate than talking about the essence of language as silence, which remains merely a distuning snowfall on the bell. Rüdiger Safranski tells in his Heidegger biography the anecdote of the time when Heidegger visited the philosopher George Picht and his wife the pianist Edith Picht-Axenfeld who played Schubert’s posthumous Sonata in B-flat Major. The story goes that after she had finished Heidegger looked at Picht and said: “This we can’t do with philosophy.”⁸⁸⁸ At any rate, one can see again that Heidegger deems the prosody of language to be essential, since this belongs most intimately to the basic attuned disposition that opens the human being for being.

⁸⁸⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 45.

⁸⁸⁷ Idem p. 46.

⁸⁸⁸ SAFRANSKI, R. *Martin Heidegger, Between Good and Evil*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998. p. 330.

3.8. The fourfold – The four poles of the poetic projection.

The gods love the mysterious

Satapatha Brahmana, 6:7:1:23

The poetic projection differentiates not first in the categories of traditional logic, but in the ‘twofold’ of the ontological difference and secondly in the ontological basic structure of world, which Heidegger calls the ‘fourfold’ (*das Gevierte*).⁸⁸⁹ The fourfold consists of gods, mortals, heaven and earth. The four regions form the poetic semantic poles of world as world.⁸⁹⁰ The fourfold are four voices in which destiny (*das Geschick*), i.e. Being as the appropriating event, gathers the total infinite relatedness. None of the four voices exist in themselves. This means that man’s finitude is related to the in-finity (*un-endlichkeit*) of the gods. The voices are turned towards each other and as such nearing each other. Heidegger writes:

The essencing of nearness is not the distance, but the movement paving the way for the face-to-face of the regions of the world’s fourfold.⁸⁹¹

The fourfold is the way in which the time-space-play is timing and spacing as ‘world play’.⁸⁹² Heidegger writes:

Language is, as world-moving Saying, the relation of all relations. It relates, maintains, proffers, and enriches the face-to-face encounter of the world’s regions, holds and keeps them, in that it holds itself, Saying, in reserve.⁸⁹³

The thoroughgoing calculative conversion of modern technology of all connections among all things into the calculable absence of distance, deprives the world’s fourfold from its originary distance embedded in the nearing of the face-

⁸⁸⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. p. 26.

⁸⁹⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 199.

⁸⁹¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1985. GA 12 p. 200.

⁸⁹² HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. Idem p. 106.

⁸⁹³ Idem p. 107.

to-face character of the regions of the fourfold.⁸⁹⁴ Heidegger calls this the ‘refusal’ of nearness. When nothing is nearing, nothing is on its way and nothing is facing or faced, which renders language as the relation of all relations meaningless, which means the implosion of all meaning. The fourfold names, in Heidegger’s view, the oneness of the four elements of the poetic projection wherein mortals dwell.⁸⁹⁵ Heidegger argues that the human dwelling is basically a saving, a sparing or preserving as the ‘presencing’ of the fourfold. In contrast with the infinite challenging of man as the techno animal, man sets, as a dwelling mortal, something free into its own presencing.⁸⁹⁶ As such, the poetic understanding of one’s mortal being, that is always in relation to the gods, sky and earth, means a dwelling on the earth as ‘letting be’, i.e. serenity (*Gelassenheit*). Heidegger writes with respect to the dwelling mortals:

They receive the sky as sky, and leave to the sun and the moon their journey, to the stars their courses, to the seasons their blessing and their inclemency; they do not turn night into day nor day into a harassed unrest.⁸⁹⁷

In serenity the dwelling mortals also save the being of the gods. Heidegger writes:

Mortals dwell in that they await the gods as divinities. In hope they hold up to the divinities what is unhoped for. They wait for intimations of their coming and do not mistake the signs of their absence. They do not make their gods for themselves and do not worship idols. In the very depth of misfortune they wait for the weal that has been withdrawn.⁸⁹⁸

Mortals initiate their own nature. They are capable of their death as death. Only the human being dies and dies constantly as long as he stays on earth, under the heavens before the gods.⁸⁹⁹ Mortals know how to live as mortals by knowing their death as death and by existing in accordance with that knowledge, Heidegger argues.⁹⁰⁰ Whereas in *Being and Time* the call of consciousness leads *Dasein* to a confrontation with his mortal nature, Heidegger now determines the essential

⁸⁹⁴ Idem p. 105.

⁸⁹⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 148.

⁸⁹⁶ Idem p. 148.

⁸⁹⁷ Idem p. 148.

⁸⁹⁸ Idem p. 148.

⁸⁹⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 7 p. 152.

⁹⁰⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001 p. 148.

knowledge of a people as poetic and in dialogue with the gods. It is in the presence of the gods that man knows himself to be a mortal being and not because he is first called by its own mortality. As such, the meaning of one's death yields from world as poetic projection instead of one's consciousness.

Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal.⁹⁰¹ Earth, self-dependent, is effortless and untiring.⁹⁰² Upon the earth and in it, historical man grounds his dwelling in the world. Earth attains to the unconcealed and is self-secluding. In each of the self-secluding things there is the same not-knowing-of-one-another. Earth is part of our world as self-secluding, as such, it is in conflict with world, which is the totality of intelligible references as the condition for essential understanding. Earth is what nourishes our existence without us being able to understand its deeper meaning or relatedness. As such, world, as articulated language is always in conflict with the unspeakable of the earth. Earth refers to the aspect of the Being that gives without giving itself. To dwell on earth always means to remain before the divinities, as such, earth is directed towards the sky.

The sky is the region of the gods. Heidegger writes:

The sky is the vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering glitter of the stars, the year's seasons and their changes, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow of night, the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and blue depth of the ether.⁹⁰³

The sky poetically signifies the openness through which the in-finite makes itself present to the mortals. Formally spoken, the human being has to stand open towards Being and Being has to be open towards the human being in order for him to be exposed to it at all. The sky is, as such, the poetic saying of the open clearing.

Heidegger mentions the fourfold for the first time in the text *Language* (1950) published in *On the way to Language*.⁹⁰⁴ However, we can already find the structure implicitly in *Hölderlins Hymnen Germanien und der Rhein* and even in the *cura* fable from *Being and Time*. This fable runs as follows:

⁹⁰¹ Idem p. 147.

⁹⁰² Idem p. 45.

⁹⁰³ HEIDEGGER, M. *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982. p. 147.

⁹⁰⁴ *Die Sprache* (1950) in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (1950-1959) GA 12.

Once when Care was crossing a river, she saw some clay; she thoughtfully took up a piece and began to shape it. While she was meditating on what she had made, Jupiter came by. Care asked him to give it spirit, and this he gladly granted. But when she wanted her name to be bestowed upon it, he forbade this, and demanded that it be given his name instead. While Care and Jupiter were disputing, Earth arose and desired that her own name be conferred on the creature, since she had furnished it with part of her body. They asked Saturn to be their arbiter, and he made the following decision, which seemed a just one: "Since you, Jupiter, have given its spirit, you shall receive that spirit at its death; and since you, Earth, have given its body, you shall receive its body. But since Care first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as long as it lives. And because there is now a dispute among you as to its name, let it be called homo, for it is made out of humus (earth)."⁹⁰⁵

Heidegger introduces the cura-fable to show that *Dasein* always already understands itself pre-ontologically as care and, therefore, temporal. We can read in the fable already the structure of Heidegger's later fourfold, the gathering of the mortals, divinities, earth and sky. In the cura-fable the beyond of *Dasein*'s finitude gets poetically its say as the judging god Saturn and the sky god Jupiter in opposition to the mortal being *Dasein* that dwells on the earth and is made of earth. Man's origin is care, which in accordance with the judgement of Saturn, the god of time is its essential determination. The fable poetically names the essence of the human being from the mode of being which rules its temporal sojourn in the world. Poetically speaking, *Dasein* is exposedness to the supremacy of Being. Care is *Dasein*'s finite time pledged by the god of time that is Being, which transcends *Dasein*'s finitude.

In *Hölderlins Hymnen Germanien und der Rhein* Heidegger introduces initially another fourfold, albeit not named as such, of 'birth', 'light beam', 'need' and 'breeding', based on the passage from the *Rhine*:

Although as much need
And breeding work, most capable namely
Is birth, and the light beam, that
Meets the newborn.⁹⁰⁶

Heidegger calls the four the 'four powers of the origin' that can be regarded as the precursor of what Heidegger in his later interpretations calls the strife

⁹⁰⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 184.

⁹⁰⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 242.

between earth and world. ‘Birth’ belongs to the origin as the ancestry (*Herkunft*) out from the closed darkness of mother earth, which had been called by Hölderlin the ‘mother of all’ carrying the abyss.⁹⁰⁷ It is therefore the origin as the grounding abyss, which can be associated with the region of earth from the aforementioned by Heidegger later formulated fourfold. In opposing direction to birth reigns the light beam that is coming towards the newborn. It is the lightning wherein the essence of the gods makes itself manifest. In the light beam, a light vision, the essential gaze becomes possible. ‘Birth’ versus ‘light beam’ counts for what metaphysics regards respectively as causality versus intelligibility. Heidegger mentions at his point the distinction between causal explanation (*erklären*) and interpretive understanding (*verstehen*), the first is assigned to the natural sciences that explain nature in terms of causal relations. The latter is associated with the social sciences that make an interpretation of meaningful relations. However, Heidegger regards interpretation as the counter essence of explaining.⁹⁰⁸ To explain means to reduce something to that which is clear, graspable and present at hand. As such, explaining always makes an appeal to the common and familiar. To understand means, however, knowing the inexplicable. This means not to explain it, but to leave it inexplicable. To understand a riddle means not to decipher a riddle, but to let go the riddle by letting it be a riddle.⁹⁰⁹ Heidegger writes: “Yet we never know a mystery by unveiling or analysing it to death, but only in such a way that we preserve the mystery *as* mystery.”⁹¹⁰ The more originally we understand, the more the unexplained and the inexplicable become wide and unconcealed as such.⁹¹¹ The former can be experienced in any scientific practice. The more one knows, the more one experiences still not to know. One might even hear an echo here of the Socratic paradox: “I know one thing: that I know nothing”. Poetry says that the essence, as the core of knowledge, is a riddle. As earth and thunder, birth and light beam belong to the powers of the earth that are in conflict with what Heidegger later calls ‘world’ but initially ‘need’ (*Not*) and ‘breeding or cultivating’ (*Zucht*).⁹¹² ‘Need’ implies afflux and inevitability. It

⁹⁰⁷ Idem p. 242.

⁹⁰⁸ Idem p. 248.

⁹⁰⁹ Idem p. 248

⁹¹⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 43.

⁹¹¹ Idem p. 247.

⁹¹² Idem p. 244.

implies limit that calls for decision. The limit forces an omission or avoiding of the decision on new ‘pushing’ ways.⁹¹³ It is something devolved upon, but never accidental, since it always creates a turn for that which originates from need and determines it as such. Need is the ground of necessity. Need is turned against the origin and also in a harmonizing conflict with the other powers of the origin.⁹¹⁴ ‘Breeding’ brings an inner taming and binding. Cultivation inserts the origin into rules thereby changing it into its very own essence. As such, breeding or cultivation belongs to *poiesis* instead of technology. Heidegger argues that there is a unifying antagonism between need and breeding. In relation to the origin, both are turned around, but also turned towards each other. Heidegger plays with the words that compose ‘*Feind-seligkeit*’ meaning animosity. The animosity of the powers of the origin is an animosity in bliss (*seligkeit*), which Heidegger regards as intimacy. This intimacy is itself a mystery. The task of poetry is not to decipher the mystery, but to un-conceal the concealment as concealed. The poet must un-conceal the mystery of the pure origin, intimacy, Being itself, the animosity of conflicting powers wherein the enmity comes to decision concerning the gods, the earth, the people and all powers.⁹¹⁵ Poetry is a way of speaking of the mystery, which Heidegger regards as the ‘grounding opening’ of intimacy. The latter means, according to Heidegger, nothing less than being hardly permitted to un-conceal (*Kaum-enthüllen-dürfen*) the mystery, which is the only task of poetry as a constantly increasing ‘having to’ un-conceal the pure origin. Poetry as the founding of Being has the same origin as that which it founds.⁹¹⁶ Therefore, poetry can and must say Being.⁹¹⁷ Poetry is as such itself the reign (*walten*) of Being.⁹¹⁸ The saying of poetry is the happening that liberates gods and humans to their determination. Poetry is therefore the basic occurrence of Being as such.⁹¹⁹ As the conflict it is the ‘armoury sound’ (*Waffenklang*) of Being that brings itself to itself in the word, Heidegger states.

Poetry as projective saying is the saying of the un-concealment of that which is. But to un-concealment belongs foremostly concealment. It is the saying

⁹¹³ Idem p. 244

⁹¹⁴ Idem p. 245.

⁹¹⁵ Idem p. 251.

⁹¹⁶ Idem p. 251.

⁹¹⁷ Idem p. 252.

⁹¹⁸ Idem p. 256.

⁹¹⁹ Idem p. 257.

of world and earth, the saying of the arena of their conflict and thus of the place of all nearness and remoteness of the gods.⁹²⁰ That which transits from earth to world becomes intelligible. It is as such mediated by the poets in the nearness of the gods as the poetic condition for hermeneutics. That which remains closed off remains concealed in the remoteness of the gods. In the poetic saying the world of a people historically arises while at the same time the earth is preserved in it as that which remains closed. World is always the sayable, but in the projective saying the unspeakable is simultaneously brought into a world. As such, earth belongs to the poetic fourfold of the world. The paradox that world contains earth without opening up earth as world, the paradox that earth is part of the structure of world as fourfold, the paradox that the unspeakable can be said without being transformed into the sayable, the paradox that things and earth bare world, the paradox that the concealed can be unconcealed as such, the paradox that the clearing is carried by the abyss, is what Heidegger calls the ‘strife’ between world and earth.

Heidegger argues that ‘intimacy’ (*Innigkeit*) is a metaphysical basic word for Hölderlin. The word indicates the highest power of existence⁹²¹. Intimacy is not a romantic concept, but a force that preserves itself by the existence of fundamental extreme conflicts of Being. Intimacy is the attuned knowingly sustaining and delivering of the essential conflict of that which has an originary unity through opposition as ‘harmonic’ opposition.⁹²² It is the originary unity of the ‘animosities’ of the powers of the pure origin.⁹²³ Man belongs to the earth, which consists in the fact that he is the ‘inheritor’, and the learner of all things. The things are kept apart in opposition and are at the same time joined together in intimacy.⁹²⁴ Heidegger seems to suggest a ‘dialectical’ movement in history, however, not by means of a logical or subjective account of the unity of opposites, but rather in a Heraclitian and pre-metaphysical way. Instead of a constant presence, Being is itself internally conflicting and torn apart by difference as the

⁹²⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 71.

⁹²¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 117, 249.

⁹²² Idem p. 117.

⁹²³ Idem p. 250.

⁹²⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 54.

rift of time. Hölderlin called the Greeks the ‘intimate’ (*innige*) people.⁹²⁵ Heidegger’s explains this by stating that the Greeks stood in the open clearing of entities as a whole. Intimacy belongs to the mystery of Being. The pure origin is not just inexplicable in certain regard, but remains a riddle through and through, Heidegger asserts.⁹²⁶ As such the intimacy of strife is never predictable dialectics.

The poets found the historical being of a people by projecting the course of its discourse. The essence of the human being is lingual and, as such, essentially poetic. At one point Heidegger calls the human being himself a poem as the poem of Being:

The world’s darkening never reaches to the light of Being. We are too late for the gods and too early for Being. Being’s poem, just begun, is man.

Being a poem, the human being is not like metaphysics determines him a *zoion logon echon*, an *animal rationale*, a being that among other capacities is endowed with the ability of language, but the human being is essentially lingual.⁹²⁷ In the time of the ‘*par-ousia*’, the time between the flight of the old gods and the advent of the Godhead as the coming of Being, the nature of the human existence is hardly known and has, as such, ‘just begun’. Heidegger borrows also the determination of the being of man as language from Hölderlin who poetizes:

Much has man experienced
Named many of the heavenly ones
Since we have been a conversation
And able to hear from one another.⁹²⁸

Being a conversation is the precondition for experience, which means that man’s experience, the way he stands open to the world, is essentially poetic. Heidegger explains the ‘since’ (*seit*) as a time indexical that belongs to the time of the people. This time is not commonly known and only disclosed when taking part

⁹²⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 118.

⁹²⁶ Idem p. 250.

⁹²⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 393.

⁹²⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 68.

in poetry, i.e. the poetic. As such, the determination is not a general definition of the human being, but points back towards the human being and its possible engagement with poetry as the condition for the authenticity of a people.⁹²⁹ The determination is therefore not an objective statement about the human being. Its meaning can only be disclosed in and by the poetic. As such, one might experience oneself as a ‘finitely determined historically raising (*anhebende*) conversation’.⁹³⁰ Language occurs in this conversation and this occurrence is language’s own essence. Heidegger writes: “Since language has authentically come to pass as conversation, the gods have their say and a world has appeared.”⁹³¹ Because language occurs as conversation, there can first of all be history and time, Heidegger argues.⁹³² Without language time would be undeterminable and undatable. Time is not an object but differentiated and projected in language. In as far as time reveals, time ‘speaks’ and is meaningful. But to saying belongs, in turn, equi-primordial hearing. The history of the human existence is firmly rooted in the conversation of poetry, Heidegger argues⁹³³ The poet’s saying is not only foundation in the sense of a free bestowal, but also in the sense of the firm grounding of human existence on its ground.⁹³⁴ Man’s being is grounded in language; but occurs only in conversation.⁹³⁵ Hearing and speaking, whether in a dialogue or quarrel, is only possible because of their unity as conversation. A conversation supposes always meaning on which we already have agreed. In Heidegger’s words this means that that ‘one and the same’ on which we agree, on the basis of which we are united and, as such, are authentically ourselves is always manifest in the essential word⁹³⁶ Language has a common character, which means that we already must have agreed on meaning by sharing that meaning. That ‘one and the same’ on which we agree must be something that remains. What remains is founded by the poets. To remain implies, in turn, not necessarily eternity, but refers, nevertheless, to time. ‘Since’ in the

⁹²⁹ Idem p. 69.

⁹³⁰ Idem p. 69.

⁹³¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 57.

⁹³² HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 69.

⁹³³ Idem p. 70.

⁹³⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 59

⁹³⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 56.

⁹³⁶ Idem p. 57.

aforementioned phrase of Hölderlin means ‘since the time that there is time’, ‘ever since time arose and was brought to stand’, according to Heidegger. Because torrential time is opened up and broken up in its dimensions of past, present and future, it is possible to agree upon something that ‘remains’ over time and comes to stand in the word.⁹³⁷ This remaining is founded by the poets’ mediation of the gestures of the gods. Our existence occurs as conversation, occurs as the gods that are addressing us, make a claim on us, bring us up in language, determining whether and how we are, how we respond, and whether we appeal or refuse them our being.⁹³⁸ Our being occurs as a conversation is as far as we, the addressed ones, speak and bring up in language entities as what they are and how they are, opening them up and at the same time adjusting and covering them. As such, we are the poem of Being. The gods come have their say only if they themselves address us first and place us under their claim. The human word, the poetic firstly, is always a response to being already addressed. Words that name the gods are always an answer to their prior claim, springing from the responsibility to a destiny.⁹³⁹ In language, the entity is given within the structure of ‘something as something’ wherein its being comes to light or is concealed. By speaking the essential word, the poet’s naming first nominates entities as what they are by means of which they become known as entities.⁹⁴⁰ Heidegger writes: “Only where language happens opens up being and not-being. We are ourselves this opening up (*Eröffnung*) and concealing (*Verhüllung*).”⁹⁴¹ Conversation and its unity based on our being-in-the-world support the human existence.⁹⁴² This means that language partakes in the clearing. Moreover, the clearing is itself lingual. Being a conversation means equi-primordially to remain silent (*schweigen*), according to Heidegger.⁹⁴³ A conversation implies also a saying of that which is not or not essential. We are servants of the mouthing (*Daherredens*), Heidegger states.⁹⁴⁴ We are as well the chatter (*Gerede*), the necessary non-essence of conversation.

⁹³⁷ Idem p. 57.

⁹³⁸ Idem p. 70.

⁹³⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 58.

⁹⁴⁰ Idem p. 59

⁹⁴¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 70.

⁹⁴² HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 57

⁹⁴³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 70

⁹⁴⁴ Idem p. 71.

As the poetic, the most violent word, silence and chatter, we are history making, but history ending as well. Heidegger argues that in a conversation, hearing and saying are equi-primordial, like the ability to speak and to remain silent. Hearing is the presupposition of speaking and therefore never merely a consequence. Likewise, being able to hear requires and is based upon the possibility of the word.⁹⁴⁵ The revealing-concealing clearing occurs therefore in hearing and saying of the conversation. The conversation is always attuned. The conversation of Being in a poetic saying is initiated by the basic disposition (*Grundstimmung*) that opens up the world. In as far the gods prevail over historical *Dasein* and the entities as a whole, the poetic disposition transports us at once from the ecstatic transportation (*Entrückung*) into the involved relation to earth, landscape and homeland.⁹⁴⁶ The basic disposition of poetry is ecstatically transporting (*entrückend*) towards the Gods and at once moving into (*einrücken*) into the earth. Poetry says the relating of the human existence both as transcendence and immanence. Again, Heidegger argues against a subject-object distinction that ascribes moods and feelings to the domain of subjectivity. The poetic disposition is, according to Heidegger, not a representation of an object by a subject to which feelings and affections are added afterwards, but instead the disposition is the ‘ecstatic moving in’, which opens the realm wherein something first can be represented.⁹⁴⁷

In *Nietzsche I* Heidegger explains the categorical intuition of essences (*Wesenschau*) of reason in terms of poetry too, literally as a ‘closing’ (*dichten/ausdichten*).⁹⁴⁸ This closing can be regarded as grounding. Categorical intuition as categorical representation is traditionally thought to find its origin in the faculty of imagination, which Kant regards as ‘freedom’. But this way of projecting originates, in Heidegger’s view, not in a faculty of the subject, but in poetry as the appropriation of the truth of Being.⁹⁴⁹ Heidegger states that freedom in a simple and deep sense is in itself poetry (*Dichten*) as the groundless

⁹⁴⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 57.

⁹⁴⁶ Idem p. 140.

⁹⁴⁷ Idem p. 140.

⁹⁴⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsche I*. Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1961. GA 6.1 p. 585.

⁹⁴⁹ Compare Heidegger on the intuition of essences in *Being and Time*: HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J New York: State University of New York Press, 1996, p. 138.

grounding of a ground in a way that gives by itself the rule of its essence.⁹⁵⁰ In a closing the free and open becomes differentiated from the open, determined, founded and grounded. Nevertheless, the closing essence of reason is not ‘poetic like’ (*dichterisch*), Heidegger argues. Just as less thinking is ‘thinking like’ (*denkerisch*), closing (*dichten/ausdichten*) is poetic like.⁹⁵¹ Heidegger goes not into details here, but suggests that ‘closing’, as the experience of the entity as entity, has an ontological meaning and nothing to do with poetry in the sense of a genre of literature and is therefore solely poetic in the ontological sense as we have discussed before in this chapter.

The poetic conversation of the poet says Being as the god and hears the gestures of the gods. This prompts the question to whom or what Heidegger is referring when speaking about God and gods, if neither in theological nor onto-theological sense? We have discussed the mortals, heaven and earth, but not in detail the nature of the gods, the essence of Heidegger’s God. Could God simply be Being or Being be God? Heidegger writes negatively: “Being (*Seyn*) is not itself ‘the highest’, not itself God.”⁹⁵² And in *On the Origin*: “Being is more originary than any god.”⁹⁵³

Heidegger’s God is an onto-poetological notion. Heidegger has never become explicit on the matter, but we will dare an interpretation. For the Greeks the gods named the way things were essentially related. They had gods for every aspect of existence and what contemporary psychology would call state of mind. As such, in the gods the essential has its say. Plato’s inquiry in the essence of love poses its question indirectly as a question concerning the god Eros. Plato calls already in the *Ion* the poets the messengers of the Gods.⁹⁵⁴ Notice that the term ‘hermeneutics’ is derived from the name of the god *Hermes*, the messenger of the Gods. Hermeneutically, the gods are a more originary principle of intelligibility than the metaphysical notion of *idea* or concept. The meaning and contexts of the pre-modern world had been the world and the time of the gods. The meaning of meaning is historically determined and occurs within language as a self-saying.

⁹⁵⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsche I*. Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1961. GA 6.1 p. 611.

⁹⁵¹ Idem p. 585.

⁹⁵² HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 61

⁹⁵³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 64.

⁹⁵⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1985. GA 12 p. 115.

The myth is an earlier determination of meaning that idea or concept that has emerged in language. The interpretation of poetry, the essence of language, that contains messages from the gods, the myth as such, is therefore a more original form of hermeneutics nearing the first and other origin. Hölderlin writes:

(...) but when
a god appears in heaven on earth and sea
comes all renewing clarity.⁹⁵⁵

Eugen Fink says to Heidegger in a seminar on Heraclitus:

Gods and humans exist as the understanding of being. The holy and the human understanding of being are ways of the self-clearing of being.⁹⁵⁶

Both the German word '*das Heilige*' and the English word the 'holy' are derived from the Greek '*holos*', which means 'totality' or 'whole'. The holy is therefore associated with 'hale', 'whole' and 'healing'.⁹⁵⁷ The home turning towards Being as a whole implies therefore a returning to the holy as a 'healing' and a 'saving', as the way Being in the extreme danger of technology escapes its total oblivion by a self-remembrance of its origin. The holy as the alien and the concealed sacred makes itself known in the nearing and distancing of the whole, which Heidegger in ontological terms approaches consequently as 'Being'. The gods are always gods of a people.⁹⁵⁸ They belong to a language and a time of a people. To relate to gods is the primordial way by means of which peoples relate to the whole, which Heidegger understands not first in terms of mythology, but primarily in terms of the poetic. Mythology is, according to Heidegger, the historical process wherein being itself poetically comes to appearance.⁹⁵⁹ Mythology, as the theory of myths that is extracted through comparison enabled by universal reasoning, attests already the demythologizing of the myth denying,

⁹⁵⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 147.

⁹⁵⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. & FINK, E. *Heraclitus Seminar 1966/1967*. Alabama: The university of Alabama Press, 1979. p. 117.

⁹⁵⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 150.

⁹⁵⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 Idem p. 170.

⁹⁵⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin's Hymne Der Ister*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1984. GA 53 p.139.

neutralizing or rationalizing its originary truth manifestation.⁹⁶⁰ But for whomever a myth had been true, the myth was never present as a mere myth. Hence, the myth as object of comparing mythology is never the same as the myth in the sense of an original cultural expression of experienced truth, which Heidegger first regards as poetic truth. *Mythos* and *logos* are in Heidegger's view neither contradictory concepts, nor different historical compartments. *Mythos* means the saying word, according to Heidegger. To 'say' in the sense of the ancient Greeks means to 'show', to 'make public' (*offenbarmachen*), to 'let appear', to 'let shine in its epiphany'. '*Logos*' says, essentially the same, according to Heidegger. Heidegger writes in this regard: "The religious is never destroyed because of logic, but always only because the god withdraws himself."⁹⁶¹ Hence, nihilism yields not from an increasing rational worldview, but the becoming meaningless of holy names, as a concealing occurrence from out of language itself.

The gods are present as absent. Heidegger writes: "You can cross out all entities; nowhere a trace of the Gods is shown."⁹⁶² The gods are not present in categorical sense, nor have they ever been, rather are they present as existentials.⁹⁶³ The gods represent a way of being in contrast to the human way of being. But their existential way of being can become absent, and even this notion of their absence can become absent. However, Heidegger argues that in the stillness of the origin of the word the god answers. The origin of the word is the poetic as the occurrence of poetry. Poetic thinking poetizes from the origin as the mystery. Who is answering concerning the origin is the 'last god', Heidegger states. But more originary than any god is Being.⁹⁶⁴ The last god is not concerned with the human being and is not doling out comfort.⁹⁶⁵ The last god is the godhead or the holy as the 'nearing' of Being. God is the infinite perspective in contrast with man's finite perspective. The more one nears the gods, the more one nears the perspective of the whole, i.e. Being. The more the gods drift apart from man,

⁹⁶⁰ Compare Heidegger on research on mythology HEIDEGGER, M. *Holzweg*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977. GA 5 p. 76.

⁹⁶¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Wass heisst denken?*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002. GA 8 p. 12.

⁹⁶² HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 105.

⁹⁶³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Seminare*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1986 GA 15 p. 180.

⁹⁶⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998. GA 69 p. 132.

⁹⁶⁵ Idem p. 132, 211.

the more Being becomes concealed. The Godhead is, as such, the transition to Being.⁹⁶⁶ God merely thought as value and as the highest is no god. God is not dead, his godhead lives, Heidegger asserts.⁹⁶⁷ The godhead is the ether in which alone the gods are gods.⁹⁶⁸ The element of this ether, that within which even the godhead itself is still present, is the holy. Hence, the flight of the gods is still a presencing of the holy. The holy is for the futural ones and the nearness to it means a reticence in the un-decidable remoteness and nearness of the gods, according to Heidegger. The godhead is not Being itself, but a remembrance of the fled gods thinks the being of the gods and, as such, the godhead is thought. If the being of the gods is not itself a god, the godhead cannot be an entity. In other words god, or the last god, is not 'a' god. Its adjective 'last' appoints the order or destiny of Being. Heidegger famously writes:

The world's darkening never reaches to the light of Being. We are too late for the gods and too early for Being. Being's poem, just begun, is man.⁹⁶⁹

The last god is the between of the gods and Being. By thinking the being of the gods, Being begins to come into view. Heidegger writes: "In the essential occurrence of the truth of Being, in the event and as the event, the last God is hidden."⁹⁷⁰ The nearness to the last God is nearness to what is most remote, but close in intimacy as well, Heidegger asserts.⁹⁷¹ This God, its holiness, is in the age of nihilism present by the way he remains silent. The last God passes by in stillness. He attunes the human existence in such a way that the human being becomes the 'steward' of stillness.⁹⁷²

Heidegger argues at one point that for Hölderlin the gods are nothing but time.⁹⁷³ Traditionally the gods are regarded from the perspective of timelessness

⁹⁶⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70 p. 65.

⁹⁶⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 13 p. 154.

⁹⁶⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 92.

⁹⁶⁹ Idem p. 4.

⁹⁷⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 21.

⁹⁷¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p. 12.

⁹⁷² Idem p. 23.

⁹⁷³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 55.

or eternity as the beyond of time, but this metaphysical determination of time does not grasp the essence of time. Rather should time be regarded from the poetic notion of the gods in the sense of a poetic revealing timing of Being. Poetry is a way of saying as revealing showing, poetry must therefore as poetic projection be located in relation to the truth of Being. In question is, according to Heidegger, the almost dictated grounded lodging and saving, as remaining remembrance of the opened essence of Being, the remembrance of which a people have to think ever anew.⁹⁷⁴ Heidegger writes:

What is at issue is the truly appearance or not appearance of the gods in the being of a people for and form out of the need of its Being. This appearing must become a fundamental occurrence (*Grundgeschehnis*).⁹⁷⁵

The in poetry founded Being encompasses always the entities as a whole; the gods, the earth and the people in their history, which means as a people. Heidegger has experienced the withdrawal of the gods in the form of European nihilism, which he regarded as the withdrawal of Being. As such, the speaking of the gods and their silence is related to the nearing and distancing of Being that takes place in and through poetry. As we have seen in chapter 1.4 in reference to *Being and Time* and in this chapter in relation to the poetic measure, nearing and distancing take, in Heidegger's view, first place on a level of meaning and intelligibility and only in secondary sense on a physical or spatial level. The gods must therefore neither be regarded merely as Being itself, nor as entities, but belong to the poetic projection of Being, as ways in which the truth of Being are revealed and concealed. In conclusion, the gods belong to the dynamics of nearing and distancing in the revealing and concealing of Being.

According to Heidegger, the basic disposition of Hölderlin's *Germania* is the having-beenness of the presence of the Gods.⁹⁷⁶ Hölderlin poetizes:

Gods who are fled! You too, present still, once.

Heidegger argues in *Parmenides* that Chronos is the highest Greek god and the father of Zeus. HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 p. 210.

⁹⁷⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999 p. 214.

⁹⁷⁵ Idem p. 147.

⁹⁷⁶ Idem p. 78.

More real, you had your times!⁹⁷⁷

The gods have fled from the earth and the people cannot receive the messages and gestures from the gods anymore mediated by the poets. The former is the poetic saying of European nihilism that Heidegger regards from the concealment of Being. Hence, the people are not able to relate to Being, neither by approaching nor by distancing Being. Because the flight of the gods from the earth and the concealment of being are concealed and not essentially experienced by the people, Heidegger thinks that the destitution of the ungodliness must be experienced first. It belongs to nihilism as the oblivion of Being that the sense of loss has become itself lost. Nietzsche describes in a parable how the madman who declares the death of god throws his lantern on the ground, saying: “I have come too early,” “My time is not yet”. “This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men.” When the madman had declared that he was seeking God he provoked nothing but laughter and mockery among the people.⁹⁷⁸ Heidegger argues that Hölderlin has founded a basic disposition of mourning of the flight of the gods in the historical existence of the German people. Hölderlin becomes for Heidegger the poet and thinker of the withdrawal. The advent of the gods means therefore not the return of the old gods but a turn towards the abyss. One of the variants of Hölderlin’s *Bread and Wine* poetizes:

Long and difficult is the word of this advent, but
White (i.e., bright) is the moment. Servers of the heavenly are,
However, well-versed in earthly ways, their step is toward the abyss
Of men.⁹⁷⁹

In *Homecoming* Hölderlin poetizes: “Often we must be silent; holy names

⁹⁷⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999 p. 78.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 211.

⁹⁷⁸ NIETZSCHE, F. *The Gay Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. p. 119.

Compare Heidegger on the relation between Hölderlin and Nietzsche in *Basic Questions of Philosophy: selected problems of logic*. trans. Rojcewicz, R., Schuwer, A. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. p. 80, 109-110. Also *Nietzsches Metaphysik, Einleitung in die philosophie: Denken und Dichten*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990. GA 50. p. 95, 150.

⁹⁷⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 212.

are lacking.”⁹⁸⁰ The gods have fled the earth and will not return. Holy names are lacking and nothing actual of the gods can be said. But as having-beenness their absence is present. Who seriously says God is dead and put his life to it, like Nietzsche, is not an atheist, Heidegger argues.⁹⁸¹ By renouncing the old gods, their godliness (*Göttlichkeit*) is at the same time preserved. The sacred mourning of the flight of the gods means a renouncing of a calling of the old gods as the determination of their absence. As such, the sacred mourning makes no bid to the gods, but lets them be absent and as such present in remembrance. Heidegger writes at one point: “Mourning is the lucid superiority of the simple benevolence of a great pain or basic disposition.”⁹⁸² Ontological difference, the difference between word and thing, and the difference among entities makes itself manifest in the rift of time as the pain of the human existence. Heidegger writes:

However, experience is in its essence pain, when the essential difference of entities reveals itself in contrast with the usual. But the highest shape of pain is the dying of death that the human existence sacrifices for the safekeeping of the truth of Being. This sacrifice is the purest experience of the voice of being (*Sein*).⁹⁸³

Only in its finitude, as the downfall in the rift of time, *Dasein* has access to being, i.e. that which is present from out of concealed Being.

As Heidegger had already argued in *Being and Time*, the attuned disposition should not be avoided. The disposition can provide an existential and ontological clue, whether as angst, boredom or mourning. Heidegger argues in this regard that only a abidance (*Aufenthalt*) in the open region (*Gegend*) whence the deficit of holy names presences, preserves the possibility of an insight into that which is present nowadays by its deficit.⁹⁸⁴

Concerning the disposition of the suffering or compassion (*mit-leiden*) of the demigods, as a moment of the sacred mourning, Heidegger writes: “The poet ought not to avoid the compassionately experiencing of this being.”⁹⁸⁵ Heidegger

⁹⁸⁰ Idem p. 216.

⁹⁸¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 95.

⁹⁸² Idem p. 82, 223.

⁹⁸³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 p. 249-250.

⁹⁸⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 13 p. 235.

⁹⁸⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 183.

calls to mind that it is first the disposition lets the un-concealment of entities occur. As such, the disposition is the attunement of the clearing. The basic occurrence of the disposition is the timing of ordinary time.⁹⁸⁶ Heidegger recalls that Hölderlin frequently speaks of the ‘travelling’ (*reissende*) time, which Heidegger explains as the ‘forwards swinging rift’ (*schwingende Fortriß*) into the future as the throwback into the past.⁹⁸⁷ The image comes to mind here of the opening and cracking up ahead of the earth, as the way in which what has been prepared in advance prepares its way and comes to light, whether as river or vegetation sprouting from the earth. Heidegger writes that poetic language is always language of imagery, but what is at issue is not the image versus its abstract idea, but the basic disposition attuning and composing the imagery of a poem.⁹⁸⁸ Poetry speaks in images (*Bildern*), Heidegger argues.⁹⁸⁹ Poetic images are imaginations (*Ein-Bildungen*) in a particular sense. They are visible inclusions of the alien in the sight of the familiar. The poetic saying of the images collects brightness and echo of the appearances of the heavens together with darkness and the stranger who remains silent.⁹⁹⁰ By such sights the god estranges. In the estrangement he manifests his incessant nearness, Heidegger argues.

The rift is the ecstatic character of time by means of which it is not constant and wholly present, but broken off, put away, finite and torn apart so its difference can stand out within time itself. The openness of the rift is the iterative clearing. According to Heidegger, we can experience our own time only if we become historical ourselves and experience the power of finite time by sustaining the ‘rift of time’, instead of holding on to the image of eternity as constant presence.⁹⁹¹ Eternity is, in contrast, old and ‘has been’, Heidegger argues, and cites from Hölderlin: “Thus everything from heaven passes quickly”.⁹⁹² To pass means not merely to perish, but to pass by, as not staying; not to stand constantly present. It means ‘essencing’ (*wesend*) as having-beenness, being present in a coming afflux

⁹⁸⁶ Idem p. 109

⁹⁸⁷ Idem p. 109.

⁹⁸⁸ Idem p. 109.

⁹⁸⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39. 204.

HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p.19.

⁹⁹⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 205.

⁹⁹¹ Idem p. 110.

⁹⁹² Idem p. 111.

(*Andrang*) from the origin.⁹⁹³ The transientness of the eternal is the passing by in the way of the presence of the gods, the volatility of hardly comprehensible gestures, which can show only in the trice of temporality of all bliss and terror. The nearness of the gods unfolds itself in retaining and remembrance.⁹⁹⁴ Through the poetic remembrance of the origin, a people can become homely in its own history and as such become historical and be opened for its futural destination.

According to Heidegger, *Being and Time* did not provide a program or ideal to arrive at one's mortal nature. The work was therefore not an ethical instruction.⁹⁹⁵ To become homely in one's own nature and thus for mortals to become homely in their mortal nature, is rather a poetic enterprise for which the existence of the poet is paradigmatic. The existence of a poet is a vocation as a destiny, which belongs to the destiny of a people and therefore the destiny of Being. Poetic thinking is never artificial nor arbitrary, but comes upon (*Überfall*) the poet, who is prepared and ready, according to Hölderlin in the poem *Germania*, when he "feels the shadows of those who have been".⁹⁹⁶ The destined existence of the poet means to be a 'demigod'. Concerning the relation between man and gods the poetry of Hölderlin often speaks of demigods. They are not entirely gods and neither simply human beings.⁹⁹⁷ Demigods are 'between' beings.⁹⁹⁸ Heidegger reminds the reader that the basic disposition of Hölderlin's poem *Germania* says that the gods have fled from us, are concealed and we suspect only a 'smoke' of them. We do not know who the gods are. Just as less do know therefore who we, the people and its destination are.⁹⁹⁹ This prompts the question how the in-between and therefore the demigods can be determined if the poles are unknown. But such questioning belongs to vulgar and calculative thinking, according to Heidegger, as if the between being can be calculated by distracting something from the gods.¹⁰⁰⁰ However, poetically regarded, demigods have an essence that is directed 'towards' the gods and in particular in a direction

⁹⁹³ Idem p. 111.

⁹⁹⁴ Idem p. 111.

⁹⁹⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 191.

⁹⁹⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 170.

⁹⁹⁷ Idem p. 163.

⁹⁹⁸ Idem p. 164.

⁹⁹⁹ Idem p. 165.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Idem p. 165.

that goes beyond human beings as ‘over men’ (*Übermenschen*), which remains at the same time below the greatness of the gods as ‘under gods’.¹⁰⁰¹ These ‘over’ and ‘under’ are not spatial determinations, but indicate directions of questioning concerning the human essence. Every question concerning the essence of the human being is a question beyond the human being, Heidegger argues.¹⁰⁰² Hence, the question concerning the essence of the human being, i.e. the mortals must be asked together with the question concerning the gods. Their essences cannot be determined separated from each other but refer to each other in the relation of man and gods. By not knowing the essence of man and the gods the question concerning the essence of man becomes the question concerning the demigod as ‘over man’ and ‘under god’. The demigod indicates the destiny of the human being whose essence is historically on its way and, as such, beyond his present and individual self. Heidegger determines a destiny in a triple sense, viz. as ‘determined ruling power’, as ‘way of being’ and as each determined entity of the way of this Being and submitted to its power.¹⁰⁰³ Again we see the triple ontological structure, as mentioned in chapter two, namely Being (*Sein*), the way of being (*Sein*) and the entity. Destiny is not ‘*fatum*’ in the sense of fatality, as in the representation of Being as an involuntary and unknowingly drifting in a blunt forth rolling fate in the totality of self-enclosed entities.¹⁰⁰⁴ This representation of Being is eastern, or Asian, and has already been artistically overcome in Hölderlin’s poetry, Heidegger argues.¹⁰⁰⁵ Furthermore, the idea of destiny as a closed totality has already historically been overcome in the ‘poetically-thinkingly-stately becoming’ (*dichterisch-denkerisch-staatlichen Werden*) of the Greek people. As far as the Greeks knew of ‘*moira*’ meaning fate, and ‘*dike*’ meaning right or justice in the sense of staying within one’s boundaries, these terms stood in the light of Being that exalted them.¹⁰⁰⁶ Heidegger discusses the originary Greek overcoming of the Asian determinism very briefly, but what is at issue is that the Greeks did not blindly seek unity with the blind totality, which would be a form of *hubris* as a lack of *dike*. By dwelling as the mortal beings that the Greeks were, their finite essence had been allocated to them in a conversation

¹⁰⁰¹ Idem p. 166.

¹⁰⁰² Idem p. 166.

¹⁰⁰³ Idem p. 172.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Idem p. 173.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Idem p. 173.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Idem p. 173.

with the gods. Heidegger states that, in contrast with the Asians, for the Greeks Being lost its blind exclusivity and received at once its monumental (*ungeheuren*) character, the limit setting allocation and determination.¹⁰⁰⁷ As such, being becomes first determined for the pre-Socratics, but also immediately forgotten in the light of entities. The basic experience of the Greeks had been that of death and knowing of it, Heidegger argues.¹⁰⁰⁸ The blind totality is infinite; lacks finitude and limit. It is like what Rilke calls the ‘open’ as that which does not block off.¹⁰⁰⁹ As such, it is blind as closed up, unlightened, because it draws on in boundlessness, so that it is incapable of encountering anything unusual, or indeed anything at all. However, where something is encountered, a barrier comes into being. Where there is confinement, whatever is so barred is forced back upon itself and thus bent in upon itself, Heidegger writes.¹⁰¹⁰ The blind totality and Rilke’s notion of the open as venture, which Heidegger identifies as a poetic expression of Nietzschean metaphysics in terms of the being of entities as ‘will’, are not the same as the openness of the un-concealment (*aletheia*) of entities that lets entities, as such, be present.¹⁰¹¹ Heidegger writes that it is distinctive for the history of the West that it had been a ‘knowing’ history.¹⁰¹² The human being does not just exist, but knows that he exists and how he exists, as the condition for the Greek emergence of the question of being, ontology and the metaphysics. The following passage from Hölderlin’s lyrical elegiac novel *Hyperion* attests clearly the overcoming of the urge of fleeing into the blind totality:

To be one with all that lives! To return in blissful self-oblivion in the totality of nature, that is the peak of thoughts and joys, that is the holy mountain height, the place of eternal rest, where midday loses its sultriness and the thunder its voice and the boiling river equals the wave of a cornfield. (...) On this height I stand often, my Bellarmin. But my moments of meditation throw me down. I think and I find myself, like I was before, alone with the pains of mortality and the asylum of my heart, the eternal single world, is gone: nature closes its arms and I like a stranger in front of it and do not understand it.¹⁰¹³

¹⁰⁰⁷ Idem p. 173. Notice that one of the three incarnations of Moira was Lachesis: the allotter.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Idem p. 173. The other incarnation of Moira was Atropos: the cutter of the thread of life who chose the manner of each person’s death.

¹⁰⁰⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 104.

¹⁰¹⁰ Idem p. 104.

¹⁰¹¹ Idem p. 104.

¹⁰¹² HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999 p. 184.

¹⁰¹³ HÖLDERLIN, F. *Hyperion*. Köln: Anaconda Verlag, 2005. p. 11.

Although nature and the earth appear as a stranger to the mortal being, he finds himself, will be exposed to the sultriness of midday, and the thunder speaks with a voice, as forms of finite knowing. Heidegger brings to mind the following words of Hölderlin:

The immediate, strictly speaking, is as impossible for the mortals as for the immortals; the god must distinguish different worlds, in accordance with his nature, because heavenly goodness, for its own sake, must be holy, pure. Man, as the knowing one, must also distinguish different worlds, because knowledge is only possible through opposition. For this reason, the immediate, strictly speaking, is as impossible for the mortals as for the immortals. Strict mediatedness, however, is the law.¹⁰¹⁴

The poet stands between the people and the gods and is therefore a demigod. Dionysus was in ancient Greece the god of the poets and theatre, but also described as a demigod. The first line of the poem Hölderlin's poem *The Rhine* alludes to Dionysus and reads: "I sat in the dark ivy, at the forest's gate, just as the golden noon."¹⁰¹⁵ Ostensibly, ivy has nothing to do with the landscape of the homeland of the German poet, Heidegger notices. But the homeland is not a mere geographical notion, but a region of destiny. Ivy is the favourite plant of the Greek builders. Heidegger poetically interprets the notion of ivy by describing its vines as 'tangled' and 'dark driving' as 'steady life disconcerting' while having cool green leaves. Ivy is also the chosen favourite of Dionysus. Ivy is in Greek *xissos* and Dionysus is also called '*ho xissophoros*' (*phero*, 'to bear') or directly addressed as '*xissos*'.¹⁰¹⁶ Dionysus is a name for Being, Heidegger asserts.¹⁰¹⁷ As the son of the god Zeus and the mortal woman Semele, one of the four daughters of Cadmos the king of Thebe, Dionysus is a demigod. His mother was burned in the lightning flames of father Zeus before she gave birth to her son. Zeus protected the child from the flames by means of a cooling of ivy vines. Hölderlin calls this demigod the 'wine god'. For in the vine and in its fruit, the god of wine guards the being toward one another of earth and sky as the site of the wedding

¹⁰¹⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. trans. Hoeller, K. New York: Humanity Books Prometheus Books, 2000. p. 84.

¹⁰¹⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin's Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 187.

HÖLDERLIN, F. *Selected poems*. trans. Constantine, D. New Castle: Bloodaxe Books, 1996. p. 48.

¹⁰¹⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin's Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 188.

¹⁰¹⁷ Idem p. 188.

feast of men and gods.¹⁰¹⁸ Dionysus is not just one among the demigods, but the most prominent. An existence between gods and man, as a demigod, is the place of the poet. The mediation of the poets brings a trace to the gods, which means to pass along the gestures of the gods to the people. Dionysus brings the trace of the fled gods down to the godless, the people, amidst the darkness of the world's night. In a generating drive, inexhaustible life and the negation of the most feared annihilating death, Dionysus is the 'wildest'. He is the bliss of being magically moved and at once the glooming of tangled horror. Dionysus is the one while he is the other, i.e. he 'is' and at the same time he 'is not'. While he is not, he is. Presently, the demigod 'absences' (*west ab*) and absently he 'presences' (*west an*).¹⁰¹⁹ The characterizing symbol of Dionysus is therefore the mask, representing the presence of absence and absence of presence, life in death and death in life. The former represents, according to Heidegger, in turn, the Greek comprehension of the relation between being and none being.¹⁰²⁰

¹⁰¹⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 91.

¹⁰¹⁹ Idem p. 189.

¹⁰²⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 229.

3.9. Poetry - historical topology

They, like painters, bring together the beauty of the earth and disdain.

Hölderlin, *Remembrance*

The destiny of the poet as a demigod means a suffering. This suffering is a self-suffering as the suffering of the poet's own destiny. It is the compassion of the poet with himself as demigod in as far as he dwells between mortals and gods. As such, a poet appropriates himself through his poetry. Poetry is a normative concept in Heidegger's view. Heidegger plays in this regard with the word '*leiden*', which means 'suffering', and states that poetic suffering is also a '*vor-leiden*', which echoes the 'fore-structure' (*Vor-struktur*) of *Being and Time* (see chapter 1.3) and literally renders into a 'suffering before' which means that the poetic founding comes first and provides first measure for the existence of a people.¹⁰²¹ As such, the suffering has an open and receptive character, while it is at the same time a projecting ahead and, as such, a poetic bringing forth that is originating and creative. Like with the word '*leiden*', Heidegger plays with the possibilities of the word '*hören*', meaning 'hearing'. The pandemonium of gods, demigods, poets and mortals creates an indirect relation to the origin. Both gods and mortals hear in their own way from the origin, but leave in their own way the origin as well to its own course. Within the poetic relation of gods, demigods and man, the gods hear with pity (*erbarmen*) as an 'answering' (*erhören*). This answering is not necessarily sole bliss and peaceful, but implies suffering as well. Heidegger calls poetry at one point the 'jubilation' of Being as the jubilantly resting of Being in the persevering of its storm.¹⁰²² In view of the half-god Dionysus, Heidegger explains the answering of the gods as liberating sustaining of that which is brought to hearing in a 'chaining raging'.¹⁰²³ The gods bring bliss and suffering. The gods let spring forth in themselves 'chaining (*gefasselten*) origins', as a way of leaving the origin to itself and to give the origin free. The origin is chained because it is poetically and historically shaped and therefore not complete let free as pure possibility. Mortals hear, according to Heidegger, as a mishearing (*überhören*), since they are incapable of hearing the origin, which is

¹⁰²¹ Idem p. 184.

¹⁰²² Idem p. 255.

¹⁰²³ Idem p. 200, 258.

therefore a hearing that turns away from the origin. Mortals flee from the origin. They want to forget the origin, avoid its terrifying character and hold on only to that which sprouts from it. In other words, mortals wish to forget about Being and seek to dwell among entities. Hence, both gods and mortals let spring the origin forth by abandoning the origin, but do not originate (*erspringen*) the origin. However, the hearing of the poet, the demigod, sustains the terror of the chained origin. The chained origin is chained because it is grasped (*fassen*) poetically by the poet. This means that historical Being is always caught in language or words, which is essentially poetic. *Dasein* is historically a 'chained stream' (*gefesselte Strom*), according to Hölderlin's poem *The chained stream (Der gefesselte Strom)*. The poem shows the poet as a titan, a son of a god, a demigod who initially does not take up his origin as his destiny, until the destiny of the stream, starts to show in the breast and the heart as the place of clearing, and starts to spring from the bosom of the earth as its source. Wandering, the destiny heads towards the gods, the immortals and it cannot find rest before it has been lifted into the arms of the father as the return to the origin.

The chained stream

How you dream and sleep, youngling, wrapped in yourself,
and hemming by the cold banks, patient one,
And not heeding the origin, you
son of the Oceans, friend of the titans,

That love messengers, sent by the Father,
know you nothing of the life-breathing air?
And does the Word not strike you, that brightly
from above the ever watchful God sends you?

It shows, it shows already in the breast, it streams,
As, when he still slept in the lap of the rocks,
On he flows, and now he recognizes his strength,
the mighty one, now, now he hurries.
The waverer, he mocks the shackles now, and takes and breaks
and throws and shatters
In his fury, playing, here and there to the resounding shore
and the sons of the gods awake the mountain ranges,
The forests stir, it hears the rift,
the distant herald, and shuddering
in joy awakens the bosom of the earth again.

The spring comes; the new green dawns;
But he wanders towards immortals;
Because nowhere can he remain, as where

is lifted into the arms of the Father.¹⁰²⁴

In *Being and Time*, being-in-the-world had been determined as the ‘*Grundver-fas-sung*’ of *Dasein* (see chapter 1.4). ‘*Fessel*’, which means ‘chain’, is etymologically related to ‘*Gefäß*’ meaning ‘vessel’ and ‘*fassen*’, which means ‘to grasp’, as ways of gathering and holding together. The poet cannot release the origins (*freigeben*) like the gods, but also does not want to mishear it like the mortals. His hearing sustains the awe of the origin. His hearing is therefore a ‘sustaining hearing’ (*standhaltenden Hören*) as a suffering. The sustaining hearing is an originally experiencing of that which the origin is as such. It brings the chained origin to hearing and first situates that which essentially occurs and ‘is’. The poetically hearing first situates and emphasizes that which has been heard in the sound of words as the founding of saying and, as such, the founding of existential hearing and conversation.¹⁰²⁵ The origin is not only chained or originating, but originating becomes first what it is by being chained in the course of the stream. Being is only able of presencing and essencing by becoming historically determined in language. Like the past occurs out of the future, the whole course of the river belongs to the origin.¹⁰²⁶ Heidegger writes in *Contributions to Philosophy*:

Yet Being is not something ‘earlier’, existing in itself, for itself. Instead, the appropriating event is the temporal-spatial simultaneity for Being and entities.¹⁰²⁷

Hölderlin’s *Remembrance* poetizes: “For richness begins namely in the sea” While it had been originated at the sources, the richness of the river begins to manifest itself only futurely at the outflow. A stanza of the poem the *The Rhine* reads:

It was the voice of the noblest of rivers
The freeborn Rhine
And high at the outset he had other hopes
When he parted from his brothers Ticino and Rhone

¹⁰²⁴ HÖLDERLIN, F. *Sämtliche Werke und Briefe*. München: Carl Hanser Verlag München, 1992. Band 1, p. 279.

¹⁰²⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 201.

¹⁰²⁶ Idem p. 202.

¹⁰²⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. GA 65 p. 13.

And wanted to wander his royal soul
 Drove him impatiently to head for Asia.
 But it makes no sense
 To wish one's own wishes in the face of fate
 But the blindest in this
 Are the sons of gods. For men know
 Their homes and to beasts it is given
 To know where to build, but they
 Start out
 With souls that want direction.¹⁰²⁸

If the past occurs out of the future, the later must always point back at the earlier. The poem *The Rhine* suggest that mortals know better than their preceeding sons of gods because destiny becomes aparant at the outflow, while it had been concealed at its origin. Heidegger's elucidation argues that the changed origin of the river turns over its course into an unchainged urge, away from its poetic origin. Heidegger speaks of an 'appropriation' (*Aneignung*) of the proper Being in the turning of the direction of the river.¹⁰²⁹ At its beginning, the direction of the Rhine is headed to the east, the locality of the origin, but then it turns northwards towards Germany. The river turns away from the origin, Asia, Iona, Greece.¹⁰³⁰ Indo-Germanic languages are thought to originate from the region north to the Caspian Sea and the question of Being is according to Heidegger first posed by the Greeks as the question of the being of entities, albeit as such immediately forgotten as well. Like the river, the course of historical Being turns away from its origin in an ongoing self-oblivion. History can never return to itself like a river cannot flow back to its origin. But it can hint back at its origin as the place whence the future and outflow occur. Hölderlin's *The Blind Singer* poetzies in this regard: "(...) and how the source follows the river whereto it thinks".¹⁰³¹ The river thinks in as far as its essence is what Heidegger calls the 'river spirit'. As such, the river thinks towards the outflow of the source, but thereby at once back into itself. The originary direction of the Rhine river towards the east breaks into another direction. This break destroys, however, not the originated, Heidegger argues. It is not wise to wish anything else than the destiny of the river, according to Heidegger. Heidegger often says that the human being has to take on

¹⁰²⁸ HÖLDERLIN, M. *Selected poems*. trans. Constantine, D. New Castle: Bloodaxe Books, 1996. p. 48-49.

¹⁰²⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 204.

¹⁰³⁰ Idem p. 204.

¹⁰³¹ Idem p. 234.

(*übernehmen*) Being and his own being as his destiny.¹⁰³² First in the counter will, away from the original course now heading to the north, the origin comes ‘in need’ and, as such, towards itself. The course of a river is never only the outflow of the source, as mere continuation, but must find a way of overcoming resistance as a destiny, which Heidegger interprets as a ‘creative suffering’.¹⁰³³

Heidegger discusses the history in which peoples emerge and become home into their own essence as destiny in terms of the journey of the spirit, which is essentially poetic. Hölderlin’s river poems poetize the spirit of the rivers as their essence. The poem the *Ister* in particular poetizes the essence of the Danube River. The Greek called the lower course of the river ‘*Istros*’. The Romans called it the ‘*Ister*’, and its upper course ‘*Danubius*’.¹⁰³⁴ The Danube originates in the upper course in Germany and makes fertile the homeland of Hölderlin. The river flows from north to south and empties in the Black Sea. Heidegger describes how it at its springs flows only ‘hesitatingly’ among the rocky cliffs. Hölderlin’s poem the *Ister* says:

It almost seems
To flow backward and
I think it must come
From the East.
Much could be
Said about this.¹⁰³⁵

The dark waters of the river sometimes stop and even push back into whirlpools. It is therefore as if the river comes from the place of its outflow at the Black Sea instead of its origins in Germany. As such, the river seems to belong to the foreign land of the East, which seems therefore to be present in the upper Danube. The Danube river flows from west to east, but the way it flows back to the west suggest the direction of peregrination (*Wanderschaft*) of the river spirit coming from the Indus, the east. As we have seen in chapter 1.5 and 2.2, time and all the more true time in the appropriation (*Ereignis*), is always a two way traffic, i.e. at once a back and forth. The rivers spirit thinks back into its own source and is as such self-remembrance. Heidegger writes in *What is called thinking?*:

¹⁰³² Idem p. 206.

¹⁰³³ Idem p. 235.

¹⁰³⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 106.

¹⁰³⁵ Idem p. 106.

Memory is the collection of remembrance. It keeps save and conceals in itself that which each time provokes thinking with everything that essences and addresses itself essencing as that which has been. Memory the mother of the muses: The remembrance of 'thinking towards' is the wellspring of poetry. Poetizing is therefore the water that occasionally flows back to the source, to thinking as remembrance.¹⁰³⁶

The river says poetically Being's appropriation. As the appropriating event, Being is self-appropriation. Being becomes Being as being, i.e. entities and its remembrance that Being is not an entity or present in the entities. As such, concealed Being becomes present, differentiated, determined and meaningful in its own contrary element. The presencing, as bringing forth from out of Being, is *poiesis*, poietic, poetic and occurs as such first in language. The occurrence of being as a saying is a conversation as hearing and saying, thinking and poetizing and is, as such, the historical superindividual spirit. Thus considered, Being is the spirit returning to itself, the parting origin that comes futurely towards itself as the origin that flows back into itself. This is the poetic saying of the turning, as the turning homewards of Being. However, Heidegger explains the dynamics of Being not in terms of traditional metaphysics, but poetically as the self-remembrance and self-oblivion of the spirit. Poetic language is not referring to something present, but finds being that is coming in the remembrance of that which has been, namely the fled gods.

Hölderlin wrote on the same page as the *Ister* the poem *Remembrance* (*Andenken*), which Heidegger discusses in a text with the same name, published in *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry* (1936-1968).¹⁰³⁷ In accordance with biographical data and the fact that the poem names the places Dordogne and Garonne the poem appears to describe the journey that Hölderlin made to the southern France in 1801.¹⁰³⁸ However, Heidegger argues that the poem poetizes essentially the remembrance of the land of the Greeks.¹⁰³⁹ Hölderlin wrote to his friend after he had returned that his stay in France, with its southern sky gave him, first of all and forever a higher truth: the remembrance of the land of the

¹⁰³⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Wass heisst denken?*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002. GA 8 p. 13.

¹⁰³⁷ *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung* (1936-1968)

¹⁰³⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 106 p. 107.

¹⁰³⁹ *Idem* p. 107.

Greeks.¹⁰⁴⁰ The poem describes therefore not the actual trip to France, but poetizes the thought the journey provoked in a retrospective reflection that only started when the poet had come back home. The poem poetizes the remembrance of the origin and the essence of homecoming. Besides the fact that poetry never has a report like nature, the poem itself already names a region beyond France, namely Greece and speaks beyond Greece towards the more distant East, towards the people of India.

But we sing from the Indus,
Arrived from afar, and
From the Alpheus, (...) ¹⁰⁴¹

The poem *Remembrance* poetizes the experience with the alien; the foreign land of the 'fiery spirit'. The poem says in this regard:

The northeast blows,
Of winds the dearest
To me, because a fiery spirit
And a good voyage it promises to mariners. ¹⁰⁴²

The northeast wind is the wind that clears the sky and gives a free, cool path to the rays and light of the sun, the heavenly fire. Hence, the blessings of fire presume the cooling and free passage of the cleared sky. The northeast wind is directed and as such pointing. It points away from the native land of the poet toward the south-western sky and its fire. Heidegger argues that the mariners are Germany's coming poets greeted by the northeast wind that show them the way towards the place of the hot richness of the heavenly fire.¹⁰⁴³ The northeast wind calls the poets to find themselves in the destiny of their historical being. Before his journey to France, Hölderlin writes in a letter to his friend Böhlendorf:

We shall learn nothing more difficult than to freely use our national character. And as I believe, it is precisely the clarity of presentation which is as natural to us as the fire of heaven was to the Greeks. But what is proper to us must be learned as well as what is foreign. That is why the Greeks are indispensable to us. Only we will not

¹⁰⁴⁰ Idem p. 107.

¹⁰⁴¹ Idem p. 108.

¹⁰⁴² Idem p. 109.

¹⁰⁴³ Idem p. 109.

match them precisely in what is proper to us, our national character, because, as I said, the free use of what is proper to one is the most difficult.¹⁰⁴⁴

One can see again the law of ‘strict mediation’. By means of the poetic passage away from home to the foreign land, the poet becomes at home in what is proper to him. The fire of heaven had been proper to the Greeks. It is the light and the blaze that guarantee them the arrival and nearness of the gods.¹⁰⁴⁵ As such, the fire of heaven is the immediate exposure to being sent from Being. Concerning fire Hölderlin writes in *Hyperion*:

The fire leaps up in shapes of joy from the dark cradle in which it slept, and its flame rises and falls, is gone and comes laughing back again, until that on which it fed is consumed; now it smokes and struggles and dies; what remains is ashes. So it is with us. This is the heart of all that the wise teach us in forbidding and enticing mysteries¹⁰⁴⁶

In *Parmenides* (1942-1943) Heidegger writes:¹⁰⁴⁷

Everywhere in Greek antiquity first reins the single brightness (*Helle*) of being that lets the entity arise in brilliance or sank down in darkness.¹⁰⁴⁸

The Greeks first asked about being, but were at the beginning of their history not at home in their own nature. The light had been to blinding. Heidegger cites at one point from Hölderlin’s *Blind Singer*, wherein the voice of Chiron says:

Where are you contemplation (*Nachdenkliches*) that must always go aside, at times, where are you light?¹⁰⁴⁹

Two strophes later the poem says that the light comes advisingly (*radschlagend*) and on ways of the heart (*Herzenwegen*). The high site of the brighter is essentially so light that people and also gods cannot behold it immediately. This means that light, as such, conceals itself. Heidegger writes:

¹⁰⁴⁴ Idem p. 112.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Idem p. 112.

¹⁰⁴⁶ HÖLDERLIN, F. *Hyperion*. Köln: Anaconda Verlag, 2005. p. 47.

¹⁰⁴⁷ *Parmenides* (1942-1943) GA 54.

¹⁰⁴⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 p. 182.

¹⁰⁴⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Nietzsches Metaphysik, Einleitung in die philosophie: Denken und Dichten*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990. GA 50. p. 144.

The light itself thins (*auslichten*) itself out of its clearing (*Lichtung*) so that it is at once concealment, which it follows all the time, i.e. contemplates.¹⁰⁵⁰

Thinking cannot move directly towards the light, but has to move aside to make room for arrival. Heidegger argues that the Greeks had first pondered the question of being, but at the same time the meaning of being became immediately covered up, distorted and forgotten. In order to appropriate the fire, the Greeks must first distance themselves from themselves by passing through what is foreign to them, which is the clarity of presentation. They had been astonished and seized by the fire, but must bring it first into the serene splendour of its ordained brightness, Heidegger argues.¹⁰⁵¹ Only by means of a passage through the foreign they gain the cool capacity of self-collection and are they able to come into the possession of their proper element. Heidegger writes: “Only the rigor of such collecting in poetry, thinking, and art enables them to encounter the gods in their luminous presence.”¹⁰⁵²

The Greeks found and build the *polis*, not first as Athena or Sparta, but as the essential place in history determined by the holy. Heidegger argues that this *polis* first determines the political.¹⁰⁵³ But in the face in the face of the excess of destiny and its dispensations, the Greeks could not hold onto their destiny. In line with the words of Hölderlin: the fire had consumed them. They fell down and did not know their own greatness, which has to be learned by what was foreign to them, namely the self-collecting clarity of presentation. The latter is precisely natural to the Germans, which means, according to Heidegger, the ability to grasp, the designing of projects, the erection of frameworks and enclosures, the construction of boundaries and divisions, dividing and classifying.¹⁰⁵⁴ But what accounts for the Greeks holds true for the Germans as well. Their nature cannot be appropriated if it is not tested by the need to grasp the ungraspable. In the face of the incomprehensible itself, clarity and the ungraspable must be brought into proper attuned disposition (*Stimmung*). The Germans must therefore first encounter the foreign, i.e. the fire of heaven. Heidegger quotes from Hölderlin:

¹⁰⁵⁰ Idem p. 144.

¹⁰⁵¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 112.

¹⁰⁵² Idem p. 112.

¹⁰⁵³ Idem p. 112.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Idem p. 112, 113.

The main tendency must be to be able to encounter something, to have a destiny, since the absence of destiny, the *dusmoron*, is our weakness¹⁰⁵⁵

As such, Heidegger's thinking remains far from any form of nationalistic navel-gazing or provincialism of which already his friendships and collaborations with Jewish, French, Swiss, and Japanese people attests. Heidegger writes:

What is natural to a historical people only becomes truly nature, an essential ground, when the natural has become historical, truly history.¹⁰⁵⁶

This appropriation happens as historically poetic dwelling, which is a dwelling near the origin. The poem *Bread and Wine* says:

For the spirit is not at home
At the beginning, not at the source¹⁰⁵⁷

The poetic spirit, the animation, that which gives life as existence is not at the source from the very beginning. It must first traverse foreign land. As origin, it gives forth, but conceals itself at once. It withdraws itself behind that which has sprung forth from it. When it seeks itself in the homeland among what has sprouted nearby from it, it will not find itself. The spirit is therefore at the beginning not at home but at the richness of the sea. Heidegger writes in *Parmenides* concerning the self-nearing of the origin:

This law of proximity is grounded in the law of the origin. The origin does not at first allow itself to emerge as originating, but instead retains in its own intimacy its originary character. The origin then first shows itself in the originated, but even there never immediately and as such. Even if the originated appears as the originated, its originating and ultimately the entire 'essence' of the origin can still remain veiled. Therefore, the origin first unveils itself in what has already come forth from it. As it originates, the origin leaves behind the proximity of its originating essence and in that way conceals itself. Therefore, an experience of what is at the origin by no means guarantees the possibility of thinking the origin itself in its essence.¹⁰⁵⁸

¹⁰⁵⁵ Idem p. 113.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Idem p. 113.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Idem p. 114.

¹⁰⁵⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. GA 54 p. 201-202.

This means that the origin, in positive sense as the first origin, cannot think the primal concealed ‘other’ origin. It seems impossible here for Heidegger to come any closer to Hegel than the explanation of historical Being in terms of ‘spirit’, however, this basic word comes from Hölderlin’s poetry and is therefore poetic, which means that its meaning refers not to something present, but the word is a saying that shows what is coming.¹⁰⁵⁹ The spirit is the openness for the open. The same poem *Remembrance* says: “The spirit loves the colony.”¹⁰⁶⁰ Being drawn to the colony the spirit is not at home. The colony is the daughter land that points back at the motherland. Concerning the meaning of the river Heidegger writes:

The flowing of the river does not simply run its course in time, as if time is indifferent to the flowing and an external frame of its course. The river suspects (*ahnen*) and disappears (*schwinden*) in time, so that, that they are themselves time-like and time itself.¹⁰⁶¹

The river is in its flowing directed in two directions. As the disappearing it is on its way to the past and as suspecting it travels to that which comes. But suspecting relates not only to that which is coming, but also to having-beenness. A real remembrance is the turning towards the unlocked inner of that which has been, Heidegger argues. This suspecting is the deepest suspecting, since everything futural comes from that which has been.¹⁰⁶² The disappearing is also not going nowhere, but a disappearing into that which is coming. As such, the river is change or ‘peregrination’. As peregrination the river reigns and essences in the destiny of winning Earth as the ground of the homely.¹⁰⁶³ The river is not a metaphor (*Sinnbild*) for the demigod as destiny, but is it itself a demigod and destiny in the way it founds land as land and provides a home for the people.¹⁰⁶⁴ The river is as such its own instantiation that points nevertheless to the dynamics of Being. Heidegger writes:

¹⁰⁵⁹ Hölderlin himself speaks of the ‘river spirit’ (*Stromgeist*) HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin’s Hymne Der Ister*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1984. GA 53 p. 12.

¹⁰⁶⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000.p. 117.

¹⁰⁶¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin’s Hymne Der Ister*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1984. GA 53 p. 12.

¹⁰⁶² Idem p. 34.

¹⁰⁶³ Idem p. 35.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Idem p. 259.

A cheering of the originated, in its being, an overflowing breakaway, reckless tearing and cleaving of the earth, an enchantment like this, the first creating of the banks; the stream takes the forests in its entourage and the declining mountains. Here occurs the becoming of the originary landscape by the spirit of the river.¹⁰⁶⁵

The essence of the river shapes the poetic essence of the *Dasein* of a people, according to Heidegger. Heidegger argues that people live among rivers and the history of the river shapes the life form of the people. Hölderlin says about the river: “Beautifully it dwells.”¹⁰⁶⁶ The river is the region for dwelling, it is itself the peregrination of becoming homely.¹⁰⁶⁷ The river is the regionality (*Ortschaft*) of the region (*Ort*) itself. As such, meaning resides not in a platonic supernatural world, but emerges from the earth itself through art en poetry. It gives food for thought what has become of us when we poison and polute our rivers that once had been holy.

The human dwelling is, in Heidegger’s view, always a poetically dwelling of the mortals on the earth under the sky before the gods, whether they appear or not. Heidegger associates the poetic basic disposition of the sacred mourning with the notion of earth, citing from Hölderlin’s *Germania* “as lamenting, with the native waters”.¹⁰⁶⁸ In the poem Hölderlin addresses not any longer the blessed that have appeared, as the images of the gods, in the old land, but addresses the native rivers now. The disposition of mourning rises from the homeland (*Heimat*) itself, which is the earth, one of the poles of the poetic projection and the region where human beings dwell poetically. Heidegger speaks of the ‘power of the earth’ as the homeland whence the sacred mourning springs. He writes:

The country lies full of expectation under the stormy sky, the whole native nature sinks down in this umshading (*Umschattung*). In such a home country, the human being first experiences his belongingness to the earth.¹⁰⁶⁹

The common theme of native nature in poetry is in Heidegger’s view not a romantic depicting of a possible surrounding, but first a mode of saying that says the power of the earth, whence the poetic disposition springs that provides

¹⁰⁶⁵ Idem p. 262.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Idem p. 42.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Idem p. 36.

¹⁰⁶⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 88.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Idem p. 88.

historically a home to the human being. As such, earth shows us who we are, namely mortal beings and it is the earth in its relation to sky and gods that poetically attunes the understanding of Being. As the poles of the fourfold are turned towards each other, the earth is cultivated for the gods.¹⁰⁷⁰ By means of such cultivation (*Erziehung*) the earth first becomes a home, but it can also degrade to a mere living place as happens in uprootedness and the desecration of the godlessness.¹⁰⁷¹ Accordingly, Heidegger asserts that the river spirit, as that which the river essentially is, springs from the waters of the earth. As such, Hölderlin's poetry of rivers sprouts not from subjective imagination, but his poetically being-in-the-world and in that region from the earth and the river itself. The river is a violently creating of course and limit on the originary pathless earth.¹⁰⁷² Since the gods have fled, the earth is pathless.¹⁰⁷³ World and thing are never separated, only different. The river is therefore at once the poetic saying of time as history and destiny and of its own essence.¹⁰⁷⁴ With regard to the 'holy earth', which is the earth in its abundance and unselfishness, Heidegger cites from Hölderlin: "Who is the mother of all and carries the abyss."¹⁰⁷⁵ And "Mortals reach into the abyss sooner than the heavenly powers".¹⁰⁷⁶ The earthly essence of the earth remains out of the reach of the heavenly ones. More than the heavenly ones, the mortal human being belongs to this abyss. As such, the sphere of earth and sky, mortals and gods, are different. Mortals belong to the earth and its abyss, but become only home on earth in remembrance of the alien, which are the gods. Homecoming begins with the experience of unhomeliness, uncanniness, uprootedness and nihilism and as such with the essence of technology as a destined sending from Being. Hölderlin's elegy *Bread and Wine* asks: "And what are poets for in a destitute time?"¹⁰⁷⁷ Heidegger argues that the destitute time is defined by the god's failure to arrive. This era is defined by the default of God, meaning that no god any longer gathers men and things unto himself, visibly and unequivocally, and by such gathering disposes the world's history and man's

¹⁰⁷⁰ Idem p. 104.

¹⁰⁷¹ Idem p. 104.

¹⁰⁷² Idem p. 92, 224.

¹⁰⁷³ Idem p. 224.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Idem p. 196.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Idem p. 105.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Idem p. 106.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Idem p. 89.

sojourn in it.¹⁰⁷⁸ Not only have the gods and the god fled, but the divine radiance has become extinguished in the world's history, according to Heidegger. The destitute time has already grown so destitute that it can no longer discern the default of God as a default and it is even no longer able to experience its own destitution. This means, in Heidegger's view, that the era is unable to experience the ground that grounds the world. This ground is the soil in which to strike root and to stand.¹⁰⁷⁹ The age for which the ground fails to come hangs therefore in the abyss, which now holds and remarks everything. Not only is the holy lost as the track toward the godhead; even the traces leading to that lost track are 'well-nigh obliterated'.¹⁰⁸⁰ The uprooted time can only turn one day towards its soil if it unequivocally turns away from the abyss.¹⁰⁸¹ This happens in a remembrance of Being when nihilism can be experienced as the oblivion of Being and therefore not merely as nothing.¹⁰⁸² Therefore, the abyss of the world must first be experienced and endured, Heidegger argues.¹⁰⁸³ Humans reach sooner into the abyss. The turning of the age away from the abyss to the ground, i.e. the presencing of Being, must first be prepared by an abode of the fled gods and there can only ever be for the god an abode fit for a god, if a divine radiance first begins to shine in everything that is. This means that the unholy era must turn to the holy by means of those who reach into the abyss, which are the poets as demigods. The poet must therefore sing and poetizes of the traces of the fled gods. The turn of the era can only take place with mortals that find the way to their own nature, Heidegger argues.¹⁰⁸⁴ Man must first experience his finite nature. Man as the mortal being reaches into the abyss sooner than the heavenly powers. The human being remains closer to absence, because he is touched by presence, the ancient name of being, which, however, conceals itself at the same time, which is, therefore, itself already absence, Heidegger argues.¹⁰⁸⁵ Thinking must experience the traces of concealed Being and the poetic saying of the destitute time belongs to the oblivion of Being. Hölderlin's suspecting of the holy experiences the

¹⁰⁷⁸ Idem p. 89.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Idem p. 90.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Idem p. 92.

¹⁰⁸¹ Idem p. 90.

¹⁰⁸² HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 13 p. 234-235.

¹⁰⁸³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 90.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Idem p. 91.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Idem p. 91.

desertion of the earth, the world, the distance of the gods and the madness of the people. This desertion is the desertion of entities by Being. Being lets them go and its letting go is a 'denial'.¹⁰⁸⁶ For the lamenting poet, the oblivion is present as the traces of the fugitive gods. Heidegger states that the poets are the mortals who, singing earnestly of the wine-god, sense the trace of the fugitive gods, stay on the tracks of the gods, and so trace for their kindred mortals the way toward the turning.¹⁰⁸⁷ Heidegger's turning as the home turning towards Being occurs therefore in the thoughtful dialogue with poetry. Heidegger writes:

The world's darkening never reaches to the light of Being. We are too late for the gods and too early for Being. Being's poem, just begun, is man.

The darkening of the world, as the night of the poet, can still be experienced as such and the concealed is present, that is to say unconcealed as concealed. As such, the concealment has not reached completion obscuring the light of Being. The old gods will not return in a renewed way, but only as having-been, as fled, disappeared and now concealed.¹⁰⁸⁸ As such, we are too late for the gods and at the same time concealed Being start to shimmer, however hardly thought and noticed since we are yet too early. Heidegger cites from Hölderlin: "But where there is danger, there grows also what saves".¹⁰⁸⁹ The danger of the implosion of meaning, nihilism, the incapability of experiencing the essence of nihilism and the holding off of the turning occurs in language. But in poetry, as the essence of language, grows at once the saving power, sprouting from earth who carries the abyss.

Earth becomes first earth and the landscape first landscape in a poem.¹⁰⁹⁰ In the poem the *Journey* Hölderlin poetizes:

And the Alps of Switzerland overshadow you too,
Neighbourly; for near the hearth of the house
Is where you live and you can hear
Inside from silvery vessels

¹⁰⁸⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Über den Anfang*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005. GA 70p. 156.

¹⁰⁸⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 92.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Idem p. 90.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Idem p. 115.

¹⁰⁹⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 226.

The spring rushing that issues
From pure hands when touched.¹⁰⁹¹

The presence of the Alps in Hölderlin's poems signifies not the particular lived experience of the poet. Heidegger argues that first by poetically 'wanting to know' and 'having to know', one's hearing (*vernehmen*) becomes open for that which in the face of the homeland - characterizing the homeland itself- occurs (*geschieht*) in the alps.¹⁰⁹² The Alps are in the neighbourhood of the homeland and form the 'hearth' of the house, the determining middle of the homely earth, the place of origin, the most noble of the German rivers. Not with a lack of pathos, Heidegger writes:

How much longer are we still going to suppose that there is first of all a nature in itself and then a landscape for itself, which with the help of 'poetic experiences' becomes mythically coloured? How much longer are we going to prevent ourselves from experiencing entities as entities?¹⁰⁹³

Nature is Being as such, Heidegger asserts at one point.¹⁰⁹⁴ Its nearness is the nearness of the origin, the essentiality of Being to which Hölderlin wishes to remain close when he says:

Reluctant to leave the place
Is that which dwells near the origin.¹⁰⁹⁵

The originary belongingness is reason for the loyalty to Being. The loyalty to Being is the presumption for everything unfolding, this or that way of being related.¹⁰⁹⁶ He who leaves its place (*Ort*) of origin easily proves that he has no origin and is left only with what is present at hand. Hölderlin poetizes of the 'stairs of the alps', which Heidegger regards as a climbing and descending that occurs in the rang of Being, which the demigods, i.e. the poets measure out. They

¹⁰⁹¹ HÖLDERLIN, M. *Selected poems*. trans. Constantine, D. New Castle: Bloodaxe Books, 1996. p. 44.

¹⁰⁹² HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 187.

¹⁰⁹³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 40.

¹⁰⁹⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 259.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Idem p. 192.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Idem p. 192.

occupy each being that is in itself a trace, a hint left behind concerning the way and directing of Being within the total relatedness of entities.¹⁰⁹⁷ As such, Heidegger's last God can be considered as a step on the stairs of the alps.

Earth is as the place where being manifest itself the homeland (*das Vaterland*). Heidegger associates Hölderlin's poetic concept of the homeland, literally, the land of the father, with being at home, being not a home and 'dwelling' in existential or ontological sense. The homeland is the earth whereupon a historical people dwells, which Hölderlin calls the 'most forbidden fruit' that will cost everyone at last.¹⁰⁹⁸ The father refers to the origin, to the historical being of the earth and the people. This being is poetically founded, thinkingly structured (*gefügt*), placed in knowing and rooted in the agentship (*Täterschaft*) of the state founders of the earth and historical space.¹⁰⁹⁹ Place, or locality, (*Ort*) and time cannot simply be separated.¹¹⁰⁰ Place is, however, easier grasped, while it can be geographically determined. But Germany is for Heidegger not a geographical, but a destinal notion whence its political course should be determined and understood. The political is, in Heidegger's view around 1934, ultimately founded in the poetic, which he later ostensibly experiences from the perspective of the hegemony of technology, towards which the poetic becomes a normative counter concept. However, the essence of technology, as en-framing, comes forth from the poetic (*poiesis*). Modern technology is therefore in originary sense founded in the poetic, as the epochal way of Being's revealing through language. This means that Heidegger's engagement with poetry reaches over time back into the history of the meaning of being as the history of the truth of Being.

Homecoming is the return to the nearness to the origin.¹¹⁰¹ The homeland is the most concealed. The homeland is Being itself that carries and structure a people from the ground up, Heidegger writes.¹¹⁰² As such, man shares his historical essence with the homeland. Heidegger writes in *Letter on Humanism*: "The homeland of this historical dwelling is nearness to being."¹¹⁰³

Nietzsche's idea of the last man that forms a downfall (*Untergang*), but also

¹⁰⁹⁷ Idem p. 193.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Idem p. 120.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Idem p. 120.

¹¹⁰⁰ Idem p. 168.

¹¹⁰¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 42.

¹¹⁰² Idem p. 121.

¹¹⁰³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 258.

a transition towards a new kind of human being as the ‘over man’ is heralded by Hölderlin’s poetic historicisation of the essence of man. Heidegger cites from Hölderlin’s *Becoming in dissolution*:

The declining fatherland, nature and man, insofar as they bear a particular relation of reciprocity, insofar as they constitute a special world which has become ideal and constitute a union of things and insofar as they dissolve, so that from the world and from the remaining ancestry and forces of nature, which are the real principle, there emerges a new world, a new yet also particular reciprocal relation just as the decline emerged from a pure particular world.¹¹⁰⁴

Heidegger calls to attention that the new origin, the possible, is essential in the downfall and never the mere ‘perishing’, as becomes clear from the same writing of Hölderlin:

This decline or transition of the fatherland (in this sense) is felt in the parts of the existing world so that at precisely that extent that existence dissolves, the newly-entering, the youthful, the potential is also felt. For how could dissolution be felt without union; if, then, existence shall be felt and is felt in its dissolution, the unexhausted and inexhaustible of the relations and forces must be felt more by dissolution than vice versa, for from nothing there follows nothing; and taken gradually, this means so much as that what moves toward negation, and insofar as it moves out of reality and is not yet a possibility, cannot take effect. However, the possible which enters into reality as the reality itself dissolves, is operative and effects the sense of dissolution as well as the remembrance of that which has been dissolved.¹¹⁰⁵

The homeland and therefore what is proper is concealed. Hölderlin writes in the poem *Mnemosyne*:

A sign we are, without meaning
Without pain we are and have nearly
Lost our language in foreign lands¹¹⁰⁶

The human being has alienated from his historical essence, its sending and task. It remains without destiny and determination, i.e. without meaning (*deutungslos*), which is the ultimate danger that reigns in nihilism and technology.

¹¹⁰⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 122.

HÖLDERLIN, F. *Hölderlin’s essays and letters of theory*. trans. and ed. Pfau, T. New York: State University of New York press. 1988. p. 96.

¹¹⁰⁵ Idem 122/123.

¹¹⁰⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und der ‘Rhein’*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p. 135.

It has lost its poetic primal language and is without pain because it even fails to recognize its own uprootedness. We are a sign, congealed; an immediately forgotten gesture from the gods.¹¹⁰⁷ Heidegger writes:

Where there is no attuningly opening of the cleft of Being, there is also no need of naming and saying, therefore, we have lost our language in foreign lands.¹¹⁰⁸

Poetry first founds the historical existence of a people and determines *Dasein*, as such, in its historical sense. The poetic forms the basic structuring of historical *Dasein* and poetic language constitutes the essence of the historical being of human beings.¹¹⁰⁹ In a variety of passages, Heidegger quotes from Hölderlin's *In Lovely Blue*: "Full of merit, yet poetically, man dwells on this earth." Man's dwelling is not determined by its merits, but firstly poetically determined as that which basically carries the structure of the human being (*Seinsgefüge*) as historical *Dasein* in the midst of the whole of entities.¹¹¹⁰ To dwell poetically means, according to Heidegger, to stand in the presence of the gods, which means to be struck by the essential nearness of things, since being is revealed in language by the gods that exists as gestures. As such, the human existence is not something earned, but is rather a gift.¹¹¹¹ The human being might be expelled from its poetic dwelling as such, but the people, nevertheless, still 'are' and a people 'is'. This shows, according to Heidegger, the ambiguity of the history of the people. Like Heidegger had already shown in *Being and Time*, the being of our existence is known and at the same time unknown. More radically now Heidegger writes: "The human being is and is not."¹¹¹² The same holds true for the poetic nature of a people. As the founding of being, it is the most powerful and awful. At the same time, poetry is considered to be harmless, and by Hölderlin called the 'most innocent occupation'.¹¹¹³

The founding nature of poetry determines how *Dasein* historically dwells as

¹¹⁰⁷ Idem p. 135.

¹¹⁰⁸ Idem p. 135.

¹¹⁰⁹ Idem p. 68.

¹¹¹⁰ Idem p. 36.

¹¹¹¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 60.

¹¹¹² HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999. GA 39 p.

36.

¹¹¹³ Idem p. 33.

a people on the earth and the way space becomes a historically determined place for him. Heidegger writes:

But poetry that thinks is in truth the topology of Being. This topology tells Being the whereabouts of its actual presence.¹¹¹⁴

In *Poetically Man Dwells* (1951) Heidegger interprets the following words from Hölderlin's *In Lovely Blue*:¹¹¹⁵

May a man, when life is all toil, look up and say: I too will be like that? He may. So long as friendliness, pure friendliness, still lasts in the heart a man may measure himself not unhappily with divinity. Is God unknown? Is he as apparent as the sky? The latter, I should say. It is man's measure. Full of merit, but poetically, man lives on this earth. But the shadow of the night with the stars, if I could say it thus, is not purer than man, who is called an image of God. Is there a measure on earth? There is none.¹¹¹⁶

In accordance with Hölderlin's words, Heidegger determines the human existence as a looking up (*Aufschauen*) to the heavens.¹¹¹⁷ This 'looking up' traverses the distance of the 'upwards' to the heavens and at once abides upon the earth. It measures through the in-between of heaven and earth. This between is measured out to the dwelling of human beings. Heidegger names that which is measured out, i.e. the adequately supplied measuring out, and by means of which the between of heaven and earth is open, 'dimension'. Nietzsche had already called to mind the measuring nature of the human being writing:

Perhaps our word 'man' (*manas*) expresses something of this first sensation of self-confidence: man designated himself as the being who measures values, who values and measures, as the 'calculating animal as such'. Buying and selling, with their psychological trappings, are older even than the beginnings of any social form of organization or association: it is much more the case that the germinating sensation of barter, contract, debt, right, duty, compensation was simply transferred from the most rudimentary form of the legal rights of persons to the most crude and elementary social units (in their relations with similar units), together with the habit of comparing power with power, of measuring, of calculating.¹¹¹⁸

¹¹¹⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 12.

¹¹¹⁵ "...dichterisch wohnt der Mensch..." (1951) in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936-1953) GA 7.

¹¹¹⁶ HÖLDERLIN, M. *Selected poems*. trans. Constantine, D. New Castle: Bloodaxe Books, 1996. p. 103.

¹¹¹⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 7 p. 198.

¹¹¹⁸ NIETZSCHE, F. *Of the Genealogy of Morality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. p. 45-46.

However, dimension is in Heidegger's view the open range between the human being and entities. To measure means to measure an open range, which is conditioned not first by two positive points or two entities, but yields from the opening of the openness of truth as un-concealment. Two points or entities are only known from the measured between and come first near only in the opening of such a between. To say it simple, first there is relatedness provided by the truth of Being and only secondly there are relations that can be known. The open range does not yield from the subject, power relations or the economic, but first from the poetic openness of presence whence these existential determinations can only subsequently follow and become intelligible. Dimension comes, according to Heidegger, not into existence because heaven and earth are already turned towards each other in a prefixed and closed way. They are in contrast poetically mediated and their being turned towards each other is rather first based upon the dimension. Hence, it is the openness that measures out by its opening and closing the range of the in between of existence. The open free measure implies that there is no measure on earth in the sense that it is absolute constant present. Hölderlin says therefore: "Is there a measure on earth? There is none." But poetry keeps one eye upon that which has been and another eye at once upon the future that it projects, which opens up an angle that provides sight and measure for human dwelling. As such poetry forms the ground for all normativity, values and morality. Heidegger argues in his interpretation of Hölderlin's poem *Das nächste Beste* that the un-poetic is the unrestrained, the un-peaceful and the infinite. As such, poetry forms measure and limit. He writes:

The poetic then shows itself as the finite, the peaceful (*Friedliche*), the succinct (*Bündige*), the restrained compliant (*das gebündigt Fugsame*) – language.¹¹¹⁹

The measure for dimension is first provided in language, according to Heidegger. Dimension is essentially poetic; poetic. Heidegger writes:

Who tells us this? Who gives us a standard at all by which we can take the measure of the nature of dwelling and building? It is language that tells us about the nature of a thing, provided that we respect language's own nature.¹¹²⁰

¹¹¹⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Zu Hölderlin - Griechenlandreisen*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 75 p. 201.

¹¹²⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 144.

Dimension is, according to Heidegger, not an extending as in the usual representation of space. But everything space-like needs for itself, as something for which room has been made (*Eingeräumtes*), already the dimension as the ‘wherein’ it has been let in. Spaces receive their being from places and not from abstract uniform pre-existing ‘space.’¹¹²¹ Heidegger explains that the German term for space, ‘*Raum*’, means a place cleared or freed for settlement and lodging.¹¹²²

A space is something that has been made room for, something that is cleared and free, namely within a boundary, Greek *peras*. A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its presencing. That is why the concept is that of *horismos* that is, the horizon, the boundary. Space is in essence that for which room has been made, that which is let into its bounds.¹¹²³

To make space (*räumen*) is the clearance (*freigabe*) of places (*Orten*) in which ‘speaks’ and conceals an occurrence, Heidegger argues.¹¹²⁴ It is an arranging (*einrichten*) and granting (*einräumen*), which lets openness rule that, among others, lets the present things appear whereupon, in turn, human beings depend. It affords the things the possibility of their ‘whence’ and ‘where to’ way of belonging to each other. This clearance is poetic, according to Heidegger, in as far as it releases places to the destiny of a dwelling people in the bliss of a homeland. With regard to bliss one can think here e.g. of temples, churches or local architecture. With regard to the doom of uprootedness, one can think of e.g. of modern uniform bank buildings or highways.¹¹²⁵ Heidegger argues that making space (*räumen*) is the clearance of the place where a god appears, as the place from where the gods have fled and where the appearance of the godhead long hesitates.¹¹²⁶ However, desacralized space is still a way in which space is meaningful, since its meaningless character is that of being not meaningful anymore and possibly not meaningful yet.

¹¹²¹ Idem p. 152.

¹¹²² Idem p. 152.

¹¹²³ Idem p. 152.

¹¹²⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 13, p. 207.

¹¹²⁵ Idem p. 206

¹¹²⁶ Idem p. 206.

Heidegger gives a concrete example of how a bridge, as a clearing, makes room by setting boundary. The bridge, like any other place, connects, or rather ‘contains’, other places.¹¹²⁷ Places may be regarded as positions between which there lies a measurable distance. A distance is in Greek *stadion*, something for which has been made room by bare positions.¹¹²⁸ *Stadion* means the same as in Latin a *spatium*, an intervening space or interval. Thus nearness and remoteness, which are always related to qualities, between men and things can become mere distance, mere intervals of intervening space. As such, one can abstract from the places and represent a space purely as *spatium*. A place is now merely something at some position, which can be occupied at any time by something else or replaced by a mere marker, Heidegger argues. By further abstraction the mere dimensions of height, breadth, and depth can be abstracted from space as intervals. Thus regarded, space becomes the pure quantitative manifold of the three dimensions. Heidegger argues that the room made by this manifold is also no longer determined by distances. It is no longer a *spatium*, but merely *extensio*, or extension, as Descartes determines the bodyness of bodies. Consequently, one is able to abstract from space as *extensio* analytic-algebraic relations, which creates in turn the possibility of the purely mathematical construction of manifolds with an arbitrary number of dimensions. Mathematical space is uniform. Universal space contains no meaningful rooms and places. Heidegger argues: “We never find in it any locations, that is, things of the kind the bridge is.”¹¹²⁹ In other words, abstract quantitative uniform space can never inform us on quality, on essences, i.e. being in its historical course. Hence, calculative thinking can never reveal, since it is only the clearing of the truth of Being that reveals. Mathematical space is therefore not poetic, but belongs to the imposing positing of en-framing. The mathematical projection of being lets man allot space its place and room instead of Being. The change of a qualitative world-view in favour of a quantitative worldview has, in Heidegger’s view, been a change in the projection of nature. It has been a change from an ordinary poetic projection to an abstract calculating design, from the essence of place as ‘poetic between’ to universal extension of that which is posited. Abstracting, as a foregoing of place, as the foregoing of the

¹¹²⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 153.

¹¹²⁸ Idem p. 153.

¹¹²⁹ Idem p. 153.

placement from the clearing, is in essence technological in as far as it as a producing and challenging placing forgoes the truth of Being. Already in *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues that that space is always a determined and meaningful place, since it belongs to world. In *Science and Contemplation* Heidegger writes:

In contemplation (*Besinnung*) we are heading towards a place (*Ort*), whence space firstly opens itself, which strides across each of our comings and goings.¹¹³⁰

Contemplation brings us on the way to the place of our historical abidance, which Heidegger interprets essentially as poetic.¹¹³¹ In *The essence of truth* and *The essence of ground* Heidegger explains the traversing of the distance between self and objects in terms of truth and grounding as the way *Dasein* relates to objects by means of its temporal way of relating to itself. In the text *Time and Being*, Heidegger emphasizes that the concept of ‘dimension’ is not thought as the possibility of measurement in exact sense, but as the ‘reaching throughout’ and as the giving and opening up of the opening of presence. However, the grounding of truth, relating, being-in-a-world and, finally, dimension signify in Heidegger’s final analysis a ‘poetic dwelling’. Poetizing is measuring, Heidegger states.¹¹³² Heidegger writes:

The essence of dimension is the cleared and, as such, measurable admeasurement of the between; the upwards to the heavens as the downwards to the earth.¹¹³³

The poetically measuring out is not something one undertakes at moments, but in such measuring out, the human being is above all first human. Heidegger calls to mind the fact that human beings have always measured themselves by the heavens. Even regarding evil man takes the heaven as measure. Lucifer had come also from heaven, Heidegger brings to mind.¹¹³⁴ Human remembrance is send from heaven. Mnemosyne, the daughter von heaven and earth, becomes, as the

¹¹³⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 7 p. 63.

¹¹³¹ Idem p. 64.

¹¹³² Idem p. 2.

¹¹³³ Idem p. 199.

¹¹³⁴ Idem p. 199.

bright of Zeus, in new nights the mother of the muses.¹¹³⁵

The poetically measuring out of the between of heaven and earth has its own *metron*, metrics.¹¹³⁶ Poetry is the ground act of all measuring, Heidegger asserts.¹¹³⁷ Measure is taken at first in poetry, with which each time, subsequently, can be measured. Earthly poetizing is to take measure of a heavenly measure.¹¹³⁸ The god from the heavens is taken as a measure for the human being, but remains at the same time unknown.¹¹³⁹ The measure consists in the way in which the god, who remains unknown, as such, is un-concealed through the heavens. Since the god is unknown there is no measure on earth. The manifestation of the god through the heavens consist in a revealing, which lets everyone see what it conceals, but not in a way that it seeks to tear the concealed out from its concealment, but only by sheltering the concealed in its concealing. This measure occurs in a taking that does not take the measure on its own, but in a collecting experience (*Vernehmen*), which remains a hearing. We can explain this by pondering upon the way each quantitative measuring presupposes a standard magnitude that is itself not quantitative in the sense that it can be measured, but as the measure it is a quality. A quality is an essence, a way of being of an entity, which Heidegger regards from the perspective of the whole as Being. Being must first be collectively heard. Heidegger argues that the poet, in this case Hölderlin, calls the heavens. The perspective of the heavens remains alien to the perspective of the mortals dwelling on earth. In the familiar appearances like lightning and thunder the poet calls the alien as that wherein the invisible sends itself to remain, however, what it is, namely unknown.¹¹⁴⁰ The meaning of an experience with the alien is therefore not to desalinate that which is strange to make it equal and familiar to oneself, but to let the alien be alien, in order to experience one's own limit and, as such, that which is properly one's own. The alien must be sought only to let it subsequently be. This holds true for Being in the first place, which

¹¹³⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Wass heisst denken?*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002. GA 8 p. 13.

¹¹³⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 7 p. 199.

¹¹³⁷ Idem p. 200.

¹¹³⁸ HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. GA 13, p. 215.

¹¹³⁹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 7 201.

¹¹⁴⁰ Idem p. 201.

must be left alone to its otherness. Heidegger writes in *Contributions to Philosophy*:

The *uniqueness* of Being grounds its *solitude*, in accord with which Being casts round about itself only nothingness, whose neighbourhood remains the most genuine one and the most faithful guardian of the solitude. As a consequence of its solitude, Being essentially occurs in relation to entities always only mediately, through the conflict of world and earth. In none of these appellations is the essence of Being fully thought, yet in each of them it is ‘wholly’ thought; ‘wholly’ means here: in each case the thinking ‘of’ Being is wrenched by Being itself into its unusualness and is deprived of any recourse to the explanations that could be provided by entities.¹¹⁴¹

The alien is therefore holy or sacred. The English word ‘sacred’ comes from the Latin *sacrare* ‘to make sacred, consecrate; hold sacred; immortalize; set apart, dedicate’. Being is set apart from all entities such that the uniqueness of its simplicity does not at all need to be set in relief and does not need differences, not even the difference from entities, Heidegger argues.¹¹⁴²

The dwelling of mortals is always a staying with things. Heidegger argues already in *Being and Time* that the human existence is a dwelling among things, as what the Greeks called ‘*pragmata*’ (See chapter 1.3).¹¹⁴³ In those things the fourfold is preserved. The fourfold ‘presences’ itself in those things, Heidegger states.¹¹⁴⁴ In a thing the fourfold is gathered. The fourfold is, as such, the symbolic structure of things and the material world. (*syn* ‘together’ *bole* ‘a throwing, a casting’). In the text *The Thing* (1949) Heidegger argues that when we talk of a thing we refer to a representation.¹¹⁴⁵ However, this representation originates not in a representing subject, but is a projection from Being. The gathering of the fourfold is an assembling, letting-stay as ‘the thinging of things’ (*das Dingen der Dinge*), according to Heidegger.¹¹⁴⁶ This happens when mortals nurse and nurture the things that grow, and construct things that do not grow.¹¹⁴⁷ Cultivating and construction are building in the narrower sense. This building is founded, in turn,

¹¹⁴¹ HEIDEGGER, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. p. 371.

¹¹⁴² Idem p. 371.

¹¹⁴³ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 64.

¹¹⁴⁴ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 149.

¹¹⁴⁵ *Einblick in das was ist. Bremer Vorträge: Das Ding - Das Ge-stell - Die Gefahr - Die Kehre* (1949) in *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge* (1994) GA 79.

¹¹⁴⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001. p. 197.

¹¹⁴⁷ Idem p. 149.

in ‘dwelling’. We already mentioned Heidegger’s example of a ‘thing place’ as bridge. The bridge is a thing that gathers in its own way to itself earth and sky, gods and mortals. It is a poetic thing, which is never merely build on a place, but provides rather itself first place.¹¹⁴⁸ The bridge lets the riverbanks that were already there first appear as banks. As a mediating thing, the bridge relates the banks by letting them lie across from each other. By means of the connecting bridge their relatedness becomes explicit as the way one side is now set off against the other. The banks do no longer stretch along the stream as indifferent border strips of the dry land. By bringing the banks together the bridge brings to the stream also the other expanse of the landscape lying behind them. As such, the bridge brings stream, bank and land into each other’s neighbourhood.¹¹⁴⁹ It provides passage to mortals so that they can go from one place to another. It hangs in the sky and lets the river, representing earth, flow its natural course. Heidegger remains rather brief on the way the gods are gathered by the bridge and merely states that, whether one knows or not, people pass on the bridge ‘before’ the gods.¹¹⁵⁰ A more obvious example in this regard, would be the building of a Greek temple. Heidegger argues in *The Origin of a Work of Art* that a Greek temple portrays or represents nothing. This means, however, not that it is devoid of meaning. Heidegger writes:

It simply stands there in the middle of the rock-cleft valley. The building encloses the figure of the god, and in this concealment lets it stand out into the holy precinct through the open portico. By means of the temple, the god is present in the temple. This presence of the god is in itself the extension and delimitation of the precinct as a holy precinct. The temple and its precinct, however, do not fade away into the indefinite. It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being.¹¹⁵¹

To see the divine in each thing, pen plow or paving stone would really require a poetic gaze. According to Heidegger, the bridge is a place and a thing at once that allows a room into which mortals, gods, sky and earth are admitted. The fourfold is the originary projection or design for all man’s ways building. Man’s

¹¹⁴⁸ Idem p. 150.

¹¹⁴⁹ Idem p. 150.

¹¹⁵⁰ Idem p. 150.

¹¹⁵¹ Idem p. 40, 41.

building receives the directive for its erecting of locations from the fourfold.

Heidegger writes:

Building takes over from the fourfold the standard for all the traversing and measuring of the spaces that in each case are provided for by the locations that have been founded. The edifices guard the fourfold. They are things that in their own way preserve the fourfold.¹¹⁵²

As such, building is essentially a letting dwell. This dwelling is, however, nothing obvious and its possibility must be searched ever anew.¹¹⁵³ It must be learned all the more in uprooted and destitute times. Learning to dwell requires therefore first a homecoming, a becoming home of a people in what is properly their own.

¹¹⁵² Idem p. 156

¹¹⁵³ Idem p. 159.

3.10. An uncanny feast

'My son,' the father said, 'you are always with me, and everything I have is yours. But we had to celebrate and be glad, because this brother of yours was dead and is alive again; he was lost and is found'.

Luke 16

Self-appropriation, whether of existence, a people, language or Being, always implies that the self is initially not at home in one's own being. In order to experience and to become one's proper self, what is properly one's own must first appear as strange, for which Heidegger often uses the word 'uncanny' (*unheimlich*). The strangeness that has to be experienced in philosophical appropriation is therefore not first the strangeness of the other, but first the strangeness of the self and of that which is properly one's own.

The latter is, however, also experienced in a confrontation with the strangeness of the other, since strangeness between one and the other points at the strange other, but at once back to oneself in as far as one has become a stranger to oneself in the experience of the strange as one's own, instead of the mere strange of the pure other. Let us reflect for a while on the parable of the prodigy, a spiritual lesson concerning man's place in the totality. In the parable of the prodigy, the son who had always stayed at home never had experienced his home as uncanny and is therefore never able to let his home appear 'as' home. Uncanny had been from his perspective at most the distant country with its wild life and prostitutes whereto his brother had left, with which he had, however, no essential contact. The prodigy, in contrast, when at home had not felt at home and had sought his home in the alien of the distant land. After returning, however, he will finally learn the blessings of the father house and come to know his home 'as home' by means of his journey through the distant land. The father is in the parable the origin that had been remembering his son by looking forward to his futural return. The father, as the older and therefore more ecstatic one, whose experience and wisdom is extended further over time, expresses the meaning of the return by celebrating the homecoming with a feast. A feast that is meaningful always commemorates an occurrence 'as' the occurrence that it is from its context

in time and is, as such, always ‘remembrance’. Heidegger asserts at one point that the basic feature of saying is celebration.¹¹⁵⁴ Poetry, and language, as such, is therefore essentially a commemoration, a notion that remains far from language as a means of mere communication. If language is to be regarded as communication at all, it is the communion of gods and mortals that comes to pass in language.

Already in *Being and Time* Heidegger had written:

Entangled flight into the being-at-home of publicness is flight from not-being-at-home, that is, from the uncanniness which lies in *Dasein* as thrown, being in the world entrusted to itself in its being.¹¹⁵⁵

Fallen-prey to the world, *Dasein* is initially in-authentically at home in the publicness of the world as the flight away from the uncanniness of his authentic mortal self. It knows itself primarily by means of what it is not, namely the world. *Dasein* has, however, the possibility of experiencing to be not at home in the everydayness where it is usually at home. By means of the voice of his consciousness, *Dasein* can be called towards its own stillness, its nothingness, its limit and death. The experience of the uncanny is therefore the call of the self towards itself.

The self-appropriation of a people in poetic homecoming is always a journey through the land of the strange, as a confrontation with the alien, which Heidegger with respect to his own people regards as the historical dialogue between the Germans and the thinkers and poets of ancient Greece. The ecstase and instantaneity of history imply an exodus from the genesis and its return, which Heidegger calls the parting (*Abschied*) and in-turning (*Einkehr*) of Being as the appropriating event. The self-appropriation of Being occurs from out of the other origin in a dialogue that originary thinking entertains with the thinking and poetry of the first origin. Like the appropriating event is still coming and arriving, its celebrating feast is still on its way as well.

Hölderlin’s river poems are called ‘hymns’. The word ‘hymn’ comes from the Greek *hymos*, which means ‘song’, and in particular ‘ode’ as the songs that

¹¹⁵⁴ p. 13.

¹¹⁵⁵ HEIDEGGER, M. *Being and Time*. trans. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. p. 177.

praise the gods or honour the heroes and winners of the fighting games.¹¹⁵⁶ ‘*Humein*’ means singing, praising, honouring, celebrating dedicated to the preparation of the feast. Heidegger argues that when Hölderlin writes his hymns, he is at the same time occupied with the translation and interpretation of the poetry of Sophocles and Pindar.¹¹⁵⁷ In view of an experience of the strange, Heidegger discusses therefore the confrontation of the German poet Hölderlin with the poetry of the Greek poet Sophocles. Paradoxically the appropriating feast is by Heidegger prepared in a reading of a tragedy at the background of Hölderlin’s hymns. The intimacy between one and the other has an uncanny character. Heidegger interprets some fragments from the *Antigone* and pays in particular attention to the opening of the choral that reads: “*Polla ta deina kouden anthropon deinoteron pelei.*” Hölderlin translates:

There is much that is tremendous (*Ungeheuer*). But nothing is more tremendous than the human being.¹¹⁵⁸

Von Hellingrath translates:

There is much that is mighty (*gewaltige*). But nothing is more mighty than man.¹¹⁵⁹

The first emphasises, according to Heidegger, what the Greeks call ‘*horme*’ to break out and to erupt, the ‘brutal’ in broad sense, the latter emphasises the mere unusual.¹¹⁶⁰ Heidegger translates:

There is much that is uncanny, but nothing that surpasses man in uncanniness.¹¹⁶¹

Heidegger translates the basic word of the *Antigone* - or even the whole Greek tragedy, he comments - ‘*to deinon*’, as the ‘uncanny’ (*das Unheimliche*), but which is usually translated as the ‘dreadful’ (*das Furchtbare*). Heidegger does not argue that the ‘dreadful’ is a wrong translation, but it is already implied in the mighty character of uncanniness and writes:

¹¹⁵⁶ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin’s Hymne Der Ister*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1984. GA 53 p. 1.

¹¹⁵⁷ Idem p. 61, 67.

¹¹⁵⁸ Idem p.85.

¹¹⁵⁹ Idem p. 85.

¹¹⁶⁰ Idem p. 86.

¹¹⁶¹ Idem p. 88.

The dread of the venerable is not evasion and escape, but the attention of attentiveness and respect, the awe of worship, to stand firmly in the esteem for that which aroused such dread.¹¹⁶²

In the Greek '*deinon*' prevails the 'turning against each other'. *Deinon* signifies always the 'terrible' (*Fürchterliche*), the 'venerable' (*Ehrwürdige*) or in the way of the 'omnipotent' (*Vielvermögenden*) the 'mighty' (*Gewaltige*).¹¹⁶³ The mighty can be the 'superior' (*Überragende*) and then its meaning comes close to the 'venerable', it can also be the 'violent' (*Gewalttätige*) and then it comes into the proximity of the 'dreadful' (*Fürchterlichen*). The mighty always goes beyond the usual and thus the ordinary forces and abilities, because of which it is at the same time the 'unusual' (*Ungewöhnliche*). But the extraordinary (*Außergewöhnliche*) is not necessarily outside the usual, like, in contrast, the tremendous (*Ungeheure*) exceeds immediately and essentially the ordinary so that it is in some way outside of it. The unusual can, on the contrary, remain within the familiar, by ruling everything that is common and turning everything equally towards itself. The extraordinary is then sent through everything, Heidegger argues. This destinedness is as much extraordinary as it allows nothing beyond its ability. Heidegger calls *deinon*, as a send destiny, therefore the 'all-destinedness' (*Allgeschicklichkeit*). In conclusion, *deinon* means the 'dreadful' (*Furchtbare*), the 'mighty' (*Gewaltige*) and the 'unusual' (*Ungewöhnliche*). Their unifying meaning is, however, the 'uncanny', Heidegger argues.

Heidegger plays with the German root '*reg*' in relation to the concept of uncanniness. Uncanniness rules the human essence. It is, according to Heidegger, the uncanny self that is the outstanding (*Hervorragende*) in the essence of the human being and bestirring (*sich regende*) in all impulses (*Regungen*) and in each vivacity (*Regsamkeit*): the present and simultaneously the absent.¹¹⁶⁴ The verb '*regen*' means to make a light movement, its reflective use means 'to move oneself slightly', 'to bestir oneself', 'to be active', 'to become noticeable', from the MHG '*regen*' meaning 'to set something into motion', 'to erect', 'to arouse something', 'to awake something'.¹¹⁶⁵ The reflective use is the causative form of

¹¹⁶² Idem p. 77.

¹¹⁶³ Idem p. 77.

¹¹⁶⁴ Idem p. 89.

¹¹⁶⁵ <http://www.dwds.de/?view=1&qu=regen> consulted on 11/02/16.

the irregular MHG verb that has become lost in NHG, viz. *'regen'* meaning 'to tower above', 'to rise up / above', 'to be stiff', 'to be straight or stretched', 'to be rigid'. Probably from the PIE root *'reg'*, which means 'to move in a straight line', with derivatives meaning 'to direct in a straight-line, 'lead', 'rule'.¹¹⁶⁶ Derivatives include erect, correct, reign, right, realm, region, regent, real, anorexia, rich, rule, interrogate, reckless, et cetera.

Uncanniness lacks the homely as the way in which the uncanny possesses the homely, but more precisely all homely possesses the uncanny.¹¹⁶⁷ In the uncanny rules the counter turning of absence that is present. Heidegger argues that the counterturning of *deinon* is pure poetically expressed in the intermediate section of the second verse of the *Antigone* as *'pantoporos aporos'*.¹¹⁶⁸ Venturing forth in every direction, all-resourcefully, without a way, without experience. Harshly set against each other and yet inserted and admitted into one another, these words name the essence of *deinon* from the side of *poros*, which is the autonomous breaking up that is to be found everywhere and which goes and executes everywhere and gets to know so everything. *Poros* is the passage that is everywhere at once ends in *aporia*. The *Pantoporos* is, according to Heidegger, a being that experiences everything, but remains without experience, in as far as it cannot turn the experienced into experience from where it can know its own essence. Basically it knows everything, but itself and thereby essentially nothing. In the end this being comes to nothing (*ep' ouden erchetai to mellon*), not in the way that it is unproductive, but nothing as 'nothingness', the human being his own death.¹¹⁶⁹ In the domain of entities whereto the human being comes and among which he thinks he is at home, he comes to nothing. All penetrating man comes therefore through nothing. As the presumed homely, he is himself un-homely or uncanny. The uncanniness of the human being consists in its '*katastrophe*' character, which Heidegger regards as the turning around and

¹¹⁶⁶ The Free dictionary <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/roots.aspx?type=Indo-European&root=reg-> consulted on 11/02/16.

¹¹⁶⁷ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin's Hymne Der Ister*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1984. GA 53 p. 92.

¹¹⁶⁸ Idem p. 93-94.

¹¹⁶⁹ Compare the concept of the 'inaccesible inevitable' (*unzugängliche Unumgängliche*) in *Science and Contemplation (Wissenschaft und Besinnung)*. HEIDEGGER, M. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. GA 7 p. 62.

against that turns away from its own essence.¹¹⁷⁰ The *pantoporos aporos* is, according to Heidegger once more expressed by Sophocles expression of ‘*hypsipolis apolis*’, the towering high above the site by forfeiting the site.¹¹⁷¹ One can see again the uncanny opposition. The *polis* is, in Heidegger’s view, the site and the scope, around which all question worthy and uncanny explicitly turns. The *polis* is *polos*, the pole, the whirl wherein and around which everything is turning. It is at once the permanent and the changing. The polar of the *polis* concerns the wherein, and the because of which, that which ‘is’ turns as the revealed. The human being is, according to Heidegger, in a distinguished way related to this pole, in as far as he, as the one who understands being, stands in the midst of entities and has here a ‘status’, a way of being, a stance within the conditions and circumstances. Status is the state and the *polis* means, as such, the state, according to Heidegger.¹¹⁷²

The essential in historical human existence is ‘political’ in as far as it rests upon everyone’s polar relation to the site of ‘abidance’, i.e. being at home in the midst of the entities as a whole.¹¹⁷³ This ‘place’ and ‘stead’ sprouts from that which is stated and not stated, what is justified and unjustified, fitted and unfitted, because the ‘fitting’ or ‘sent’ (*das Schickliche*) determines the destiny (*Geschick*), which determines, in turn, history. Heidegger argues, that to the *polis* belong the gods and the temple, the feast and the games, the ruler and the advice of the old, the moot and the army, the ships and the generals, the poet and the thinker.¹¹⁷⁴

As ‘*hypsipolis apolis*’, the human being towers above his own site that is at once ‘siteless’. The place of man is an empty center. The human being is an open *polis*, which Heidegger regards therefore as historical. The abidance character of the people is grounded in Being that has opened itself up for the human being, Heidegger explains. This ‘open’ is the open that a people occupy and as such always determines a people’s being in a place. The open is *aletheia* as the unconcealment of entities¹¹⁷⁵.

¹¹⁷⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Hölderlin’s Hymne Der Ister*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1984. GA 53 p. 94.

¹¹⁷¹ Idem p. 97.

¹¹⁷² Idem p. 100.

¹¹⁷³ Idem p. 101.

¹¹⁷⁴ Idem p. 101.

¹¹⁷⁵ Idem p. 113.

Uncanniness shows itself as the not yet awoken, the not yet decided, the not yet taken up of the ability of being at home and becoming homely. The suffering of *deinon* is Antigone's highest acting, Heidegger argues.¹¹⁷⁶ This acting is the movement and 'drama' of becoming homely. In homecoming the uncanny first occurs and comes to light. Antigone lives not first under the rule of Creon, the king or the people, but under the rule of the gods. As such, she follows not the rule of the ostensible familiar or the human being, but the strange, the alien, the complete other by means of which Antigone can become the mortal being that she is destined to be and, as such, homely in her un-homely essence.

Heidegger calls to attention how one of Hölderlin's hymns of the river poems poetizes that the spirit is not at home at the source. "The spirit loves the colony and valour (*tapfer*) forgotten."¹¹⁷⁷ 'Valour' Heidegger explains as the knowing courage to experience the strange. Standing in the strange, this experience thinks what is properly one's own.¹¹⁷⁸ The remembrance of the valour that is forgotten in the love for the colony, is the preparedness of wanting to know, in the strange and from out of the strange, what is properly one's own until it is time to leave it behind, that is to say no longer one's own. To know what is properly one's own in its free use is the most difficult, according to Hölderlin in his letter to his friend Böhlendorf.¹¹⁷⁹ It is therefore easier to know the strangeness of the other, the colony, the south, the fire, which is the realm of the holy. But being always returns to its origin is as far as it has future. Only by means of the journey through the holy one can finally become at home in one's mortal being.

The river is the 'between' that poetizes man and gods. This destiny is therefore also expressed as 'festival' or wedding of gods and man. The poem *Remembrance* poetizes:

Beautiful is
The wedding day, but anxious are we
Because of honour.¹¹⁸⁰

¹¹⁷⁶ Idem p.128.

¹¹⁷⁷ Idem p. 157.

¹¹⁷⁸ Idem p. 157.

¹¹⁷⁹ Idem p. 168.

¹¹⁸⁰ HEIDEGGER, M. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000. p. 127.

The between, is a demigod who wishes to become either man or god, Heidegger elucidatingly argues.¹¹⁸¹ As such, the demigod calls the realm of mortals and the realm of the gods towards each other. The closing up of this between and the relation between man and gods is, however, allotted by the holy who destines what Hölderlin poetically names the ‘festival’. The festival is, according to Heidegger named in Hölderlin’s poetry by the preceding holidays that think towards the festival, naming it in a silent manner.¹¹⁸² The holy lets the festival be as a ‘primordial greeting’, Heidegger interprets.¹¹⁸³ The greeting occurs as the festival. The greeting greets the coming. The holy greets in the festival and the greeting comes to appearance in the festival. In the festival, the demigod arises and is greeted by the holy. Heidegger writes:

The feast awakens celebration, only when the being of the demigod, who has originated from the wedding day, lives and moves in the feast.¹¹⁸⁴

As the mediating poet, the demigod remains however ‘unlike’, neither god nor man, nor from heaven nor from earth. In the figure of the demigod those differences remain preserved. The poem *The Rhine* poetizes:

The men and gods celebrate their wedding festival
All the living ones celebrate
And for a moment destiny is equalized.
Then comes the wedding song from heaven¹¹⁸⁵

The festival is the poetic expression of the ecstatic moment as advent. The feast is the eminent moment to look back and ahead. Destiny is for a moment equalized in as far as the festival lingers for a while in its own manner. The event of the festival is unique. It is unsurpassable and moving towards that which is coming, wherein what is coming has its advent. Heidegger argues that in this moment a destining sending by the holy occurs in which it first gives its blessings, which is poetically said by the wedding song from heaven. The festival is a wedding of the mortals and the divine in the mediation of the poet as demigod. The wedding commemorates the union of one and its other, but the equalization

¹¹⁸¹ Idem p. 127-128.

¹¹⁸² Idem p. 130.

¹¹⁸³ Idem p. 128.

¹¹⁸⁴ Idem p. 128

¹¹⁸⁵ Idem p. 129.

makes god and man not the same, but appropriates them in their essence. In the wedding, the time of the mortals first receives its sense and direction as the poetic determination of the meaning of history. Man's history as '*parousia*' begins with the union, parting and returning in the relation of gods and man. The festival of the wedding day is therefore the concealed 'birthday' of history, Heidegger argues.¹¹⁸⁶

¹¹⁸⁶ Idem p. 130.

Conclusion

We have seen how Heidegger's original quest for being required the self-appropriation of the human being that turned out to be the appropriation of Being itself. Thinking and saying are therefore to be regarded from the starting point of Being as well. Everything that comes forth from Being is *poíesis*; poietic; poetic. Being's speaking is, as such, poetic, first in the human experience as the open clearing, secondly in the word as linguistic structure and subsequently in visual art. The human being can only think from the perspective of Being by letting Being be the concealed revealing origin that Being is. Concealed Being can only become concealed Being by its journey through the strange as the un-concealment as presence. Being can only originate, bring forth by appropriating itself, from out of its concealedness and man's remembrance of the concealed origin. When placed or challenged by en-framing, Being is no longer on its way returning homewards. As such, the language of Being cannot be propositional, but must be poetic, it cannot be clear and distinct, but must remain mysterious and speak in gestures. As the denial, the mystery says nothing, it says itself as silence and it remains silent. As such, the poetics of Heidegger's appropriating onto-history, i.e. Heidegger's onto-poetology, is not solely Greek, but oriental as well following the Judeo-Christian adagium 'As it was in the beginning so shall it be in the end'. Hereby, we return to our introduction and ponder a last question. If the abidance of the human being has a poetic source, can his abidance still be called 'philosophical', which is metaphysical and determined by the Greek first origin? With leaving metaphysics to itself we finally leave the talk of Being and contributions to 'philosophy' behind as well. We conclude that Heidegger has in the end not so much spoken of 'Being', but of freedom as the 'open' to which we give back the words of our exegesis here as well.

*So come! That we may behold the open,
So that we may seek what is our own, however far it may be.*

Bibliography

- ALLEMANN, B. *Hölderlin und Heidegger*. Freiburg: Atlantis, 1954.
- ARISTOTLE. *Metaphysics I*. Tredennick, H. London, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.
- . *Physics*. Sioux Falls: NuVision Publications, 2007.
- . *Poetics*. in *Aristotle in 23 Volumes Vol. 23*. Fyfe W.H. London, Cambridge: Harvard University Press - Heinemann, 1932.
- ASHRAF, A. *Romantic Poetologies: Collaboration and Interdisciplinarity in early Anglo-German Romanticism*. Dissertation, London: Queen Mary University of London, 2013.
- <https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/8366> consulted at 18/02/2015.
- BUDDEBERG, E. *Heidegger und die Dichtung: Hölderlin, Rilke*. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche, 1953.
- DESCARTES, R. *Descartes meditations on first philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- GLEICK, J. *The Information*. New York: Pantheon books, 2011.
- GUZZONI, A. *Martin Heidegger Zum Siebzigsten Geburtstag*. Tübingen: Neske, 1959.
- HARMAN, G. *Tool-being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects*. Illinois: Open Court, Caris publishing company, 2002.
- HEGEL, G.W.H. *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2008.
- HEIDEGGER, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. GA 13 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983.
- . *Basic Questions of Philosophy: selected problems of logic*. transl. Rojcewicz, R., Schuwer, A. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. p. 80.
- . *Basic Writings*. Sanfrancisco: HarperSanfracisco, 1977.
- . *Being and Time*. Stambaugh, J. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996.
- . *Beiträge zur Philosophie*. GA 65 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989.
- . *Besinnung*. GA 66 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997.
- . *Contributions to Philosophy: On the Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012.

- _____. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. GA 69 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998.
- _____. *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*. GA 29/30 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983.
- _____. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*. New York: Humanity books, 2000.
- _____. *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*. GA 4 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981.
- _____. *Grundbegriffe*. GA 51 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981.
- _____.; FINK, E. *Heraclitus Seminar 1966/1967*. Alabama: The university of Alabama Press, 1979.
- _____. *Heraklit*. GA 55 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994.
- _____. *History of the Concept of Time*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.
- _____. *Hölderlins Hymne Der Ister*. GA 53 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1984.
- _____. *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und der 'Rhein'* GA 39 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999.
- _____. *Holzwegen*. GA 5 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977.
- _____. *Identität und Differenz*. GA 11 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006.
- _____. *Introduction to Metaphysics*. New Haven: NB Yale University Press, 2000.
- _____. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. GA 3 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991.
- _____. *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*. GA 38 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998.
- _____. *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978.
- _____. *Nietzsche I*. GA 6.1 Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1961.
- _____. *Nietzsche II*. GA 6.2 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997.
- _____. *Nietzsches Metaphysik, Einleitung in die philosophie, Denken und Dichten* GA 50 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990.
- _____. *Off the Beaten Track*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- _____. *On The Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982.
- _____. *Parmenides*. GA 54 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992.

- _____. *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- _____. *Platon: Sophistes* GA 19 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992.
- _____. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harperperennial, 2001.
- _____. *Seminare*. GA 15 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1986.
- _____. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988.
- _____. *The End of Philosophy*. Chicago: The university of Chicago press, 2003.
- _____. *The Heidegger Reader*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.
- _____. *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977.
- _____. *Über den Anfang*. GA 70 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005.
- _____. *Unterwegs zur Sprache* GA 12 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1985.
- _____. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. GA 7 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000.
- _____. *Wass heisst Denken?*. GA 8 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002.
- _____. *Wegmarken*. GA 9 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976.
- _____. *What is called Thinking?* (New York: Harperperennial, 2001).
- _____. *Works*. Toronto: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972.
- _____. *Zollikon Seminars*. Evanston, Illinois: NorthWestern University Press, 2001.
- _____. *Zu Hölderlin - Griechenlandreisen* GA 75 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000.
- _____. *Zur Sache des Denkens*. GA 14 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007
- HÖLDERLIN, F. *Hölderlin's essays and letters on theory*. trans. and ed. Thomas Pfau New York: State University of New York press, 1988,
- _____. *Hyperion*. Köln: Anaconda Verlag, 2005.
- _____. *Selected poems* CONSTANTINE, D. New Castle: Bloodaxe Books, 1996.
- _____. *Sämtliche Werke und Briefe*. München: Carl Hanser Verlach München, 1992.
- HOMER *The Odyssey* Butler, S. London: A. C. Fifield, 1900.

- HUME, D. *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- KANT, I. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998.
- KOCKELMANS, J. *On Heidegger and Language*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972.
- KUHLMANN, U. *Das Dichten denken*. Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2010.
- NIETZSCHE, F. *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- _____. *The Gay Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- NUNES, B. *Passagem para o Poético: filosofia e poesia em Heidegger*. São Paulo: Loyola, 2012.
- PLATO. *Letter Seven in Plato in Twelve Volumes Vol. 7*. Bury, R. London Cambridge: Harvard University Press - Heinemann, 1966.
- . *Cratylus*. in *Plato in Twelve Volumes Vol. 12*. Fowler, H.N. London, Cambridge: Harvard University Press - Heinemann, 1921.
- . *Ion*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd., 1925.
- . *Republic*. in *Plato Twelve Volumes Vols. 5 & 6*. Shorey, P. London Cambridge: Harvard University Press - Heinemann, 1969.
- . *Protagoras in Plato in Twelve Volumes Vol. 3*. Lamb, W. London, Cambridge: Harvard University Press - Heinemann, 1967.
- SAFRANSKI, R. *Martin Heidegger, Between Good and Evil*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.
- SHEEHAN, T. *Making sense of Heidegger: A paradigm shift*. London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2015.
- WELTON, D. *The Origins of Meaning*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhof publishers, 1983.